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Faced with depleted oil stocks from 2035 onwards, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a 
strategy of becoming a more knowledge-based economy by indigenously exploiting 
transferred technologies.  However, despite significant investment in university-based 
technology transfer and incubation facilities, there is little progress in establishing high-
growth advanced technology companies outside of the oil sector. 
 
The thesis explores the commercialisation of university knowledge in university-based 
incubators in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and contrasting with arrangements in the UK, 
to identify the cause of low spinout rates and what can be done. 
 
Beginning with a systematic review of literature on innovation and entrepreneurship as it 
applies to commercialisation, the thesis identifies gaps and areas of controversy in the 
literature.   
 
From previous research an initial conceptual framework is developed to guide data 
gathering, its presentation and analysis. 
 
Using a qualitative method a sample of twenty-four Saudi interviews and eight UK 
interviews is justified. 
 
Significant new data on Saudi incubator policy, processes and outcomes is presented 
alongside new data from the UK.  This is then analysed from an in-case and cross-case 
perspective and then re-integrated with literature.  A revised conceptual framework is 
presented and conclusions for theory and practice drawn.   
 
The thesis adds to the multidisciplinary bodies of knowledge for example by updating 
Gerschenkron’s (1966) theory of catch-up, challenging the validity of Etzkowitz’s (1983) 
triple helix theory, and arguing that North’s (1990) neo-institutional theory is 
ethnocentric.  I argue that culture is a major influence on commercialisation in developing 
countries and consciously changing cultures necessary for Saudi Arabia’s transition from 
a rentier state.  I find little empirical evidence in either the UK or Saudi Arabia for theories 
(Shane 2004) of academic entrepreneurship. 
 
I conclude that major reforms of Saudi universities and commercialisation processes are 
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western Gregorian calendar.  The Saudi riyal (SAR) is a historic currency, to aid non-Saudi 
readers all money amounts in the thesis are in US dollar (US$).  One SAR is worth £ 0.19 





CHAPTER-1  INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1  The problem being investigated 
 
To paraphrase the economist Simon Kuznets, there are three types of countries in the world: 
developed countries, developing countries and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) – the 
subject of this research.  The KSA as I shall show below, is characterised by a deeply 
embedded Islamic and Arabic culture, vast oil reserves (predicted to decline after 2035) 
and a strong desire and commitment to modernise through innovation-based 
entrepreneurship to address future falls in oil revenue.  KSA’s people have a sense of their 
own destiny and exceptionalism: non-conformity with prevailing international morès is 
unproblematic.   
 
By 2024, the economy of the Kingdom (of Saudi Arabia) will have made great strides 
towards becoming knowledge-based, relying on a society that provides individuals with 
quality education, skills and experience, and will have begun to approach the levels of 
developed countries in this respect.  So reads the 9th KSA development plan (KSA 2014).  
Like many other developing economies/societies, the lure of replicating Silicon Valley, 
shortening the gap between science and successful technology (Pisano 2011) aims to 
achieve successful trading in international markets not from selling raw materials but rather 
from created a knowledge-based economy in which entrepreneurship and innovation in 
advanced industrial sectors drive growth.  There is a long history of US technology transfer 
to KSA, primarily associated with oil extraction, refining and distribution technologies 
(OTA 1984).  At the heart of my research is to understand knowledge commercialisation 
of university-related knowledge in KSA, the processes employed and their effectiveness.  
This leads me to investigate the social setting in which commercialisation occurs in KSA 
and the influence of Islamic/Arabic culture, institutions and resource-richness. 
 
1.2  KSA context and culture  
 
Saudi Arabia is a rich country with US$ 646 billion annual GDP at US$21,395 per capita 
for its 29 million population the KSA is the 19th largest economy.  In Jeddah, Ad Dammam, 
Jubail and Riyadh house building and prices are booming.  GDP growth averages 5%.  Life 
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expectancy is 74 years, with 14 spent in school: literacy is 83%.  Living standards are high.  
KSA has 83% urbanisation; almost free supply of energy and air-conditioning.  KSA is a 
young country, with 19% of the population under 14 years of age.   The gender ratio is 1.5 
men per woman, population growth is 1.5% per annum with the average woman having 
2.1 children: a demographic dividend. 
 
Historical development of KSA’s meta-institutions  
Ottoman suzerainty over Arabs began in the 10th century and was completed with the 1517 
conquest of Egypt it was succeeded by British and French colonialism after 1918 (Gil’adi 
1992) and in 1932 the third Saudi state. Article-1 of the KSA’s 1992 Constitution begins, 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state, which encapsulates its two 
dominant institutions: Islam and monarchy.  Since these institutions can be misunderstood 
and since they predominate KSA’s polity, society and economy, this section explains how 
these meta-institutions originated, why they continue to dominate KSA and how they 
influence technological innovation and commercialisation in KSA.   
 
The Saud clan which had ruled central parts of Arabian peninsular since 1727, in 1744 
formed an historic alliance with representatives of Islam, representing a (purifying) 
reformation tendency in Sunni Islam with a goal of permanent expansion: the Islamic and 
Saudi pledged a shared destiny, that continues to persist (Brown 2014).1  The details of the 
Whhabist position are given in Madelung (1997) and Alkhateeb (2014).  This first Saudi 
state was overturned by Egypt’s Mohammed Ali Pasha in 1818 at the behest of the 
Ottomans; returned as a second state in 1824, only to be ousted by Al Rashid in 1891 
(McMeekin 2015).  Following the 1927 Treaty of Jeddah with Britain and after 1945 with 
the US, the Saudi Kingdom emerged as a distributive state, with Islamic mutawwa’a 
supporting the monarchy and the monarchy giving exclusive religious power to Sunnis 
(Abu Hakima 1967).  Orthodox Sunni never supported the Ottoman Caliphate, deeming it 
                                                 
1  Terminology matters.  Commins (2015) prefers the use of Salafi to donate a Sunni tradition wider than KSA, 
however, many authors (such as Valentine 2015) use Wahhabism to denote the particular school representing 
Islam in KSA, however, these are external commentators – I follow KSA practice and refer to Muslims. 
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illegitimate and therefore justifying khurij ala al-hakim i.e. rebellion against illegitimacy 
and blasphemy (Teitelbaum 1998).2  
 
Initially, the Saudi King’s distributive powers relied on the collection of the zakat or 
Islamic tax, income from the hajj, and British subsidies; a situation dramatically altered 
when oil well Dammam-7 began pumping in 1939 (Leatherdale 1983).  As oil revenues 
grew, the King began building a state infrastructure (including roads, education and 
healthcare services, telecommunications), palaces for the Saud family and a strong military 
(Vassiliev 1998).   US President Roosevelt endorsed this arrangement by in his famous 
meeting with King Ibn Saud aboard USS Quincy in 1945 (Anderson 1981; Grayson 1982). 
 
For the purpose of my research several points arising from the origins of the Saudi state 
are important.  Firstly, as Brown (2014) shows, innovativeness (bida’) and creativity are 
blasphemy to Islam (though secular innovations may be treated differently.  Abdullah 
(1995) shows that the monarchy and Islam are mutually dependent, including external 
relations such as the (1974) Islamic Solidarity Fund and Islamic Development Bank and 
since 1982 the Gulf Cooperation Council. As King Faysal, a committed reformer, found 
and Aslan (2011) shows, building a change constituency in KSA is problematic.  Secondly, 
unlike Egypt, there is history of industrialisation and associated social change in KSA.  
State largess in the form of benefits, education grants and employment (46% is public 
sector) and public sector contracts to private firms.  Cordesman (1984) points to three-
million (temporary) inward migrants doing work Saudis consider menial, whilst oil (and 
health and often education) companies and agencies continue to import skilled labour. 
These difficulties building change constituencies and culture of state dependency feature 
prominently in this research. 
 
Destabilising events 
                                                 
2  The Arabic Sunni view is that in only three Islamic periods did legitimate Caliphates exist (the four rightly-
guided Caliphs succeeding  (peace be upon him); the 661-750 Umayyads and their successor ‘Abbasids, 750-
1258).  From the Whhabist perspective, the Ottoman Caliphate illegitimately promoted Sufism, attacked true 
Muslims and was not Arabic.  Despite being protector the Medina and Mecca mosques, few Saudis (unlike 
extreme jihadists) now call for the restoration of a Caliphate; and it is unlikely that the majority of Muslims 
in Africa and Asia would accept a pan-national Caliphate.   
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Internally KSA’s economic achievements are strong: in 2014 (IMF) KSA had a GDP per 
person of US$ 21,395 (ranked 11th with only 1.6% debt to GDP ratio), despite the lowest 
oil price in fifty years.  Yet the Kingdom has faced a series of destabilising events.  
Militarily, after 1945, a series of Arab-Israeli wars, insecurity arising from wars in Yemen, 
Kuwait, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan destabilised Saudi society and following 9/11 in New 
York, resulting in serious terrorist attacks within KSA.   
 
Ideologically, the Saudi regime has been challenged by pan-Arab nationalism (spreading 
from Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir’s coup in Egypt and later pan-Islamism resulting from the 1979 
Iranian revolution.  The 1970s and 1980s high oil prices are now distant and diversifying 
from oil-dependency is a major strategic objective: though because of meta-institutions, 
the country targets modernisation without westernisation, highlighting the important Rodik 
(2011) gives to alternative development models – a major discussion point in this research.  
Here I note, that KSA has a vibrant (online) debate around governances and the interplay 
between Islam-monarchy and democracy.  Current arrangements depend on oil revenues 
and these revenues seriously decline after 2035 (Simmons 2006; Moser, Swain and 
Alkhabbaz 2015): economic diversification and commercialisation of technology is now a 
major preoccupation for KSA policy-makers and across Saudi society. 
 
Sustainability and challenges 
Aware that oil reserves will rapidly diminish after 2035, the KSA Government has a 
diversification policy - currently 70% of GDP is oil-related.  Oil extraction, logistics, 
petrochemicals and energy are capital intensive employing few indigenous people: 46% of 
all indigenous employment is public sector.  Even successful service sectors such as health 
and financial services are often staffed by the 3-million international migrant workers in 
KSA, recruited for the administrative and technical skills many Saudis lack.   Most 
manufactured goods are imported.  Rather than converging with developed economies, 
KSA appears to be diverging: trapped by a curse of natural resources (Sachs and Warner, 
2001): whilst oil is 30% of GDP, it is 90% of exports and 93% of Government revenue.  
Though the recent fall in oil prices effects Saudi Arabia, given reserves, the main 




In Boyer’s (1990) terms, current social practice misaligns with current strategic intent, 
again a theme of this research.  For example, imported labour performs menial and 
advanced jobs because young Saudis avoid such employment.  Another example, unlike 
most major economies with a female workforce participation rate of over 70%, KSA’s rate 
is only 10% (Detalle 2000).3  Another major social issue facing the Kingdom is youth 
unemployment (currently 28% of under-25s) many are part of the 20% of the indigenous 
population living below the official poverty line.  Achieving alignment between social 
structures and technological vision of the future is a major challenge for KSA.   
 
Innovation and growth  
Since 1984, KSA has systematically made oil exports to the US conditional on TT in return 
(Ramady 2005): the Economic Offset Programme, which targeted oil-related and military 
technologies (Cordesman 1997) later widening TT to include advanced service 
technologies, agri-processing and life-sciences (Economic Offset Office 2001).   
However, as Ramady (2005) notes, in the case of KSA this has not resulted in the 
commercialisations benefiting the growth of the Asian Tigers and now China. 
 
Business formation and incubation 
GEM (2012) found that 69% of Saudis believe they have the capability to run their own 
business whilst 39% expressed a fear of failure.  Only 1% said they intended to go into 
business and join the 9.4% of 18-64 year olds, owning their own business; (I discuss the 
detailed figures below).  For most Saudis, Sadi and Al-Ghazali (2010) argue, working for 
an international company or the Government seems preferable to owning their own 
business – this is especially so for young women.  As Alshemari (2005) notes, in KSA 
there are 23,000 businesswomen, 213,000 women teachers and 2,300,000 women students 
(66% of the total).  Saudi women invest an annual US$ 5-billion and increasingly occupy 
                                                 
3  It is not the purpose of my research to comment on the theology of women in Islamic society (see Alkhateeb 
2014) or the extent to which cultural and religious traditions intertwine (as Llewellyn-Jones [2003] makes 
clear – veiling preceded Islam by a millennium).  Liberal Saudis, such as Al-Awdah (Alshamsi 2011 and on 
Twitter: @salman_alodah) continue to defend the position of women under Islamic guardianship and women 
continue to press for independence, voting and driving rights – largely through social media, rather than 
physical protests.   
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public space exemplified by Lubna al-Olayan CEO of Olayan Financing and Nura al-Feyez 
a previous deputy Education Minister (Al-Rasheed 2013). 
 
Learning 
Learning is important in Islam; the Quran mentions knowledge (ilm) 750 times (Boyle 
2006): knowledge is either revealed (by God) or the result of sensory perception (Halstead 
2004).  Güther (2006) states, from the eighth century to the sixteenth, there was a 
continuous tradition of Arabic-Islamic scholarship dealing with pedagogical and didactic 
issues, reflecting a range of individual scholars’ theological stances, ethnic origins, or 
geographical affiliations.  Hence the Islamic tradition is replete with empirical science 
discoveries such as Ibn Athir (history), Ibn Kathir, (Ophthalmology), Al-Nafisi (Medicine), 
Al-Jabbar (Algebra) and Abu Biruni’s Chemistry, Physics and Astronomy.  Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) commanded Muslims; To acquire knowledge is an obligation on every 
Muslim, male or female and to Seek knowledge from the day of your birth until the day of 
your death.  
 
School learning is primarily rote learning: the country is ranked 66th (behind Macedonia, 
Tunisia and Albania) for its quality of maths and science teaching, in the lowest quartile of 
World Bank rankings: Women rank 90th in international indices of educational attainment.  
As Roy (1992:479) notes, education in Saudi Arabia tends to be formalistic and authorities 
avoid any antimonarchic or religiously liberalising curricula.  Education is gender 
segregated (Ahmed 2010; Taleb 2010).  Inactive pedagogy and the reluctance of Saudis to 
take vocational programmes, helps explain why substantial investment in education 




Knowledge transfer and creation  
KSA faces challenges in the inward transfer of knowledge, production of knowledge and 
its commercialisation.  Partly this is the result of a low modern knowledge base and 
absorptive capacity (UN IDO 2012).  The King’s Arab Content Initiative and King Abdul-
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Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) acknowledge these issues, into which my 
research delves deeply.   
 
KACST has 200 R&D units attached to universities and private companies about 50% of 
which are in Riyadh, 20% in Jeddah, 13% in Dammam and the rest spread around the 
country.  These units focus on medicine, agriculture, engineering and emergent 
technologies such as nanotechnology and life-sciences.  Around 10% of this activity is 
basic research; mainly it is applied (Frascati 2014).  KACST dominates Saudi R&D with 
seven institutes, four research centres and five national research programmes.  Overall, 
KACST supports some 2,500 R&D projects at a cost of SR800 million.   
 
Amongst its successes are patents in desalination and solar technologies, communications 
satellite launches, an Electrostatic Particle Accelerators, automated diacritizer of Arab text, 
catalytic fuel materials, fire-resistant polypropylene plastic and cloning camel insulin 
hormones.  KACST has established to incubators (ICT and biotechnology) and plans eight 
more.  Some 800 scientific papers are published annually with KACST support (between 
1996 and 2006 26,854 in aggregate).  Alongside the Ministry of Economy and Planning, 
KACST oversees a US$ 2-billion budget supporting 190 national projects in water 
technologies, oil and gas, petrochemicals, nanotechnology, biotechnology and genetic 
engineering, photonics, aerospace and aviation, energy, new materials and the 
environment.  The King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) offers 
MSc and PhD programmes in 11 fields grouped around resources, energy and environment; 
materials and life sciences and bioengineering; and applied mathematics and computer 
science.  As Jones (2015) notes, KAUST was established with the legitimacy of King 
Abdullah to prepare a modernising agenda for KSA.  There are several Government 
research centres, mainly in medicine.  Private sector R&D facilities include the Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation, and the Saudi Aramco, which helped register a total of 8,000 patens 
(2010 figure).  These private R&D centres cooperate with international institutions.  
Whilst between 1977-2010 KSA registered 382 US patents, in the same period by 






The Saudi Government funds a plethora of organisations aimed at exploiting transferred or 
generated knowledge from its universities.  These include the National Strategy for 
Fostering Giftedness, Creativity and Innovation; the King Abdul-Aziz and His 
Companions Foundation for Giftedness and Creativity, and the King Abdullah University 
of Science and Technology.  Most universities now have commercialisation units and 
managers, alongside technology licensing organizations and associated technology parks; 
incubation centres and technology transfer centres.  There is an array of supportive venture 
capital funds, Government grants and support from banks for new ventures.  As we will 
show, however, these institutional arrangements are failing to deliver significant new 
products and companies and have only tenuous links to business, international markets and 
the private sector. 
 
Institutional and cultural setting for commercialisation 
Applying his national systems of innovation framework (1990), which prominently 
features endowment and clustering as variables, Porter (2009) suggests that the following 
constrain commercialisation in KSA. 
 
 The absence of an entrepreneurial culture  
 Lack of a skilled Saudi workforce  
 Absence of general and industry specific training programs for employees  
 Regulatory processes including startup, taxes and contract enforcement 
 Insufficient startup programmes including incubators, technical assistance, and 
entrepreneur networks supporting SMEs 
 Lack of focus and visibility of clustering development, including supplier and big 
company linkages 
 
These are all points to which my research will return.  Even amongst other resource-rich 
economies, KSA has a low business birthrate, with only 4.7% of the population involved 
in startup activity.  The particularities of KSA as a developing, resource-rich, Muslim 
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economy are perhaps understated in Porter’s analysis.  In particular, as Gerschenkron 
(1962) argued, and the development states seem to have proven, there are advantages to 
relative backwardness where TT is available and target markets enable leapfrogging; 
though as I discuss in a knowledge-based era, these advantages may wane.   
 
Why has KSA not benefited more in terms of innovation and diversification from the 
availability of TT?  Peck (2008) for example, suggesting that the export-driven Asian tiger 
economies, notes that the success of Arab economies has been limited to turnkey TT such 
as hospitals, military systems and refining oil.  In my view, Porter references culture in a 
deterministic manner – without explaining why particular cultural predispositions came 
into being and how they might be altered: his analysis, whilst sharply posing questions, 
fails to give an answer beyond Asian exceptionalism.  My research delves more deeply into 
these ‘explanations’ of KSA tardiness in commercialisation in particular the impact of 
culture.    
 
Commercialisation, TT and incubation 
Researchers such as Pappas (2003), Volkmann (2004) and Alshumaimri, Aldridge and 
Audretsch (2010) have pointed to the relatively low impact of TT and incubation initiatives 
in KSA relative to other economies.  In particular, researchers such as Peters, Rice, and 
Sundararajan (2004) and Lalkaka (2006) point out that incubators cannot be separated from 
institutions, culture and business structures: indeed, in a developing economy context, they 
argue, part of the role of incubators is to sharply highlight barriers to innovation and 
entrepreneurship, bringing them to the attention of policy-makers.  Whilst policy-makers 
in KSA have responded to these challenges, as Salem (2014) notes, deeper structural and 
cultural changes will be required in KSA for TT to successfully and sustainably diversity 
its economic base.   
 
In 2010, KSA launched a decade of entrepreneurship programme (Michelle 2003), inspired 
by Etzkowitz’s (2003) triple helix, drawing together universities, private capital and TT 
incubators.  The 2010 Saudi Fast Growth-100 initiative for example, particularly targets 
TT adaptation by small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  University linkages, as 
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Grimaldi and Grandi (2005) point out, are especially important where firms in life-
sciences, nano-technology and advanced information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) begin from a low knowledge base and (Al-Kurdi 2002) encouraging SMEs to 
reference international standards.  
 
A wide array of incubation-related initiatives include the Prince Sultan Fund to Support 
Women's Small Enterprises, Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), the 
Prince Salman Young Entrepreneurship Awards, the National Entrepreneurship Centre, the 
Prince Salman Entrepreneurship Institute, and the King Abdullah University of Science 
and Technology (KAUST). 
 
Numerous researchers celebrate the success of these initiatives.  For example, Radwan and 
Al-Kibbi’s (2002) case-based study applauds the SME inter-firm linkages and 
enhancement of individual competence and capabilities resulting from accelerator 
programmes, including testing calibration and warehousing.  Other researchers, such as 
Ramady (2005) and Al-Thawwad (2008) point to the adoption of international standards 
by SMEs in sectors such as ICT software and pharmaceuticals. 
 
In summary, since the 1930s KSA has created a top-20 world economy and now faces the 
strategic challenge of diversifying from oil-dependency.  From the viewpoint of innovative 
firms, seeking to commercialise transferred technology into profitable products, my 
research digs into the detail of the constraints and opportunities faced in KSA. 
 
1.3  Motivation 
 
I am a proud Saudi citizen and hope my (eight) children enjoy a happy future in KSA.  The 
future beyond oil is therefore important to me and I hope to contribute to identifying and 
resolving some of the barriers towards a sustainable, diversified future for the country.  As 
a Saudi, I bring a deep understanding of the cultural traits around which issues of 
commercialisation orbit, enabling me to answer research questions (number 3) comparing 




This research connects closely with my professional work as Associate Director of R&D 
Project Management Office at King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology 
(KACST) in Riyadh and previously in a variety of commercialisation projects: between 
KACST and the UK (2011); Biotechnology Incubator in Riyadh (2009); National Medical 
Strategic Research Planning in Riyadh (2007); and KACST and South Africa (2002).  I 
bring to this research my professional training in electronics engineering (Cardiff 
University and Wentworth Institute of Technology). 
 
1.4  Research Questions 
 
As I note in section 1.2 above and illustrate further in the literature review: most research 
on incubation as a means of exploiting knowledge in developing economies explores small 
numbers of cases; outcomes such as return on capital or spinouts; or relationships between 
universities and entrepreneurs.   My research answers these research questions. 
 
 RQ-1: What is the contribution of state science parks and business incubators in Saudi 
Arabia towards commercial innovation and entrepreneurship? 
 
 RQ-2: How do financial, social, cultural and human capital blend in KSA’s innovation 
and entrepreneurship processes and how might their impact be improved? 
 
 RQ-3: Why do innovation and entrepreneurship processes in KSA appear less effective 
than those in the UK? 
 
My approach to research questions was as follows.   
 
 My own experience in Saudi commercialisation and reading of the literature suggests 
an unclear picture of the performance of incubators and success of commercialisation.  
Indeed, the nature of success (jobs, companies, profit, innovations) is itself contested 
(Hausmann and Rodrik 2003).  I therefore decided to begin with a what question that 
maps the terrain and gives some basic performance data: what is the contribution of 
state and privately owned science parks and business incubators in Saudi Arabia 
towards commercial innovation and entrepreneurship?  Hence RQ-1 maps the terrain 




 Noting Al Thawwad and Rashed’s (2009) important point that the study of incubation 
and associated innovation is multidisciplinary, quite simply because the processes 
connect with policy, finance, strategy, HR, operations and marketing and since my unit 
of analysis is the innovating firms, which are necessarily multi-faceted, I decided to 
ask a how and a why question to capture the holistic nature of these processes.  An 
important implication of this approach is that my research is at the point where 
entrepreneurship and innovation meet: there can be no innovation without 
entrepreneurial risk taking, leadership and resource assembly; and innovation success 
is adjudged not in simple technical terms, rather as Freeman (1982) argues, in terms of 
market (and wider social) success.  RQ-2 covers this ground. 
 
 My interest in understanding how and why KSA commercialisation-related innovation 
processes are shaped and how effective they are needs a standard by which to judge 
them.  Since I wanted to capture the richness of current and planned processes, I 
discounted a chronological approach over time and instead opted for an international 
comparison.  My choice of the UK was influenced by (a) a large body of research; (b) 
as a student in the UK, access opportunities; and (c) suggestions in the literature (Al 
Thawwad and Rashed 2009) and reports that UK practice is a high standard and 
successful.  RQ-3 poses this comparative question.  
 
 All systems of innovation and innovated systems (see Hughes 1983 on the US railways 
or Bijker (1987) on the bicycle) face reverse salience i.e. their efficacy is hampered by 
uneven performance or constituent parts (Dedehayi and Makinen 2011).  From the 
perspective of incubators as part of a commercialisation innovation system, inter-
linkages with important system parts (such as entrepreneurial culture, availability of 
risk capital, absorptive capacity, fiscal rules, IPR law etc) draw my research questions 
towards the impact of financial, social, cultural and human capital.  My aim therefore 
is use active agency (Archer 2000) as a link between an institutional level of analysis 
and risk taking activities at the level of the incubating firm: an idea drawing on Ogle’s 




Each of my three research questions references clear gaps in the literature and in figure-1 
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Figure 1.1: summary of research approach  
 
1.5  Theoretical significance and arguments 
 
Commercialisation and innovation processes 
Commercialisation involves adding capability and competence from learning and 
embedded technology, enabling the recipient company to create novel products, address 
new markets and/or adopt new business models.  This is a wide-angle lens perspective on 
commercialisation, unlike Kumar (1995) and Madu (1992), who define commercialisation 
in terms of formal knowledge.  In taking this wider approach, I align with Schumpeter 
(1934) who emphasises the holistic nature of the invention-innovation-diffusion process.  
I also align with Freeman (1982) who argues that in a commercial setting, market success 
(coupled to social acceptability) are part of the success criterion for innovation i.e. not only 
does the product (including service) work, but also does it solve a problem people have 
and are prepared to pay to be resolved?  This is why Autio and Laamanen (1955) focused 
their study on sales rather than technical success.  As El-Hadidy (1983) notes, implied in 
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this approach is the price of the product results in profit for the firm i.e. the business is 
sustainable.  My definition of commercialisation endorses McIntyre and Papp’s (1986) 
view, that whilst it may be inter-regional or cross-sectoral, it is increasingly international.  
Connecting the technical with the social aspects of commercialisation, links closely with 
the points in section 1.4 above (see also Kedia and Bhagat 1988; Tsang 1977) that the 
incubating firm inter-relates with the context and culture in which the innovation is 
occurring; in particular, as Alk-Ghailani and Moor (1995) point out, with the cultural 
dimensions of entrepreneurship influencing success.  This is especially important when as 
Lewis (2007) points out, processes of knowledge exchange or joint-venturing invariably 
pose issues of cross-cultural understanding and negotiated meanings.  We will see that 
culture plays an important part in Saudi and UK commercialisation. 
 
As Rosenberg (1970) and Lindqvist’s (1984) study of transferring steam power into 
Sweden illustrated, TT is not simply the transplanting of physical technology; TT 
necessarily involves understanding embedded and operation knowledge and the ability to 
adapt the transferred technology into the institutional, physical and market setting to which 
it is targeted.  The latter point on market success is especially important for commercial 
technologies, echoing Schumpeter (1934), Cottrill et al (1980) and Geijerstan (2004) 
argues that without market success commercialisation is a failure.  For Bell (1997) such 
success necessarily involved adaptation of the transferred technology to match the 
competences and capabilities and target markets of the target location.   Whilst as Backer 
et al (1995) note, meta-data (such as FDI return on investment) is important in evaluating 
the success of commercialisation, most research focuses on outcomes and little on the 
processes of adaptation – the focus of my research.  One reason for this is the difficulty in 
gathering data on relationships and knowledge flows between supplier and customer, 
compared with the relative ease of assembling macro-level financial data (see Lee et al, 
2010:136).  Additionally, adaptation suggests options, ambiguities and risks, which as 
Szongs (1989:120) notes add further complexities for researchers.  In the case of KSA 
commercialisation, as Alshumaimri, Taylor and Audretsch (2010) found in the US, despite 
significant expenditure and inward knowledge flows, outside of oil and gas, KSA rarely 
reaps commercial rewards from commercialisation: my research explores this proposition 
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with a view to explaining why it might be so.  Both Ramady (2010) and Jordan (2011) call 
attention to “human capital” in particular social relations of production (as opposed to 
technical knowledge and technical absorptive capacity.   I discuss later, the argument of 
Al-Thawwad  (2008) and others that this is culture – determinism?  Pack (2008) contrasts 
Asian success with Arab failure to adapt.   
 
KSA’s target technologies are not dissimilar to those targeted by other developing and 
developed economies.  Like other developing and developed economies, KSA seeks to 
reduce the risks and costs of adopting its target technologies by reducing failure rates; 
specifically by importing exogenous (i.e. an external cause of change) proven knowledge 
and exploiting it (indigenization) using incubators.  A burgeoning suggests that incubation 
is an appropriate strategy for developing economies: Bearse (1988) and Al-Mubaraki et al 
(2013; 2014).  Significant research, albeit somewhat dated, suggests that incubators can 
successfully lower innovation costs and reduce risks: (Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988; 
Merrifield, (1987) and Kuratko and LaFollette (1987).  Country studies such as Al-
Mubaraki et al’s (2014) study of the UK and city studies such as Castells and Hall (1994) 
argue that at a macro-level incubation processes correlate with creativity and growth. 
 
Reducing risk and costs of adapting new technologies is especially important in developing 
economies, which are characterised by a low (technological) knowledge base and high 
demand on resources for social and infrastructural development.   
 
Obstacles and Solutions to Commercialization of University Research 
With the entrepreneurship mission incorporated into the education and research missions 
of universities, their role in the economic and social development in societies has increased. 
Thus, subjects revolving around academic entrepreneurship and knowledge 
commercialization have drawn the attention of many researchers and politicians in different 
countries in the world. In Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, too, the knowledge commercialization 
phenomenon is in its prime and is in its early stages of taking shape and development. 
Therefore, this research aims to identify obstacles and solutions in the commercialization 




Evidence and examples of the growth of technology based ventures in the valid universities 
in the world such as Cambridge (Siegel 1995), Stanford and MIT (Roberts and Malone 
1996) indicate that starting new university ventures and spin-offs and commercializing of 
university research are easily viable. The only requirement of its success is creating and 
implementing supportive values and cultures in such risky business ventures. On one hand, 
many researchers believe that in essence, universities are not entrepreneurial organizations. 
Perhaps, one reason for it could be the dimensions and largeness of these organizations. 
Nevertheless, there are many reasons to account for it such as the nature of relationships, 
the hierarchal structures and organizational levels, intense monitoring of rules and 
processes, time constraints and the tendency to achieve results quickly, lack of 
entrepreneurial skills, inappropriate incentive methods and systems, etc. Besides these 
barriers and constraints, many university professors and staff believe that being an 
entrepreneur practically prevents them from their main mission as researchers, which is to 
continue learning and teaching (Zahra and Garvis, 2000). 
 
Key arguments in literature  
Accepting Al Thawwad and Rashed’s (2009) argument that researching incubation is 
necessarily multidisciplinary, I will present a wide-ranging literature review. The challenge 
of a widely scoped literature review is avoiding lack of focus.  I frame my literature review 
around the key points in my research questions: commercialisation, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship in developing economies (referencing in particular resource-rich, Arabic 
cultures).  Here I indicate some of the main arguments in the literature review. 
 
Reviewing literature on knowledge and learning, I argue that active, social learning (in 
adaptation process to address the new target context) is a better perspective than (more 
passive) knowledge management.  Thus a key element in successful commercialisation-
related innovation becomes active agency (Archer 2000; Ogle 2007) and the creativity of 




Analysing research on knowledge-based economic development, I argue with Pisano 
(1997) that shortening the gap between knowledge and technology innovation, rather than 
a particular technology (such as ICT) constitutes becoming knowledge-based: in Kessler 
and Chakrabarti’s (1996) terms the journey from concept to customer is shorter.  From the 
viewpoint of developing economies this provides opportunities for technological 
leapfrogging (Davison 2000), however, it poses the challenge of creating sufficient 
absorptive capacity (Kinder 2002) to understand the transferred technology to a sufficient 
degree that allows adaptation and its formulation to address new problems and markets, 
some of which are already contested by the originators of the transferred technology. 
 
I discuss the nature of institutions supporting commercialisation in developing economies, 
noting the importance of trust-based institutions (risk capital, IPR) and the ‘thick’ 
institutions necessary to support entrepreneurial risk (fiscal policy, absence of corruption 
and importantly culture incentivising risk-taking.  The latter point I consider in the light of 
research on resource-rich economies and Islamic culture.   
 
In all developing economies, that state plays an important role (tariffs, tax, rule of law, 
GEM-type business-friendliness criteria).  My research questions two and three explore the 
connection between the innovating entrepreneur and her context, including the KSA state 
from the perspective of literature on the development state (Chang and Grabel 2004).  I 
note for instance Rodrik’s (2015) argument that only two out of three of democracy, 
globalisation and growth are achievable and discuss the balance the Saudi state policy and 
actions aims to achieve. 
 
Following a discussion on the nature of universities in developing economies, I discuss 
university-industry links in this context mounting a critique Etzkowitz’s (2002, 2003) triple 
helix theory as inapplicable to countries with ‘thinner’ i.e. developing institutions and how 
UILs can be ‘thickened’ in particular by attracting international R&D project and spilling-




I construct a new framework for sectoral systems of innovation to use as a mapping tool in 
answering research question one, based on Geels (2004) idea of multiple-level institutional 
linkages and Ogle’s (2008) notion of active agency and in doing so criticise applications 
of systems theory (such as Porter 1995 and the triple helix) to commercialisation and 
innovation.   
 
1.6  Practical significance 
 
Diversifying its economy from reliance on oil and gas to one that is internationally 
competitive in growing, high-value sectors that exploit knowledge rather than natural 
resources is the key strategic objective of the KSA Government.  Currently, non-carbon 
sectors contribute only 10% of KSA’s GDP (AME 2013).  In addition to medical devices, 
life-sciences, and nanotechnology the 9th Development Plan envisages private sector 
growth in value-added services (logistics, banking and financial, creative industries) 
private sector construction companies and agri-food processing.  
 
With 18% of verified petroleum reserves and as its largest exporter, petroleum accounts 
for 92% of KSA’s revenues, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (2013) calculates that 
55% of GDP and 90% of exports relate to petroleum.  Oil-dependency has characterised 
the KSA economy since the late-1930s, prior to which subsistence agriculture dominated. 
Per capita income remains largely dependant on the international price of oil, creating an 
average currently around half the US level, though with significant uneven distribution of 
wealth.   Saudi Aramco (the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, which is 100% Government-
owned) dominates KSA’s oil industry and has a US$ 10,000,000,000,000 valuation 
producing around 3.5 billion barrels of oil a year overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources, which also oversees other activities such as gold mining.  KSA 
GDP growth rates increased from 5.1 to 7.1% from 2010 to 2011.   
 
KSA’s Eighth Development Plan (2005-2010) centred on the challenge of becoming a 
knowledge-based economy.  It included a National Science, Technology and Innovation 
Policy; the National ICT Plan, a National Industrial Strategy, and the Strategy and Plan for 
Giftedness, Creativity and Supporting Innovation; the Knowledge Economic City in 
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Medina, and the Technology Zone of the Saudi Organization for Industrial Estate and 
Technology Zones in Dammam; favoured privatisation of state companies and a vocational 
turn in higher education.  KSA’s aim is to dedicate 1% of GDP to RD&D by 2014 (the end 
of the 9th Development Plan) and 2% by 2024, with a quarter of this coming from the 
private sector and thereby increase the output of technology-based production by between 
30% and 45% and exports from 18% to 26%. 
 
Human resources 
Tatweer, King Abdullah’s programme for modernising education in KSA sets 
improvement goals for education quality, training of teachers, a vocational turn in curricula 
development, skills-based learning, language training and entrepreneurship education 
(including an emphasis on emerging technologies).  One aspect of creating the absorptive 
capacity necessary to exploit knowledge from emergent technologies is participation rates 
in postgraduate education.  Here KSA performs poorly, despite generous financial support.  
Between 1994 and 2006 enrolment in MSc grew from 5,312 to 9,768 and in PhDs from 
615 to 1,219 (comparative % figures).  Saudi education has been criticised as inadequate 
in mathematics and sciences.  It faces the challenge of Arabisation i.e. migrating scientific 
work, often in English, into indigenous language.  Low levels of tertiary education 
participation correlate with low levels of life-long learning.   
 
Islam  
I am aware of a western academic narrative suggesting that whist Arabic societies were for 
a period (when is disputed) intellectually vibrant and economically innovative; that anti-
innovation is somehow part of modern Islam or some Islamic societies.  A range of meta 
economic histories comment on this debate including Mokyr (1990) who emphasises state 
institutions; Landes (1998) who emphasises individual entrepreneurs exploiting 
innovations; North (1990) who focuses on company-level innovativeness; Bowles and 
Edwards (1993) alignment between production and consumption; and Rosenberg and 
Birdzell (1986) who emphasise the importance of free markets.  Popular authors 
(Huntington 1996) pose these issues in terms of the inferiority of Islamic culture.  Earlier 
work by Tawney (1962) focused on the protestant attitudes towards usury and exploitation 
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of the natural environment.    In answering my third research question, I will comment on 
the empirical veracity of these arguments and their intellectual integrity. 
 
One particular strand of this argument is important: are resource-rich economies prone to 
denigrate risk-taking and innovation: the argument stimulated by Aury (1997; 2001) and 
later Sachs (2001) and Collier (2008) in his analysis of Africa.  In answering RQ-3, I will 
comment on these debates, noting that numerous Islamic countries are developing 
successfully (Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE) and as my research will report are creating 
successful and innovative global companies. 
 
1.7  Overview of research process 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the intellectual flow of the thesis, showing that my research objectives 
are to understand commercialisation-related innovation and entrepreneurship in KSA, I 
review relevant literature (chapters 2 and 3), arriving at three research questions (what, 
how and why) and then drawing together in a new conceptual framework (chapter-4) 
definitions and a perspective from which to analyse my findings.  Following methodology 
and method (chapter 5), chapters 6 and 7 present rich data gathering from two incubators 
in the KSA and UK and six incubated firms in each country, in addition to an analysis of 
institutional arrangements and entrepreneurial culture in both countries.  Following in-case, 
cross-case and cross-country analysis, (chapter-8) using my new framework, I then 
reintegrate with previous literature, answering the research questions, including polishing 
my conceptual framework into its final form (chapter-9).   The thesis concludes (chapter-






Figure 1.2: intellectual flow of thesis 
This research is qualitative.  I follow Charmaz’s (2007) constructed grounded theory 
approach, characterised by creating an initial framework from literature, which is then used 
to structure analysis and inform an amended (final) framework.  Data is analysed using 
thematic analysis supported by theoretical coding and patterning of data.  My unit of 
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analysis throughout is the firm seeking to commercialise transferred technology in the 
Saudi context i.e. the cultural and institutional parameters enabling or constraining 
commercialisation. 
 
1.8 Structure and flow of thesis 
 









CHAPTER-2  INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALISATION  
 
 
My literature review is in three chapters.  In this chapter I analyse previous research on the 
context of commercialisation, the following chapter focuses on the nature and activities of 
academic entrepreneurs and chapter four presents a new, holistic analytical framework, 
which guides my data gathering and later analysis. 
 
This chapter brings together an extensive range of literature drawn from innovation studies, 
economics, economic geography, pedagogy, philosophy of knowledge, strategy and the 
processes of building businesses.  This very diversity of research, each with its own 
epistemological roots and definitions is one of the reasons why research on 
commercialisation is complex: the context is complex.   
 
In deciding what to include and exclude from the literature review three decision-rules 
predominated: firstly, is the literature necessary to an intellectually robust answering of my 
three research questions?  Hence, though important Krugman’s work on new economic 
geography (1993) and unproductive investments (1999) were excluded since my research 
questions are answerable without centrally featuring these fields of literature.  Literature 
on the nature of knowledge and the knowledge-based economy are included, precisely 
because no answer to the research questions would be complete without concepts from 
these fields.  
 
Secondly, given the aim of the research is to produce a new integrated framework with 
which to analyse and understand commercialisation processes in a developing economy, is 
the previous research (definitions, findings) a necessary component of the new framework?  
Important work on fiscal regimes and risk investments (Locket and Wright 2005) and 
details of intellectual property regimes across borders (Siegel 2003) were thus excluded, 
since I refer to these as background material whilst not considering them critical to 
understanding commercialisation processes in KSA and other developing economies.  I 
have incorporated a critical review of literature on universities, incubation and Etzkowitz’s 
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(2003) triple (quadruple) helix; because these concepts are important in the literature, 
though in each case I offer critiques of the literature. 
 
Thirdly, I excluded bodies of literature, which whilst important and are referred to, do not 
for the purpose of this work require problematising.  An example is research on venture 
capital (Bell 1992), the processes and tools of which now appear well understood; 
alternatively, I included a short review of neo-institutionalism in order to evaluate the 
application of the development state thesis (Woo-Cummings 1999) to KSA.  Similarly, I 
consider that systems of innovation literature is important, but too often deterministic and 
without active agency.  In a similar vein, I include a brief review of research on clustering 
as scaffolding towards considering knowledge spillover process in a developing economy.  
In my analysis chapters I comment on how these theories inter-relate.  For example, the 
development state thesis presumes strong state direction of university-industry linkages, 
despite the fact that triple helix institutions may be thinner in a developing (as opposed to 
a mature) state context. 
 
Figure 2.1 indicates the scope of literature included in this chapter.  Note the 
interconnectedness of these literature fields.  Further, note that beginning with ‘knowledge’ 
at the top of the tree, the sequence of discussion (and structure of the chapter) follows an 
out-to-in trajectory, ending with consideration of commercialisation itself and its economic 
impact. 
 
Since technological products (along with service innovations) are the targets of 
commercialisation, it would be possible to take an overarching framework such as actor 
network theory (ANT) and apply this as a framework.  To an extent ANT is the dominant 
discourse in sociological innovation studies.  Founding works include Callon (1986, 1991), 
Latour (1987, 1988), Latour et al (1992), Law and Callon (1992) and Law and Bijker 
(1992).  This social constructivist approach features interpretative flexibility and is 
therefore attractively argues that actants interact to shape technology and its social 
acceptability and success.  However, on closer inspection all actants including physical 
artefacts are accorded (discovered Callon et al 1992) conscious intervention during 
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innovation processes (see Molina 1999).  This fatally flaws ANT since technology is 
socially shaped (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985) and the idea that the sociotechnical 
moulds the sociotechnical (Law 1988) sophistry.   My aim is to show how the perspectives 
on commercialisation shown in figure-1 interconnect and causally interrelate, in doing so 
it is the social forces and entrepreneurial decisions that are ontologically privileged 








2.1  Knowledge and learning 
 
Knowledge is central to this research here means evidenced understanding, sufficiently or 
useful to guide thought and action and valuably aligns with other knowledge and ways 
reliable ways of sense-making.  This section argues three points: firstly, I use Vygotsky’s 
socio-cultural pedagogy to show that knowledge use is impossible without active learning 
- a social process.  Secondly, that the codifiability of knowledge is not a significant 
characteristic, rather its usefulness to people in problem-solving is most significant.  
Thirdly, I argue that whilst people learn in organisations, organisations cannot learn since 
learning requires cognition and presumes sentient beings. 
 
Knowledge and active learning 
For Vygotsky (1934), cognition (i.e. higher mental processes) occurs for groups of people 
and individuals only by referencing the social setting sharply disputing the 
behaviourist/cognitivist-constructivist cognition and consciousness paradigms (Wertsch 
1985).  Consciousness for unifies all cognitive learning processes (Nardi 1996); in the 
process of internalising learning, individuals make new combinations and interpretations 
creating new knowledge using socially constructed semiotic mediations (Daniels et al 
2007).  For Vygotsky, zones of proximal development enable children to develop (with 
instruction) into adult thinkers by internalising the ability to mediate socially constructed 
artefacts in their thinking, becoming able to exercise higher mental powers and reach 
consciousness.  Human cognition results from interaction between people and artefacts: 
Lave and Wenger’s (1991) socially situated learning resulting in situated cognition.  
Consciousness involves thinking - a first-person bodily effort (except when unconsciously 
occurring, see Velmans 2000).  We may not fully understand what consciousness is and to 
exercise it, but as Rosenthal (2008) points out, it is perverse to reduce that most human of 
characteristics to a simple biological function.  Rational cognition appears effective when 
it is unconscious or conscious.  We learn during conscious effort to learn, and when we are 
not making conscious effort since as Rosenthal (2000) points out meta-cognitive judgement 
such as feeling-of-knowing and ease-of-learning can occur without consciousness.   
In summary, knowledge is never a transferred package, as every teacher and parent knows, 




Problem-solving versus codifiability 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Swan and Scarborough (2001) and others envisage an almost 
mechanical cycle in which organisations codify transferred-in knowledge or knowledge 
resulting from learning-by-doing.  Figure 2.2 presents an alternative picture drawing on 
pedagogic theory in which learning occurs at different levels, each of which involves 
cognition by individuals and to which codification may be irrelevant.  Indeed, especially 
where learning is the result of experienced feelings (attachment) as is often the case in 




Figure 2.2: Levels of learning using distinctions drawn by selected theorists 
 
In summary, purposive business-related learning codifies learning into routines and 
operations when necessary.  In other instances, codification may be dysfunctional because 
of cost or information overload in knowledge-management systems.  Figure 2.3 illustrates 
components and contexts of knowledge.  A final point on informal knowledge is that it 
may be procedural (i.e. know-how) rather than declarative (know-why and know-what).  





This research uses the distinctions and meanings in figure 2.3 to more subtly interrogate 
knowledge - its origins and use for business purposes – and is particular looking for (figure 
3.2) transformative knowledge that might create disruptive products or services.  
 
Distributed learning versus learning organisations  
Engeström’s (1987) third-generation activity theory cycles of expansive learning, widens 
activity scope to mediating with background (e.g. network) and foreground (e.g. team) 
artefacts constituting an activity system.  Dialogically, learners (implicitly or explicitly) in 
interpreting artefacts, have the effect of reinforcing or challenging interpretations and their 




Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of knowledge and their contents 




For activity theory, distributed cognition frames learning (whether conscious or not; 
embedded or not; widely or narrowly scoped).  Distributed cognition involves individual 
humans thinking: organisations and machines cannot think.  Where groups of individuals 
within an organisation or using machines share knowledge, including knowledge sharing 
with the agreed goal of solving a particular puzzle, then the social setting in which 
individual cognition occurs benefits individual cognition by distribution.  This is the sense 
in which activity theory supports the idea of distributed cognition: learning organisation is 
a metaphor whereas enabling and encouraging distributed learning is a practical 
management tool enabling entrepreneurs to create and mobile what Itami terms invisible 
assets – an absorptive capacity capable of exploiting a knowledge base.  
 
In summary, this section provides a view of the nature of learning and knowledge for the 
rest of the thesis emphasising active and social learning as a necessary component of all 
knowledge use and contesting views of knowledge that diminish human cognition and the 
use of knowledge to solve puzzles by purposive learning involving knowledge distribution. 
 
2.2  Knowledge-based economy (KBE) 
 
Since KSA’s aim using commercialisation is to build a KBE, clarity of the concept is 
particularly important; the contribution of this section.  My argument is that emergent new 
modes of production are not new because they use knowledge - all modes of production 
use some knowledge - rather what is new is closing the gap between science and technology 
and shortening of innovation cycles.  Whereas in manufacturing economies it was possible 
to leapfrog stages of development by importing advanced technologies (Gerschenkron 
1966), the challenge of development is more problematic in the knowledge-based era. 
 
Originating in the in the sociological work of Touraine (1971); Bell’s (1974) technology-
of-control post-industrial society thesis, argues that information and knowledge would 
become more important than physical resources and knowledge workers more important 
than physical work, which would be increasingly automated.  Post-industrialism merged 
from labour process and post-Fordism debates (Braverman; Aglietta) and the post-
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modernism perspective (Foucault 1991; and Loyotard 1989) problematising the legitimacy 
of knowledge and education, with the position of science and technology in terms of power.   
 
Governments readily adopted the idea of modern economies driven by new knowledge and 
knowledge workers.  A UK (1998:2) paper defined a KBE as … 
 
… one in which the generation and the exploitation of knowledge has come to play 
the predominant part in the creation of wealth. It is not simply about pushing back 
the frontiers of knowledge; it is also about the more effective use and exploitation 
of all types of knowledge in all manner of economic activity. 
 
Typical terms include the economics of abundance, the annihilation of distance, de-
territorialisation of the state, importance of local knowledge, and investment in human 
capital.  The idea of a KBE is now the dominant discourse in the WB (1996) and OECD 
and as Peters (2002) notes, the primary development policy is one of filling knowledge 
gaps and moving up knowledge value chains.   
 
Neoclassical models ascribed economic growth improvement (the Cobb-Douglas function) 
to factor substitution i.e. replacing labour with capital.  Since Solow (1956) and the 
subsequent critique of neoclassicism, it is understood that learning and knowledge 
exploitation are the key residual determining endogenous growth rates (i.e. self-generated 
technology improvement).  When Solow (1987) quipped that You can see the computer 
age everywhere except in the productivity statistics, his meaning was the learning (to use 
the potential technology releases) is just as important as possessing the technology.  OECD 
(1996) suggests that more than 50 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the major 
OECD economies is now based on the production and distribution of knowledge.   
 
2.2.1 Contested interpretations of the knowledge-based economy 
 
Thinking about KBE reflects societal divisions and normative debate.  This section uses 
the neo-liberal (market) and institutional perspectives on the KBE to illustrate contested 




From the market perspective Drucker (1959) and Machlup (1962) highlighting the 
importance of education and knowledge exploitation laid the foundations for work in 
Chicago theorising knowledge as driving innovation and economic growth in the ‘free’ 
market tradition promulgated by Hayek (1991), summarised by Wit (1997:1) as the 
proposition that markets do things more efficiently than governments do.  Important work 
in this field includes Becker’s (1964) theorisation of knowledge workers as human capital: 
education is an investment in people upon which there is a calculable (individual) return 
and similarly investment in knowledge creation should give a (social) return on investment.  
Aghion and Howitt’s (1998) endogenous growth model attributes costs and returns to 
education in a quantitative modelling of the impact of investment in education and 
knowledge creation on economic growth.   
 
This perspective on KBE is criticised (Stehr and Ericson 1992:111) as privileging 
economic above social factors.  Whilst as Smith (2000) notes, knowledge has been and 
continues to be core foundation of the economic process, he goes on to argue that 
knowledge is also an inherent part of social life, including pre-industrial societies.  The 
difference in industrial society, as Marx (1865/1970) points out is the conscious application 
of science to technological product and process needs.  Noting with Magalhases and Stoer 
(2003:43) that the neo-liberal view of KBE redefines people as human capital with 
competences and performance levels, Carlton (2001:13) argues knowledge ceases to be 
non-rivalrous and non-exclusive and becomes itself capital to accumulate and paid-for 
(Klees 1999) and its dissemination shaped by the largess of the World Bank (Klees 2001).  
 
The institutional view of KBE is complex since it interweaves with social theory and labour 
process debate; its ontological foundations are institutions and relationships, of which 
markets are one part not the dominant only institution. Fordist economies ‘pushed’ 
products and focused thinking on production.  KBEs focus more on products ‘pulled’ by 
customers and changing patterns of consumption.  If developing economies are to 
successfully enjoin international markets their products must conform to international 
standards and appeal to target customers.  From the perspective of information and 
knowledge networks, Castells (1997) argues that networks are the paramount institution in 
 
 44 
knowledge-based societies, highlighting along with Florida et al (1996) how organisational 
forms and motivation are quite different in a network society than command-and-control 
hierarchies, where 80% of jobs and GDP are in the service sector.  Knowledge (including 
subjective assessment of consumer experiences) thus becomes critical in KBEs and 
societies.  This is important, since KSA is not simply a developing economy or emerging 
market – it is a society undergoing rapid change and modernisation.   
 
2.2.2  Conclusions and relevance to developing economies 
 
This discussion illustrates widely differing perspectives on the KBE highlighting the 
importance of definitional clarity in using this and associated terms.  Clearly the nature of 
work, products and production is becoming more reliant on knowledge and knowledgeable 
workers, perhaps it is worth noting with Joan Robinson, that the only thing worse than 
being exploited by a capitalist, is not being exploited by a capitalist.   
 
From the above discussion, I endorse Leadbeater’s (2000:43) contrast between old and new 
economy:  
 
… organised around physical, material, and tangible assets and products. The old 
economy had a large service sector, but it was organized to service physical 
products: processing paper, taking orders, managing production, selling, 
servicing, and repairing. 
 
The market perspective correctly emphasises that knowledge has value only if accepted by 
markets.  As Lyotard (1989:4) argues 
 
Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold; it is and will be consumed 
in order to be valorised in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. 
 
By way of summary, new products in KBEs have shorter innovation cycles resulting from 
a speedier migration of science into (saleable) technologies (Pisano 1997, Chesbrough 
2011); in Kessler and Chakrabarti’s (1996) terms the journey from concept to customer is 
shorter.  However, the market perspective needs coupling with social change including 
premiums paid to knowledge-workers, changing tastes, service sector expansion – the 
issues raised by the regulation theorists, explored in Bauman (1988) and including CSR 
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issues such as sustainability and ethics.  As Chisholm (1999:3) notes, for developing 
economies, KBE paradigm is both threat and opportunity.  Threat if education levels are 
low, exclusion from IP appropriation persists and exclusion from knowledge networks 
inhibits entry to international markets.  Alternatively, KBE is an opportunity to readjust 
the world economic order to the advantage of developing economies if they can create and 
exploit a science base (Das and Kinder 2016), rapidly internationalise (chapter 2) and 
create the institutions including markets that attract mobile knowledge workers and 
companies.  It is to the last of these points to which I now turn. 
 
2.3  Institutions and the developing economy   
 
Since part of my purpose is to identify how institutions and agents and their interactions 
can improve KSA’s commercialisation, this short section defines terms and critically 
reviews previous research in this field. 
 
Freeman and Soete (1987) note that institutions matter because some contexts prove more 
fertile for economic growth than others.  Long views of economic growth agree, though 
disagree on which institutions are important: Mokyr (1990) emphasises state institutions; 
Landes (1998) exploiting innovations; North (1993) companies; Bowles and Edwards 
(1993) alignment between production and consumption; and Rosenberg and Birdzell 
(1986) free markets.  Here I argue that institution-building is crucial in KBE economic 
development; that institutional thickness and untraded inter-dependencies take more time 
and resources to create than technology transfer; and that creating an entrepreneurial 
habitus depends on active agency. 
 
Institutional theory explains stability and change by referencing social hierarchy, laws and 
cultural predispositions, what North (1990 terms the rules of the game), which influence 
people and organisations and are in turn shaped by the patterned acts of agents (March and 
Olsen 1989:170; Clemens and Cook 1999).  Veblen (1965) and Commons (1934) and 
Sleznick (1949) and more recently Sen (1979) uses institutional theory to predict patterns 
of individual behaviour and resource allocation as an alternative to rationalist neo-classical 
economic models.  Old Institutionalists tend to privilege economic factors as drivers of 
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change or stability (Commons 1934; Alchian 1965, Minsky 1986) though without the homo 
economicus of neoclassical economics, focusing on property rights, state and ideology.  
Neo-institutionalist theorists (North 1990; Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Williamson 1985; 
Scott 1995) are characterised by three points of difference from their predecessors: (a) 
rational choice (Elster 1979), (2) explaining change rather than stability by adopting an 
evolutionary perspective (Hodgson 1993), from a methodological individualism 
perspective, and (3) ontologically more strongly feature culture, such as Scott’s (1995) idea 
of legitimacy. The cultural turn in institutional thinking (Jepperson and Meyer 1991) 
frequently employs Bourdieu’s (1977) idea of cultural reproduction and North’s (1990) 
notion of path dependency to explain stability, sometimes (Pfeffer and Selnick 1978) 
highlight the key role of individual entrepreneurs in extracting resources or (Tolbert and 
Zucker 1983) legitimising routes to resource capture and incentivising organisational 
isomorphism. 
 
Old institutionalism is correctly criticised as functionalist and determinist (Giddens 1982).  
Powerful criticisms of neo-institutionalism revolve around structure and agency.  Adopting 
the evolutionary perspective (for example of Nelson and Winter 1982) opens institutional 
theory to Popper’s (1992:24) critique that the theory is untestable; and to debate on whether 
the biological metaphor is too ontogenic (environment influences) or Lamarkian 
(cumulative conscious choices) evolution.  Elster (1979:18) makes this criticism arguing 
for methodological individualism, which as Hodgson (1993, 2007) points out is an odd 
argument in a framework essentially social in nature.  Archer’s (1988; 2007) work on 
agency and structure argues that if social theory denies autonomy to one side of a 
relationship this conflates active agency, the alternative being to attribute interdependence 
of both structure and agency; thus the entrepreneur and the institutional environment can 
both respond to an opportunity in different ways and overtime alter the actions of the other.  
This is a particular important point for developing economies, where institutions are often 
built and alter rapidly and is a point Arrow (1974: chapter 2) makes forcefully: institutions 




Institutions and developing economies 
To understand commercialisation in developing economies this field of literature has 
important lessons, including the importance of leadership and active agency, the interaction 
between nested levels of institutions and how Rutherford’s (1995) idea of cumulative 
causation in social events results in unintended consequences including perverse 
incentives.  As Storper and Salais (1997) argue, institution building is not only a process 
requiring laws and structures; it requires changes to cultural predispositions: ways-of-
working and thinking: this illustrated in Castells and Hall’s (1994) work on cities and 
Flamm (1988) on creating the computer.  Storper’s (1997) idea of untraded 
interdependencies is important in these processes, as is Amin’s (1994) notion of 
institutional thickness.   
 
An important aspect of informal institution building is the entrepreneurial habitus 
legitimising risk-taking product innovations.  Habitus is Bourdieu’s (1977) term for the 
matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions constituting regulated improvisations.  It 
is the endless capacity to engender products, thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions - 
whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production, 
the conditioning, and conditional freedom it secures is as remote from a creation of 
unpredictable novelty as it is from a simple mechanical reproduction of the initial 
conditioning.  Habitus can be used deterministically (Elster’s 1983 critique), unless 
causalities are grounded.  Potter (2000) who cites a range of persuasive uses of the concept 
rejects LiPuma’s (1993) argument that he it fails to connect the individual to society.  
Jenkins (1992) argument against Bourdieu, that embedding predilections in the 
unconscious opens up the charge that they cannot be altered, is answered by Bourdieu 
(1977) argument that such a view invalidates the whole of social science, which also 
addresses Farnell’s (2000) critique that habitus contains the danger of dualism, external 
imprinting and Kind (2000) that the term could be employed deterministically.  I use the 
idea of entrepreneurial habitus in the framework developed in the next chapter, agreeing 
with Sender’s (2001) that the concept of habitus can be subtly used and taking comfort 
from its successful use in a range of empirical studies including Atkinson (1983), Delamont 
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(1989), McClelland 1990) Engler (1990), Reay (1995), Horvat and Antonio (1999) and 
Dumais (2002) in addition to Bourdieu’s own work.   
 
In summary, whilst institutions matter, thick institutions and untraded interdependencies 
take time and resources to create: they are a social construction and can only take root at 
the pace by which habituses alter.  My research investigates the institutional arrangements 
relevant to commercialisation in KSA and qualitative issues of institutional thickness, 
interdependencies and entrepreneurial habitus an important influence on these matters is 
the state, especially in a development context; it is to the nature of the KSA state that I now 
turn. 
 
2.4  KSA and the development state?    
 
As I showed in discussing TH theory, it fails to translate into the context of rapidly 
emerging economies, a gap filled by Development State theory, which as we shall see I use 
later to interpret opportunities facing KSA as an alternative to oil-centred analyses.     
 
For Auty and Gelb (2000) the resource-rich state’s strategy seeks to retain legitimacy by 
redistributing rents in the form of social welfare: the rentier state.  One aspect of unpacking 
the dynamics of KSA is the extent to which two seemingly contradictory strategies 
(development state and rent distributive state) co-exist.  Other seeming contradictions are 
more easily resolved: the development state is an open economy that at the same time 
protects infant industries from international competition – the mercantilist model found in 
1970s Japan and later South Korea, Taiwan and currently China and KSA.  Resource 
abundance without a development state model can lapse into the clientism and the 
corruption Knack (2006) argues characterises Central Asia.  This is not so in KSA, where 
the developmental aspect of Government policy is resulting is a steady increase in non-oil 
income (up to 14% in 2011).   
 
One aspect of the burden of backwardness is the significant role of the state in the economy 
(hence Bouckaert’s (2007) focus on bureaupreneurs and changing property rights).  
However, as Chaudhry (1994) argued what differentiates developmental from rentier states 
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is the role the state plays in using rent distribution to create a market culture and business 
incentives.  The question for this research is to what extent can current KSA rentier-
relations migrate to a development state trajectory?  This is important since modernisation 
without westernisation rejects the neoliberal dominant discourse favouring western 
institutions adopted by the US, WB and IMF: the Washington Consensus (Chang et al 
2004: Brautigam 2009) – what Hirschmann (1981) criticised as monoecnomics.   
 
2.4.1  The idea of the development state 
 
Whilst Gerschenkron (1966) had analysed the important role of the state in economic 
development; it was Chalmers (1982) who challenged neo-liberal development and cultural 
particularism theories (Wolf 1984; Wolferen 1989) with his idea of the development state 
(DS), the characteristics of which, figure 3.4 summarises.  The golden thread in Chalmers’ 
(1982) study of Japan’s post-war economic development is a nation sacrificing in order to 
re-establish independence by becoming economically successful a theme also strong in DS 
analyses of Korea and Taiwan (Johnson 1982) and later China (Leonard 2008).  Economic 
growth becomes a post-colonial strategic route to independence and national integrity, 
though as Pempel (1999) Korea and Taiwan depended heavily on US economic support.   
 
DSs are only effective in an expanding world economy (open to exports); downturn 
jeopardises the strategy as events recently in China and earlier in Japan have shown. Budget 
deficit and instability are also potential problems (Sachs (1995).  Parker et al (1997) 
highlights the challenge of property rights; this is important as Bouckaert (2007) shows 
when bureaupreneurs transfer state to private property.  In Japan’s case (Woo-Cummings 
1991) DS was consciously adopted, whereas in China, Deng Xiaoping famously stepped 
on stones across the stream - improvising as opportunities unfolded (Vogel 2013) or as 
Coase and Wang (2012:166) suggest Not by design, the dual structure of reform provided 
an effective and flexible institutional framework for Beijing to navigate China’s move to a 





Nationalism The DS uses economic growth to achieve and protect national 
integrity and independence; economic development is late 
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Internationalist DS is mercantilist and international in outlook for export-led 
growth and technology transfer; the DS is open and imitative of 
advanced technologies and structures 
Shared goals The DS embodies an economic development vision that is widely 
shared by its institutions, people and businesses 
Autonomous economic 
bureaucracy 
Expert, rational planners guide economic development without 
recourse to special interest groups 
Technological learning and 
adaptation 
Public and private organisations are technophile and capable of 
adapting technologies and ways-of-working to the local context 
Industrial policy There is a clear and achievable industrial strategy including strong 
business networks capable of its implementation. 
State control of finance Central controls over borrowing; exchange, inflation and interest 
rates ensure stable state finances 
Labour relations Sanguine and benign industrial relations; staff motivated around 
competitiveness  
Incentives and command structure Absence of perverse incentives, market discipline; without special 
interest groups distorting growth 
Equity/efficiency balance DS is benevolent authoritarian privileging development is above 
the rule of law and democratic engagement; thin civic society 
 
Figure 2.4: overview of development state characteristics  
 
A DS strategy is always catch-up – late development reliant on TT (often inward-FDI) and 
exports; leapfrogging also quickens the pace of catch-up (Freeman 1997) i.e. by-passing 
vintage technologies without the costs of displacing existing capital investment or jobs 
(Soete (1985:416; Perez and Soete 1988; Krugman et al 1993; Lee and Lim 2001).  Simple 
examples include mobile communications rather than fixed line networks (Steinmueller 
2001:194); improving productivity using lower input costs  (Goldemberg 1998) or new 
business models such as Gallagher (2008) found in Korean steel.  Other advantages of 
leapfrogging Unruh et al (2006) suggest may be avoiding ‘dirty’ development stages; 
moving directly to customer-focused technologies and business models (Davison et al 
2000, Vogel et al 2000) or innovative adaptations such as the Kenyan mPENSA and 
National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) in India (Webb 2014; Mody and Sherman 
1990).  
 
A shared destiny future vision is essential to a DS, since urbanisation and modernisation 
involves altruistic inter-generational wealth transfer from old to young (Pempel 1999) and 
reordering of vested interests: for example provincial Governments in China only endorsed 
Deng’s NEZs in exchange for transfer of power.  The DS is a value creating rather than 
value-distributing state; weaker in democratic processes than in development actions, a 
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socially accepted trade-off (Rodik 2011) based on equality of sacrifice in which state and 
society are mutually embedded (Evan 1995).  In Asian models businesses take 
responsibility for welfare (Dore 1986) and HR reward policies are subsumed to industrial 
policy (Terry 2002); labour markets are credentialist (Fleisher 2005).  Semi-permanent 
socioeconomic coalitions (Tsebelis 1990) shape domestic institutions to suit success in 
international markets using hegemonic projects (Jessop 1997) capturing advanced 
technologies using I-FDI.  Modernisation becomes the dominant ideology (Liao 2010). 
 
An autonomous meritocratic economic bureaucracy guides the DS, MITI in Japan and 
MOST in China – absent in South America according to Schneider (1991) offering 
administrative guidance yet (Evans 1995) argues is embedded in society and the articulated 
shared vision.  This bureaucracy holds tight control over state finance (Johnson 1987; Woo-
Cummings 1991) i.e. state budgets, exchange rates, inflation and interest rates.  It promotes 
in Stiglitz’s (1992) high not low equilibrium state. 
 
The DS state model is criticised or its rigidity (Low 2004), lack of democracy (Deans 2004) 
and dependency on TT (Beeson 2009).  Beh’s (2008) analysis draws attention in the 
Chinese case to the importance of the Chinese business diaspora as enabling China’s rapid 
internationalisation.   
 
Social challenges to the Washington development model and unavailability of the thick 
institutions required by the Nordic model (Castells and Himanen 2002) means that many 
African countries now follow a Beijing model of development (Brautigam 2009).  In KSA 
the DS is prominent in discourse: my research asks if the DS strategy is suitable for KSA?  
 
2.4.2  Can KSA become a development state? 
 
Previous research, for example Sachs and Warner (1995; 1999), shows that resource-poor 
economies between 1960 and 1990 grew GDP two or three times as fast as resource-rich 
economies.  Explaining this Dutch disease, Corden and Neary (1982) argue that export 
revenues increase importation and prices of tradable goods, appreciating the currency and 
 
 52 
labour prices, making the growth of manufacturing difficult and (Krugman 1987) loss of 
competitiveness making industrialisation difficult. 
 
KSA is a capital surplus (Auty 2001) resource-abundant economy - rents from oil exceed 
other earnings.  This Santa Claus state creates a dependency culture effecting 
entrepreneurship (Al-Hegelan and Palmer 1985; Luciani 1990).  To diversify and avoid 
social disruption when oil revenues dissipate (2035), as Bellin (2004) argues, KSA needs 
to forego its rentier state model and move to a model privileging entrepreneurship and 
innovation.  My research comments upon trends in KSA towards becoming a successful 
development state.   
 
2.5  Universities    
 
Universities, as recipients of TT and creators of absorptive capacity play a crucial role in 
development (Galbraith 1979) alternatively, Wolf (2002) argues that whilst there are 
individual returns to education, there is no economic imperative justifying ever-greater 
enrolments.  This section explores one important arena in which knowledge is 
disseminated, created and (sometimes) exploited: universities.  I argue four points: firstly, 
developing economy universities need to teach, research and commercialise; secondly, that 
basic research is necessary if transferred ideas are to be adapted; I then consider 
publish/patent duality, arguing that universities in developing economies need both, not 
either; and finally, I argue that whilst corporatism is problematic, universities in developing 
economies best assist development by paying close attention to social and business needs.   
 
2.5.1  What is a university? 
 
The European view of universities as a community of scholars (Newman 1952) is rooted 
in their origins in European as defenders of religious orthodoxy (Geuna 1998) and the 19th 
German notion academic freedom (Fuchs 1963).  Asian universities traditions differ, the 
Japanese state made funding conditional on applied and collaborative research (Kunio 
1986).  Thus, universities reflect the society to which they are accountable, for example in 
the academic disciplines they create and the activities pursued (Gibbons et al 1994).  
Techno-nationalist states, such as India, intervene regularly to guide university activities 
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(Stevens 1990; Yamada 2000); other states (Thailand) focus on vocational education.  
KSA’s 68 degree-awarding institutions and 200 R&D units research the target technologies 
featuring the 5 year plan: medicine, agriculture, engineering and emergent technologies 
such as nanotechnology and life-sciences.  My research returns to the issue of how 
appropriate KSA’s universities are to it KBE strategy. 
 
2.5.2  Basic research 
 
The balance between applied and basic research in KSA is not clear, in part because of 
terminological confusion (Calvert 2006:199).  I follow the Frascati Manual (OECD 2012) 
characterising basic research as aiming to acquire new knowledge of the underlying 
foundation of phenomena and observable facts.  Such research is only possible by 
researchers at the cutting edge of their field.  Though Nelson (1962 and 1998) and 
Verspagen (1993) point to difficulties auditing the direct economic benefits of basic 
research, as Rosenberg (1990) argues, private companies would not conduct basic research 
without benefits.  Salter and Martin (2001) give numerous examples of basic research 
opening up new technological products; one example is Flamm’s (1988) work on creating 
the computer.  Pavitt (1998) and SPRU (1996) endorse the view that without basic research, 
university’s ability to conduct developmental research wanes.  In summary, whilst applied 
research is important, conducting basic research characterises those universities most able 
to contribute to long-term economic growth.  
 
2.5.3  Publish or patent 
 
The Economist (2002) argued that the Bayh-Dole Act was the most impressive piece of 
law making in the US in the second half of the 20th century making it easier for universities 
to retain IPR from academic research by filing patents.  As a result of the Act, between 
1980 and 1993, university patents rose 315%, from 390 to 1,620.  Yet, has this been 
achieved by sacrificing publishing in favour of patenting or can the two go together.  Here 
I argue for the latter case, noting Cohen et al (1998) and Henderson et al’s (1998) argument 
that applied research can crowd out basic research in the long-term.  In the short-term as 
Agrawal and Henderson’s (2002) empirical study of MIT shows the two can co-exist; a 
finding endorsed by Markiewicz and DiMinin (2005).  Similarly, Van Looy et al  (2005) 
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find that patenting and publishing are complementary in Europe as does Buenstorf’s (2005) 
study of the German Max Planck Institutes, Carayol’s (2005) study of French universities 
and Breschi et al’s (2005) Italian study.   
 
Noting that if patents become a university KPI, researchers become incentivised against 
basic research, Henderson et al (1998) fails to find evidence that this is happening and 
Mowery et al (2004) show that where it does occur it is the result of inexperience in 
patenting, and Murray and Stern (2005) find that publications associated with patents enjoy 
a higher citation rate (by 9 to 17%).  In summary, the argument that universities either 
publish or patent or commercialise is flawed: the best universities do all and more 
(teaching); the question is which scenario applies in KSA? 
 
2.5.3  University-Industry Linkages (UILs) in Developing Countries 
 
The criticism from Stromquist and Monkman (2000) and Giroux (2006) that focus on the 
needs of industries is corporatist now finds voice in New Public Management’s influence 
on universities (Lapsley and Miller 2004) and partly relates to the sector’s accountability 
(Leys 2001). Axelrod (2002); Steck (2003); and Clark’s (2004) argument that HE’s impact 
on the global economy can and should be measured.  Neo-liberal thinkers promote 
corporatisation of HE, as part of a package (Harvey 2005) hallowing-out the state and in 
the case of HE refocusing teaching towards student careers and a further (first in the 60s) 
massification of HE. 
 
From a developing state viewpoint, education is a pre-condition for modernisation (Liefner 
and Schiller 2008).  Hobday, 2000:156), Wong (1997:201) and Lall (2000:41) argue that 
as firms move from imitation and TT into technological adaptation and new product 
development firms increasingly need university-educated staff.  In Thailand, Brimble and 
Doner (2007) find that university strategies are agreed in consultation with industry rather 
than with Government. The World Bank 1998/99 on knowledge development and the main 
topic of the 2005 UNIDO Industrial Development Report too stress the importance of 




Of course close UILs presume companies who are willing and able partners (Bell and Pavitt 
1997:116).  Initiatives such as the Knowledge Integration Community (KIC) model (for 
example between Cambridge [UK] and US’s MIT) are based as Acworth (2008) found on 
a ‘thick’ institutional heritage of both companies and universities with advanced 
technologies and research capabilities (O'Shea 2005; Howells 2006).  Studies such as Di 
Gregorio and Shane (2003; Wright, Lockett, Clarysse, and Binks (2006) additionally 
mention the availability of risk capital in the environment surrounding successful KICs; 
Lecuyer (2006) the social arrangements allowing easy staff exchange between business 
and universities; and Roberts (2002) the possibility of long-term cross-governance research 
projects.  By definition, developing economies lack such institutional thickness. 
 
Studies such as Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) and Kim (2000) emphasise the role of 
universities as providers of skilled labour in developing countries.  Lack of university-level 
education is often cited (for example D’Costa’s 2006 work in Bangalore) as a constraint 
on economic development.  Chen and Kenney (2005) ascribe differential levels of 
‘knowledge-based’ economic development in Chinese regions to the presence or not of 
research universities as does Basant and Chandra (2007) in the case of Pune in India.  It is 
clear as Wu (2007) notes from studying two research universities in Shanghai (Fudan and 
Jiaotong) that however good linkages with businesses are a necessary but insufficient 
condition for commercialisation, which also requires thickness in the wider institutional 




2.5.3  Summary 
 
KSA is able to fund universities, attract international researchers and transfer technologies 
and scientific knowledge inwards.  My research investigates the degree to which KSA 
universities and their partners are able to generate basic and applied research: in short to 
create a triple helix and commercialisable technologies. 
 




National and regional innovation systems (Lundvall 1992) and learning region theory 
(Morgan 1997, Gertler, 2001) help to understand why some nations and city-regions are 
more able to adopt new technologies.  If for each target technology to be successful the 
developing economy needs to create a sectoral system of innovation (SSI), two points 
follow.  Firstly, as Memon et al (2014) argue, networks by definition are loosely coupled 
(requisite variety and loose ties that bind) whereas systems have a clear purpose, 
boundaries, governances, agents and causal relationships.  It is therefore important to 
conceptualise SSIs as purposive systems not loose networks.   Secondly, to successfully 
achieve the purpose of commercialising target technologies, SSIs require transparent 
leadership – active agency that creates entrepreneurial legitimacy, marshal resources and 
guide the SSI towards particular products, markets and partnering, one important aspect of 
which is adopting appropriate business models for the target technology and its markets. 
 
2.6.1  The SSI framework  
 
Systems approaches have two dangers: drawing the system boundaries and establishing 
causal relationships; especially difficult in social systems (Beer 1979).   Breschi and 
Malerba (1995) argues that grounding particular moments of technological and market 
opportunity and in the actions of people, is the best protection against systems being 
deterministic or merely descriptive.  Additionally, as Saxenian (1994) Nelson and 
Rosenberg (1993) and Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1995) argue, establishing interactions 
between system-levels (SSIs and its firms) requires auditable causal relations.  Though 
Geels (2004) envisages SSIs as networks rather than systems, my approach accepts his 
point that effective SSIs have active agency: the people (and organisations) responsible for 
inputs, transformations and outputs have clear remits, roles, relationships and 
responsibilities. 
 
SSI governances are contingent upon opportunities and heritage: in this case the KSA 
socio-economic context and the types of rule-making powers are important: regulative 
(formal), normative and cognitive (intellectual paradigms) that Scott (1995) envisages will 
set boundaries and governances appropriate to that context what Kay (2004) terms 
disciplined pluralism, outside of which the loose agents are not direct SSI participants.  
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These governances are dynamic as the SSI matures and enters phase transitions 
(Gladwell’s 2006 phrase) towards new products, markets and partners.   
 
2.6.2  SSIs, active agency and learning  
 
SSIs are not simply technical networks al la Hughes’ (1984) and Malerba’s (2002) 
technological systems.  Lundvall (1992:2) argued that a central activity in the system of 
innovation is learning, and learning is a social activity, which involves interaction between 
people.  Ogle’s (2008) notion of ideas space is important; the SSI is a collective knowledge 
base from which new solutions to customers problems can be created: commercial 
products.  Whereas socio-technical paradigms (Dosi et al 1988) guide thinking within 
corridors, ideas space encourages boundary-hopping and novel knowledge combinations: 
it is a community of practice combining diverse disciplines intent on innovation. 
 
Whilst Geels’ (2004:915) SSI is a mapping framework, figure 3.5 models an SSI capturing 
supply and demand, social and technical characteristics at the centre of which are active 
agents occupying ideas space.  In figure 2.5, supply and demand creates a habitus within 
which the agents operate, operations shaped by Saudi culture and ways-of-working 
aligning production and consumption.  Supporting and shaping the SSI is an array of supply 
and demand, social and technical factors: the more social to the left and more technical to 
the right.  Demand influences include customers, since as Porter (1990) points out, 
discerning customers at home are a good base from which to enter international markets: 
KSA construction firms are a good example of this.  Also, important is the availability of 
the professional services entrepreneurs require (accounting, logistics, tax, law, design): 
important linkages to Government policy (section 2.3 above) are shown by NSI 
connections.  The supply side of figure 2.5 begins with the science and technology 
available to the SSI, followed by the sources of this knowledge and the SSI’s ability 
therefore to exploit the knowledge.  Particularly important here are university-industry 
links, this sector is at the cutting edge of science-technology development.  Also important, 
as Herrmann and Peine (2011) stress are the right mix of leadership, scientific labour and 
operator level labour, and the supply of resources (capital in all its forms, including state 
aid).  Cross-fertilization of ideas between foreign direct investors (FDIs) and indigenous 
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firms, either via supply contracts or staff mobility (Østergaard et al 2011) is shown to be 
significant.  Thus the issue of evolving standards suitable for British/Indian and 
international markets and the processes of arriving at decisions on standards, is of crucial 




Figure 2.5: Conceptual representation of SSI (Source: adapted from Webb et al 2014) 
 
2.6.2  Business models 
 
Schumpeter (1939) argues that each phase of creative destruction comes with its own 
relevant sets of institutions that enable diffusion a particularly important institution are 
business models (BMs) since they alter with technology and over time and space.  One 
critical task of the SSI is to evolve BMs appropriate to the target technologies that align 
with customer preferences.  Additionally, as Teece (2010) notes, the BM shapes the 
organisational and financial architecture of a firm. 
 
A BM schematically represents choices around how the business creates and distributes 
value amongst stakeholders centring on costs, sales/price and margins and predicting 
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profitability.  For the customer this becomes the value proposition, for the investor the 
business plan.  Whilst the BM guides action, it is not an unchanging recipe since as Baden-
Fuller and Morgan (2007; 2010) argue entrepreneurial leaders conduct thought experiments 
continually tweaking the business model in particular in the activity system (Zott and Amit 
2007) mediating supply and customers.  This is McGrath (2010) a discovery approach to 
evolving business models in opposition to Demil and Lecocq’s (2010) static approach.  My 
point is that (for example) the business models evolved by a life-science SSI will differ 
from those of the medical device SSI and each may adopt a different model for target 
Chinese than US customers. 
 
2.6.3  Summary 
 
In the ninth 5-year plan medical devices, life-sciences, and nanotechnology are target 
technologies.  My research will investigate at a policy level the suitability of KSA SSIs in 
these areas for the commercialisation of knowledge, inquiring particular on the thickness 
of institutional arrangements to support commercialisation processes (including innovative 
business models) and to achieve the targeted outcomes: in short, do the SSIs operate as 
loose networks or focused systems?  As this section has argued, SSIs are populated by 
people, especially leaders and entrepreneurs as active agents are important is goals are met.  
My research investigates how effective SSIs are from the viewpoint of their leaders and 
entrepreneurs.   
 
 
2.7  Triple Helix - a heuristic?   
 
The dominant conceptual framework for commercialisation is Etzkowitz’s (1983) triple 
helix (TH).  I argue that the TH is neither a testable model nor a theory; indeed, its lack of 
intellectual integrity in relation to other theories is a major weakness.  After a brief 
overview of how the TH approach originated and developed, I argue (2.7.2) referencing 
section 2.4 above that institutional thinness limits the usefulness of the TH in developing 
economy contexts; its ability to act either as a policy guide or a comparator tool is curtailed. 




2.7.1  The origins and use of the triple helix 
 
Origins and development of the TH 
The triple helix (Etzkowitz 1983; 2000) is a neo-institutional framework designed to map 
and analyse the inter-relationships between Government, universities and business that 
commercialise university research challenging Lowe’s (1982) the dyad that excludes 
universities.  Each triad is conceptualised as a sub-system (Luhmann 1984), evolving 
together to support commercialisation (Leydesdorff 1996; 2008; Leydesdorff and 
Etzkowitz, 1996, 1998).  Premised on non-linearity of innovation processes (Freeman 
1982), the idea of an entrepreneurial university is important: educating and researching to 
meet the needs of industry and adopting a third mission to commercialise. 
 
Development of the idea 
The original (mode-1) version of the TH was Government-led – statist – (Turpin et al 1993; 
Leydersdoff and van den Basselaar 1998; Shinn 2002; Etzkowitz and De Mello 2003) was 
replaced (Etzkowitz 2003:302) by a mode-2 according equal importance to business and 
universities.  Colapinto and Porlessa (2010) and Ranga and Etzkowitz (2013) now 
synthesise the TH with systems theory highlighting five processes: technology transfer, 
collaboration and conflict moderation, collaborative leadership, substitution, and 
networking in three spaces: knowledge, innovation and consensus.  Ranga and Etzkowitz 
(2011) discuss Central/Eastern European transitional economies using a TH-NSI approach, 
without theorising the synthesis, or the basic/applied research relationship and institutional 
setting (IP, professional availability etc).  A current incarnation of the theory Todeva and 
Etzkowitz (2013) emphasises learning and knowledge development viewing the TH as a 
highly charged intellectual enterprise. 
 
Various authors have sought to add dimensions to the TH making it a quadruple helix.  
These include Arnkil et al (2010) who add users as the fourth leg; Lindberg et al (2010) 
adding the gender dimension; MacGregor (2010) adding eco-systems and Datta and Saad 
(2011) including international migration.  Perhaps like razors shifting from one to multiple 
blades, we now await the hexagon helix.  In 2008, Etzkowitz suggested that the TH gives 




Taking an alternative route, Dezhina and Kiseleva (2008) argue that such is the debilitating 
impact of the Russian state on innovation and entrepreneurship that Russia is a double-
helix, in want of a third leg.  
  
My point is that quite fundamental characteristics of TH theory remain unresolved: as does 
its relationship to existing bodies of literature (innovation theory, diffusion economics).  
By way of example, Deakin (2014) argues that conventional rankings of city 
innovativeness or smartness miss the point that advanced social networks, embedding 
communications and other technologies, are a major spur to innovation often neglected in 
TH theory.  Perhaps his significant contribution is to highlight the importance of learning, 
as opposed to knowledge transfer as important.  Although the author self-cites twelve 
times, Castell’s (1998) on social networks and innovation is not cited: TH theorists often 
find no need to locate their contributions within existing bodies of learning.  To reinforce 
this point, since Massey and Quintas’ (1992) pioneering work on high-tech fantasies, we 
have understood that science park developments as a business model are only successful if 
the property aspect of the business repays capital investments (in commercial rents and 
housing sales) and if the park’s businesses are situated close to a relevant pool of 
labour/choice of employment for labour.  Bellgardt et al (2014) pose the intriguing issue 
of migrating a business park into a self-sustaining city using housing developers as an 
intermediary between the TH constituents.  They do not cite Massey’s work and provide 
only sketchy evidence in a Berlin-Adlershof case study.  Nevertheless, their approach of 
identifying key intermediaries necessary to inject sustainability into geographically 
bounded TH initiatives is worthy of research.      
 
Popularity 
Leydesdorff and Fritsch (2005) note that following the UN (2000) Millennium 
Development Goals, balancing knowledge, social and business goals, the TH became 
mainstream policy alongside Porter’s (1995) promotion of clustering.  Etzkowitz (2002) 
positioned it at the ideal tool framing policy, resources and knowledge.  TH’s popularity 
arose from the perceived failure of linear technology transfer (Chang 1994; 1995; Saha et 
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al 2004) and its alignment with other policy trends such as open innovation, adoption of 
ICTs and interdisciplinary development projects.  In Dawes and Eglene (2004) terms it 
became a framing approach suitable for integrating popular policy perspectives also 
including the idea of international entrepreneurship (Blumenthal and Schlissel (2007) and 
interoperable systems (Solomon and Brown 2005). 
 
Another reason for the popularity of TH is its use as a chameleon theory: changing linkages 
and vocabulary as new ideas emerge.   Gebhardt (2015) introducing a special issue of Triple 
Helix on the city point to the limits of neo-institutionalism (without saying what these are) 
preferring instead the idea of a smart city.  They Cite Sassen (2006), who actually uses the 
term global cities and focuses primarily on financial services and international company 
headquarters, surrounded by professional services.  Take a different perspective, Burgos-
Mascarell et al (2016), reference a science fiction utopia (Roth’s Divergent, 2011) as a case 
study shows that inter-faction coordination is the key to successful innovation and that 
without it TH models unravel.  
 
In summary, TH became popular as theories of linear innovation were challenged 
(principally by evolutionary economists and entrepreneurship theorists); its enduring 
popularity in some academic circles is because of its eclectic nature and seeming usefulness 




Empirical studies framed by the TH abound: South American studies include Mello and 
Rocha (2004); Etzkowitz, Mello and Almeida (2005); Saenz (2008); Bianco and Viscardi 
(2008) and Luna and Tirtido (2008).  African examples include Konde (2004), Kruss 
(2008) and Booyens (2011).  US studies Campbell et al (2004); Feldman and Desrochers 
(2004); Boardman (2009); Wang and Shapira (2012) and European studies (Klofsten et al 
(1999); Inzelt (2004); Geuna and Nesta (2006); Lawton-Smith and Bagchi-Sen (2010); 
Geuna and Rossi (2011) and Svensson et al (2012).  Section 9.3 below will argue there is 




Methodologically these are mostly qualitative case studies neither triangulating with other 
evidence nor reintegrating with (critical and alternative) literatures.  TH remains a 
framework i.e. a set of variables without clear causal relationships (which would make it a 
model capable of prediction) or robust grounding in testable theory.  For example, Raza 
and Saad (2011) note that the TH approach has had limited success in Malaysia but do not 
draw connection to institutional thinness (Storper 1997) for example by failing to develop 
IP systems, risk capital and availability of business professionals.  Vargas (2011) analyses 
the relative success of South Korea compared to Mexico without referencing the absence 
of basic research in the latter; a similar absence can be found in Bouraoui et al’s (2011) 
analysis of South-south JVs.  Other examples include Farinha et al’s (2016) Portuguese 
case study, which examines the TH from a regional-innovation perspective (in this case 
olive harvesting) focusing on academic-industry relations, noting that where market 
growth is a restraint, attracting development finance for both academic applied research 
and business innovation is a problem: hardly a new conclusion and certainly not 
verification of TH theory.  A final example, is Breznitz’s (2007) use of TH theory to 
compare innovation regimes in Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan; a study with empirical insights 
yet since it only superficially charts the culture and context of each case, ends up revealing 
little that is new. 
 
Some newer studies are quantitative; itself troublesome, since without accepted definition 
of boundaries, variables and causal relationships quantitative testing of a systems theory 
appears precipitate.  Isaksson et al (2016) for example study patents in US high tech 
sectors, concluding that where buyers and suppliers are innovative, this creates mutually 
stimulus of innovation as a result of knowledge spillovers, whether or the buyer and 
supplier are in same sector; best if long-term relationships.  This hardly verified TH theory, 
especially since the conclusion has been known since von Hippel’s (1988) work.   Applying 
a quadrilateral TH (i.e. including arbitrageurs) and (as I show below) the equally policy-
lite NSI at a state-level, in this case Ghana, Bartels et al (2016) survey 578 relevant agents 
and after a factor analysis conclude that skill capability, market sophistication, financial 
markets and organisational risk are the main factors inhibiting innovation in Ghana.  They 
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make only general policy recommendations, such as recalibrate skills training, concluding 
that developing countries will benefits from policy initiatives strengthening their 
institutional and financial frameworks.  Again, use of the TH framework for an empirical 
study reveals nothing new.  A third example of quantitative empirical work using TH is 
Petersen et al (2016) who revise the TH model into supply, demand and technological 
capabilities, analysing meta-data on medical innovations (they incorporate TH in first) 
showing interaction between the three correlates with successful (market) innovation i.e. 
evolutionary economies uncertainty: another conclusion without making a new 
contribution.   
 
In summary, both the qualitative and quantitative empirical studies using TH as a research 
framework fail to be convincing in the validity of TH, which added to the fact that most 
offer re-definitions or new variables suggest that the theory remains too loose to be applied 
or alternatively cannot be robustly tested.  I agree with Mowery and Sampat (2004): the 
TH is problematic when empirically tested.   
 
2.7.2  Criticisms and analysis of developing economies using triple helix  
 
Recent research criticising TH reach the similar conclusions of earlier research: that the 
theory lacks rigour.  Farmer et al (2016) analysing the diffusion of 53 technologies show 
that while aggregated data provides predicable spread rates, the actual speed of a particular 
technology’s diffusion relates to the factors Schumpeter identified i.e. applied research 
migrating knowledge into products and the available of finance and markets.  Other recent 
research similarly questions any new contribution added by TH.  Noting that 
entrepreneurial risk necessarily involves uncertainty Vaivode (2015) suggests an algorithm 
for use in business modelling that allows for degrees of technical, commercial, 
organisational and social uncertainty.  This would be break-through research supporting 
TH if it were not the case that simplifying assumptions in an algorithm would be a poor 
way of building a business model.   
 
Partnering is one way of trying to create the TH interactions.  Zaini et al (2015) explore 
the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Moscow), a graduate school, 
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partnership with MIT (Boston) seeking to create a “world class” innovation centre.  
They find that ambient network factors (risk capital, clear commercial law enforcement) 
are inhibitors, not technical expertise, which is abundant especially in software and Internet 
security knowledge: hardly verifying any notable new contribution from TH.  Similarly, 
Inzelt (2015) points to the desire for effective TH-type innovation in Armenia, however, 
her analysis shows universities only beginning to build the absorptive capacity to 
productively transfer knowledge; the absence of independence from the state, HR 
shortages; in short no realistic way in which the TH applies and no policy-agenda to make 
it apply.  
 
Other recent research similarly fails to offer a robust defence of TH.  Balzer and Askonas 
(2016) set themselves the daunting task of comparing Russia and China using the TH 
model at a meta-institutional level of analysis and Etzkowitz’s (2008) precondition of 
effective state institutions.  Citing previously published data on universities, patents and 
key sector outputs, they make the case for China’s superior achievements, noting the 
important role of indigenous and IFDI private investment.  No deep discussion is offered 
of the role of advanced (development state) bureaucracy in China’s case, its entrepreneurial 
culture and history of experimentation, and the size of the Chinese market.  In short, TH 
seems to lead to mechanical simplification, rather than attracting researchers to the 
complexities of innovation systems.  A final example of apply TH is using it as an example 
of post-modern hybridity of organisational dichotomies, in particular legal intermediaries.  
Reich-Graefe (2016) suggests that such legal entities act as a fourth dimension of the TH 
offering coordination, centralisation and control functions in the TH system, he cites hybrid 
legal entities supporting innovation and goes on to explore a biotechnology university 
spinoff, startup in Helsinki (plant productivity) the failure of which he attributes to suitable 
legal frameworks for the technology.  However, in the absence of serious information about 
the product and market it is difficult to accept the research as verification of TH or the 





TH has criticised for underplaying the importance of governances (Tuunainen 2002), 
especially important since bridging academic and business governances as Vohora et al 
(2004) argue is often a barrier to commercialisation: few universities employ incubation 
mangers with business experience according to Kirkland and Stackhouse (2011).  Section 
2.5 above considers patenting versus publishing, as an example of conflicting governances.  
TH theory offers to guide university startups, bereft of legitimacy and facing (Stinchcombe 
1965) the liability of newness, without saying how to overcome these governances 
challenges.   TH is theory-lite Saad (2004) argues; it fails to integrate with other fields of 
literature representing nuanced understandings of innovation processes.  Systems 
approaches focus attention of goals, causal relationships and outcomes, yet in its recent 
synthesis with systems approaches, little of this literature is referenced.  Another example 
is the recent adoption of knowledge capital (Etzkowitz 2008).  Bourdieu’s (1985; also Burt 
1992 and Putnam 2000) idea of social capital, along with human capital (Becker 1962) and 
sexual capital (Hakim 2011) as Fine (2001) points out, inflates the concept of capital to 
make it awkward to use without qualificatory explanation.  Capital in these senses is no 
longer a ‘hard’ resource with exchange value deployed to create profit.  
 
As I argue in section 2.4.1, Chalmers’ (1982) idea of the development state (see figure-2.4 
for characteristics) has been applied only in Asian context and to some (Pempel 1999) 
constitutes an Asian development model.  My argument is that to successful shift from oil 
dependency to a KBE, KSA might examine the development state model and look to adapt 
it to a Saudi context.  In particular, the idea of national integrity and shared destiny seem 
important to KSA.  One important aspect of the development state model is using 
university-industry linkages to create new knowledge and leapfrog existing technologies 
and business models.  China appears to be successful doing this at the moment: deploying 
UIL in export orientated industries such as electric vehicles, biotechnology and ecommerce 
using UILs to develop science and technologies.  At first sight TH theory aligns with the 
development state perspective.  However, the wider socio-political aspects of the 
development state thesis (shared destiny, generational sacrifice, autonomous economic 
bureaucracy, industrial policy and labour relations) are a far wider perspective and policy 
content than TH theory.  Additionally, as I argue above, TH assumes a level of institution 
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thickness (including non-competitive institutions) unavailable to developing countries such 
as KSA (or indeed China).  Agency in the development state is led-by, but not limited to 
the state and its economic bureaucracy, agency in the TH rests with academic entrepreneurs 
with the state providing context rather than leadership.   
 
Authors such as Balzat and Hanusch (2004) note how difficult it is to use the TH framework 
in developing economies.  Institutional thinness (above) affects innovation within 
developed economies and Chang (1995) shows how technology transplants often fail 
because basic physical and people infrastructures are lacking.  Referring to the set of factors 
surrounding a phenomenon that exert some direct or indirect influence on it as a context 
effect, Whetten (2009:31) criticises TH as framing problems without creating a policy 
agenda to resolve them.  As Shapiro (2011) a dominant point in developing economies is 
that institutional thinness inhibits cross-governance working and knowledge spillovers.  
TH as a heuristic metaphor: useful despite its theoretical shallowness and difficulty 
migrating to the developing economy context.4   
 
Metaphors can be theory-constitutive (Ortony 1993) but only (Polanyi 1958:175) if used 
to structure the search for evidence; in this sense, a metaphor is a nascent theory (Llewelyn 
2003), but not a theory in Weick’s (1989) sense of ordered assertions predicting 
generalisable behaviour.  TH fits with Bhaskar’s (1979) notion of practical adequacy: ways 
of thinking the validity of which is contextual (Burrell and Morgan 1979), relating to a 
particular conceptual system (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) but falling short of precision or 
propositionality (Black 1979).  It is in this sense that the triple helix is a heuristic metaphor. 
 
2.7.4  Summary 
 
                                                 
4  Kuhn (1970:210) suggests that metaphoric thought is essential to science.  In musing around comparisons 
Gummesson (1991) argues, similes create new meanings or suggest other logical similarities i.e. analogies.  
Dawkins (1986:195) argues that, the human mind is an inveterate analogiser.  For Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
metaphors aid understanding by linking the unfamiliar to the familiar: imagineering in which meanings evolve, 
become redundant (Schwarz 1988) or disconnect from their origins - what Penfield and Dura (1988) call quotes 
from the ancestors.  Metaphors are often used declaratively for textual emphasis or as Kövecses (2002) suggests 




Reviewing almost two decades of research on TH reveals that empirical studies (both 
empirical and [more recently] quantitative, have failed to substantiate the theory.  A string 
of critiques over its inapplicability to developing economies, characterised by thinner 
institutional arrangements, is unanswered.  Theoretically, as the above section 
demonstrates, the theory remains loosely constructed in terms of what the variable are, how 
they are defined and how they causally relate to each other.  Many of the empirical studies 
fail to make contributions adding to existing understanding, for example on the need for 
risk capital, stable legal arrangements and universities with the absorptive capacity to 
translate formal knowledge into new products.  Other research shows the limited usefulness 
of TH in comparative research.  I conclude that although TH is part of the dominant 
discourse on developing economies and universities, it is best used as a heuristic metaphor 
and not as either an analytical framework or policy guide. 
   
2.8  Clustering / knowledge spills   
 
Clustering and knowledge spills only adjacently connect with my research, however some 
of the concepts feature in interviews and policy documents; therefore this short section 
defines terms and maps the terrain. 
 
The allure of Silicon Valley is making the desert fertile: knowledge-based jobs creating 
world-leading products and technologies: technological cluster with a silicon landscape 
(Hall and Markusen 1985), a new western sunrise (Hall et al 1987).  Effective clustering 
may take 50 years (Saxenian 1985): to establish social networks (Castells and Hall 1994) 
and knowledge-laden supply chains (Oakey 1985).  This helps explain, the multi-





Figure 2.6: Five institutional Approaches to spatially focused 
innovation showing theoretical frameworks important 
 
 
My focus is on creating and spilling knowledge spillover and supporting purposive 
business networks, noting that physical infrastructure does not guarantee success (Massey 
et al 1992); that insularity endangers cluster sustainability (Harrison 1994) and that cluster 
governances entail some degree of loose-coupling (Grabher 1993).   
 
Figure 2.7 conveys the interaction between place (physical) space (social): Yi Fu Tuan’s 
(1977; 1979) sense of place as more multifaceted than simple agglomeration of businesses 
(Marshall 1919) and now found in new economic geography (Harvey 1996; Soija 1996 and 
Krugman 1998).  Ironically, as Castells and Himanen (2002) and Stiglitz (2002) point out 
the more economies globalise – in the knowledge-based era – the more localised 






Figure 2.7 depths and breadth of cluster relations 
(Source: Kinder and Molina 2001) 
 
Learning and knowledge flows are then an important result of clustering: my research 
examines why the location of incubators contiguous with universities, targeting incubation, 
so often fail to deliver where   requisite variety (Lundvall 1992) is lacking.  
Unlike academic knowledge that is based around excludability (Zuker et al 1994) spillover 
in business networks overcomes Baldwin and Scott’s (1987) appropriability problem by 
sharing standards, exchanging staff and social discourse.  The costs of gaining from 
knowledge spillovers are continued membership of the business network and maintaining 
sufficient absorptive capacity to appreciate the learning (Langlois and Robertson 1996).  
Audretsch and Stephen (1999) argue that cluster members give because they get though 
spilling knowledge he also argues (1998) can be incentivised by good relationship at a 




2.10  Commercialisation of knowledge     
 
Here I argue that figures on university commercialisation are opaque and even more so 
their subsequent growth and diffusion i.e. the final desired outcomes.   Spinouts UK (2014) 
list 2,000 UK university spinouts surviving at the end of a ten-year period (i.e. 200 a year 
from 162 universities - less than two per university per year).  Some universities (2000 to 
2010 figures) perform better: Imperial (59) Edinburgh (49), Cambridge (44), Warwick (36) 
and Strathclyde (35).  Given that university spinouts have a higher survival rate and often 
exploit research, their economic impact may be greater than typical startups.  In the UK, 
90,000 businesses start each year, adding a net 50,000 to the total of 2.8 million UK 
businesses.  An unknown number of companies follow the Xerox strategy and spinout 
companies each year.  University spinouts are then a small proportion of company startups 
or total spinouts making evaluation of their lasting impact important. 
 
2.10.1  What is commercialisation  
 
Professionalised (often university) research (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998; MacGarview 
and Furman 2005) and university-industry links (UILs), especially applied research 
(Rothaermel et al 2007) is intended to create product and process innovations.  Many 
universities Markman et al (2008) note, now feature commercialisation (figure 2.9) as part 
of their mission (along with teaching and research).  UIL suggests also embedding business 
problem solving in pedagogies and a focus on career preparation (Abreu et al 2009) and 
close interactions with businesses (Perkmann and Walsh 2008) eg in conferences, shared 
staff and wider networking (D’Este and Patel 2007) including joint projects, contract 
research or services such as consultancy or testing (Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga (1994).   
 
Businesses rarely fund basic university research: as Perkmann (2011) suggests 
commercialisation more often involves universities setting business-related parameters to 
applied research.  Since only proprietary knowledge has financial value, (Shane 2004), 
protecting intellectual property (IP) is important and often (Mayer 2003) part of formal 
commercialisation agreements. The incentive to commercialise may be individual or 
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organisational or joint (Agrawal 2006); for example with researchers being given equity as 




Figure 2.9: Three dimensions of UILs 
 
Research (Klofsten et al 2000; De’Este and Permann 2011) suggests that whilst c20% of 
academics participates in formal UIL, less than half of these (i.e. 10%) participate in 
commercialisation.  Participating researchers, Bozeman and Gaughan (2007) and 
Boardman and Corley (2008) argue, are more likely to be male, senior, attached to 
dedicated research centres, to also be successful at publishing and (Carayol and Matt 2004) 
to work in larger research centres.  Markman et al (2005) and Phan and Siegel (2006) find 
that universities with commercialisation units are more likely to commercialise than those 
without (Audretsch and Lehman 2005).  Some disciplines, such as medicine and 
engineering Bekkers et al (2008) are more prone to commercialise.  Institutional 
arrangements such as the US Bayh-Dole Act and intense competition for tenure and 
promotion incentivises commercialisation argue Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001); 
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however, Mowery et al (2005) suggest that EU universities have now closed this gap by 
establishing commercialisation units.  
 
My research focuses more on processes and outcomes than inputs, specifically university-
related incubation as a form of commercialisation and the influence of institutions and 
culture on its success. 
 
2.10.2  Crossing governances and commercialisation strategies 
 
Much of the literature on commercialisation is from the university perspective when as 
Barnes, Pahsby and Gibbons (2002), Lambert (2003) and Wilson (2012) point out, from 
the business perspective academics and universities can be challenging partners: crossing 
between public and private sector governances is problematic.   
 
Generic UIL appears quite successful in the UK.  Wilson (2012) for example points to 
action learning pedagogies, Professional doctorates; skills and careers including business 
mentoring; workplace placements and active learning projects, and business people on 
advisory boards.  As Murray and Stern (2007) note, the impact over time of such initiatives 
is difficult to measure; also the case with patenting, which may or may not result in 
innovation or economic activity (Lissoni et al 2008).  Collinson and Gregson’s (2003) 
study of CONNECT in Edinburgh noted that whilst initiatives may bring researchers and 
business people together it cannot be assumed that scientific breakthroughs address market 
gaps, a conclusion Lockett et al (2005) endorses.  Noting the limited success of university 
commercialisation efforts, Chapple et al (2005) argue that they lack business skills and 
recommend school-level units led by business people. 
 
Some of the issues frustrating potential business partners include overvaluation of historic 
IP, the time taken to register IP (Markman et al 2005), deviation (back into basic research) 
rather than sticking to a business plan.  However, the most significant issue businesses raise 
in relation to cross-governance working with academic (BioEnt 2014, is their 




2.10.3  Commercialisation in other developing countries 
 
Appendix-two gives some detail of commercialisation in China and India noting in 
particular the state intervention in creating joint university-industry applied research 
projects and close UILs and including access to risk capital.  This lengthy section is placed 
in appendices so as not to interrupt the flow of my literature review.   
 
In summary, governances and their embedded cultured significantly effect processes of 
commercialisation – a prominent theme through my research. 
 
2.11  Chapter summary: gaps and arguments  
 
In this, the first of two literature review chapters, I have analysed the relevance to 
commercialisation in KSA of previous research and the theorisations shown in figure 2.1, 
setting the context in which commercialisation occurs.  My next chapter turns to the 
position of the individual entrepreneur and how s/he operates within this context; this will 
be followed (chapter 4) by the development of a conceptual framework.  Here I summarise 
gaps and arguments in the literature. 
 
Section 1 argued for an active Vygotskian social perspective on learning on knowledge, 
disputing theorisations, such as Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) theory of learning 
organisations and Wenger’s (1998) communities of practice from the viewpoint that they 
decentre individual cognition.  I further argued that from a commercial viewpoint, the 
usefulness of knowledge in providing new solutions to customer problems is privileged.  I 
will therefore argue that successful commercialisation of TTs (presuming absorptive 
capacity) requires active learning processes, evidence for which data will reveal (or not).  
 
Citing regulation theorists such as Boyer (1988) and the work of Freeman (1982) on 
innovation, section two argued that a KBE is characterised by shortened innovation cycles 
between science and technology; doing so requires alignment between society and 




Institution-building is a crucial factors in KBE economic development; that thick 
institutions and untraded interdependencies take time and resources to create (far more than 
technology transfer); that creating an entrepreneurial habitus (referencing chapter 2) is 
difficult and that active agency by key individuals makes an important difference.  
Referencing the discussion in section three and Amin’s (1994) idea of thick institutions 
able to learn, innovate and reach international markets: I argue that some KSA institutions 
are too thin to successfully deliver their target technologies also that NIS and TH are poor 
guides to action in developing economies. 
 
The phenomenal growth rates and technological innovation in East Asia highlights the 
importance of the state in development processes (Chalmers 1982).   Figure 2.4 in section 
4 suggests a set of characteristics for the development state, of particular importance in the 
autonomous economic bureaucracy.  Research on KSA has focused on resource-abundancy 
and oil economics (Auty 2001); I argue that KSA could become an Arabic development 
state and analyse the implications of this for policy making and its implementation, in 
particular Bellin’s (2004) argument that at some stage in development the state privileges 
entrepreneurship and private property rights above other social values. 
 
The role played by universities in developing economies seems to switch from primarily 
training to applied and later basic research (Liefner and Schiller (2008).  It is not clear in 
relation to its (5 year plan) target technologies what absorptive capacity exists in KSA 
universities and how much basic research is undertaken.  My research will analyse the 
extent to which (section 2.5) tension between publishing and patenting are resolved by 
doing both and cultural inhibitions and enablers of commercialisation amongst academics. 
 
Section 6 explored the nature of SSIs arguing that they are best conceptualised (Memon et 
al (2014) as closely coupled systems rather than looser networks and critically depend on 
the their quality of leadership for success i.e. effective active agency.  My empirical 




My research explores the degree to which social networking in and knowledge flows 
operate in KSA clusters (section 8 above), the metrics for their measurement and 
effectiveness at achieving outcomes; I will draw attention to the differential relationship 
with global knowledge flows between the UK and KSA. 
 
Section 9 highlights the wide range of value-adding services necessary to incubate high-
value, knowledge-based products, I will argue that to bridge academic/business 
governances management of incubators and their industry linkages is best done by business 
management of incubators. 
 
Finally, arising from section 10, which considered the nature of commercialisation and its 
measurement I will argue that existing quantitative and cost-benefit data in both the UK 





CHAPTER-3  ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND COMMERCIALISATION  
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
Rapid technological change, shorter product lifecycles and intensifying global competition 
have radically transformed the competitive position of many developing economies. With 
the drive to generate knowledge based employment opportunities, policy makers now place 
a greater emphasis on the role of universities in the commercialisation of scientific and 
innovations. 
 
Etzkowitz’s (1998) term entrepreneurial university describes universities having proven 
themselves critical to regional economic development.  Although some authors refer to 
European universities (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000; Jones-Evans, 1999), the case of MIT 
is the reference example (Roberts 1991; Etzkowitz 2002).  By encouraging faculty 
members to pursue private ventures outside the research lab, the Bank of Boston (1997) 
calculated that MIT start-up companies generated $240 billion worth of sales per year and 
provided an additional 1.1 million new jobs to the US economy.  The University of Texas 
at Austin is similarly cited for the Austin Technology Incubator (Gibson and Smilor 1991), 
with academic entrepreneurship describing individual contributions. 
 
 
Knowledge creation and knowledge exploitation and technology-based entrepreneurship is 
now a strategic priority (; section 2.1); acknowledged by the World Economic Forum 
global competitiveness report (2003) as competitive advantages replacing comparative 
advantage i.e. accumulating knowledge capital. 
 
Economies looking to meet the aim of developing a comparative advantage based on the 
enhancement and exploitation of the national knowledge base must look to foster 
university-based entrepreneurship as a central component of their strategy to develop a 
knowledge-based society (OECD 1998). This is particularly so because of the closing time 
gap between science and technology (section 2.2).  The ability to develop technologically 
sophisticated and knowledge led regions has already provided Greater Boston and Silicon 
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Valley regions with wealth creation and quality of life improvements (Kenney 2000; 
Roberts 1991).  As a result, governments increasingly recognise the need to support the 
process of technological change with the aim of spawning high-growther, knowledge-
intensive companies from university research.  
 
3.2   Academic entrepreneurship 
 
Wood (2011) suggests that business innovations supporting entrepreneurship are 
increasingly emerging from university research giving rise to academic entrepreneurs, 
which Gulbrandsen (2005) defines as,  
 
… researchers that have patented their research results, started a new science/technology-
based firm or otherwise contributed to the commercialisation of research-based ideas and 
knowledge. 
 
Note that the academic entrepreneur has commercial intent (Henrekson and Rosenberg 
2001) in addition to research i.e. patenting/licensing and/or spin-off company formation.  
Meyer (2003) distinguishes academic entrepreneurs (adapting to applied research and grant 
opportunities) from entrepreneurial academics who have business intent i.e. a dual role.  I 
use the term academic entrepreneur to refer to a wide range of activities various emphasises 
by researchers: invention disclosure to TTOs (Goktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar 2009), 
applied research for industry consultancy to higher involvement like patent licensing 
(Mowery and Ziedonis 2002), technology transfers and spinoff creation (Gartner 1988).  
My focus is on the processes by which academic entrepreneurs migrate scientific 
knowledge to a commercial purpose, similar to Renault (2006).  Academic entrepreneurs 
here are individuals that have, 
 
...patented an invention or are intending to patent their past research results or have 
started a spin-off or are planning to start a spin-off based on their past research results.  
 
I include both spinoff companies and patenting following previous researchers including 
Lam (2010), Ambos, Makela, Birkinshaw and D‘Este (2008), Renault (2006), Gulbrandsen 
(2005).  As D‘Este and Perkmann (2011), researchers doing (for example) joint or contract 
research or consultancy often have shorter time frames and more limited aspirations than 
researchers patenting or spinning out companies.  As Shane (2004) notes, such is the 
time/expense of IP protection, academic entrepreneurs undertaking such work demonstrate 
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a higher order of commercial intent than those doing short-term work.  Finally, I note with 
Dasgupta and David (1987) that unlike industrial R&D professionals, with whom academic 
entrepreneurs may share activities, the latter face a conscious choice to commercialise.   
 
Many European universities now provide dedicated support staff and facilities in science 
parks or incubators to support commercialisation (Albert et al 2002; Dahlstrand 1999; 
Dahlstrand and Klofsten 2003; and Stankiewicz 1998) accompanying industrial liaison 
offices (ILO) and technology transfer offices (TTOs), (Rasmussen 2006; Rasmussen et al 
2007). 
 
The spin-off process takes place in the interface between the university or research 
organisation and industry, and the process will to a significant extent depend on specific 
features of the university environment and milieu as well as the more general industrial 
and socio-cultural environment (Virtanen and Laukkanen 2002, Spilling 2008). The ability 
to identify and develop business opportunities will depend on a number of factors in this 
environment, including the entrepreneurial culture of the academic milieu, and so will the 
further processes of commercialization. The key driving force, however, is entrepreneurial 
leadership, act between academic and business governances and create effective business 
linkages.  The institutional set-up may facilitate these processes, and in our analyses we 
will briefly comment on these aspects.  My main focus, however, will be on the processes 
of commercialization and the role of academic staff in these processes, contrasting KSA 
with the UK. 
 
3.3  The Determinants and Consequences of University Start Up Activity 
 
Roberts’ (1991) work on spinoffs at MIT initiated research on academic entrepreneurs, 
followed by Clark’s (1988) cross-national study of five highly successful European 
universities that identified elements common among successful entrepreneurial 
institutions, including the following. 
 
 Strong top-down leadership that supporting and encouraging processes of academic 
entrepreneurship and merging an entrepreneurial objective with the traditional values 
of the university; 
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 Strong ties between the university and industry in research projects of mutual gain and 
robust structures, policies and procedures to enable such activity (for example, 
industrial liaison offices and flexible contracting procedures); 
 A diversified funding base such as industry and private benefactors, though much of 
university funding is still derived from government sources; 
 A strong academic base, what the authors referred to as a steeple of excellence 
approach, whereby the universities recruited the top candidates in those fields where it 
has built its steeple. Tenure and academic promotions are granted solely on academic 
achievement and not due to individual entrepreneurial endeavours; 
 An entrepreneurial culture that embraces change and sustains the fundamental values 
of the institution. 
 
A body of research that has explored individual determinants of spin-off activity underpins 
such findings.  
 
Existing literature can be divided into six distinct research streams: (1) the individual and 
personality correlating with spinoffs; (2) organisational configuration studies explaining 
spin-offs in terms of university resources allocations; (3) socio-cultural studies explaining 
spinoff activity in terms of culture and the rewards; (4) studies explaining spinoffs in terms 
of external environmental; (5) studies measuring spinoff performance; and (6) studies 
measuring economic impact.  I structure my literature review around these themes. 
 
3.4   Spin-offs and commercialization  
 
Section XX above analyses commercialisation from an innovation perspective, here I tease 
out its implications for a key set of agents: academic entrepreneurs.  Although patenting is 
important, spinout companies are the archetypal commercialisation, often used as a vehicle 
to exploit a patent or some form of IP protection.  I define university spin-offs similarly to 
Nicolaou and Birley (2003) as the transfer of a core technology from an academic 
institution into a new company, where the founding members include the academic 
inventor who may or may not be currently affiliated with the academic institution.  
Unfortunately, much of the literature on academic entrepreneurship adopts a superficial 
(stages or deterministic) perspective on the entrepreneur, a gap my research helps to fill, 
by focusing on the entrepreneurial process i.e. quite different from simple ‘output’ surveys. 
 




Spinoff and technology transfer (TT) processes aim to commercially exploit new 
knowledge (Chiesa and Piccaluga 1998).  As Spilling and Godø (2008) argue, the concept 
of commercialization may be identified as the process of transferring and transforming 
theoretical knowledge as existing in an academic institution into some kind of commercial 
activity. 
 
In the literature, I find a number of different approaches for analysing commercialization 
processes, and generally these approaches are based on a stage model approach (Jolly 1997, 
Virtanen and Laukkanen 2002).  For instance, Ndonzuau, Pirnay and Surlemont (2002) 
distinguish between the following four stages: 
 
1. Generate business ideas from research 
2. Finalise new venture projects out of ideas 
3. Launch spin-off firms from projects 
4. Strengthen the creation of economic value by spin-off firms. 
 
As discussed by Spilling and Godø (2008), an important aspect of commercialization 
processes is shifting from mainly technology-driven (push) activities towards processes 
that are mainly (pull) market-driven.  This implies that scientific concepts and principles 
are turned into viable technologies and products or services, which means that knowledge 
is transformed from one mode to another (Chisa and Piccaluga 1998; Fontes 2003, 2005). 
 
During the commercialization process, agents may go back and forth between the stages, 
partly they may combine elements from different stages simultaneously, or important 
elements from different stages may come in a different order.  The agents will also depend 
on interaction and communication with a number of other actors belonging to the business 
community as well as the research community.  So, interaction across stages and 
organisational boundaries are most important for the process. 
 
On this background, the innovation process may be termed as ‘chaotic’ and as an 
innovation journey (Van de Ven et al 1999).  However, a basic feature of 
commercialization of R&D is that it implies some kind of linearity in the sense that the 
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process necessarily will take the existing knowledge base as its point of departure, and the 
new project will start out based on the existing knowledge base. 
 
3.4.2   Academics in academic spin-offs 
 
A spinoff is a company is based on knowledge resources from a parent organisation 
becoming autonomous from the parent organisation (Birley 2002; Carayannis et al 1998; 
Dahlstrand 1999, 2000; Nicolaou and Birley 2003, Shane 2004, Steffensen et al 2004). 
Different terminologies may be applied, such as academic spinoff, university spinoff or 
R&D spinoffs; the concept of spinout is applied synonymously.  The spinoff is originated 
in an academic institution, and the entrepreneurs generally have their background as 
academic scientists.  New ventures are based on the intellectual assets of the parent 
organisation (Birley 2002), and the process is typically characterised by an employee 
exiting (entirely or in part) from this organisation in order to start the new company 
(Carayannis et al 1998, Steffensen et al 2004).  To qualify as a spinoff, the new business 
must be based on a business idea which originated in the previous organisation (Dahlstrand 
2000); the new business is based on intellectual property developed in the parent 
organisation (Birley 2002; Carayannis et al 1998) and may include the transfer of IP rights.  
 
Pirnay et al (2002) argue that a spinoff fulfils the following three conditions. 
 
• It takes place within an existing organization, generally known as the ‘parent 
organization’ 
• It involves one or several individuals, whatever their status and function are within the 
‘parent organization’ 
• These individuals leave the ‘parent organization’ to create a new one. 
 
While much of the literature is focused on spinoffs resulting in wholly new firms, the 
concept may also include cases in which the new business activity is developed in an 
existing firm by way of selling licenses for obtaining the rights to exploit commercially the 
new technology (Shane 2002; Hill 1995). This also is a common way of organising 
technology transfer.  The main point is not whether the spin-off ends up in a new firm, but 
that the result of the process is the creation of a new business activity, and independent of 
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it is organised as a new legal business unit or it is adopted by an incumbent firm which 
organise the new business activity internally.  
 
According to Roberts and Malone (1996) and Carayannis et al (1998), four types of agency 
are important: the parent organisation, the technology originator, the entrepreneur and the 
venture investor (see figure 3.1).   
 
A typical way of organising a spin-off is that one or more of the scientists who have 
contributed to developing the technological innovation, organise the new business and 
leave the parent organisation when the new venture is started.  This is what Birley (2002) 
characterises as an ‘orthodox’ spin-off, which is characterized by a ‘clean break’, that is 
the scientists previously employed by the parent organisation, leave to start the new 
business. This implies, referring to the types of actors summarised in figure 3.1, that the 
scientist initially has the role as technology originator, and then follows up by taking the 
role as entrepreneur. 
 







Host and organise R&D activities to create 
technological 
innovations. May also serve as a facilitator 




Individual or group of 
engineers or scientists 
 
Bring the technological innovation through the 
innovation-development process; bring the process 
to the point where technology transfer is possible 
Entrepreneur  Engineers, scientists; 
‘external’ person with 
business knowledge 
Identify the business idea and develop the new 
business venture based on the technological 
innovation; take the technology to create a new 




Venture capital organization, 
business angles, 
informal investors 
Provide the financial resources to develop the new 
venture, may also provide needed business 
management expertise 
 
Figure 3.1: Main actors and their primary roles in the spin-off process 
Source: Based on Roberts and Malone 1996 and Carayannis et al 1998 
 
Birley (2002) introduces two other categories of spinouts: technology spinout and hybrid 
spinout; the former entails an external agent  (investor, manager or company) buying or 
leasing the IP rights, the academic entrepreneur remains in the parent organisation, creating 
no overlapping personnel although they may contribute to the new venture development as 
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consultants and equity holders. The third category, the hybrid spinout, represents a 
combination of the two previous categories; the new venture is based on a joint 
organisation of external and internal actors.   
 
Figure 3.2 summarises other typologies of spinouts suggested by Dickson, Coles and Smith 
(1998); Fontes 2003; Jones Evans (1997); Radosevitch (1995).  Fontes (2003) is quite 
similar Birley (2003). While Birley distinguishes between orthodox, technology and hybrid 
spinoffs, Fontes differentiates insider and outsider-conducted commercialisation and 
intermediary conducted process as the third category.  The insider conducted process 
corresponds to the orthodox spinoff as it is the scientific staff – the insiders – who conduct 
the process, while the technology spin-offs corresponds to the outsider conducted process. 
However, while the orthodox spin-off as defined by Birley implies that the scientific staff 
involved in the process leave the university – it is a ‘clean break’ - this is not the primary 
focus in the typology of Fontes; her emphasis is on who conducts the process, whether they 
maintain their relationships with the research organisation or not. Furthermore, there is also 
a difference in the way the third category is defined. While Birley regard the hybrid type 
as a mixture of the orthodox and the technology spin-off, the third category in the case of 
Fontes focus explicitly on intermediary organisations as potential actors in the process of 
commercialisation. 
 
Radosevitch (1995) distinguishes two models of commercialisation of public sector 
technology: the inventor-entrepreneur model in which the scientist takes the role as 
entrepreneur and organises the new venture; and secondly the surrogate-entrepreneur 
model in which an external actor takes the role as entrepreneur. The advantage of the first 
model is that the technology originators organise the entrepreneurial process, and in this 
way provide greater technical capacity and have commitment to the technology and good 
relationships with the technology source.  On the other hand this model implies 
disadvantages in terms of less experience from entrepreneurial activities and less business 
knowledge (Radosevitch 1995). The champion of the business idea is seldom the best to 
manage (Clarysse and Morey 2004). The advantages and disadvantages of the second 
model, the surrogate entrepreneur model, go in the opposite direction.  Advantages are 
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related to entrepreneurial experience and good contacts with the business community, 
while relationships with the technology originators will be less developed. 
 
Author Typology of spin-offs/ 
entrepreneurial roles 
Definitions/comments 
Birley 2002 Orthodox spinout  
Technology spinout  
Hybrid spinout  
Scientist(s) leave to form the new company –‘clean break’ 
Outside actor organizes the commercial exploitation 
Combination of inside and outside actors 






Insiders of the research organisation (RO) 
exploring knowledge originating from RO 
Outsiders who establish relationships to gain access to an 
RO to assist development of business ideas 
Outsiders or (more rarely) insiders who operate as 
intermediaries in technology transfer as a business 
Radosevitch 
1995 
Inventor entrepreneur model  
Surrogate entrepreneur 
model 
Scientist(s)/inventor(s) organise the new 
venture 
External actor with entrepreneurial experience 








Scientific entrepreneur  
Scientist who engages in entrepreneurial endeavours, but 
maintain their identity as academic scientists. 
Scientist operating full-time in the new business 
essentially dedicated to scientific interests. 
Integration of scientific and business interests, utilising a 









User technical entrepreneur 
Opportunist entrepreneur 




Figure 3.2: Spin-offs and entrepreneurial roles 
 
Jones-Evans (1997) suggests a different framework distinguishing types of entrepreneurs 
by their background; that is in research or as producer, user or opportunist.  The first 
category will coincide with the inventor entrepreneur model, while the other three relates 
to the surrogate entrepreneur model in which the process is organised by external actors 
with backgrounds from different positions in the business community. 
 
3.4.3   The role and culture of academic staff 
 
The degree to which academics transgress governances and become involved in business 
building is thus an important differentiating aspect for types of commercialisation: does 
the academic remain or cease to be an academic?  The typology suggested by Dickson et 
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al (1998) is interesting in this respect as it distinguishes between academic entrepreneur, 
entrepreneurial scientist and scientific entrepreneur. The academic entrepreneur maintains 
his or her identity as academic scientist, remaining affiliated with the parent organisation. 
In contrast the entrepreneurial scientist migrates full-time to the new venture dedicated to 
scientific interests.  The third category, scientific entrepreneur migrates to the new venture 
participating fully in business decisions (Dickson et al 1998:36).  Samson and Gurdon 
(1993) find that a majority of academic entrepreneurs prefer migrating to the new venture, 
adopting business governances and cutting ties with academic governances, though a 
minority adopt Dickson’s halfway house stance.  Birley’s (2002) findings are similar. 
 
3.5   Academic entrepreneurship factors 
 
General entrepreneurship literature often focused upon the individual attributes of the 
entrepreneur whereas Clarysse et al (2011) find that academic entrepreneurs literature 
concentrates on the outcomes rather than contribution of individual agents to the processes.   
Clearly as Owen-Smith and Powel (2001) argue, the individual acts within the context of 
the academic organisation, such as the quality of technology transfer and 
commercialisation support units and related university governances.  Here, I take 
Rothaermel et al ’s (2007) list of contextual factors affecting academic entrepreneurship 
and explore their influences on commercialisation processes such as incentives, status, 
location, culture, faculty, intermediary agents, policy, experience, defined role and identity 
and technology.  
 
3.5.1   Effort – Entrepreneurial commitment  
 
To what extent do levels of commitment to exploit knowledge influence academic’s 
exploitation route?  Yang and Chang (2009) argue that limited commitment pulls 
academics into consultancy rather than spinoff companies, whereas Smith and Parr (2003) 
suggest that many academics are simply not interested in commercialisation. 
 
Currently, the primary focus of university and majority of faculty members is on teaching 
and research work; therefore, time accessibility is an important determinant whether an 
academic scientist will be willing to engage in entrepreneurial activities. (Chang, Yang and 
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Chen, 2009, Lach and Schankerman, 2004) By exploring different knowledge 
combinations scientists can achieve innovation. The primary factors that lead to the 
innovation are individual‘s effort, ability and knowledge (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004, 
Sauermann and Cohen, 2010).  Allocation of effort will determine the performance of the 
activity.  Going beyond the standards of effort will lead to higher ability; additionally as 
Kahneman (1973) notes, all risk taking entails an emotional commitment.  Since academic 
entrepreneurs are expected to wear two hats (i.e. basic and applied research), it is important 
to see how much time (effort) do they devote for commercialisation activities (cooperating 
with industry, doing applied research, filing patents or starting/working on spinoff 
company) and for traditional science (teaching, basic research, paper publication, attending 
conferences).  
 
Some empirical tests have shown that academic scientists who have engaged in 
entrepreneurial activities such as filing patents or/and starting spin-off activities, or just 
collaborated with industry have allocated less time for teaching and basic research 
activities (Fini, Lactera, Shane, 2010).  However, there is not unanimous opinion on the 
impact of entrepreneurial effort and if it sacrifices basic research activities. Stephan et al 
(2007) finds that patents do not crowd-out researcher‘s publications amount. While Yang 
and Chang (2009) outline that faculty members will need to devote substantial time for 
applying and also maintaining the patent – in many cases the researcher will need to consult 
the licensee on how the patented technology works and should be developed (Smith and 
Parr 2003).  These findings are also very dependent on academic‘s age and tenure position 
– older faculty members are more likely to do both patenting and publishing without 
sacrificing the other (Geuna and Nesta 2006).  Another belief is that if an academic 
entrepreneur allocates more time for applied research relative to basic research it does not 
mean that the basic research is receiving less time than before but rather that leisure time 
will be sacrificed (Thursby et al, 2007).  Despite these findings, the concerns of the majority 
of faculty members are still based on the prejudice that engagement in research result 
protection and commercialization will be very time-consuming and will take time off their 
academic activities.  As a result some researchers are reluctant to put even the slightest 
effort into commercial activities. (Smith and Parr, 2003).  If only scientists would spend 
 
 88 
more time with industry people it would already increase the probability of patent filing, 
based on empirical findings of Fini et al (2010). Thus leading to the derivation of the 
actuality that the more time individual spends on cooperating with industry, doing applied 
research, filing patents and/or starting/working on spin-off, the higher the probability that 
the individual will be an academic entrepreneur.  
 
 
3.5.2   Effort – mediating effects  
 
Numerous studies find that higher incentives improve mean performance.  Extrinsic and 
intrinsic incentives can affect individual‘s attention and therefore affect cognitive functions 
(Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).  However, some incentives not only improve average 
performance but sometimes can also hinder it.  For example, an intrinsically motivated 
employee will not increase performance in an easy job if the extrinsic incentives are raised 
(Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) or extrinsic incentives might even reduce creativity of 
intrinsically motivated individual (Amabile, Hennessey, and Grossman, 1986).  At the 
same time, some studies have shown that monetary incentives do increase scientist‘s 
productivity (Lach and Schankerman, 2003).  Therefore, it is important to identify the 
appropriate incentives for commercialisation activities so that the individual would decide 
to spend more time on it.   Effort only improves performance if the match is good, (Camerer 
and Hogarth, 1999).  According to Owen-Smith and Powell’s (2001) study, an academic 
researcher‘s decision to disclose and commercialize his/her invention depends on the 
following factors: (1) perception of personal and professional benefits of 
commercialization – motivation; (2) perception about time and cost of engaging in 
commercialization activities – decision on the amount of effort to devote; and (3) general 
attitude of technology transfer/commercialisation activities.  Only if individuals are 
motivated enough they will devote more hours for entrepreneurial activities that will lead 
to commercialization outcomes. Therefore from this reasoning we can conclude that the 
Level of effort is a mediating effect between individual’s commercialization motivation and 
academic entrepreneurship. 
 




A number of studies highlight the importance of entrepreneurial attributes in shaping the 
individual's behaviour and whether an academic will establish a spin-off business.  Other 
researchers have stressed the role personality; motivation and disposition play in 
influencing academic entrepreneurship. Some studies have used psychological models to 
explain spin-off departure from universities. These studies emphasise the impact of 
individual abilities and dispositions on the entrepreneurial behaviour of academics.  This 
stream of research shares a common theme: that spin-off behaviour is a reflection of 
individual actions and therefore is largely due to the personality, ability or willingness of 
the individual to engage successfully in entrepreneurial behaviour. Roberts (1991), for 
example, found that academic entrepreneurs with outgoing, extroverted personalities were 
more likely to engage in spin-off activity.  From a study of almost 130 technical 
entrepreneurs and almost 300 scientists and engineers, he concluded that personal 
characteristics such as the need for achievement, the desire for independence and an 
internal locus of control were common in both groups. Tenure in universities and 
occupational and research skill levels amongst academics are also found to impact 
university spin-off behaviour. Audretsch's (2000) analysis of academic entrepreneurs 
found that university entrepreneurs tended to be older and more scientifically experienced 
than typical high-technology entrepreneurs.  Similarly, Zucker et al. (1998), using data on 
California biotechnology companies, found that scientific stars collaborating with firms 
had substantially higher citation rates than pure academic stars. 
 
3.5.4   Incentives of academic entrepreneurship 
 
Here I consider the personal, professional and political incentives to academic 
entrepreneurship.   
 
3.5.4.1  Personal income incentives 
 
One of the reasons why academic entrepreneurship emerged was because scientists such 
as creators of biotechnology firms in 1970s and 1980s realized the significant financial 
benefits that potentially could come from their research outcomes. First the thought of 
making money out of research results was unacceptable but with time many academics 
started to see the opportunities it did provide.  These advancements in science were not 
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present only in biotechnology but in other disciplines as well, even linguistics research 
found its place and commercialization potential in computer and software industry. 
(Etzkowitz 1998) 
 
The main form of payment to academics is salary.  However, this provides no incentive to 
further research inventions towards commercialization since the remuneration is not tied 
to the outcome of researcher‘s activities.  Therefore, different monetary structures have 
been introduced that link commercialization activities with performance-based payment 
and/or equity compensations. (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2002) This has been done with the 
argumentation that researchers will disclose their invention to TTO only if they see proper 
benefits of patenting, start-up formation, industry collaboration (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2001) especially due to the scarcity of research resources (Markman, 2004).  Monetary 
compensation and profit motives are emphasized in Etzkowitz (1998) work of 
entrepreneurial scientist. Some research has emphasized that universities that provide 
higher monetary rewards linked to commercialization involvement shows higher 
individual motivation to commercialise (patent) more (Goktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar 
2009).  Sieget et al. (2003) found that secondary motive of university scientist is financial 
gain and a desire to secure additional research funding and if technology transfer office 
will be perceived as productive and offering personal compensations for engagement, 
scientists will be more motivated to disclose their inventions to TTO.  Lach provides 
similar findings and Schankerman (2003) that shows empirical findings that monetary 
rewards linked to scientist‘s inventions increases the incentives to patent. Another 
argument in favour of importance of monetary incentives is scientist reflection on 
commercialization barriers. According to empirical study of Siegel et al (2003), significant 
amount of scientists reported insufficient rewards to faculty members for university-
industry involvement activities.  The incentive effects work both on the level of effort and 
selection of academics (Baldini 2010). 
 
However, the view, whether personal financial incentives increase commercial activities 
of academic scientists, is not unanimous since previous results have shown contrasting 
empirical results (Baldini 2010).  Several studies have hypothesized for significant and 
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high relationship between commercialization rewards and commercialization outputs but 
have resulted in minor importance (Friedman and Silberman, 2003). Colyvas et al. (2002) 
also find small or no role of financial incentives on faculty member motivation to engage 
in innovation producing research projects.  Gulbrandsen (2005) researched academic‘s 
different motivations to patent and financial incentives were not among the most important.  
Markman and his colleagues‘ (2004) research results showed in contrast to the theoretical 
predictions that monetary incentives are actually negatively related to the number of equity 
licenses in young ventures, and to the number of start-ups.  Furthermore, some scientists 
retain the traditional academic mindset that is illustrated in Etzkowitz (1998) work: 
academic scientist signifies purity of motives that does not have place for material concerns 
and commercialization gains.  The rewards for their research should not be found in 
pecuniary advantages but rather from recognition from their peers. 
 
Therefore, it is not entirely clear how important monetary incentives play role in motivating 
academics to put effort in commercialization activities.  As argued by Lam (2010) money 
could be a hygiene factor and not a motivation factor based on motivation–hygiene theory 
and positive psychology. Therefore, her argument is that money influences scientist‘s 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction but is not strong enough to motivate people to put more effort.  
A similar finding comes from Hayter (2010) who finds that financial rewards is not the 
primary motivation but rather a beneficiary side effect that does cover the extra hours 
individuals put in commercialisation activities.  Thus, the Importance of financial 
incentives plays small or no role in motivating scientists to spend more effort in 
commercialization activities and has higher likelihood of becoming an academic 
entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.2  Intellectual Challenges 
 
Intellectual challenge refers to the intrinsic satisfaction/ curiosity fulfilment that academic 
scientists gain by engaging in knowledge application and technology transfer.  Academic 
scientists often are characterized as dedicated individuals that desire to advance 
knowledge. The motivation behind the dedication is the intellectual curiosity and the desire 
to engage in creative puzzle solving (Cotgrove 1970).  This motivation is due to the 
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embedded norms of science institutions – to advance knowledge by - commitment to the 
disinterested pursuit of truth (Merton 1957).  Research by academics is seen as a puzzle-
solving game where solution is the reward (Stephan and Levin 1996). According to 
Stephan et al (2007), there are two key reasons why scientist engages in research – interest 
in solving the challenge and importance of winning the game.  Therefore, academics are 
seen as being intrinsically motivated where they are enjoying the research process 
(Goktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar, 2009). 
 
Considering general characteristics of academic scientists the same motivation of 
intellectual challenge and creative puzzle solving could be applied in the context of 
research application and commercialization activities (Lam, 2010). Winning the game may 
be considered as creating something new that can be done by filing a patent or by starting 
a spin-off. This, however, will depend on the university‘s culture and if the faculty 
members share the same view on commercialization activities as being intellectually 
challenging. Sauermann and Cohen (2010), who show that motives have significant effect 
on innovative effort and performance, find intellectual challenge as very important 
motivator.  Thus we can conclude that the importance of intellectual challenge has positive 
effect on motivating scientists to spend more effort in commercialisation activities and on 
the likelihood of becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.3  Learning 
 
Learning from the industry and from engagement in commercialisation activities is another 
motivation for the faculty members.  The learning motivation may include benefits such as 
gaining novel insights, feedback on research outcome, and opportunity to access new 
knowledge and technology.  For example, by resolving problems in technology 
development can lead to more information in research agendas, follow-up research projects 
and even new science disciplines. (D‘Este and Perkmann 2011) Applied projects with 
industry create exploratory learning possibilities; it might not lead to new scientific outputs 
but may lead to new research problems (Perkmann and Walsh 2009). From faculty member 
interviews in US, 65% of the scientists described industry collaboration as having positive 
influence on their research work (Siegel et al 2003). According to Meyer-Krahmer and 
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Schmoch (1998) who conducted a research on German academic scientists, found learning 
from the industry together with acquisition of additional research funds as the main motive 
to engage with industry. However, learning as a motivation is more evident in collaboration 
activities such as collaborative research and industry consultancy and not in more 
commercialization driven activities such as patent applications and spin-off formation 
(D‘Este and Perkmann 2011). 
 
The project Benchmarking Industry-Science-Relations identified main incentives of 
academic researchers among which was also mutual learning where the public research 
sector from the enterprise sector gets access to knowledge and absorption of new 
knowledge (Polt et al 2001).  Hence it is apparent that the Importance of learning 
possibilities has positive effect on motivating scientists to spend more effort in 
commercialization activities and on the likelihood of becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.4  Application and Exploitation of research 
 
Similar to learning possibilities, many academic researchers want to find application and 
exploitation possibilities for their research results (D‘Este and Perkmann, 2011).  Some 
researchers want to see wider social application of their research and therefore application 
and exploitation of research outcome is especially important. Application and exploitation 
of research can be seen as one part of the challenge and curiosity only in a non-traditional 
academic norm setting. Scientists consider commercialisation as extension of their research 
– pushing the boundaries‖  of the research (Lam 2011:15). 
 
This motivation can also be seen as knowledge exchange, where it is important for the 
scientist to advance the research and generate economic and technological development. 
This motivation for entrepreneurial engagement was evident in Baldini et al (2007) work. 
In addition, through the possibility of applying and exploiting further one‘s research, the 
scientist creates more opportunities to find novelty and possible originality in the research 
outcome which is also very important criteria in researcher‘s publications.  Thus, leading 
to the Importance of research application and exploitation of research has positive effect 
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on motivating scientists to spend more effort in commercialization activities and on the 
likelihood of becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.5  Research funding 
 
A significant motivation to engage in commercialization activities is the research grant 
incentive to gather more money for continuation of existing or past research projects. 
(Baldini et al, 2007) In such situations scientists see commercialization activities as means 
to get research funding; however, some scientists associate industry funding as ―selling 
their soul...‖  (Lam, 2011). Nevertheless, acquisition of research funding has been found as 
one of the primary motives in several empirical findings (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 
1998. Lam, 2011). 
 
Research grants from the industry are one of the most favoured forms of involvement by 
academics since they usually can continue with their research in their lab with condition to 
consider what is relevant to the grant provider. From a survey in Sweden over 50% of 
respondents reported that potential research grants and the users of the research results 
influenced decisions of research topics. (Goldfarb and Henrekson 2002) However, such 
research grants at many times take away scientist‘s time from more basic research (Geuna 
and Nesta 2006; Goldfarb, 2007,). 
 
D‘Este and Perkmann (2011) find a distinction between different kinds of 
commercialization engagement in terms of motivations. They find that joint research, 
contract research and consulting are driven by academic‘s motivation for research funding; 
however, this motivation does not have positive effect on spin-offs and patenting activities. 
Therefore, the literature does not show unanimous findings on research funding motivation 
and its effect on patenting and spin-off activities. Nevertheless, one of the main motives 
for commercialization endeavours that appear in many academic papers is the desire to 
secure additional funds (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998, Siegel et al, 2003, Meyer 
2003, Lam, 2011); therefore the derived proposition predicts a positive relationship.  
Importance of acquiring research funding may have a positive effect on motivating 
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scientists to spend more effort in commercialization activities and on the likelihood of 
becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.6  Better work conditions 
 
The same arguments go for motivation to provide better work conditions. Etzkowitz (1998) 
even argues that a prerequisite of doing science is also the ability to get access to better 
work conditions (lab equipment) and better conditions for students by securing job 
opportunities. From scientists’ interviews in Siegel at el (2003) study a scientist told that 
his involvement with industry allowed him to purchase better lab equipment that enabled 
him to conduct more experiments. A widespread view is present that for researchers good 
work conditions with high-level lab equipment is even more important than higher salary. 
(Sauermann and Cohen 2010) 
 
Importance of better work condition has positive effect on motivating scientists to 
spend more effort in commercialization activities and on the likelihood of becoming 
an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.7  Job opportunities for students 
 
Since a large proportion of faculty members’ responsibility is on the work with students 
through teaching and dissertation supervision, job provision for students can also be an 
important motivator (Lam 2011). 
 
Importance of providing work placements for students has positive effect on 
motivating scientists to spend more effort in commercialization activities and on 
the likelihood of becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.8  Recognition and prestige 
 
The science institution has incorporated a reward system that is designed to recognize and 
praise scientists that have fulfilled their roles to make original contribution to the 
knowledge stock (Merton 1957).  The primary motive premise of faculty members is to 
fulfil their role and the role fulfilment can be observed from the recognition in the scientific 
community.  The recognition comes from publications in top-tier journals, participation in 
prestigious conferences, and national research grants. (Siegel et al, 2003) As a result, 
academics are motivated by rewards of recognition and prestige from their fellow 
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colleagues and they are intrinsically motivated by the intellectual challenge and driven by 
the desire to win the game (Merton, 1957).  The need to make original contribution 
corresponds with patenting activity. Patent creation shows novel scientific contribution and 
can show the usefulness of science that can foster individual prestige (Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2001). Scientists can use patents to indicate the newness and quality of their 
research results and thus increase personal visibility and reputation (Goktepe-Hulten and 
Mahagaonkar 2009). 
 
The question is whether scientist peers see patents and other commercialization activities 
as novel and useful. Scientist merits are not evaluated by the commercialization activities 
and it does not improve the promotion possibilities within university, at least in traditional 
universities. Therefore, scientists that are surrounded by traditional academic views that 
promote open science would be less motivated to engage in commercialization activities 
(Goktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar 2009).  If commercialization activities do not receive 
the same amount of peer recognition as research activities it is important for TTO and 
university administration to encourage the faculty members to disclose their inventions 
(Thursby et al 2001). 
 
Despite the open science counterargument of invention disclosure, Baldini et al (2007) 
found that Italian academic inventors valued ―prestige/visibility/reputation‖  as the main 
motivator to engage in university patenting activity. As already referred, the most 
important motivation together with intellectual challenge is the ability to win the game that 
gives scientists the prestige and recognition (Stephan et al 2007). 
 
Importance of gaining recognition and prestige has positive effect on motivating 
scientists to spend more effort in commercialization activities and on the likelihood 
of becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.9  Personal and professional network 
 
Scientists are becoming not only interested in receiving recognition from fellow peers but 
also from wider external university network (Lam, 2011).  Strong network (diverse 
network with interactive relationship and partnership) is especially important to succeed in 
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start-up formation (Meyer, 2003).  By opening a strong personal and professional network 
will enable scientist to succeed both in academic and commercialization activities 
(Debackere and Veugelers 2005). 
 
Proposition 11: Importance of gaining personal and professional network has 
positive effect on motivating scientists to spend more effort in commercialization 
activities and on the likelihood of becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.4.10  Independence 
 
In entrepreneurship literature, independence has played an important role to individuals as 
a motivator to start a new company (Hayter 2010).  Also employees working in R&D 
centres are incentivized to engage in patenting behaviour by independence motivator 
(Hessels et al. 2008). At the same time, engagement with industry collaboration in many 
cases might not give faculty members with more independence.  On contrary, these 
scientists would be constrained in their research focus to meet the paying party‘s interest. 
Therefore, the importance of independence might not have positive results on 
commercialization activities such as industry collaboration.  However, forming a spin-off 
is seen as a means of preserving autonomy since the researcher can proceed with their 
research and activities independently from a larger company sponsorship (Lam, 2011).  
Furthermore, if patent application were considered as potential step towards firm formation 
then independence motivation would also apply as a driver force. 
 
Proposition 12: Importance of gaining independence does play a role on 
motivating scientists to spend more effort in commercialization activities and on 
the likelihood of becoming an academic entrepreneur. 
 
3.5.5   Other Individual-level factors 
 
In order to make the theoretical model more comprehensive and account for other 
influential predictors of academic entrepreneurship, other individual-level factors are 
considered. 
 
Many scientists are still confronted with the idea of basic or fundamental research where 
the research outcome should be open and publicly available to everyone (Gulbrandsen 
2005). Attitude towards commercialisation activities was mostly negative in the early stage 
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of entrepreneurial university development. Many scientists did not realize that they had a 
choice of both doing science and also making money from their research. (Etzkowitz 1998) 
The attitude of scientists is very important determinant of academic entrepreneurship 
(Baldini, 2010) and by some empirical evidence has been found that personal attitude is 
the most significant determinant of the actual academic entrepreneurship behaviour 
(Renault, 2006). 
 
According to academic life cycle theory, academic scientists develop their human capital 
and reputation during the first phases of their career and once these aims have been fulfilled 
they look to engage in entrepreneurial activities for financial gain (Lam, 2011). It is also 
consistent with Shane and Khurana (2003) findings that researcher‘s highest academic rank 
has positive effect on individual‘s commercialization endeavours. 
 
Different academic papers have observed the effect of age on the likelihood of 
commercialization engagement.  Some claim that younger scientists are more inclined to 
engage in commercialization activities since they are not yet pushed into academic-norms 
and are more open to entrepreneurship (Owen-Smith and Powel 2001); however, other 
view advocates that more experienced professors are more likely to patent and form spin-
offs since they have acquired bigger social capital and are not pressured by tenure 
acquisition (Renault, 2006).  Since it is found by previous studies that higher academic 
rank has positive effect on the likelihood of engaging in academic entrepreneurship 
activities, it is also more likely that age has the same relationship.  Scientist‘s research 
quality also influences patent and new spin-off formation. The so-called star scientists are 
more likely to be successful in both academic and commercial activities. (Di Gregorio and 
Shane, 2003) In addition, scientists’ skills and knowledge plays an important role on 
academic entrepreneurship. 
 
Despite several findings that show positive commercialization results coming from basic 
research, these researchers are mostly hands-off, researched focused and are less likely to 
engage in academic entrepreneurship activities (Gulbrandsen 2005). Empirical findings 
support the claim that Researchers that are not engaged in applied research and mostly 
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focus on basic research are less inclined to engage in commercialisation activities (Lam, 
2011). 
 
A lot of research has been done on gender differences on academic performance in terms 
of scientific achievement, rank advancement, productivity and publication amount but not 
so much on the commercialization performance.  Nevertheless, gender seems to also play 
a role in the prediction since it is found that female scientists have negative likelihood on 
engagement in academic entrepreneurship activities. (Azoulay et al 2007) 
 
3.5.6  Environmental factors: influencing university spinout activity 
 
Social scientists operating at the organisational level have adopted a different approach to 
the study of spin-off activity. Organisational theories of university spin-off behaviour are 
generally concerned with the impact of environmental forces on academic 
entrepreneurship.  Rather than focusing on broad social or economic forces, such 
researchers have centred their attention on organisational and human resource aspects of 
the university. Specifically, researchers have sought to establish links between spinoff 
activity and the level and nature of research funding; the quality of the researchers, the 
nature of the research within the university; and the presence of technology incubators and 
technology transfer offices.  
 
Level and Nature of Research Funding 
 
Several investigators have focused their attention on the level and nature of funding for 
R&D activities within the university.  For example, Lockett and Wright (2004) find that 
the number of spin-off companies created from UK universities is positively associated 
with R&D expenditure; the number of technology transfer staff; expenditure on intellectual 
property protection; and the business development capabilities of the university. 
Blumenthal et al (1996) surveyed 2,052 faculties at 50 universities in the life sciences field 
and found industry-funded faculty members to be more commercially productive (i.e. 
patent applications and new products brought to the market) than those who are not 
industry funded.  Powers and McDougall (2005) found a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between annual university wide R&D expenditure and spin-off 
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activity. Furthermore, Wright et al (2004) found evidence to suggest that involvement of 
industry functioning as venture capitalists via joint venture spin-offs may facilitate the 
emergence of university spin-offs because they have the necessary financial resources and 
commercial expertise to transfer technologies successfully to the marketplace. 
 
One of the main differences on organization-level is the type of academic discipline.  This 
factor has been found to have influence on the level of interaction and collaboration with 
the industry (D‘Este and Perkmann 2010).  Type of discipline determines the focus of the 
research and how closely it can be related to the industry and entrepreneurial activities 
(Lam 2011). Faculty members from life sciences are expected to be more entrepreneurial 
compared to faculty members from engineering sciences (Renault 2006). According to 
Lam (2011), computer sciences and medical sciences should have higher probability that 
an academic will become an academic entrepreneur relative to academics from physical 
sciences. 
 
TTOs play an important role in fostering academic entrepreneurship (Clarysee et al 2011).  
The expertise, culture, experience and support that it can provide have direct positive effect 
on academic entrepreneurship activities (Baldini 2007). External funding has also positive 
effect on commercialization activities within university (Ponomariov 2007). 
 
3.5.7   Institutional Determinants of Spin-off Activity 
 
The central tenet of the third stream of research is that university spinoff activity is a 
reflection of institutional behaviour.  This research suggests that universities that have 
cultures that support commercialisation activity will have higher levels of 
commercialisation and higher rates of spin-off activity. In contrast, university 
environments that do not encourage entrepreneurship will have less spin-off activity. 
Roberts (1991) argues that the social norms and expectations of the university are a key 
determinant of commercialisation activity.  He suggests that MIT's tacit approval of 
entrepreneurs was a key factor in explaining successful academic entrepreneurship at MIT.  
Golub (2003) supports this perspective and credits the growth in spin-off activity at 
Columbia University, at least in part, to the knowledge spillovers provided by academic 
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inventors in life sciences who had established companies in the early 1990s.  Similarly, 
Kenney and Goes (2004) argue that Stanford University Faculty members were more 
motivated than their Berkeley counterparts to become entrepreneurs because of the 
inspiration provided by prior academic entrepreneurs at their university.  Shane (2004a) 
argues that faculty members' decisions to start companies in MIT were socially 
conditioned.  He suggests that efforts by pioneering entrepreneurial faculty members to 
create start-ups led new academics to believe that firm formation was an acceptable and 
desirable activity. 
 
By contrast, university environments that do not encourage entrepreneurship have been 
shown to inhibit spin-off activity.  More specifically, an academic's reluctance to engage 
in spin-off behaviour may be exacerbated by the attitudes and behaviours of superiors such 
as professors or departmental heads.  For example, Louis et al. (1989) found that local 
group norms were important in predicting active involvement in commercialisation.  They 
argue that this may be due to self-selection, which produces behavioural consensus and 
behavioural socialisation, where individuals are influenced by the behaviour of their 
immediate peers.    
 
Universities that lack a culture supportive of commercialisation activity may take a number 
of actions. For example, studies in the UK suggest universities that are favourably disposed 
toward the use of surrogate entrepreneurs are more likely to be effective at university spin-
off activity (Franklin et al 2001).  Similarly, Siegel et al. (2004) propose that in order to 
foster a climate of entrepreneurship within academic institutions, university administrators 
should focus on five organisational and managerial factors: reward systems for University 
Industry Technology Transfer (UITT); staffing practices in the technology transfer office; 
university policies to facilitate university technology transfer; increasing the level of 
resources devoted to UITT; and working eliminate cultural and informational barriers that 
impede the UITT process. 
 




This stream of research emphasises the impact of broader economic factors on academics 
within universities.  Three factors that it could be argued will impact on spin-off activity 
are access to venture capital, the legal assignment of inventions (or, more specifically, in 
the US, the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act) and the knowledge infrastructure in the 
region.  
 
Florida and Kenney (1988) highlight the central role of the availability of venture capital 
(VC) in encouraging the formation of high-technology companies. Several studies have 
provided empirical support for the geographic localisation of VC investments.  Sorenson 
and Stuart (2001) found that the probability that a venture capital firm will invest in a start-
up decreases with the geographical distance between the headquarters of the venture capital 
firm and the start-up firm: the rate of investment in companies 10 miles from a venture 
capitalists headquarters is double the rate of investment in companies located 100 miles 
away.  However, more recently, Di Gregorio and Shane (2003), using a dataset collected 
from 101 universities between 1993 and 1998, found no evidence that the number of VC 
investments, the amount of VC invested, the number of venture capitalists, the amount of 
their capitalisation or the presence of university VC funding are related to the amount of 
spin-off activity in a locale.  In terms of seed capital, Franklin et al. (2001) found that those 
universities in the UK that generated a large number of spin-offs tended to provide their 
spin-offs with better access to sources of pre-seed stage capital than universities that did 
not generate a large number of spin-offs.   
 
According to Shane (2004b) another significant impetus in the generation of university 
spin-offs in the US was the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act whereby inventions were 
assigned to academic institutions rather than individual inventors. According to some 
European studies, national policies, which allow inventions to be assigned to academic 
inventors, have inhibited spin-off activity.  In Sweden, for example (Wallmark, 1997), 
academic inventors are reluctant to bear the upfront costs and risks associated with 
patenting technology. Other researchers suggest that national policies of assigning 
inventions to individuals can lead to an anti-entrepreneurial attitude among faculty and 
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university administrators who do not gain from inventors' entrepreneurial activity 
(Goldfarb and Henrekson 2003). 
 
The knowledge infrastructure of a region is also cited as a key factor determining spin-off 
activity. For example, Saxenian (1994) has shown that spin-off activity is more likely to 
occur in high-technology clusters because of ease of access to critical expertise, networks 
and knowledge.  My research integrates UK and KSA data with these findings. 
 
 
3.6  Critical evaluation and identifying gaps in the literature  
 
Academic Entrepreneurship and university spin-offs have received increased attention 
from both scholars and policy makers during the last decade.  While this research has 
provided many insights into why some universities have higher levels of spin-off than 
others, there is still a lack of research about the limitations to determinants of spin-off 
activity and to the policy context of the research. 
 
Many of the studies conducted to-date are theoretical and lack empirical grounding.  As a 
consequence, there is a need for more studies to systematically explain why some 
universities are more successful than others at generating technology-based spin-off 
companies (Di Gregorio and Shane 2003; Vohora et al 2004).  Insufficient attention has 
been paid to the importance of culture and governances and the individual motivation of 
academics to commercialisation their work.  Although Shane and Roberts have carried out 
very insightful work in an MIT context, constructs of personality have yet to capture in a 
reliable fashion specific attributes, which underlie individual responses to experiences 
within different institutions of higher education.  I return later to arguments about the extent 
and nature of academic entrepreneurship challenging the figures in sections 3.7.9 and 
3.7.10.  My research findings suggest that the notion of academic entrepreneurship is 
flawed principally because crossing the governances gulfs is challenging for academics, 
funders and businesses.   
 




I now turn to developing a framework for analysis of university commercialisation that 
integrates my findings from entrepreneurship and innovation literature.  The framework 
suggests that four factors influence the rate of spin-off activity. 
 
1. The academic's reasons for engaging in entrepreneurial activity (individual 
characteristics studies); 
2. The attributes of universities such as human capital, commercial resources and 
institutional activities (organisational-focused studies); 
3. The broader social context of the university, including the barriers or deterrents to 
spin-offs (institutional and cultural studies); 
4. The external characteristics such as regional infrastructure that impact on spin-off 




CHAPTER-4  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework that I will use to structure data presentation 
and conduct data analysis, linking closely with the previous literature reviews.  This is my 
Framework-1, from which I will derive a Framework-2, which (following Charmaz’s 
constructed grounded theory approach) is created after integrating the findings from my 
analysis.   
 
The chapter begins by clarifying the status of a framework in my research and how this 
differs from existing framing, such as prospect theory.  Then, referencing back to my 
chapter two and three critical review of existing theory, I justify the need for a new 
framework with which to analyse commercialisation processes in developing economies.  
Explaining the nature of the holistic framework I construct, I reference other eclectic 
frameworks as legitimating my approach.  Section 4.5 presents my conceptual framework 
justifying its variables and explaining what this new framework brings to analysis that 
existing frameworks do not.  I conclude by explaining how the framework will be used in 
my research.  
 
4.1 Framing: type and use of a framework 
 
Many conceptual frameworks in entrepreneurship and innovation literature are either 
rational or non-rational; the framework I develop is both.  For example, Mintzberg et al’s 
(1976) sequential framework usefully targets unstructured decision-taking, yet fails to 
include emotional/non-rational elements of business decisions.  My conceptual framework, 
as chapters two and three have argued necessarily combines both rational (technical, 
market analysis, return on investment) and non-rational elements, such as animal spirits, 
entrepreneurial self-belief, emotional commitment to the new product /project.   
 
My approach is quite different from Brundin and Nordqvist (2008) who whilst insisting 
upon the importance of affect in business decision taking, look at group dynamics in 
established firms: my focus is on emerging firms and the individual academic entrepreneur.   
Busenitz and Barney (1997) offer a framework for entrepreneurial decision-taking, but 
without holistically including the innovation element necessary in successful 
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commercialisation processes; Foo (2001) focuses on opportunity identification without 
referencing the essential commitment of the entrepreneur.   
 
My framework follows the tradition of Kahneman and Tversky (1973; 1979) and Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman’s (2003) prospect theory centrally placing the 
rational/non-rational entrepreneur as the leader of the emergent firm at the centre of 
explaining (in this case) commercialisation processes (see Chapter-3 and in particularly 
section 3.7).  Whilst building on this approach, my framework takes the wider perspective 
outlined in Chapter-1 and section 3.6) beyond simply the decision (to invest) and instead 
explores the holistic (technical and social) processes of building the new firm around an 
innovative product.  Additionally, prospect theory seeks to model decisions: it aims to be 
predictive, whereas the framework I develop is closer to Batesons’ (1972) original idea of 
a conceptual frame for analysing a holistic process; what Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 
(1998) term attribute framing.  The point of Bateson’s approach, is to include sufficient 
variables to mount and explanation, without at this stage in the analysis being either 
completely specific over definitions of the variables or the causal relationships between the 
variables. 
 
In summary, unlike prospect theory, my framework explores the processes of building a 
new business not simply the behavioural finance decision and unlike attempts to 
incorporate affect into decision-taking (Snow et al 2008; Pfister and Böhm 2008) my 
conceptual framework follows Bateson and includes all dimensions influencing the 
building of the business: it is not a simplifying (predictive) model.  I discuss, in the methods 
chapter, the implications of these choices for the generalisability of my research 
conclusions.   
 
4.2  The need for a new framework for commercialisation 
 
My journey so far (chapter two and three) illustrates the inadequacy or inappropriateness 
of existing frameworks, my basic criticism being that analysing commercialisation needs 
grounding in both entrepreneurship and innovation concepts and theories, rooted in active 
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agency and to reference the target context and culture (in this case, the KSA, its institutions 
and people).   
 
In sections 2.1 and 3.3 above I criticise as passive frameworks for successful TT based on 
knowledge management, as inadequately featuring the active learning and adaptation roles 
of academic entrepreneurs.  Active agency is crucial to all innovation-entrepreneurship 
processes a point of criticism made in section 2.6 of sectoral system of innovation models.  
In section 3.4, I have argued that academic entrepreneurs are idiosyncratic boundary-
hopping individuals capable of combining a high level of technical expertise with the 
ability to purse commercial opportunities.  As section 2.9 notes, viewing incubation simply 
as a technical process, ignores the emotional commitment the academic entrepreneur needs 
to succeed.  Active agency then is a crucial dimension of successful TT commercialisation 
and is centre-staged in my framework. 
 
KSA’s Development Plans target emerging knowledge-based technologies as a 
diversification strategy.  Section 2.2 notes the importance of clarity over creating the 
absorptive capacity to do basic and intermediate research necessary to create innovative 
products and in doing so criticises frameworks that see TT as a linear process.  An 
important part of my argument for straddling innovation and entrepreneurship theory, 
(section 2.3) is that in a developing economy, the state’s role (section 2.3) is crucial in 
strengthening the institutional context necessary for academic entrepreneurship to flourish.  
Figure 2.7 and section 2.8 captures this argument, noting that emerging technology 
clustering requires both breadth and depth.   
 
For successful innovation and entrepreneurship knowledge flourishes only in an 
appropriate culture and context.  Important aspects of this are universities with the 
appropriate absorptive capacity and links with industry (2.5 and 3.2).  Entrepreneurial 
resource assembly and risk management only occurs when the adapted transferred 
technology is embedded in competitive products and (existing or emerging) markets.  As 
section 2.7 notes, the institutional aspect of my framework needs to address the KSA 
institutional context.  I detail this in sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7: analysing the processes of 
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successful commercialisation by academic entrepreneurs requires appropriate incentives 
and a culture supporting commercial risk-taking.  Unlike frameworks that focus only on 
the individual (section 3.8) or organisational parameters of commercialisation, my 
framework takes the firm as the unit of analysis, drawing evidence of change processes 
from macro- to micro level. 
 
4.3  Justifying an eclectic framework 
 
Dunning’s (1977, 1988a and 1995) framework explaining foreign direct investment (FDI) 
- a holistic, integrative approach to international production - is a well-known and oft-cited 
eclectic approach.  He employs organisation, firm, trade, location and FDI theory in his 
ownership, location and internalisation envelope.  Dunning’s aim, similar to this paper, is 
to explain multi-dimensional, multi-governance, multi-scalar and multi-layered processes 
from the holistic perspective required by decision-takers and policy makers; incorporating 
both top-down and bottom-up influences on FDI.  His broader recent work includes social 
factors such as knowledge generation and its flows (see Brouthers et al 1996).  Following 
Dunning, this paper aims to show that an eclectic framework captures interaction between 
the particular (space, organisation and technology) and the general (institutions, 
international markets and technological trends) associated in my case with 
commercialisation.  Additionally, like Dunning (2000), this research demonstrates the 
complementarity of the featured theoretical schools, each theoretical school offering 
significant insights into economic development processes (whilst differing in method and 
focus).   
 
Eclectic theory works best when the constitutive theories refer to similar facts and events.  
Nobel’s (1999) criticism of eclecticism is that it mixes theory from conflicting 
epistemological foundations.  Both Dunning and this research use complementary theory, 
addressing related issues and questions.  Similar to Dunning’s work, my framework is 
applicable at micro and macro levels.  The analysis of KSA’s commercialisation processes 
and those of the UK avoids distortion from inappropriate scaling by using an approach to 
scaling inspired by Harvey (1982; 1985; 1992) and developed by Moulaert and 
Swyngedouw (1989; 1992).  As with Dunning’s theory, my commercialisation framework 
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is not testable as a general theory: validity lies in its ability to explain events and guide 
policy.  A final resemblance with Dunning’s work is that my framework is not a new 
general theory but a fruitful analytical framework emphasising and exploiting 
complementarity between existing theories.  Whereas Dunning’s research focus is patterns 
of FDI, here the focus is on changing technological regimes at a sub-regional level.  
Eclectic frameworks for economic development analyses are not new: see also examples 
in Porter 1990; Hall 1985; 1990 and Sternberg 1996). 
 
To avoid a top-down deterministic causal hierarchy, some physical and social sciences 
employ Harvey’s (1982) theory of scaling (developed by Moulaert and Swyngedouw 1989; 
Eoyang 1989; and Harvey and Reed 1997).  Scale suggests similarity of transformation 
and interconnectedness across dimensions.  Scaling is not a simple a static hierarchy in a 
geometric formulation, instead it is characterised by processes of autopoietic interaction 
between scales since the results of change may be similar regardless of scale (see von 
Krogh and Roos 1995).  Scales are therefore phenomenological formulations, relative to 
one another.  This relativity arises from both context and vantage point.  In socially 
constructed scales, the degree of consciously intended and planned purpose can vary.  Early 
Regulation theorists, for example, focused upon international-order scale.  Like some of 
the later Regulation theory, my framework envisages multi-scalar to include the regional 
scale (see) and national scale (Boyer and Drache 1996 and Jessop 1997 and 2001).  This 
paper illustrates how four scales (local, regional, national and international) can feature in 
one analysis.   
 
It is insufficient to explain economic or cultural development as uneven, since development 
is both combined and uneven.  One of Lenin’s criticisms of imperialism was that despite 
suffering unevenness, it is difficult for countries/regions to opt out of combined 
development processes (see Chossudovsky 1997). In this sense, Harvey’s theory of scaling 
explains differential development to be a result of its combined nature – markets 
encapsulate power relations.  These trends appear to be growing in strength, if as  
Collinge, (1999) argues, services are becoming more internationally marketable and 
knowledge flows of transnational companies reflect political power structures.  As Rodik 
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(2011) notes achieving globalisation, democracy and national autonomy is an aspiration 
rarely achieved.  
 
4.4  Proposed new analytical framework  
 
Figure 4.1 shows my new framework in four columns, which going from left to right are 
firstly the culture and context of the developing economy that enable or constrain the firm’s 
ability to commercialise; secondly the direct inputs into commercialisation; thirdly the 
actual commercialisation processes and finally, the outcomes and outputs of these 
processes.  Drawing from my literature review, each column shows the variables 
contributing towards commercialisation, particularly the concepts in Chatper-2 and 
entrepreneurial factors discussed in section 3.7.   
 
In column-1, the emboldened rectangle shows the policy framework (institutions, state, 
entrepreneurship and knowledge-based activity) from which are derived measurable 
characteristics enabling or constraining academic entrepreneurship, which can be evaluated 
against the needs of the innovating firm: referencing particularly sections 2.3, 2.5 and 3.6 
in the literature review.  My framework draws from neo-institutionalist approaches (North 
1990; Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Williamson 1985; Scott 1995) to which I have argued 
(section 2.3) need to more explicitly embed active agency.  I do this by drawing upon 
Archer’s (1988; 2007) approach to the mutual shaping of institutions by agents active 
within them, by acting within and continually recreating habituses Bourdieu’s (1977) term 
for pre-dispositional cultural and cognitive approaches to understanding and decision-
taking.  In doing so column-1 addresses the stability/change conundrum in institutional 
theory, by positing ideas space (Ogle, 2008; section 2.6.2) as learning agents; bringing to 
the fore my discussion of a socio-cultural model of learning in section 2.1.  Column-1 
therefore integrates the institutionalism of innovation theory, with the active agency central 
to entrepreneurship research found in Chapter-3.  My framework intends to avoid the 
determinism and universalism too often found in systems theories.  I have criticised such 
approaches extensively, for example Breschi and Malerba’s (1997) conceptualisation of 
NSI in section 2.6; Etzkowitz’s (1983; 2000) Triple Helix in section 2.7 and non-processual 
approaches to clustering such as Porter (1990) in section 2.8.  My framework also begins 
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in column-1 by citing enablers and barriers to entrepreneurship (see figure 3.2) and in 
particular for academic entrepreneurship (Shane 2004), a detailed discussion of which in 
section 3.7 draws attention to motional issues (Lach and Schankerman 2003) and 
institutional level factors (section 3.7.5) for example Gulbrandsen’s (2005) work on 
multiple goals.  Column-1 therefore closely links with my discussion of literature and 
represents in figures 4.1 and 9.17 the culture and context in which commercialisation 
occurs. 
 
Column-2 shows inputs to successful commercialisation: legitimacy creation and resource 
assembly, TT, leadership and internationalisation capacity.  These are the practical inputs 
of that sort that GEM measure and compare and in which section 2.9 and 2.10 review 
previous research emphasising legitimacy and resource assembly.  Throughout my 
literature review, I have emphasised that while quality of inputs into commercialisation 
processes are important, my interest is in the processes of commercialisation leading to 
successful outcomes.  Column-2 references the idea (section 2.2.1) that a KBE is (Castells 
1997) is typified by shortened innovation cycles: a closing of the gap between science and 
technology.  Hence the importance of section 2.5 discussing the changing nature of 
universities (Yamada 2000), balance between basic and applied research (Pavitt 1998) and 
the multiple goals arising from the patenting/publishing debate (Agrawal and Henderson 
2002).  Given the importance of thickening institutions in KSA, my arguments in section 
2.5.3 against Stromquist and Monkman (2000) and Giroux’s (2006) vocational universities 
in developing countries is an important aspect of column-2 (see also section 3.2).  The 
column also draws on literature advocating the discovery approach to business models 
(McGrath 2010) and entrepreneurial leadership in commercialising universities, capable of 
providing effective TT and incubation facilities (see my discussion in 2.9.1 using Becker 
and Gassmann 2006), an international orientation (Kenney 2000) and close UILs with 
successful business to act as exemplars within the context and culture (section 2.5.3).  I 
emphasise, using Blumenthal et al’s (1996) work the quality of TT and incubation services 
necessary for effective commercialisation, citing Siegel et al’s (2004) point that this 
necessarily involves promoting close UILs at all levels and functions (teaching, research 
and incubation).  Column-2 envisages commercialisation activities in a developing 
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economy overcoming the burden of backwardness (Bouckaert 2007) by adopting some of 
the characteristics of the Development State shown in figure-2.4 i.e. shifting from resource-
dependency (Auty 2001) towards a KBE, led by a clear strategic vision and rational policy-
making. 
 
Commercialisation processes in column-3 cover the main choices and challenges the 
academic entrepreneur faces.  The checklist is not exhaustive nor in order of importance 
since each commercialisation process is unique, however, I expect the data to show patterns 
and to revise this section in framework-2.  The list integrates contextual factors facing 
academic entrepreneurs (section 3.7 above) and the results of discussions in section 2.5 on 
motivation and 2.62 on business models.  Section 3.9 brings together the practical results 
of research by Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) and Vohora et al (2004) on how academic 
entrepreneurs can build legitimacy and assemble the resources necessary to launch 
successful enterprises, see also Rothaermel et al (2007).  The importance of UILs (section 
2.10.1) is argued from the work of Markman et al (2008) and Abreu et al (2009) to be 
important in providing mentoring and exemplars in particular (2.10.2, for example Wilson 
2012) on crossing governances: the central challenge facing academic entrepreneurs.  I 
note too, in section 3.7.7 using the work of Kenney and Goes (2004) that knowledge 
spillovers is two-way and not simply a technical transfer from abroad or into markets, 
knowledge spills from businesses and market institutions into universities.  Following 
Florida and Kenney (1988) and important work by Shane (2004b), column-2 centrally 
features access to risk capital without which venturing is impossible, noting that secondary 
markets to raise subsequent rounds of finance or exit via private equity markets remain a 
major challenge in developing countries.  In summary, column-3 of my framework 
includes the practical contributions necessary to commercialise a business based on 
university research. 
 
Finally, column-4 lists the concrete, monitoring and improvement aspects of (measurable) 
outputs and (evaluated) outcomes from the commercialisation processes.  In particular, I 
will be looking for firms to establish themselves sustainably in their target market; points 
discussed from the widest perspective in section 2.4, also drawing upon the discussion of 
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success criteria in section 2.9 of the literature review.  In section 3.7.9 and 3.7.10, I note 
the dearth of robust research on firm and economic performance associated with 
commercialisation.  In this sense, column-4 represents not only the outcomes of 
commercialisation processes; it also represents the results of my research. 
 
Note that the framework features multiple levels of scaling (such as international markets, 
state structures and policy, university arrangements and firm-level actions.  My intention 
as I argued in section 4.3 (citing Harvey 1982) is that the framework operates at these 
multiple levels of scaling and from the point of view of the innovating firm references 
variables impacting on the commercialisation processes.  The framework bridges variables 
from innovation theory (systems, absorptive capacity) and those from entrepreneurship 
theory (resource assembly, legitimacy).  Since I apply this framework at the level of the 
firm, led by the academic entrepreneur, column-3 is particularly important, representing 
decisions and choices by the active agents.  Insisting on the importance of active agency 
differentiates this framework from others that focus on policy, structures or organisational 
form.  Each column, beginning with column-1 references the particular culture and context 
of Saudi Arabia and the UK.  I avoid one-best-way approaches to commercialisation by 
grounding and explaining events and decisions within the culture and context in which they 
occur.  My framework is not an abstract prescription of what ought-to-be in place to 







Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework  
 
4.5  Using the framework  
 
As I explain in my methods chapter, this framework is used in data gathering to design 
interview schedules and guide the assembly of public data.  I then use the framework 
(chapter-6) to structure the presentation of case studies.  My analysis chapters (seven and 
eight) use the framework to aid comparison between KSA and the UK and analysis of the 




CHAPTER-5  METHOD AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out and justify the methodological choices made in 
this research, justifying them in relation to methods literature and previous work in the 
field.   
 
5.1  Summary of method and structure of chapter 
 
In summary, my methodological choices are a constructivist epistemology for quantitative 
research using a constructed grounded theory approach and multiple case studies based on 
a carefully selected purposeful sample of interviewees and observations. 
 
Beginning with a summary of the method used and the research questions, the chapter 
considers methodological options and then research strategy and design.  Details of sample 
and data gathering techniques are followed by a justification of data presentation and 
analysis choices.  The chapter concludes by considering the type of theory generated by 
this research and its generalisability and examining ethical issues associated with the 
research. 
 
5.2  Research objectives  
 
This section explains how I use Blaikie’s (2008) guide to setting research objectives: my 
over-riding objective is to better understand incubation processes in KSA in order to 
theorise their particular culture and context and therefore guide their effectiveness. 
 
Blaikie’s (2008) four-part approach to research objectives guides this research: 
exploration, description, explanation and understanding.  My research is exploratory since 
there are few studies of incubation in Arab contexts and none focused on public sector 
incubation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).   
 
My literature review reveals that whilst there is extensive commentary and research 
justifying the need for commercialisation (sections 2.10 and 3.2) and significant research 
on its outcomes (section 2.5.3 and 3.3), my focus – commercialisation processes – is an 
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under-research and emergent arena of study, as section 2.11 demonstrates.  Major 
theorisations such as the TH and innovation systems (section 2.6 and 2.7) are shown as 
lacking in intellectual rigour, especially when analysing the factors influencing individual 
academic entrepreneurs (section 3.7) in commercialisation processes.  I therefore regard 
my study as of an emergent area in which concepts and their causal relationships have yet 
to be firmly established into dominant discourses.  The under-explored nature of my subject 
is my principle justification for adopting Charmaz’s (2006) constructed grounded theory 
(CGT) approach, since it enables me to propose conceptual categories and their 
relationships in an initial framework, which I can then amend in the light of evidence.  My 
three research questions are ‘what,’  ‘how’ and ‘why’ based on Blaikie’s (2008) three other 
research guides: description, explanation and understanding.  Using categories in my initial 
framework (figure 4.1), I gather evidence describing what is happening in public 
incubation centres using a cross-country comparison to generate reference points.  Chapter-
8 focuses on explaining (in-case and cross-case analysis) how the variables operate in both 
KSA and UK incubators, comparing and contrasting actions and results between centres, 
between agents and between incubators in two radically differing sets of institutional 
arrangements.  Understanding these actions, events and outcomes is the focus of chapter-
9, in which I reintegrate my results and sense-making with existing theory and (figure-
9.17) revise my initial framework to take account of new theory generated as a result of 
my analysis. 
 
In summary, using Blaikie’s (2008) guide to setting research objectives, this section begins 
my explanation and justification of method based around exploration, description, 
explanation and understanding.   
 
5.3  Methodological approach 
 
This section justifies a constructivist epistemological stance, using a CGT approach and 




5.3.1  Epistemological stance 
 
Agreeing with Easterby-Smith et al’s (1991) ontological approach that people construct 
social reality, it follows as Miles and Huberman (1994) note that social research is 
interpretivist.  It is therefore necessary as Cochran-Smith and Lytle (2009) argue to 
explicitly clarify ontological and epistemological assumptions in order to avoid sinking 
into relativism.  There is no objective social data, removed from social context: the 
categories, such as incubation, I have chosen only has relevance to the social settings that 
I construct to explore and understand (Burrell and Morgan 1979).  Selecting events and 
agencies associated with incubation as Pauwels and Mattyssens (2004) note is not random, 
but nor are these choices beyond dispute; rather their justification rests on the believability 
of the narrative I construct: my interpretation.  Every event, as Sztompka (1994) argues has 
some idiosyncratic particularities and in each event active agents influence outcomes: there 
is an array of events and ‘facts’ from which I choose in order to provide a persuasive 
interpretation (Kvale 1996), persuasive to the reader (hopefully), writer and agent.  As 
Saunders et al, (2003) suggest: 
 
It is necessary to explore the subjective meanings motivating people's actions in order to be able to 
understand these... [the] role of the interpretivist is to seek to understand the subjective reality of those 
that they study in order to be able to make sense of and understand their motives, actions and intentions 
in a way that is meaningful for these research participants (Saunders et al 2003:84)  
 
From an interpretivist standpoint, as Schoenberg and McAuley (2007) note, both the 
researcher and agent/interviewee’s epistemological stances are subjectively constructed, 
perhaps especially so as Hine and Carson (2007) suggest in an emergent field of research 
such as adopting western technologies and commercialisation processes in an Arabic and 
Islamic context.  To capture and understand motives, judgements and actions, as a 
researcher I need to ‘get into the head’ of the respondents, adopting as Saunders et al (2007) 
and Pettigrew (1997) suggest an empathetic stance.  My protection against bias is the cross-
referencing of grounded data, triangulation with previous research and deep reflexivity in 
sense-making: these are the hallmarks of rigour.  An advantage of the grounded theory 
approach, is inducting meanings, relationships and causalities from experiences, rather 
than assuming that a range of concepts, definitions and relationships are already 




Since as I explain, none of the incubator centre keep (or are prepared to share) important 
quantitative data (such as cost-benefit analysis or value-added), my research is qualitative; 
my focus is on the processes incubating ideas into businesses in the incubation centres, 
making quantitative testing of hypotheses impossible.  My research stance is post-positivist 
in that I whilst I reference what quantitative data is available the main evidence I assemble 
and interpret is inferred from quantitative data.  Following Peirce (1955); Miles and 
Huberman, (1994); and Dubois and Gadde (2002), I recognise that my conclusions are not 
embedded in my premises or data, rather they are revealed in sense-making processes 
including social morés, rules and cultural significances. 
 
In summary, for this qualitative research, I take a constructivist epistemological stance, 
gathering multiple case studies from KSA and the UK structured by an initial framework 
that is later amended in the light of data: the constructed grounded theory approach. 
 
5.3.2  Research approach  
 
Conceptual, see figure-1.2, I draw upon a range of theory drawn from innovation and 
entrepreneurship disciplines.   The theoretical frameworks guiding the conduct of my 
research are constructed grounded theory (Charmaz 2006) and Yin’s (2003) idea of 
multiple case studies; which I explain and justify in this section. 
 
Constructed grounded theory  
In their Discovery of Grounded Theory Glaser and Strauss (1969) argue that theory – as 
explanation or prediction - can be generated from data systematically obtained from social 
research.  Their aim is to provide an alternative to logico-deductive models of research, 
whilst retaining rigour and systematicity and argue for a particular definition of theory. 
 
a strategy for handling data in research, providing modes of conceptualisation for describing and 
explaining. The theory should provide clear hypotheses so that crucial ones can be verified in present 
and future research; they must be clear enough to be readily operationalised in quantitative studies when 
these are appropriate.  (Glaser and Strauss 1967:3)  
 
Charmaz (1995) and Bryant and Charmaz (2007) set out to reinstall previous research into 
a grounded approach suggesting that there is a middle ground between realism and 
 
 120 
relativism; that it is epistemologically valid to take existing theory as an artefact (along 
with data and suggested new theorisations) repositioning grounded theory into what 
Charmaz terms constructed grounded theory (CGT, Charmaz and Mitchell 1996).  As 
Bryant and Charmaz (2010) argue, this places research theorising processes closer to  
‘interpretive conceptual frames and further away from determinist variables.’  They avoid 
realism by insisting that CGT is an interpretation and representation of reality, rather than 
its replication. 
 
Interpretivist in acknowledging that to have a view at all means conceptualizing it. Data are always 
conceptualized in some way. Thus the generalizing impulse in classical grounded theory, its strain 
towards parsimony and subsequent reductionism, the beliefs in discovery and distanced observation, all 
become problematic. A repositioned GTM bridges defined realities and interpretations of them. It 
produces limited, tentative generalisations, not universal statements (Bryant and Charmaz 2010:52).  
 
The significance of both human and non-human artefacts are interpreted by the researchers 
in CGT the validity of which relies of limiting theorisations to that which flows from the 
data.  Unlike Merton (1949) who Glaser and Strauss (1967:2) suggest was ‘preoccupied 
with how verifications through research feed back into and modifying theory, not grounded 
generating of theory,’ new theory is generated from the data and verification intentionally 
sought: the lesser the falsifying data and deeper the data, the stronger the emergent theory 
(1967:27).  Overemphasis on validation and testing, they argue limits the generation of 
new theory: what they term  ‘plausible interpretation versus genuine verification’ (Glaser 
and Strauss 2008:13).  It is the absence of a generally accepted set of variables (defined 
and causally related) that justifies the use of CGT.  Had clear variables been established in 
the field (which section 2.11 shows is not the case) then I would have adopted a quite 
different research approach, such as hypothesis testing. 
 
Charmaz (2006) picks up this theme disputing Swanson’s (1960) argument that verification 
processes are more important than generating new theory.  She goes on to dispute Blauner’s 
method (Alienation and Freedom, 1964) as sacrificing theorisation in order to retain 
structuralist certainties even where they contradict the felt experiences of agents.  For 
Glaser and Strauss, verification is not a lower-order of importance; rather it comes after 
theorising a sense-making interpretation of the data.  Comparative studies (such as my 




Generating theory carries the same benefit as testing theory, plus one additional one. Verifying a logico-
deductive theory generally leaves us with at best a reformulated hypothesis or two and an unconfirmed 
set of speculations; and, at worst, a theory that does not seem to fit or work.  A grounded theory can be 
used as a fuller test of a logico-deductive theory pertaining to the same area by comparison of both 
theories from an accurate description used to verify a few propositions would provide. Whether or not 
there is a previous speculative theory, discovery gives us a theory that ‘fits or works’ in a substantive or 
formal was since the theory has been derived from data, not deduced from logical assumptions. (1967: 
29).  
 
Comparative studies are important in validating research and theorisations because it draws 
in potentially falsifying evidence giving the ‘fullest generality for use on social units of 
any size’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967:22).  For example, are the conceptual categories 
constituting entrepreneurship the same in KSA and the UK; the ‘facts’ relating to 
successful commercialisation the same and do they illustrate the same causal relationships?  
For Glaser and Strauss (1967:24) comparative studies increase the ‘generality and 
explanatory power’ of social research.  Theory generated may be substantive or formal, in 
both cases, 
 
Joint collection, coding and analysis of data is the underlying operation. The generation of theory, 
coupled with the notion of theory as process, requires that all three operations be done together as much 
as possible.  (Glaser and Strauss 1967:43)  
 
These are best not viewed as linear processes; rather iteration between collection, coding 
and analysis gives the best results – a process I adopted. 
 
Comparative analyses, according to Glaser and Strauss (1967) support two types of 
theorisation: conceptual categories and the relations between conceptual categories, each 
of which has analytic and sensitising features.  Analytical features are generalisable and 
not limited to the observed entity.  Sensitising features are the meanings and significance 
attributed to actions, events or representations, by the actors themselves – their meaning in 
context.  They go on,  
 
While the verification of theory aims at establishing relatively few major uniformities and variations on 
the same conceptual level, we believe that the generation of theory should aim at achieving as much 
diversity in emergent categories, synthesised at as many levels of conceptual and hypothetical 
generalisation as possible. The synthesis provides readily apparent connections between data and lower 




Theory generation they argue does not require an absence of Popperian falsification or 
proof, rather sufficient evidence to make the theory plausible and testable by further 
research.  However, they also state that:  
 
In the beginning, one’s hypothesis may seem unrelated, but as categories and properties emerge, develop 
in abstraction, and become related, their accumulating interrelations form an integrated central 
theoretical framework – the core of the emerging theory. (1967: 40)  
 
Taking this idea further, Charmaz (2006:178) argues that ‘grounded theory depends on 
using constant comparative methods and your engagement. Both constitute the core of the 
method.’  Constant cross-referencing between comparators and empathetic interpretation 
of meanings, she argues are the foundations of CGT. 
 
Comparative methods lend you basic tools, yet myriad interactions occurring in multiple forms at various 
levels shape the content of your grounded theory. Ultimately, the emerging content shapes how you use 
the tools. Your grounded theory journey relies on interaction-emanating from your worldview, 
standpoints, and situations, arising in the research sites, developing between you and your data, emerging 
with your ideas, then returning back to the field or another field, and moving on to conversations with 
your discipline.........In short, interaction is interpretive. (Charmaz 2006:179) 
 
Parting company with Glaser and Strauss, she argues that the ‘cloak of objectivity 
enshrouding grounded theory of the past reduced visibility of its interactive strength’ 
(2006:179).  This is my approach to research and like Charmaz builds on Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), Glaser (1978), Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998).  
 
Whilst Glaser (2002) argues that everything observed is data, Charmaz (2006:16) further 
suggests that the ‘logic of grounded theory guides your methods of data-gathering as well 
as of theoretical development’ proposing that ‘people construct data - whether researchers 
construct first-hand data through interview or field-notes or gather texts and information 
from other sources’ (2006:16).  
 
For Charmaz (2006:17) each research has a ‘points of departure:’ a desire to understand or 
puzzle through an issue: for myself the point of departure is the heavy investment by KSA 
in incubation as part of its diversification strategy and the relative failure of incubation to 




CGT then avoids quantitative hypothesis testing, since framing of issues in order to 
construct the hypothesis significantly influences subsequent theorisation.  Rather CGT is 
pulled by the problem towards relevant data and from sensitising concepts and coding the 
initial framework guiding data gathering may well be amended: a route to new 
theorisations.  It is the grounding in data that give CGT ‘its rigour and resilience on 
emergence’ (Charmaz 2006:183).  She links these to the US (Chicago tradition of 
sociology, which she argues (2006:184) fosters openness to new explanations, encourages 
empathetic understanding and takes account of the subjective interpretations of 
participants.  The CGT approach is now well established in social science and developed 
by others including Baszanger (1998); Bowker and Star (1999); Clarke (1998, 2005); and 
Corbin and Strauss (1988).  
 
For Charmaz (2006) retaining constructivist sensibilities aligns closely with pragmatic 
philosophy (Dewey) in not discounting nuances of meaning and action as constituting 
evidence for theorisation. 
 
emergent nature of your data and analyses. In short, returning to the pragmatist foundations encourages 
us to construct an interpretive rendering of the worlds we study rather than an external reporting of 
events and statements. (Charmaz 2006: 184)  
 
 
Multiple case studies 
Yin (2003) is clear that the approach to research depends upon the type of research 
questions being asked.   The great advantage of casework is that one can approach the 
exploration of emergent phenomena, such as incubation centres in KSA, without overly 
structured preconceptions – provided it is used rigorously.   Pauwels and Matthyssens 
(2004) suggest that rigour, in multiple case study work, involves theoretical sampling, 
triangulation, pattern-matching logic and analytical generalisation and a single roof of 
validation through concurrence and iteration.  Since the purpose of my study is to 
understand with a view to improving KSA incubation processes (referencing UK 
practice), multiple case studies give the depth and variety Ghauri and Grenhaug (2002) 




My study uses multiple cases of incubation processes (six centres in KSA and two in the 
UK, and twelve incubated companies, six from each country).  Thus in Yin’s (2003) 
terms, I use multiple cases with a single unit of analysis – the incubation process and in 
each case draw on the case material to answer a ‘what,’ ‘how,’ and ‘why’ question: 
covering the three types of cases Eisenhardt (1989) identifies: exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. 
 
My pilot empirical work involved interviews with KAST and ERI, which I used to polish 
an interview schedule (appendix) prepared using the 4.1-framework.  Following Miles and 
Huberman (1994:25) the interview schedule and narrative approach to interviewing 
encouraged respondents to link the incubation processes to the wider cultural and 
contextual setting in which incubation occurred, thereby giving richness and depth to the 
cases.  Comparison therefore within and between cases and countries (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Miles and Huberman 1994) was facilitated at a deep level.  Cases were based on 34 original 
interviews and background research (policy and reporting documents).  
 
In summary, given the emergent nature of the research field in KSA and the need to deeply 
investigate incubation processes, this research adopts Charmaz’s (2006) CGT approach 
and Yin’s (2003) idea of multiple case studies 
 
 
5.4  Research questions 
 
My research questions are as follows. 
 
 RQ-1: What is the contribution of state science parks and business incubators in Saudi 
Arabia towards commercial innovation and entrepreneurship? 
 
 RQ-2: How do financial, social, cultural and human capital blend in KSA’s innovation 
and entrepreneurship processes and how might their impact be improved? 
 
 RQ-3: Why do innovation and entrepreneurship processes in KSA appear less effective 
than those in the UK? 
 
As I explained in chapter-1 these are intended to map the terrain (RQ-1 is a ‘what’ 
question); capture the ‘how’ of holistic incubation processes covering a wide array of 
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disciplinary fields; and (RQ-3) to understand ‘why’ Saudi incubation processes are 
implemented the way they are and the extent to which they are influenced by the cultural 
and contextual setting, by comparing them with those in the UK.  I chose the UK as a 
comparator because it is well researched, access was available and some researchers for 
example Al Thawwad and Rashed (2009) hold it to be international best practice.  I resisted 
a direct comparison of national systems of innovation, since at the level of the incubator 
and incubating firm, active agency (leadership, risk-taking, knowledge, emotional 
commitment) matter and it is the processes of incubation rather than its structural setting 
that interests me. 
 
5.4  Research strategy and design 
 
5.4.1  Research strategy 
 
Yin (2003; 2009) advocates the use of multiple case studies to explore contemporary, 
dynamic and emergent issues generating Llewelyn (2003) suggests contextually-specific 
or mid-range theory.  Thematic analysis ideally suits multiple case study work in that the 
themes structure the cases and allows decomposition of variables below the unit-of-
analysis level for analysis, which can then be recomposed into a narrative.  To add to the 
groundedness of my analysis, as Glaser and Strauss (1967:22) suggest, I introduce 
comparability (between countries and between incubator and incubating company cases), 
which facilitates validation of emergent theory.  Additionally, I follow Charmaz’s (2006) 
CGT theory approach of structuring research using a framework based on previous 
research, that I then amend following analysis to form part of my theoretical contribution.  
This is my research strategy. 
 
5.4.2  Unit of analysis 
 
Innovation and entrepreneurial processes are complex and multidimensional.  The choice 
of unit-of-analysis is far from trivial since as Low and MacMillan (1988) note study is 
possible of individuals, groups, organisations, sectors, industry, and society.  My choice 
was guided by seeking to identify how agency influences outcomes.  Agency here is not 
only the entrepreneur; it is also the incubation manager and the wider business network of 
people supporting incubation.  I decided therefore to take the incubation process as my 
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unit-of-analysis to avoid focusing on systems, structures or policy since my experience in 
KSA and reading of the literature suggests that analysis of systems, structures and policies 
are unlikely to identify reasons for the relative under-performance of Saudi incubation.  
Following Archer (2000) my approach to agency within the incubation process unit-of-
analysis is one of mutual interdependency with institutions: institutions guide agents, who 
in turn pattern behaviour and reshape institutions.  In all social analysis the danger of 
determinism is ever-present.   
 
Choosing innovation and entrepreneurial commercialisation processes as my unit of 
analysis informed my later decisions on data population and samples.  To understand the 
processes requires detailed processual and qualitative data, which I decided was best 
available from individual academic entrepreneurs (both in KSA and the UK) coupled with 
contextualising data overviewing these processes.  This I decided was best available from 
university-based incubation units, I therefore decided to interview incubator Managers in 
both counties.   
 
5.4.3  Research design 
 
Having worked in areas associated with commercialisation in KSA for twenty years, I 
brought pre-understanding (prejudice?) to my study.  Following Hatem (2013) during my 
time digesting literature, I visited several UK incubators familiarising myself with 
processes, nomenclature, hierarchies and network connections.  Figure-1.1 illustrates my 
final version of research questions that have undergone multiple drafts.  Following Yin 
(2003:21) I focused on the connections between literature gaps and the practical problems 
that inhibit commercialisation in KSA.   
 
My research design evolved into several stages and ‘levels’ from which I interrogated the 
unit-of-analysis incubation processes.  These are summarised below. 
 
 Literature search, digestion and identification of gaps 
 Visits to UK incubators for familiarisation 
 Preparation of research framework (figure-4.1) 
 Preparation of interview schedules (managers, incubatees, policy-makers) 
 Pilot of interview schedule in KAST and ERI 
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 Identification of likely cases and negotiation of access 
 Interviews with incubation managers 
 Interviews with incubatee companies  
 Interviews with policy-makers 
 Translation, transcription and archiving of data 
 Primary data coding 
 Data reduction and analysis for in-case and cross-case analysis 
 Overall analysis triangulating with literature  
 Sense-making and formulation of framework-2 
 
My research choices were numerous and some of them appear in the following sections, 
justifying sample, data gathering and data analysis.  My main choices were to use cases, 
adopt CGT, seeking an international comparison and to take incubation processes 
involving active agency as the unit-of-analysis.    
 
5.5  Population and sample details 
 
This section explains and justifies the logic of my dataset choices.  Figure 5.1 shows my 
primary dataset amounting to 23 interviews in KSA and 12 in the UK (some with extended 
observation).  At an early stage I decided that introducing the additional comparison of 
private and public sector incubators introduced too many variables.  Since all public sector 
incubators in KSA are attached to universities, I decided only to investigate similar centres 
in the UK.  Whilst most of the UK’s 156 universities have an incubation centre or support 
services, only six universities in KSA have incubation centres.  I decided to interview all 
six of the Saudi centres and that for comparator purposes two would be sufficient in the 
UK: ERI and Cambridge agreed to participate.   
 
My approach to constructing a database was theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007) consistent with the CGT approach of creating emergent theory.    As Yin 
(1994) summarises, cases are chosen because they are unusually revelatory, extreme 
exemplars, or represent opportunities for unusual research access: my access to Saudi 
incubators is dependent on trust built over years allowing privileged access.  This sampling 
strategy complies with the arguments that qualitative sampling is "purposive" (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994:27) and "theory-driven" (ibid).  In my case, I sought incubation centres 
intent on internationalisation and companies from a range of sectors (software, life-science 
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and value-adding services).  Since my research questions dig into commercialisation 
processes, I required detailed qualitative data, which I decided was best available from 
individual academic entrepreneurs and the Managers of university-based incubation units.  
In addition I interviewed a selection of policy makers, both from Universities and 
Government.  My theoretical sampling choice of entrepreneurs and incubation Managers 
is further justified by the policy interviews, which though informative about policy reveal 
little about processes.  Only by sampling people involved in the processes did processual 
qualitative data become available.   
 
To delve into incubation processes I needed to gather data from incubated firms and leading 
entrepreneurs.  My first thought was a mix of successful and failed incubatees.  Although 
the list of the latter is lengthy, the incubator centres were reluctant to give me access, I 
therefore decided only to interview companies and entrepreneurs deemed by the incubator 
centres to have had some success: in KSA’s case making them ‘unusually revelatory’ (Yin 
1994) since this is a new phenomenon.  Seeking a theory driven (Miles and Huberman, 
1994:27) purposive sample I tried to source two incubated companies from software, life 
science and value-added service sectors.  This mix remains discernible in my sample; 
however, I was unable to strictly adhere to my plan.  Few other studies of incubation present 
data from managers, policy-makers and companies.  Within the eight incubation centres 
which I study, are embedded cases of twelve incubated firms: these twenty cases are 
substantially greater in number than (for example) the triple helix studies referenced above, 
many of which refer to only one or two illustrative (i.e. not deep) cases.  I decided that 
given time considerations and referencing previous research a sample size of six companies 
in each country was appropriate: small enough to be manageable, whilst large enough to 
generate a range of views.  My overall approach was theoretical sampling.  
 
 
Some centre managers migrate between the centres and policy-making.  Fortunately 
Respondent-33 and Respondent-35 (UK), Respondent-9 and Respondent-23 (KSA) fall 
into this category and were able (in separate interviews) to cover policy and give their 




Figure-5.1 is my sample: on balance I believe it to be imperfect yet appropriate since the 
sectorally-diverse sample improves the generalisability of conclusions.  As Perry (1998) 
notes, data-richness logic trumps sampling logic.  There can be literal replication where 
similar results are found for predictable reasons or theoretical replication where contrary 
results are found for predictable reasons (Perry 1998). Thus the selection of cases is 
“purposeful”, not random sampling (Patton 2002), involves using replication logic and is 
dependent on the conceptual framework developed from prior theory (Perry, 1998).  Case 
studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions, not to populations as in survey 
research (Yin, 2003). 
 
5.6  Data gathering 
 
I considered an ethnographic study using non-participant observation (Easterby-Smith et 
al (1996) but quickly realised there would be insufficient time or that I would need to 
greatly reduce my sample size.  Several of the incubation centres were not keen on detailed 
observation; I contented myself with an observation visit to each centre and settled on 
interviews as a data gathering technique. 
 
This study began with two exploratory visits to KAST and ERI of the type developed by 
Gill and Johnson (2002): effectively using ethnographic techniques of listening, looking, 
learning and familiarisation as Sharpe (1998) recommends in business research:  the 
naturalistic modes of inquiry Gill and Johnson (1997: 96) favour.  Each visit last half a 
day, during which time I also gathered archival data (documents, annual reports, press 
releases) adding data to my overall data set as Welch and Piekkari (2004) recommend 
including talking with current clients at varying stages of incubation.  In effect, my 
exploratory visits assisted me as Brannen (1996:264) suggest they might in (a) polishing 
my interview schedule and (b) in ERI’s case understanding better the cultural morés, 
standards and ‘feel’ of the incubation processes particular in what is a foreign country to 







Interviewees Criteria Justification 
KSA 
companies 
(1) Respondent-1 IT for online education  Company CEO using US 
transferred technology targeting 
EU markets 
 (2) Respondent-2 IT for booking services Company Manager, using KSA 
university-based 
commercialisation  
 (3) Respondent-3 Energy/ Programming  Company using US and KSA 
university technology  
 (4) Respondent-4 IT/Programming  Company using technology 
from Boston 
 (5) Respondent-5 Creative Arts  Company using KSA (KAUST) 
university commercialisation  
 (6) Respondent-6 Mobile Application  International idea developed in 
KSA university  
 (7) Respondent-7 E-Commerce/IT/Media Manger of three companies 
using technology from LBS, 
and Australia 
 (8) Respondent-8 Recycling  Manager using technology from 
Malaysia  
 (9) Respondent-9 Agriculture  Manager using technology from 
US  
 (10) Respondent-10 Photography  Manager using technology from 
US 
 (11) Respondent-11 IT for services.  Food Company manager using KSA 
university commercialisation  




(13) Respondent-13 Incubation centre Manager 




 (15) Respondent-15  Incubation centre CEO Dhahran 
 (16) Respondent-16 KSA Consultative 
cabinet 
Policy-maker responsible for 
commercialisation  
 (17) Respondent-17 International 
commercialisation 
expert 
Contract manager advising on 
commercialisation  
 (18) Respondent-18 Commercialisation 
policy expert 









I prepared three interview schedules (Appendix C) for managers, firms and policy-makers 
based on the 4.1 framework and my exploratory visits (Smith et al 1992; Yin, 1994) 
interviewing the owner-managers of firms, though on two occasions other team members 
joined me.  All the interviews ranged from ninety minutes to 180 minutes in length; those 
in KSA were conducted in Arabic.  On two occasions the interviews lasted for four hours, 
KSA policy (19) Respondent-19 Commercialisation 
policy expert 
Dean of planning in KSU 
Makers (20) Respondent-20 Commercialisation 
policy expert 
Was KAST head of R&D, now 
secretary to Board of KACST 
 (21) Respondent-21 Commercialisation 
policy expert 
Prof of entrepreneurship (KSU) 
and leader in Entrepreneurship 
Society of KSA 
 (22) Respondent-22 Commercialisation 
policy expert 
Vice Principal at KSU 
responsible for entrepreneurship 
and innovation 
 23) Respondent-23 KSA Consultative 
cabinet 
Policy-maker responsible for 
commercialisation  
UK  (24) Respondent-24 University incubation  CEO Polorum, UK technology  
Companies (25) Respondent-25 University incubation CEO Maketechnics, UK 
technology  
 (26) Respondent-26 University incubation CEO, Egyptian/UK technology  
 (27) Respondent-27 University incubation Manager Tala, Portuguese/UK 
technology  
 (28) Respondent-28 University incubation CEO, UK and US technology  
 (29) Respondent-29 University incubation Manager Freeland, UK 
technology  
 (30) Respondent-30 University incubation Manger of Teadough, UK 
technology  
 (31) Respondent-31 University incubation Manager Scientific Editing 
Company, UK knowledge  
UK 
incubator  
(32) Respondent-32 UK incubation 
manager 
Student spinout incubator at 
University of Edinburgh  
Mangers 
and 
(33) Respondent-33 UK incubation 
manager and policy 
expert 




(34) Respondent-34  UK incubation 
manager 
Manager at Free Space, 
Cambridge 
 (35) Respondent-35 Policy expert and UK 
incubation manager 




as the founder/entrepreneur was so interested in telling the “story” of how he managed to 
take his start-up venture into new international markets, explaining the different challenges 
he faced as the company expanded. 
 
Taking a lead from Marschan-Piekkari and Reis (2004:227) I employed the language with 
which respondents were most comfortable: English for the British interviewees and Arabic 
for KSA interviews, with the exception of Respondent-15.  Although all of the Saudi 
interviewees are bilingual, some of the technical terminology was not familiar to the 
interviewees and the author felt it might affect the ease of flow of the narration.   
 
Collecting data in one language and presenting the findings in another involves researchers 
taking translation-related decisions.  Translation took a great deal of time and effort as 
Broadfoot and Osborn (1993) and Ercikan (1998) suggest noting with Birbili (2000) that 
translation-related decisions directly impact on the validity of the research.  In this case, I 
reflected carefully on meanings using my knowledge of both languages, familiarity with 
Saudi culture and intention of the research.  Effective translation is never literal.  
Respondents at times used different word interchangeable, for example yataallam 
(learning), taaleem (education), tadreeb (training) and kheprah (learning from experience); 
I have been careful to transcribe intended meanings, many of which I double-checked with 
respondents.    
 
After an outline of research aims and an assurance of confidentiality by the researcher, the 
entrepreneurs were asked to describe their identification of the entrepreneurial opportunity 
that they had faced and how they had exploited it, using the “story-telling” approach 
developed by Magretta (2002).  Ontologically, narratives are the essence of human 
behaviour and a fundamental mode of thinking; we often organise and transfer our 
knowledge in a narrative form (Linde 2001; Williams 2006).  Narrating is what researchers 
do when they construct case descriptions and what informants do when they convey the 
details of their experiences (Riessman 2002; Czarniawska 2002).  
 
The interviews were then structured, using open-ended questions, to understand the 
complexity of the issues and the thinking of the interviewees themselves in as open a 
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narrative as possible (Yin 1994). The interviews began with the primary objectives for the 
firm, the strategic decision process, and the major obstacles and challenges faced during 
planning and implementation, before moving onto discussion of the firm’s strategy market 
entry and network building.  The interviewees were then asked to reflect on the most 
important things that they had learned in their experience of initiating their operations. 
 
Throughout my research, as suggested by Yin (1994) I have gathered archival data from 
secondary sources enabling triangulation with the primary interview data.  Many of these 
sources are cited in the literature review and chapter-6 and 7 and include official 
documents, Internet sites, written and visual media documents (e.g. newspaper reports and 
television programmes) and internal documents and archival data (e.g. firm histories).  In 
addition to primary data from interviews, I gathered from firms and incubation centres 
annual reports, financial statements, four gave marketing reports and one a VC risk 
evaluation. 
 
5.7  Data presentation 
 
All primary interview data is translated and included in the appendix.  Chapters 6 and 7 
give a little background of each centre, firm and policy-maker, cases (of incubation 
processes) are presented thematically, using categories from the figure-4.1 framework; a 
technique Eisenhardt (1989) recommends for this type of study.  Each centre manager and 
firm-owner is given voice in extensive quotations under each theme.  As Jack, Dodd and 
Anderson (2008) note, giving voice and allowing the case narrative to develop is the key 
to effective presentation of narrative and thematic analyses.   
 
Chapters 6 and 7 reveal an unfolding story of incubation processes, what Eisenhardt 
(1989:540), terms “unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to 
generalize patterns across cases… it gives investigators a rich familiarity with each case 
which, in turn, accelerates cross-case comparison.”  Stories inspire and require reflection 
and contrasts between narratives and outcomes Gartner (2007:614) often found in the 
nuances and details of events and thought processes.  As Hosking and Hjorth (2004:265) 
suggest, story construction is a process of creating a reality the storyteller hopes is 
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plausible.  Where possible I indicate the numbers of interviewees agreeing with a particular 
viewpoint. 
 
In summary, my data presentation creates stories about my unit-of-analysis – incubation 
processes – structured thematically by the variables in my figure-4.1 framework.  Narrative 
presentation as Gartner (2007:615) suggests depends upon the listener/reader of the stories 
entering into the reality created by the storyteller and finding it convincing.   
 
5.8  Data analysis 
 
I agree with Yin (1994:103) that the ultimate objective of analysis is to treat the evidence 
fairly, to produce compelling conclusions, and to rule out alternative interpretations.  My 
analysis mirrors Hamersley’s (1989) pattern model in which explanation is not separated 
from description.  In other words, this study adopted a method that describes the 
relationship between one action and others in context, interpreting or explaining the 
meaning of such actions whilst describing their place and relationships to other parts 
(Bryman and Burgess, 1994:6) in the given context.  
 
Analysis begins with in-case and cross-case analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994) 
referencing primary and secondary data, using coding derived from the literature as Yin 
(1993) recommends.  An important point about coding is ensuring that all evidence is 
interrogated, thereby avoiding confirmatory bias; indeed cross-referencing between data 
sources as Silverman (1993) and Huberman and Miles (2002) point out identifies whether 
facts/opinions/events are outliers or typical.  Throughout this stage of analysis I referred 
back to concepts and conclusions in literature, nuancing the primary data coding until new 
insights dried up (Yin 2009). 
 
Data analysis involved interpretation of the case data and the coding within the paradigms 
of understanding that, a-priori, appeared to have relevance identifying behaviour in relation 
to theoretical constructs (represented by themes).  Areas of behaviour that were not well 
understood were collated and associated with other frameworks that appeared to have 




For example, primary coding during in-case and cross-case analysis referenced themes 
from framework-1; amongst the secondary coding issues of venture or risk capital or 
finance gained prominence, another secondary coding area was around emotions and 
commitment.  Other secondary coding gaining prominence from cross-case analyses were 
issues of training programmes and external business mentoring.   
 
After completing interviews and before finally deciding on a structure for presenting data, 
I spent considerable time familiarising myself with the data, memoing initial thoughts on 
key points, patterns and significant events and citations.  My approach to coding followed 
Glaser’s (1978) recommendations: (a) listing primary coding, (b) listing secondary coding 
and (c) cross-referencing coding with literature (and in my case the analytical framework.  
By way of example, my first primary coding list had 21 items ranging from IP law, risk 
capital, and entrepreneur’s motivation to quality of TT and Incubator Unit support.  
Following Yin (2003) to limit primary codes to approximately six, I reduced this to four. 
 
 Drivers, enablers and barriers to commercialisation  
 Commercialisation inputs 
 Commercialisation processes 
 Commercialisation outcomes and outputs 
 
At this point, I returned to the figure 4.1 Framework and reclassified items in order to 
achieve correspondence between the framework, representing the literature review 
conclusions and my analytical approach.  I then identified secondary codes.  For example 
under Commercialisation Inputs I began with thirteen items, which I then reduced to four: 
 Success criteria 
 TT, UILs and absorptive capacity  
 Motivation and capability for entrepreneurship 
 Internationalisation and standards compliance  
 
Cross-checking the usefulness of these codes with the literature allowed me to distil down 
the list (I previously had business models as a separate item, but incorporated it into 
capability).  I was then able to unpack each secondary code; for example, under Success 
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Criteria I added problems in service range and quality (of the incubator unit), its cost and 
value-for-money and overall satisfaction of the entrepreneur with incubator input.  As 
forewarned by Yin (2003), given that interviewees use different terms, my initial ‘Find’ 
coding was supplemented by looking for ‘same meaning.’  Examples include using 
different terms for risk capital and IP.  I also took Yin’s advice and avoided the temptation 
of adding secondary codes.   
 
Glaser’s (1978:83) idea of ‘memoing’ proved invaluable during analysis, to develop freely, 
which is then stored centrally, and readily sortable.  I made many hundreds of memos 
during analysis, perhaps too literally following the ‘free-flowing style’ Martin and Turner 
(1986:151) recommend.  In fact, producing ideas to follow-up helped enormously in 
creating (subconsciously) a clearer narrative from the mass of data.  Charmaz (2006) 
correctly views memo-writing is a ‘pivotal intermediate stop’ between data collection and 
the writing of draft papers, as she says it: 
 
constitutes a crucial method in grounded theory because it prompts you to analyse your data and codes 
early in the research process. Writing successive memos throughout the research process keeps you 
involved in the analysis and helps you to increase the level of abstraction of your ideas (2006:72).  
 
As Yin (2003) suggests the original (thematic) deductive coding phase was followed by an 
inductive phase, with secondary codes added until the stories emerging became plausible: 
clear behaviour patterns emerged.  Data coding at this stage involved content analysis of 
interview transcripts and secondary data as in the previous stage, with the same checks and 
controls.  Elements of the framework were retained, revised, removed or added, as field 
data provided empirical evidence (Yin 2009), which is reflected in the chapter-10 
discussion on framework amendment and theory generation. 
 
Eliminating data not relevant to the analysis at hand and extracting data that are relevant 
was the simplest form of data reduction, as explained by Miles and Huberman (1994:11), 
“Data reduction is not something separate from analysis… (It) is a form of analysis that 
sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that “final” 
conclusions can be drawn and verified.  My personal experience is that deciding upon the 
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relevance (or not) of data is a crucial stage after which the ‘pruning’ reveals the clear 
narrative. 
 
Charmaz (2006) debates the relative merits of line-by-line or word-by-word coding 
suggesting the latter may best suit documentary data and the former more ethnological 
data.  An advantage of line-by-line coding is that patterns may emerge more easily.  I 
adopted word-by-word coding because using thematic analysis to construct the case 
narratives, led me to interrogate the meanings and significances of statements, decisions 
and actions.  Of course, the danger is missing emergent sub-plots not highlighted in the 
original themes (such as the risk capital, emotions and training mentioned above).  An open 
mind and commitment to following where the data leads is the best protection against 
missing points. 
 
Cross case analysis was used to identify patterns of similarity and differences in the 
behaviour of companies (Eisenhardt 1989; Gummesson 1991; Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Yin 2009).  Of particular importance is variation in causalities, for example the more 
mature incubation centres (KAST, Cambridge, ERI) enjoying the benefit of inputs from 
business networks built up over years; and the easier connectivity of UK centres with risk 
capital providers (as a result of the UK’s fiscal and legal regimes).  Through an on-going 
iterative process of cross-case comparison, within-case re-analysis and the interrogation of 
relevant literature, I tried to construct a complex pattern across all cases informing the 
chapter-10 adjustments to the framework, testing new ideas emerging from the data 
Bogdan and Biklenb (1982) view as the most productive stage of original research: the 
platform from which to answer my ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. 
 
Chapter-9 reintegrates analysis with the bodies of literature on innovation and 
entrepreneurship in chapters two and three; as Yin (1994:103) suggests comparing data 
with the related theoretical propositions and gaps that led to the case study investigation 





5.9  Limits on generalisation, validity and nature of theory generated  
 
My constructivist CGT epistemology and research strategy necessarily limits the 
generalisability of my findings.  As Kinder (2002) points out, most case-based research 
requires careful re-contextualisation prior to transfer.  In this sense, my research does not 
aspire to validity; rather I seek trustworthiness.  There will be a degree of external validity, 
in the eyes of KSA and UK incubation researchers and practitioners, however, general 
theorists of incubation and entrepreneurship may conclude that my work deeply contextual.  
Of course, I hope that there is internal validity to my research, in the sense of rigorous 
methods and careful and honest analysis – the hallmarks of the narrative approach.   
 
For Riessman (2008:195) trustworthiness as opposed to validity is a recognition of the 
pragmatic limitations on much social science research and is the preferred criteria of 
numerous authors such as Atkinson (1998); Bush (2003); Lincoln and Guba (1985); 
Mishler (1990); and Elliott (2005).  Trustworthiness flows from a plausible narrative, based 
on rich and honestly gathered and analysed data, resulting in theorisations that are humble 
in their claim to generalisability.  From this perspective, part of any future research agenda 
is the limitations pointed too by other researchers Riessman (2008).  Plausibility here refers 
to internal consistency between evidence sources and honest searching for counter factual 
points, including those that cannot be explained.  Plausibility also references coherence 
(Atkinson 1998): that whilst other researchers may draw different narratives from the 
evidence, the narrative presented (albeit subjective) is a reasonable inference from the data.  
This is what Mishler (1990) means by seeking validation, rather than validity.  Atkinson 
(1998) goes further and argues that deep understanding flowing from persuasive narrative 
is of greater authenticity and value than validated positivist research.  Silverman (2005) 
makes the important point that honestly conducted research means that another honest 
researcher would generate similar data, though s/he may interpret it differently: as Atkinson 
(1998:73) says, ‘no single interpretation of a life is going to be the “correct” one. 
 
In Llewelyn’s (2003) terms my research goes beyond concept or metaphor development 
but falls short of universally applicable or general theory.  My research generates mid-
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range theory and should be treated as such i.e. the context and culture of UK and KSA 
incubation have unique and generic characteristics.  Prior to transferring my results to a 
new context, these particularities need to be decomposed and contrasted with those in the 
new target situation.   
 
I do make comment and criticisms of general theory such as arguing (chapter-9) that 
Gerschenkron’s (1966) theory is dated in its application to more knowledge-based 
globalisation; I challenge the generalisability of Etzkowitz’s (1983; 2000) triple helix 
theory; and I argue that North’s (1990; 2007) view of institutional change is ethnocentric. 
 
5.10  Ethics 
 
Since as Goodson and Sikes (2001:89) say research is ‘an inherently political activity in 
that it has a bearing on how human beings make sense of their world’ my research involves 
grappling with a range of ethical issues including (Cohen et al., 2006:49) the nature of the 
research project; its context; procedures adopted; data collection methods; the nature of the 
participants; types of data gathered; and how the data was processed including its 
publication.  Overall, I was guided by Mason’s (1996) advice: clarity about the purpose of 
my research, an honest approach to affected individuals and organisations and carefully 
considering the interests of those I interviewed. 
 
Access to data and informed consent 
I have worked for twenty years in KSA incubation and therefore know many of the actors.  
This is an advantage in gaining access but also a potential source of bias (Oakley 1999).  I 
discussed the range of public incubators in KSA and decided to take the six most 
prominent, the five most influential policy-makers and six company cases nominated by 
the incubators on the basis of criteria I supplied.  In this way I hope to overcome the bias 
of familiarity; pre-understanding of the people and issues does however give the advantage 
and filtering comments from interviewees and (Burton et al 2008) beginning from a 
position of being trusted by respondents.  For the UK my sample arose from contacts made 
at the University of Edinburgh Research and Innovation Ltd, who recommended the 
Cambridge centre as a UK best practice site.  I was careful as Elliott (2005) recommends, 
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obtaining their informed written consent to use the interview material in the thesis 
(attributing names) and in subsequent publications (anonymised).  I exercised a ‘duty of 
care’ over respondents, since as Clandinin and Connelly (2000) some of the legalities if 
tested may be insoluble; instead I focused as Atkinson (1998:37) suggests on my own 
moral responsibility to act honourably (‘being fair, honest, clear and straightforward’).  
From literature such as Robson (1993) and Cohen et al  (2006) I was conscious of four 
aspects of informed consent: competence, voluntarism, full information and 
comprehension and consider each of my respondents to meet these criteria.  In particular 
in the KSA and for the twelve companies, I was concerned as Alderson (1995:20) 
emphasises that respondents freely elected to participate in my research and (especially for 
KSA respondents), as Lee (1993) notes under no obligation to participate; I am senior in 
the KSA hierarchy to some of the respondents and others are long-term acquaintances.  
Each respondent received a summary of my research objectives and research design.   I 
emphasised that respondents had the right to withdraw at any point (Goodson and Sikes 
2001) – none did.  As a foreign researcher in the UK, I was particular pleased to gain the 
trust of senior interviewees in Edinburgh and Cambridge (Lee 1993) exemplified by the 
length of candid interviews and the materials and contacts they supplied. 
 
Narrative inquiry Issues 
I conducted the interviews in the style of a narrative inquiry (Bassey 2003) since my aim 
was to produce a plausible narrative of incubator processes in chapter-7.  I am aware of 
potential criticisms of this approach: for example Goodson and Sikes (2001:106) suggest 
it can become an affirming climate – hence my probing questions seeking alternative 
evidence.  I was less concerned about Clandinin and Connelly (2000) suggestion that 
narrative might blur fact and fiction, since in both cases the plausibility of the narrative 
rests on the marshalling of evidence.  I note Riessman’s (2008) point that narrative inquiry 
makes a: 
 
major contribution to make to many investigations of aspects of life in social and educational 
settings, not least, because of the way in which life history accounts can, and should, be 
readable and accessible, enabling researchers, informants and readers to gain a recognizable 




In my case, as chapter-7 illustrates, constructing a persuasive narrative overall was not 
difficult, since incubator managers told similar stories (within their context), though the 
chapter notes different perceptions of incubators from policy-makers and some companies. 
 
Research according to Sikes (2006) is neither neutral nor innocent.  In this case, my non-
interventionist research process was not the problem.  A bigger issue was the on-going 
evaluations of public incubators in the UK and KSA; as Busher (2003) points out a risk to 
participants is that cited evidence and opinions is used against the respondents or their 
interests in future.  I found that respondents were committed to presenting a full and honest 
appraisal of their achievements and challenges and take satisfaction that fair-minded people 
citing my research, as evidence will appreciate the need to explore negative and positives.  
Additionally, as Atkinson (1998:12) notes, respondents are often grateful for the 
opportunity to consider their work and in articulating answers sharpen up their own 
thoughts.  In this regard, I pointed out to all respondents that my published PhD is only 
‘confidential’ for a limited period of time and that anonymised publications referencing 
particular technologies or locations may be used to discern information sources.    Elliott’s 
(2005:148) advice was useful:  
 
The researcher therefore has a responsibility to do more than valorise the narrative voice of respondents, 
rather to conduct an analysis which places narratives firmly within their social and cultural context and 
which makes explicit the available resources which have been used to structure them.  
 
In summary, there are ethical issues in constructing narratives based on respondent 




Case Study Issues 
At an early stage in my research I considered non-participant observation as a data 
gathering method, whilst this was possible in KSA but not in the UK where echoing Jones 
and Somekh (2005) incubation centre managers felt it would be intrusive from the client 





Inevitably, having marshalled evidence and interpreted it in the light of previous research, 
my narratives are likely to differ from individual interviewees, who may not be familiar 
with concepts, previous research and the ‘bigger picture.’  I addressed this issue by 
presenting the narratives structured by themes rather than personalised or organisational 
case studies - building a collective story (Richardson 1990) - thereby limiting the degree 
to which any individual respondent reading my interpretation will feel that his/her 
opinion/story is somehow discounted. 
 
5.11  Chapter summary 
 
In summary, having justified adopting a constructivist epistemological stance and guided 
by Charmaz’s (2006) CGT and Yin’s (2009) idea of multiple cases, this chapter identified 
incubation processes (rather than organisations or input-output or firms) as the unit-of-
analysis, justifying a sample of six public incubators in KSA and two in the UK, each with 
six embedded cases of incubated firms.  A clear logic was set out for gathering, archiving, 
coding, presenting and analysing this data and the main data gathering technique narrative 







CHAPTER-6  DATA – KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA  
 
This chapter presents data on commercialisation of commercialised technologies in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) based on reports from international bodies (GEM, OECD, 
IMF); KSA Government and institution reports; my own working experience at KACST 
for twenty-years and thirty-four new interviews with entrepreneurs, incubation managers 
and policy-makers.  Section 1.2 above set the general context and culture for KSA.  The 
following chapter (seven) presents similar data for the UK.  Where appropriate I highlight 
inconsistencies in evidence from interviewees and areas where practice conflicts with 
policy. 
 
6.1  Introduction and structure  
 
Chapter-five details and justifies my approach to coding and patterning.  My data chapters 
follow my conceptual framework structure organised under high-level themes (conceptual 
themes in figure 4.1) and more operational themes.  Figure 4.1 gives structure to this 
chapter and chapters 6 and 7 as shown in figure 6.1.   As noted in section 5.7 the structure 
for my data presentation follows the variables in my initial framework (figure 4.1) i.e. from 
the firm-level unit of analysis composing a story of how and why commercialisation occurs 
in KSA and (chapter-7) the UK. 
 
Reports and previous empirical research cited in this chapter are shown with a Harvard 
reference and citation in the bibliography.  When I cite my own experiences, my 
involvement and role is explained and triangulated support for my view is given.  
Appendices one to thirty-four in my theses give the raw (translated and transcribed) data 
from my interviews.  In this chapter these are referenced by interviewee or interview 
number, then followed by a particular question in the transcript.  Where interviewees are 
directly quoted, these are in italics and following by a specific reference to an interview 
and question. 
 
6.2 Drivers, enablers and barriers to commercialisation in a developing economy 
 
Perhaps it is the circles that I move in in KSA (university and business), it seems that 
everybody has read or reading literature on economic history and/or the future developing 
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economies.  Debate ranges around existing models (oil richness, US diplomatic alliance, 
the politico-religious settlement in KSA) and references potential alternatives (the Beijing 
model, end of oil richness, the benefit of 105,000 internationally-educated graduates and 
creating home-built exportable products).  None Saudis would be startled by the extent of 
debate around the country’s strategic future.  The data presented in this section aims to 
capture opinion on these debates and in doing so references its internal, regional and global 







Main data  
referenced 
6.2 Drivers, enablers 
and barriers to 
commercialisation 
in a developing 
economy 
  Reports 
 Previous empirical 
research 
 Appendices 1 to 13 
6.2.1  Institutional arrangements and SSIs: 
alignment with national plans/strategies 
and active leadership of SSIs 
 
6.2.2  DS: value-adding, supportive 
bureaucracy, innovation incentives and 
macroeconomic stability 
 
6.2.3  Entrepreneurship: barriers, disincentives 
and enablers 
 
6.2.4  Knowledge flows: absorptive capacity, 
basic research and adaptation capability 




  Previous empirical 
research 
 Appendices 1 to 18 
6.3.1  Incubation and start-up services  
6.3.2  TT, UILs and absorptive capacity  
6.3.3  Motivation and capability for 
entrepreneurship 
 





  Previous empirical 
research 
 Appendices 1 to 18 
6.4.1  Start-up and growth  
6.4.2  Internationalisation  
6.4.3  Labour supply  
6.4.4  IP and regulations   
6.4.5  Governances  
6.4.6  Risk capital  
6.4.7  Entrepreneurial risk and leadership  




  Previous empirical 
research 
 Appendices 1 to 24 




Evidence is presented in four sections.  Firstly, the views of interviewees, business and 
government reports on KSA’s current institutional arrangements, including sectoral 
systems of innovation and their alignment with national and regional plans and strategies.  
I am particularly concerned to illustrate active agency: actions and decisions effecting 
institutions and how they work.   
 
A second section may seem unusual to non-Saudis since it is headed the development state 
and covers discourse around the Washington or Beijing development models.  Given 
KSA’s unique Arabic and Islamic culture and context, the possibility of economic 
modernisation without adopting ‘western’ values and institutions is important in KSA and 
associates with ideas on incentivising innovation coupled to macro-economic stability.   
Section three presents data on entrepreneurship; including barriers, disincentives and 
enablers.  Saudis regard themselves as entrepreneurial, given their heritage as traders, yet 
recognise their relative failure to indigenously create globally successful products and 
services.  This evidence links naturally to the fourth and final section on knowledge flows 
detailed evidence on KSA’s absorptive capacity, capability of conducting basic research 
and adapting new products and services from international transferred-in technologies. 
 
6.2.1 SSIs, NSIs: active agency and leadership  
 
6.2.1.1  The KSA national system of innovation  
 
From the discussion in section 2.5, we would expect to find a ‘thin’ set of institutions 
constituting KSA’s NSI: this is what we find, however it is not what Saudi’s themselves 
perceive; focusing as they do on top-down infrastructure and facility initiatives.  These 
conclusions echo those of Kayal (2008). 
 
Since the 2002, the KSA has set the goal of becoming a knowledge-based economy (KBE), 
targeting oil and gas, healthcare, education, ICT, financial services and biotechnologies.  
Opinions vary on how successful KSA’s NSI has become.  Mr Albariqui of Acadox in 
Riyadh, who has developed an online education platform for Arabic states, states that 
(A/1/17) suggests that whilst the Government often provides funding and premises, the 
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overall regulatory position for startups remains difficult and shows little interest in growing 
promising startup into globally competitive business.  He says,  
 
.. they will still go for such companies like SAP, or Oracle. They wouldn’t support the local product 
for that project, they will rather go for the international company and that’s why I think they can 
give you mixed messages.  
 
Respondent-15, who moved from Pakistan to KSA to head up commercialisation projects 
based on his experiences in the UK (A/15/8), argues that the Saudi business model is 
flawed.  He suggests that UK universities run commercialisation centres as property 
businesses (taking rent and/or equity) whereas in KSA commercialisation services are free.  
Further, in his view, UK commercialisation centres are managed by business-people, rather 
than by academics: which is the case in KSA.  Also he suggests: 
 
In Saudi Arabia, it is completely different – neither do we have Professors who develop Viagra nor 
do we have doll-making machines. What we have is oil and gas chemical researchers. Our science 
park activities, our innovations differ from the western ones because the western ones are driven by 
the Professors but ours are driven by national champions like the big oil companies and the research 
is done on the energy sector not into other sectors.  
 
Respondent-16, who works at KACST as part of the national science and technology plan 
has experience in biotechnology and ICT commercialisation in KSA.  Suggests that KSA’s 
NSI fails to respond to the legal and capital requirement of high-growth companies,  
 
When I was managing the organisation we created a consortium of 5 big companies to find what 
was wrong with or ecosystem – that is why people can’t buy or sell their companies? .. we hired a 
lawyer and an expert from Canada and 5 people and a Saudi Lawyer. They found that our corporate 
law is not flexible – for example, buying and selling companies is not easy. … In Saudi commercial 
law, an individual can only create a single establishment not a corporation. So if you’re to acquire 
a company you can only share with the owner not shareholders.  All the start-ups are a single entity 
and they won’t want to change ... the Minister of Commerce has to sign in order to approve this new 
company (A/16/6). 
 
Two other KSA policy experts endorse this view. Respondent-18, a commercialisation 
policy expert too contrasts the more mature VC and angel investor networks in the UK 
with those in KSA as a retardant in the NSI.  However, he goes on to suggest that the 
commercialisation and incubation programmes themselves disincentive entrepreneurial 
risk-taking by offering long-term subsidies to nascent company concept development, with 
little marketing expertise offered and no ‘dash-for-cash’ incentive to get products to market 
and seek early income.  Respondent-34 comments that the National Science and 
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Technology in Saudi Arabia began incubation at the behest of the Government, which 
provided substantial financial resources.    
 
There was no consciousness or conceptualisation of start-up programmes, no incubation 
programmes and basically they were doing it on their own. .. very few successful companies at that 
time which were home grown … [the] … larger family basically incubated them and there was no 
systematic intervention – whether from private or from the public sector to support that.  So this 
incubator, which was supposed to be the national ICT centre at that time was meant to be a 
government tasked, government funded and government managed incubator and it was not for 
profit.  All the typical aspects of incubators were imbedded in this whether it was mentoring, 
coaching, physical facility, virtual support, shared services like accounting and all that all those 
elements were imbedded in the design …. the intent was to kick start a bunch of companies in Saudi 
Arabia between 2008-2010 – that was stage one. By 2010 …. lack of implementation experienced 
we had to bring in professional incubator managers from outside to run this programme and a small 
team was selected through a competitive bidding process and they run it for 2 years. Then we 
realised that in 2 years time the awareness was pretty good and there were applications coming in 
through the pipeline, entrepreneurs were getting very interested in the programme and the 
programme had to be because of popular or public demand had to be expanded to a series of 
incubators. What you see today, as the Saudi national incubation programme called Buada basically 
is the current evolution of the single incubator programme that was designed in 2008 (A/18).  
 
Respondent-21, a senior commercialisation policy expert from Riyadh highlights another 
issue: too many projects and programmes.  He says, 
 
I’m responsible for the national plan for science and technology but in the university we have 
another office for innovation and this one. We have intellectual property office. (A/21/20 
 
Respondent-21 (A/21/3) refers to commercialisation in KSA as a 25-year national plan to 
become a knowledge-based economy. 
 
The university concentrate on basic research and administration in 5 technology areas: animal 
technology; biotechnology; agricultural technology; advance technology; medical technology; and 
water technology.  We have about 300 million Riyad support each year for the research. So 
normally, professors apply fro the grant and it is taken to Babeson in the US for evaluation and if 
the a project is accepted, it’s supported for 2 years for 2 million Riyad for each project for the 
technology (A/21/4). 
 
In summary, practitioners in KSA commercialisation and their user-incubating firms, 
appear clear on the goals of the Saudi NSI (knowledge-based economy, competitive 
sectors), however, these senior and experience interviewees are unsure (critical?) of the 
processes for building the new NSI and the perceptions of what has been achieved differ 
markedly to Vision 2030 since practitioners recognise the thin nature of Saudi institutions.  
 




How then does commercialisation activity seem at the level of the SSI?  KSA’s Ninth Five 
Year Plan (2010-2015) acknowledged that simply listing emergent technology sectors as 
an aspiration, is less useful than identifying sectoral and cross-cutting capabilities that 
closely fit with achievable strategic objectives – it focuses on electronics, upstream 
petrochemicals and healthcare technologies and (the cross-cutting theme of absorptive 
capacity building.  Funded by this US$385 billion plan (Saudi e-Government 2010) are 
two new R&D centres jointly with Aramco, a new SABIC-led TT complex in Riyadh and 
two petrochemical plastics R&D centres at the Riyadh Techno Valley KSU complex.   
 
Expressing frustration at the gap between SSI plans and their delivery and in particular 
technically qualified entrepreneurs, Respondent-14 CEO of an ICT client service 
Management Company based in Riyadh says,  
 
… maybe it has to change a little bit because while we were in a rush, we did not take our time to target 
the right people, I think. We had a flow of many people who were lacking the entrepreneurial spirit and 
ideas by all means. Being the client service manager I had the privilege actually to meet with every single 
person. I am talking about more than 1,500 meetings with entrepreneurs and inventors. At the beginning 
we selected 10 people based on recommendation or based on the fact that they were already working on 
KACST and had to be adopted and taken care of. But we did not know is this guy really entrepreneur or 
not (A/14/2). 
 
Respondent-15, a Science Park Manager (A/15/1) has experience in an number of oil-
related international innovation projects (he mentioned Nippon, Shell and Ex-On Mobile) 
bemoans KSA’s inability to attract off-shore R&D, noting that none of Shell’s 76 R&D 
centres are in KSA despite the proven ability of KSA innovation centres to adapt TT to the 
Saudi setting.  He is CEO of Tehran Techno Valley Science Park (A/15/1). 
 
Outlining some of the processes of sectoral innovation building, he goes on to state that 
only 10% of projects result in innovation. 
 
Our university has made some landmark efforts in acquiring about 300 issued patents from the US Patent 
office, which is a great number in the field of engineering. Out of this 10% are in commercialisation scale 
so as the CEO I have to make a decision on the investment in – does it need to go through the prove of 
concept or prototyping or going for a manufacturing.  Also we do the incubation for the students who 
come for the idea and we screen them. The Saudi nation oil and petro-chemical companies are normally 




Reflected the greater sectoral focus of the Ninth Five Year Plan, Aziz Al Agargan who 
works in a network of incubation centres (Riyadh, Jidda, Medina etc), says their focus is 
on:  
ICT, Biotechnology and advance manufacturing. Only these three. We can go the Saudi Credit Bank to 
get our clients loans up to 4 million Riyadh. That’s one aspect of funding. Then we can go to other funding 
agencies in Saudi such as the Saudi Development Fund. That fund supports big donors who can take 
loans to support their work.  One of clients was given 30 million Riyadh. That amount of money, the 
government couldn’t give it and the interest is free.  Then we created our own funding network in Jidda 
and it was very unique in Saudi Arabia. … It’s a way to convince the stakeholders that we’re seniors and 
we’re bringing international experience over (A/16/4). 
 
There is a clear gulf between the more positive notes struck by R-15, with an oil innovation 
background and R-14 in the ICT sector. 
 
What is interesting about Respondent-13’s story is how the SSI expanded into “we created 
our own funding network” i.e. crossed the sectoral (technical) specific boundaries into other 
governances (finance).  Another example of the incompleteness of KSA SSIs is the use of 
foreign experts, saying that we, 
… developed originally with consultancy CRI from the USA in 2007 to do a feasibility study for other ICT 
companies. Then in 2008 when CREDA from Australia were appointed consultants to assist the 
establishment and management of Badir ICT working with the Saudi staff. We worked together through 
the development of the vision and mission as well as the strategic objectives for that incubator. Since then 
in 2010 a similar process with other consultants was done to develop the vision and mission of the Badir 
Bio-incubator and then in 2010 again the advance manufacturing incubator. But as from 2011 onwards, 
a new vision for the whole Badir programme was developed in conjunction with other projects by the 
management team of what was then the Badir programme  (A/16/4). 
 
This too is highlights a gap in institutional arrangements that Vision 2030 claims are 
resolved.  SSIs in KSA, with the possible exception of oil refining are incomplete, 
particularly the availability of finance and a culture motivating entrepreneurs.  
 
6.2.1.3  The Government, university and industry triple helix 
 
As section 2.7 argues, effective triple helix (TH)-building in developing economies, poses 
sharply the ‘thinness’ of institutions.  Evidence from KSA supports this view, again 
contrary to Vision 2030 claims. 
 
Respondent-7 CEO of a mobile web development company argues that large Saudi 
corporations partners with universities international, whilst the triple helix for smaller 




The other thing when you refer to the triple helix model, we have again the clear cut of funding and 
ownership again the ecosystem is not matured (A/16/1). 
 
Hussein Al Alattar is CEO of sawerly, a photographic technology startup in Jeddah, states 
bluntly, 
 
I believe we are still not there in creating our ecosystem in Saudi Arabia although there is a push from 
the government and other entities, we still don’t have all the necessary components to create a successful 
eco-system whether it was lack of government support or a gap in investment from the private sector. But 
I think the private sector is better. Government has the funding but lack a clear plan and structures. The 
universities follow the government plan (A/10/18). 
 
Respondent-15 is in no doubt, A/15/8, that cross-governances issues are the problem in 
KSA’s TH pointing to academics running science parks and innovation centres for which 
they have no business capability.  He contrasts this position with the UK, where from his 
experience, the role of academics is limited to technical development. 
 
Respondent-18 a commercialisation policy expert in Saudi Arabia is equally clear: lack of 
market-orientation in incubators have held back creating more effective sectoral systems 
of innovation. 
 
Well, I think the intent of the government was good to encourage or stimulate the sort of technology 
ownership in the country. However, I think the mandate to make the incubator completely not for profit 
incubator to the extent that they are not thinking and the event of not pushing themselves about survival 
in the market place was not a great idea. So what happened was that many of these incubators became 
perhaps complacent and they started sort of not looking at the market factor but rather just surviving and 
doing their own technology thing or whatever they were focused on and not really looking at the market 
(A/18/4). 
 
Perhaps typifying some of the difficulties and inconsistencies in the evidence, Respondent-
21 a senior commercialisation policy expert lauds success in patent applications and cannot 
comprehend why companies do not support these achievements (the view of all five Saudi 
policy experts) 
 
Actually the government because, for example, myself I have 4 patents and 3 are on the way but I couldn’t 
find any support from outside from the businessman or from private companies because they don’t 
support this kind of business ideas. So we rely on government support and the government support 
depends on the administration whether they are interested or not. So I think we have a problem with 
private companies or businesses because they don’t support these ideas (A/21/8). 
 




We have had no support from academia. In theory the government is more influential when it comes to 
innovation in Saudi. But in practice there are a lot of frustrations dealing with the government as well. 
The entrepreneur has to do a lot of things to prove that he deserves support from any of these bodies here 
in Saudi Arabia (A/7/19). 
 
In summary, KSA’s TH is flawed: the governances between the three legs of the tripod are 
inadequate, goals are not shared (achieving patents or product sales) and in areas financial 
arrangements disincentivise commercialisation. 
 
 
6.2.2  Development state attributes 
 
When King Abdullah (2005-2015) announced that it was possible for KSA to modernise 
without westernising, he set in train discourses that continue.  These discourses are framed 
in terms of the Beijing model against the Washington consensus as economic development 
strategies and are clearly articulated in Vision 2030.  Whilst KSA discourse uses different 
terminology, the issue is the same: is there a Saudi Arabian way to modernisation that 
allows the retention of valued aspects of its Islamic and Arabic culture and institutions?  
Needless to say, opinion is divided.  This section presents evidence of development state 
attributes in five sections: (a) a value-adding rather than value-distributive state; (b) a 
supportive expert national bureaucracy; (c) incentives to innovate; (d) shared national 
vision – internal and external; and (e) macroeconomic stability. 
 
6.2.2.1 Redistributive or value-creating state 
 
In 1923 KSA GDP was US$ 1.5 million; currently it is SR 1,500,000,000,000 or US$ 4-
trillion per year.  KSA has always been a re-distributive state: the king is expected to reward 
loyal tribes and family members with gifts: charitable giving is the third pillar of Islam.  
The size of the gifts (palaces/ infrastructure) grew enormously as oil-revenues expanded.  
Faced with demands for social change and constitutional monarchy, King Abdullah 
dramatically expanded the scope of largess to include study grants, social welfare 
payments.  Yet population growth from 6 million in 1970 to 30 million today, with the 
associated falling average age, unemployment amongst Saudi men is 5.7% (646,845 
individuals) and some 4-million live on less than about $530 a month – about $17 a day – 
the poverty line in Saudi Arabia.  If a characteristic of the value-creating state is deferred 




6.2.2.2 Expert bureaucracy 
 
The idea of an expert bureaucracy, above everyday politics, rationally directing economic 
development is central to the development state.  Not until the reign of King Faisal (1964-
75) did KSA develop a recognisable civil service: then as now headed by members of the 
royal family.  But do its actions suggest long-term, rational directions of the sort MITI gave 
to Japan between 1950 and 1970?   
 
In KSA it is difficult to disentangle actions of the bureaucracy from those of the King and 
royal appointments.  As the Five Year Plans have evolved from concentrating on 
infrastructure in general to commercialisation and human capital improvement in 
particular; the case can be made for a rational bureaucracy directing economic 
development.  Since Faisal and then King Abdullah (2005-2015), who though both enjoyed 
periods of strong oil prices and revenue flow, both retrenched on conspicuous consumption 
expenditure, preferring infrastructure and human capital investment?   
 
Of course, there are critics.  Respondent-14 CEO of an ICT client service Management 
Company points that aspects of the distributive state continue cloaked as Saudidisation, he 
argues, instead of giving large project contracts to big companies, who may have failed to 
deliver in the past, a more rational course would be to favour high growth young companies 
(A/14/14) and reduce tax burdens on companies expanding employment.  His view is that 
resource-dependency centre-stages bigger companies, that tend to keep their knowledge 
stores in their home base.  Aziz Al Agargan from the KACST ICT incubator centre 
criticises the Government for providing incubation facilities without encouraging the 
associated provision of venture capital (A/16/2).  In fact, 30% of the world’s largest 100 
company’s R&D is now offshore – though little of it in KSA.  Respondent-18 suggests 
(A/18/5) that it is irrational to offer generous welfare benefits and free incubation services 
to young people, who then become dis-incentivised from actually starting trading. 
 




In the development state (1945 Japan, 1953 Korea, 1979 China) unity around the need to 
create national integrity is shared across social groups; the means of doing so being to 
create a strong economy. 
 
For Respondent-15 shared destiny is an immediate issues: when asked about post-2035 oil 
revenue decline; he says, 
 
You said in 25 years time? We will have a major problem. We have the oil declining now. Our internal 
consumption is increasing (A/16/12).  
 
He favours a more open rational bureaucracy directing economic affairs. 
 
I think we’re moving towards a knowledge-based economy but which organisation is responsible for the 
management of the government effort of knowledge based economy? People say KACST and others say 
no, it is the national plan. So until now we don’t have a single organisation, which is in charge. Besides 
there is the issue of finance, we need huge money (A/16/13). 
 
Respondent-7, who is CEO of an e-commerce company, which provides mobile Internet 
business development services bemoans that fact that the national vision does not include 
entrepreneurship education in every university course and systematic Government support 
for potential high growth companies (A/7/20).  Respondent-17 of Badir, a network of 
business incubators endorses this view suggesting that the interests of the large 
(international) oil companies distort the nation vision: they are favoured above smaller 
indigenous businesses.  Respondent-17 suggests, that senior academics fail to buy-in to the 
national vision, preferring academic output to business engagement and joint research. 
 
We really try to match the technology in the science packs and the faculty members. The faculty is not 
proactive in terms of going to the companies and looking for the projects just because they are much 
involved teaching and their mindset and the culture of long vacations that we had in the past in Saudi 
Arabia. Practically our faculty here works only 7-months in a year, the rest of the months, they are either 
on inter-semester vacation or other holidays  (A/15/8). 
 
As the experience in Asian development states show, a great advantage of centralised top-
down decision-making, is the pace at which significant resources are marshalled behind 
national goals.  Respondent-17, Manager of an incubation network affirms this view, as do 
four other experts and half of the CEOs. 
 
… the major policy decisions was for Prince Turkey to request CREDA project to work on the 
development of a national technology incubation policy framework together with Dr Abdul-Aziz.  That 
process was started in 2010 and it involved workshops with key stakeholders both in the government and 
 
 154 
private sector … [in] … facilitated workshops with local stakeholders plus case studies ….  [referencing] 
… eight other countries in the world.  So we got consultancy in those other countries which were involved 
in incubation … and all of that came together into a draft national technology incubation policy that was 
then presented back to KAST and the stakeholders in Saudi … That framework was then developed further 
by KAST and so Saudi is one of the few countries in the world that actual has a national technology 
incubation policy and framework.  So Saudi is certainly unique in terms of policy and framework … the 
UK doesn’t have a national policy on incubation ...  So as far as policy constraints, This became a little 
critical during 2013-2014. When you have a budgetary control of an incubator by government, you do 
have issues. In the case of the UK, all the incubators are either incorporated associations or companies 
limited by guarantee. So they may still be funded by Government but they have the ability to raise their 
own funds by charging or taking equity from clients. Badir has never been able to do that because it was 
originally funded by KAST and government  (A/17/2). 
 
For Respondent-22, a senior commercialisation policy expert responsible for innovation 
argues the ability of KSA to adopt national goals that seek a new role in global economic 
structures is important. 
 
Knowledge economy is based on innovation, education, skilful and knowledgeable workforce 
development, information technology, and scientific management.  This is as opposed to agriculture 
economy or labour-intensive economy. Knowledge economy is innovation/creativity intensive, 
manufacturing based, and services-driven. Examples of knowledge economy successes in bringing wealth 
to societies can be seen in the US and Western Europe as well as in the Far East. If citizens of the Middle 
East and Northern Africa are to attain higher standards of living the strategic transition into knowledge 
economies must be made in countries in these regions (A/22/1). 
 
In summary, whilst Vision 2030 and my interviewees recognise the knowledge-based 
vision of a diversified economy based upon technology commercialisation, each suggests 
that the overall Saudi population and key agents in institutions do not act around this vision. 
 
6.2.2.4  Innovation incentives 
 
Whilst the development state may prescribe who, where, what products and processes 
businesses development, in partnership with whom, and where (internationally) they can 
be sold; it favours national champions and supports high-growth businesses.  In KSA, 
Armco is perhaps the best-known example – in oil exploration, refining and distribution.  
Does the Saudi state similarly incentivise entrepreneurship and knowledge-based company 
startup and growth?  Most interviewees think not. 
 
Respondent-18 a commercialisation policy expert in Saudi Arabia suggests that the not-
for-profit business model for incubators led to complacency by entrepreneurs (A/18/4).  He 
goes on to suggest that only small numbers of entrepreneurs graduate from incubators with 




Respondent-20 at KACST suggests a different perspective: incubators allowing lengthy 
periods to create companies. 
 
… in terms of incubation we discussed and reviewed work length of incubation period for the companies. 
For IT, it is 2 years. For Biotechnology, it’s 5 years. For the industrial and so on we’ve measured the 
typical length and we’ve standardised it and we said that if you’re an IT within 2 years you either succeed 
or fail and you’re out no matter what. With Biotechnology, it’s the same - within 5 years you either 
succeed or fail but you can’t continue in an incubator. You will have to go. So you cannot go to the 
Biotechnology sector and say within 2 years you’ll graduate because it doesn’t make sense. So we’ve 
looked at these practices and learnt lessons and yes, different technologies need different time to mature 
and graduate. And so ICT incubators have 2 years; after 2 years you have to graduate either failed or 
succeed but they have to get out. They cannot hold the space longer than two years  (A/20/15). 
 
These timescales compare unfavourably with the UK, where firms (usually) pay for 
incubation (sometimes in equity share) and shorter time periods are often strictly adhered 
to; for example Hewlett-Packard allow only one year.  The issue of course is at what stage 
the companies are at when they enter the incubator. 
 
Dr Respondent-1 of a major online training company in Riyadh, says an online education 
platform addresses a deeper cultural problem of disincentivising business development, 
suggesting that welfare and education grant payments to young people make it irrational to 
undertake business risks and the work of establishing a business, though he qualifies this 
by pointing to subsidies for employing indigenous labour. 
 
It is not only about the grant support but it is also about the really competitive market for jobs. … maybe 
there is a sense of entitlement that is affecting the people.  There are other aspects, for example, when it 
comes to government regulations and government paper that is necessary. I remember talking to my VC 
at the time. He was telling us about the Saudi market when it comes to government regulation is more 
tailored towards the real estate business than the entrepreneurship and technology type of businesses.  
Although the government has some funds that support the starter companies. For example if you’re hiring 
Saudi employees they will help you to pay their salaries. I think to will help you to pay to SAR 2000-4000 
of the employees’ salary. So there are a lot other incentives. Also, one other aspect is getting the 
workforce, getting the talent, getting the people, employees, engineers or certain individuals (A/1/8). 
 
Respondent-20 CEO of Tehran Techno Valley points out some perverse incentives facing 
incubation centres.   
 
… we also try to evaluate these companies in science park. We have very strong criteria where we 
evaluate how many jobs are created by these companies using the science parks because they don’t have 
many people. They normally have 30-40 people … We also look at how many Saudis are getting into these 
technology development in each of the companies because the Saudis get very good jobs in these oil 
companies but as engineers or as a line manager or as an IT expert and not as technology developer.  So 
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to get Saudis for this particular work function, it not very easy. They have to pay a lot to attract them. So 
when it comes to job creation, yes, we have a strong element of it … we have about 15% from the Science 
park only in terms of job creation. In terms of incubators and in terms of these technologies start-ups, 
definitely, job creation is an important element. So there has to be some other way for creating jobs other 
than the large oil and petrochemical companies.  That is one of the visions that the King had, that’ why 
he took this initiative over 5 years back and directed everyone to get involve and start making efforts to 
a knowledge based economy (A/15/5). 
 
Other incubation Manager hinted at similar conclusions.  A national level 
commercialisation policy maker, Respondent-23 points to another perverse incentive: the 
absence of indigenous risk capital available to KSA startups arguing that rich Saudi’s are, 
 
… interested in real estate, oil and petro chemicals is there. Going into high-risk investment, they don’t 
care. We set up a venture capital fund with some Saudi communication companies and they brought a 
big organisation to manage the fund but when it came to funding and they were told they will get 20% 
return, they said they can get similar amount on the stock market so why risk it. So, the culture is not 
there and the government has tried without success.  (A/16/6 
 
I note Hertog’s (2015) point, that public service as a proportion of employment in most 
developing states is around 6%, in the MENA region the average is 15%, however in KSA 
state employment accounts for over 45% of all employment.  In summary, KSA’s culture 
and welfare system act as major disincentives to entrepreneurship, in particular some 
sections of the Saudi population seem content to live on the benefits of a rentier state that 
disincentivises work ethic in general and entrepreneurship in particular. 
 
6.2.2.5  Macro-economic stability 
 
For the development state stability is crucial, since instability is costly (to the state) and 
interferes with the nationally accepted goal of building business champions.  Of course all 
states face exogenous shocks and the more open (export-led) a state’s economy the more 
danger it faces from currency instability, commodity price velocity or wars and disruption 
to trade routes.  With 80% of KSA revenue coming from oil and 80% of food imported, 
the country is highly sensitised to this volatile commodity price.  At inflation-adjusted 
prices, upon accession post-war Saudi kings have faced the following oil price (US$/barrel; 
Oil 2014): Saud (1953) $26; Faisal (1964) $23; Khalid (1975) $54; Fahd (1982) $78; 
Abdullah (2005) 460; and Salman (2015) $85.  At the time of writing the price is $35.  Of 
course, as Faisal and later Abdullah and Salman have shown, quantities of oil sales can 
compensate for falling prices or state spending can be reduced.  The point is that exogenous  
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shocks and oil price volatility make KSA prone to some macro-economic instability; the 
question is whether the degree of instability is sufficient to destabilise the diversification 
of its economy? 
 
6.2.3 Entrepreneurship: barriers, disincentives and enablers 
 
This section assembles evidence on entrepreneurship in KSA. 
 
6.2.3.1 Entrepreneurship in KSA – success stories 
 
With 6% GDP growth as the largest Arab economy, KSA has numerous internationally 
successful non-oil companies in construction (SABIC; Consolidated Contractors), 
financial services (Saudi American, Riyadh and Saudi Consolidated Banks) and utilities 
(Saudi Cable; Consolidated Electric).  The Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(sponsored by Saudi Fransi Capital) celebrates annually ten Saudi entrepreneurs.   
 
In 2014, the Muslim Entrepreneur of the Year, Shadi Khawandana of Special Direction 
was involved in a wide range of social project and businesses such as date processing and 
spring water sales.  Another candidate, Rashid Al-Ballaa of National Net Ventures is 
Jordanian.  Three businesses have digital products (software configuration, online 
entertainment production and app investments).  The other entrepreneurs run service 
business including fashion design, Arabic coffee sales, facilities management and PR-
events.  My point is that despite c100,000 students per year studying abroad, TT 
agreements with international companies and universities and major policy initiatives on 
commercialisation and incubation, that there are few Saudi entrepreneurs in high-
technology and high growth sectors.  There are exceptions, including well-known Saudi 
entrepreneur/innovator Saleh Al Zaid, the founder of LunarApps that currently offers three 
Twitter-like apps in Arabic language including TwitMail. 
 
6.2.3.2 Institutional barriers to entrepreneurship  
 
There are two competing narratives around entrepreneurship in KSA.  One narrative is 
rooted in meta-history (Mokyr 1990; Landes 1998; Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986) pictures 
a centralised state, fearful of innovation, discriminatory towards women, living off oil-
wealth.  The alternative narrative is of a nation of traders, eagerly embracing new 
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technologies (Porter’s [1990] discerning customers) embarking on a diversification 
journey to build a new economy, comparable with Singapore and the UAE.  This section 
explores how Saudi entrepreneurs and policy-makers view entrepreneurship in KSA.  
Noting the absence of (UK or GEM) figures for business birth-rates in KSA, a SWOT is a 
good starting point (figure 6.2). 
 
STRENGTHS  WEAKNESSES 
 Low corporate tax rate   Weak culture of entrepreneurship & innovation  
 Light touch regulations   Poor record of bank lending to startups 
 Easy access to risk capital   Rate of return deficit relative to oil 
 Young population    High % of family-owned businesses 
 Strong international connections   High youth unemployment rate and poverty 
    Banks retard business birthrate 
    Rentier state, based on oil revenue 
OPPORTUNITIES  THREATS 
 Strong education opportunities   Negative ‘human rights’ image 
 Entry point into MENA by foreign firms   Open to exogenous shocks (wars; oil price) 
 Major policy initiatives on 
entrepreneurship 
  Diminishing oil revenues within 20-years: 
volatility of oil prices 
 WTO member   




Figure 6.2: KSA SWOT  
 
Whilst the basic rate of corporation tax in KSA is 20%, effective rates after allowances are 
closer to 10%, including the 2.5% Zakat tax.  Regulations governing startup are deemed 
by GEM (1-week) business-friendly and there is access to risk capital (particularly equity 
and for amounts over $US 4 million).  Many Saudi’s study abroad and have international 
connections.  Total early stage entrepreneurial activity for 18 to 64 year-olds at 9.4% is 
above the 8% UK level, though at 39% ‘fear of failure’ is much higher (GEM 2014).  Major 
institutional weaknesses for startups in KSA are lack of bank facilities (especially between 
US$50,000 and 4,000,000. Compared with other developing economies, few Saudis want 
to run micro-businesses (defined by lack of growth potential), which are culturally viewed 
as subordinate.  Many SMEs are family-owned, difficult private sale exit routes. 
 
The number of women entrepreneurs in the Middle East is likely to grow, including in the 
least likely places. “Well-educated women in Saudi Arabia want to work, but their family 
often objects,” explained an entrepreneur at the Wamda shindig. “Running an internet start-
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up from home is the perfect compromise.”  Le Renard (2015) notes that Saudi women 
marry late or not at all and that divorce rates are high: commitment to family is not therefore 
the cause of low female entrepreneurship.  Some 80% of KSA divorces are initiated by 
women and 66% occur within the first year of marriage with rates of birth halving in the 
last 25 years, though fertility is 2.2 and population growth (given rising life expectancy) 
rising at 1.2% per year. 
 
Many developing countries faced with the list of ‘opportunities’ in KSA’s SWOT would 
be sanguine about the future: education I/FDI, major programmes and international TT.  
Oil revenues allowing generous welfare payments, 45% of employment in public sector 
jobs and a cultural predisposing against working in small companies all contribute towards 
a culture demeaning entrepreneurship.  KSA’s fragility revolves around the absence of an 
indigenous technological base to compensate for the impending loss of oil revenue.  
 
6.2.3.3 Incentives to entrepreneurship  
 
The World Bank (WB) lauds KSA business friendliness, point to the ease (1-week) time 
of establishing businesses and each year some 10,000 attend entrepreneurship training, 
starting 1,000 new businesses a year as a result of the National Entrepreneurship Institute 
(Riyadh) alone. 
 
National level initiatives promoting early-stage entrepreneurship include the following. 
 
 Kafalah offers loan guarantees covering bank facilities for companies with under US$8 
million turnover and offers seminars and business skills development. 
 Wa’ed a venture capital fund (VC) offers loan and equity, preferring MBA-level 
applicants or successful completion of a training programme, with investments in 
companies such as OrderMe, Geophysical Equipment, PayTabs and Virtual Vision.  It 
partners with Schlumberger and Siemens.  
 SIRB, established under the BADIR programme is an Angel network for equity 
investment and annual (US$66,000) competition.  It prefers applicants to participate in 
a training programme prior to application.   
 Oqal is a non-state Angel Network, though it has difficult expanding geographically in 
KSA, many high net worth individuals preferring the higher returns and lower risk of 




My interviewees point to high quality of (often free) incubation centres available to Saudi 
entrepreneurs, though on balance, they bemoan the barriers more than applaud the 
incentives.  Respondent-14 CEO of an ICT client service Management Company, a client 
service management company in the energy sector is an interesting case, having managed 
an incubation centre and then established his own business, without using an incubation 
centre.   
 
Actually I left the programme after that I worked for a company as the DM. It is a private company. Then 
I took one year after which I created my own company – it is a company in Energy – innovative energy 
and solar energy and also creating some electro-chemical work ..  (A/14/10).  
 
… as part of the policy is that if an employee wanted to use the facility independently or as a member of 
a group, you should make it known publicly and sign an undertaken to be fair in his dealings with other 
users of the facility  (A/14/11). 
 
.. it would have taken me longer to come into existence. (A/14/13). 
 
In summary, KSA has a range of programmes incentivising business startup and 
commercialisation; however, the social and motivational barriers and disincentives appear 
stronger. 
 
6.2.3.4   Institutional enablers and barriers 
 
Respondent-20 argues that KACST sourced the best practice around incubation 
internationally (we contacted a company which is running and operating incubators which 
is called ‘KIEDA’ in Australia; A/20/14) and from the beginning place centre management 
in the hands of people with business sense. 
 
Respondent-19 a commercialisation policy expert in Saudi Arabia, states that their strategy 
is to help students develop an entrepreneurial mindset (A/13/6).  He speaks of the centres 
activities as a programme, rather than individual business projects, and acknowledges the 
centres role in changing cultural attitudes, such as sharing ideas. 
 
So we take into account when we design the programme including the incubator programme that we have 
to work the technology transfer office including the innovation centre and other centres. We make it a 
point to tell our students that it’s all about customers – if you don’t have customers, you don’t have a 
business. Our programmes are developed to be practiced based learning exercise and case studies. We 
also have an existing strategy for students. Finally and perhaps most importantly is that we have to tackle 
cultural barriers – for instance we always tell our students that it’s ok to share ideas with others but don’t 
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tell them how to develop that into a business. It’s always better to become a job created than a job seeker  
(A/13/1). 
 
Respondent-14 CEO of an ICT client service Management Company, is less sanguine, 
pointing to difficulties bringing budding entrepreneurs into contact with businesses and 
funders: he suggests that universities are wary of sharing ideas, even with other university 
incubators (A/14/9): a quite different picture to that painted in the Vision 2030 state-of-the-
art. 
 
Aziz Al Agargan at KACST comments on the difficulties that shortage of exit routes pose 
for entrepreneurs. 
 
First of all, the minimum capital is 300 million Riyadh and not many companies can afford that. For most 
of them there is an option and the only option is for them to borrow. The main obstacle is a cultural 
obstacle. They don’t want to sell. For example there is an agency which books hotels and finished 
apartments. They get deal before hand of about 4 million Riyadh but they refused to sell. For all of over 
100 clients, only 2 sold their companies. So it is that culture we want to change. When I was managing 
the unit that was actually one of the mission to clarify this to the clients. The other obstacle is the venture 
capital fund – we don’t have. We don’t have the law for venture capital fund for organisations working 
here.  (A/16/5) 
 
Both Respondent-18 and I have witnessed the market-orientation and close working 
relationship between the Indian Institute of Technology in Bangalore (IITB) and firms such 
as Infosys, Wipro and Tata Consultancy: these companies assess student business ideas 
and then either invest in them or refer them to ex-pat Angel Networks in the US.  He 
comments,  
 
The story is a bit like the story of India. You know when the ICT industry was taking shape in India, lots 
of people were saying that India has a large body of English speaking people and many graduates were 
coming in thousands. But the point was that the numbers on that the public education systems prepares 
about 300,000 graduates from colleges and so on. But if you look at Saudi of about a million plus per 
year and look at the quality, probably about 80% are not ready for the market  (A/18/10). 
 
In summary, KSA policy-makers see the need for institutional change to increase 
entrepreneurship, however, cultural inhibitions on innovation run deep and universities 
remain wary of knowledge sharing. 
 
6.2.3.4  Disincentives to entrepreneurship  
 
Interviewees highlighted both policy and cultural disincentives to entrepreneurship in KSA 





Asked if KSA university incubators are on track, Respondent-20 a senior 
commercialisation policy expert in KSA expressed the majority policy expert view:  
 
No, they are not really doing a good job but I think some of them have realised that and are changing but 
others are continuing the same line of work. They think of incubation in a simplistic manner so for an 
academic person, seeing what’s going on it looks like they are treating it like an academic exercise rather 
than a commercial exercise (A/20/12). 
 
Entrepreneurs such as Respondent-14, are critical of incubators, from the different 
perspective; that they incentives the search for free cashflow, rather than inspire taking a 
product to market and generating sales income. 
 
Actually, the support initially was ok and acceptable. But these entrepreneurs kept demanding for more, 
which I would say, is natural considering that they are entrepreneurs.  So they are quiet pushy and quiet 
demanding. For instance, we are offering offices to those clients, networking, meetings room and 
conference rooms, consulting sessions, linking them with funding institutions and business people and 
giving them technical support. So we try to provide all these support within 6 months – from the business 
plan to launching of the company. Again we have met our target on this and the capacity of the incubator 
is full (A/14/7). 
  
Such attitudes, as Respondent-18 reports, may be the result of lengthy periods in the 
incubator at no cost to the budding entrepreneur. 
 
Because the first incubator focused on information technology the original design was to keep the tenants 
in the incubators for not more than two and half years – 30 months. However we realised that in 30 
months time the entrepreneurs were not ready for the market with revenue and the right now of employees 
and so on. So over time that criteria was so of relaxed. Many of the companies have been in the incubator 
for more than 3 years. I think one or two have been there for 4 years now (A/18/3). 
 
KSA’s incubators are in a deeply Arabic and Islamic context of business, Respondent-20 
a senior commercialisation policy expert in KSA wonders whether university incubation is 
value for money, challenging a fundamental assumption in Vision 2030.  
 
Another major policy issue for startup entrepreneurs, particular those with external equity, 
highlighted by Respondent-18 is the absence of exit routes. 
 
… real estate that takes the trade most of the time and beyond real estate there are other areas like 
petroleum deliveries for example and heavy metal industry. There is a lot consumption of these things 
and private players feel comfortable to acquire businesses from outside rather than investing in genuine 




Too this he adds the criticism that academics rather than people with experience in business 
startup manage incubators. 
 
Yes and this is at the heart of the problem. If you don’t bring someone with the business sense, you don’t 
expect the incubatees to get that business sense (A/20/13). 
 
In summary, there are powerful disincentives to entrepreneurship in Saudi culture and 
institutional arrangements; rather than ignoring such disincentives policy documents such 
as Vision 2030 would be better saying how they can be overcome.  
 
Cultural disincentives 
To these policy barriers to entrepreneurship in KSA must be added a range of cultural 
barriers mentioned by interviewees.  Respondent-1 of a major online training company 
poses the cultural barriers as follows. 
 
One of the first things we encountered for example was supervising people within KAUST. You could also 
see that the instructors or trainers were being brought from abroad being it from Europe or the US. All 
of them came from a Muslim mentality that talks to a Western audience. I felt that they didn’t have the 
sufficient information or background of the Saudi market and how to actually approach it. There was this 
cultural gap that I think prevented a very fruitful training session per se (A/1/1 and 2). 
 
Respondent-15 agrees, noting that one effect on academic faculty of commercialisation has 
been patent registration, seeking licences and royalties.  It is interesting to note that the one 
successful commercialisation he mentions occurred in the US, not KSA. 
 
The most significant problem for a period of 14 years was basically a cultural problem. The faculty was 
not ready for all these because the faculty was used to teaching a course, giving assignment, grading 
exams and going for a summer vacation of 3 months and then come back. To convince this faculty to 
getting into innovative research, a research that will result to IP, which will get you a patent which can 
be commercialised was the biggest task because this needed a complete overhaul of the system and you 
know that the faculty is a very sensitive creation with a different mind-set. So that was one of the biggest 
task. They have gotten to a stage of making more patents, few of them are commercialised, and the royalty 
flow hasn’t started. Once they start receiving 15,000 dollar cheques, they are all in good shape because 
now they are getting something more than a publication in a journal, having patents with their name, 
royalty cheque coming in.. Let me tell you that we are very proud of one technology that we developed 
for a bottle desalination purpose. Now we are trying to commercialise the same technology more here in 
Saudi Arabia. Coming back to the challenges, all our efforts are basically based on university research 
faculty and switching the mind set was not an easy task; two, the bureaucracy was terrible; three, it was 
not easy to find the human resource for this particular business – that’s technology commercialisation 
export. So for that we came to the UK and I hired two people from the University of Manchester who 
spent 10-15 years of their lives in taking the University of Manchester technology to the market and we 
have both of them there and then playing a very significant role. These two worked for me with a team of 





Too these viewpoints can be added a continually repeated point (for example A/21/9) that 
young people in receipt of long-term education grants or social welfare payments face a 
perverse incentive: a good income without risk or an uncertain future income with risk and 
hard work. 
 
6.2.4  Knowledge flows: absorptive capacity and adaptation capability 
 
KSA has been building basic research capability for two decades, often by encouraging 
successful international researchers to spend time in KSA and Saudi students to study 
abroad (200,000 do each year).  At the best KSA universities there is basic research 
capability.  For example Respondent-20 a senior commercialisation policy expert in KSA 
reports basic research in: 
 
… animal technology; bio-technology; agricultural technology; advance technology; medical 
technology; and water technology. So we have 15 technology areas and the university is responsible for 
the research in these areas. We have about 300 million riyad support each year for the research. So 
normally, professors apply for the grant and it is taken to Harvard in the US for evaluation and if the a 
project is accepted, it’s supported for 2 years for 2 million riyad for each project for the technology 
(A/21/4). 
 
When asked (A/21/6) to name a KSA company benefiting from this basic research, 
Respondent-20 could not name one.  Respondent-23 suggests this is because KSA basic 
research has yet to migrate into science-based technologies. 
 
In KSA most of the technical knowledge comes through international technology transfer as most of the 
industry in KSA partner with international and multinational corporations and industries.  Limited 
technical knowledge is provided locally by university research and research performed in 
national/Governmental laboratories (A/23/5). 
 
Of course, basic research and research-led teaching are also important in creating the 
absorptive capacity necessary to understand and adapt learning from elsewhere into the 
Saudi context, especially in the form of adaptations creating new products.  Respondent-
18 makes the point that the first incubators (2008) in KSA were general purpose at KAST; 
targeting IT innovations, whereas later models are sector-specific and more likely therefore 




One aspect of entrepreneurship in KSA, as with other social activities, is social capital.  Dr 
Respondent-1 makes the point that connections outside the incubator can be of critical 
importance. 
 
Especially for example if you want to talk a specific practical example like developing a pitch. We have 
something person in Saudi that if you want to successful pitch something to someone especially in the 
business scene there are a lot of other aspects that need to take into account. For example your personal 
relationship with the person. Your background in Saudi Arabia for example, personal ties, whether you 
come from the same tribe, whether you come from the central region or whether you come from the 
eastern region. You know things like that could always be used to your advantage and that’s what I mean 
by the cultural issue. But if you look at the western concept of developing a pitch, it’s a wonderful concept. 
But if you also come to less say a Saudi businessman, for example, you may want to do it over a coffee or 
in a more relaxed atmosphere (A/1/3). 
  
KSA is building up absorptive capacity and basic research capability; at present there is 
little flow from transferred technologies into new Saudi products and no ‘star’ companies 
resulting from university incubation. 
 
6.3  Commercialisation inputs 
 
This section explores inputs into KSA incubation. 
 
6.3.1   Incubation and start-up services 
 
Here I assemble evidence on the range and quality of services adding value to business 
projects inside incubators. 
 
6.3.1.1  Success criteria 
 
Respondent-17 Manager of an incubation network, comments that before incubators are 
established, they instigate,  
 
independent feasibility studies for every single one of the incubators; secondly, siting the right facility; 
and thirdly, developing a good business plan which includes an understanding of the business module 
(this was unique and different to any of its kind globally (A/17/5). 
 
At King Fahad Petroleum (KFP) incubator the success criteria are threefold: 
 
We have three simple CSFs or KPIs – one, we record the number of screened ideas; two, the number of 
businesses who successfully finish and graduate and three, the number of graduates who receive funding 
to start their business (A/13/4). 
 
Admissions criteria vary between incubators, at KFP, 
 
We have a screening process. Students are told about this process when they apply. It includes: a minute 
video pitch of their business idea; they are put into groups and then meet with a team who do the final 
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selection. The final selection is based on the passion of the applicant, the energy of the team (if it’s a 
team) and the attitude of the applicant. We also do some form of evaluation assessment to their business 
knowledge. Some are admitted directly but others are advised to undertake some short courses or advised 
to take a job before they are admitted (A/13/9). 
 
Like all incubators evaluation of applicants covers both the innovativeness of the product 
and the entrepreneurial ability of the application.   Respondent-14 suggests these are 
reconciled as follows. 
 
Actually we were planning to go alongside the business incubation policy for Saudi Arabia, which was 
created among key people in the industry and some Consultant came from overseas to see what is the 
best practice for business incubation. What are the criteria that could be put in place to select the right 
clients or the right potential clients especially since we are doing technical incubation and not mix 
incubation? Is was therefore very important to have a real criteria. We put general criteria at the 
beginning to introduce the idea to people and to encourage them to join. But after a year or two we came 
out with the full policy stating the criteria that need to be taken into consideration to select the client 
(A/14/3). 
 
I note that client satisfaction (see 6.3.1.4) does not feature prominently in success criteria.  
There seems to be an urgent need for a full evaluation (including cost-benefit analysis) of 
university-linked incubators referencing international benchmarking. 
 
6.3.1.2  Problems in service range and quality 
 
In explaining entry criteria, Respondent-15 raises an important point privileging 
technology work and university links above marketing, indicating preference for a 
particular balance between technical and market-oriented services. 
 
… the first thing is that you need to be a technology company; two, and most important that you intend 
to do technological work, not to use the facility for marketing and sales or other services and three, you 
must interact with the university in terms of developing a product, in terms of commercialising a product, 
in terms of start-ups where the university has to participate and that’s when the DTVC gets in for 
investment and for providing the funding or for arranging it from Engels or the governmental agencies 
which provide the seed funding and advance because it is a pretty expensive business  (A/15/6). 
 
Several interviewees, whist suggesting that incubators provide an appropriate range and 
quality of services, suggest that universities should do more to encourage entrepreneurship.  
For example, Respondent-7 says, The government also need to educate a lot of people on 
entrepreneurship and universities should promote R&D. They should integrate practical 
business into the theories they are teaching in the universities.  (A/7/20).  Others raise 
points from personal experiences, such as Respondent-3 who wants more cooperation 




There are four areas of incubator scope and quality, which interviewees suggest need 
improvement: training, foreign culture, marketing and finance; these items interrelate.  
Respondent-1 from a major online training company is one of many interviewees referring 
to training programmes in the incubators: this is important because the implication is a 
programme rather than a project (new business) orientation and that the programme 
contains training (whether the entrepreneur needs it or not).  He links this to the importation 
of foreign incubation models. 
 
.. when it comes to training I will suggest that to take the Saudi market into consideration and the culture 
into consideration – that’s one thing. Another thing is to have more Saudis in the incubator itself because 
culturally speaking we have this tendency that this creates connection. So it is much easier to have people 
with the same background. I remember for example the manager of the incubator, he was German. I 
believe that if you have people who speak the same language, the same culture, the same background as 
the people you’re trying to approach and make them invest in those companies or create it, it’s going to 
be much more fruitful. Basically I’m saying that it’s all about the network and connections that you can 
build. And it will be much easier to build networks and connections if you have the people speaking the 
same language  (A/1/13). 
 
In the same vein, Respondent-14 points to the cultural disadvantages of importing foreign 
staff as incubator managers unaware of nuances in Saudi culture (A/14/1). 
 
Respondent-8 CEO of a recycling company (A/8/3 and A/8/7) had difficulty raising capital 
and feel firstly that incubators should have funds available and secondly that they should 
more actively support companies applying to funds such as the BADIR arrangement with 
the Saudi Loan Bank to provide startup loans. 
 
Respondent-6 felt the incubator could do more to support market trend and entry analysis. 
 
In terms of development and marketing, we do it personally. Majority of our work is via social media. We 
prefer social media because newspapers are expensive with less returns. We even tried having a website 
but it didn’t work well. Social media is very cheap and effective  (A/6/7). 
 
In summary Saudi incubators appear formulaic, intent on delivering (training) programmes 
rather than on a project basis developing entrepreneurs and individual new businesses. 
 




Most of the interviewees report that incubation services were free: (A/7/9) is an example.  
One interviewee valued the free services they received as costing US$ 10,000 (A/2/6).   
Another stated that as a result of being inside the free incubator, they received a 
Government grant of USD 4,000 (A/4/7).  One interviewee (A/3/9) paid the incubator 24% 
of the company, which he values at US$ 100,000; though then commented, I didn’t pay 
anything at KSU incubator in Riyadh Techno Valley.  Interviewee (A/10/7) paid 15% of 
equity for incubation services.  Finally, (A/12/7) said the incubator services cost $US 
10,000 commenting, But this was paid for us by the university. The accelerator’s strategy 
was that they come after the customer in the first phase for you to realise their importance. 
Then they sit back in the second phase and expect you to pursue them. This is also to test 
those who are serious about their business.  
 
6.3.1.4  Incubator customer contentedness  
 
Not every interviewee was positive about their experiences in Saudi incubators.  When 
Respondent-9 CEO of an agri-food innovation company who distributes organic 
vegetables, was asked about the KACST incubator, he commented: 
 
I think they are a network of bad people. I don’t trust them. They are propagandists. They didn’t seem 
excited about the idea and nobody gave me any encouragement (A/9/7). 
 
Respondent-7 CEO of an e-commerce company who offer Web and mobile development 
services joined the incubator because it was near his university and offered   and advice on 
finance and accounting (A/7/7).  He was disappointed that little network was offered 
(A/7/8) and was unimpressed by the help given: No, because they are government 
employees. You rarely find such employees to be entrepreneurs (A/7/12). 
 
These critics are a minority.  When asked whether they used commodity, professional or 
networking services of the incubator, most of the interviewees who had spent time in 
incubators suggests they used all of these services (A/3/10; A/3/8; A/4/6; A/4/10; A/5/5).  
Many, such as Respondent-5 CEO of an ideas incubator, felt incubation gave 
encouragement and confidence:  joining VentureLab has given us a great push and the 
right amount of confidence to get started  (A/5/10).  In particular, he felt the incubator 
helped him overcome doubts being on 24 years of age (A/5/11).  Respondent-12 CEO of a 
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transcription services provider felt the incubator helped with networking and clarifying the 
nature of his product  (A/12/10). 
 
Giving more detail of the benefits of the incubator, (A/2/5) who moved from KACST to 
BADIR suggest that consultation services were strong in KACST, whereas BADIR offered 
a better location and office space.  Respondent-2 from an online exercise platform 
company, who also moved from KACST to BADIR, said that, From KACST I will say re-
shaping the business; and BADIR will be networking at the beginning  (A/2/10), though he 
found some staff more useful than others (A/2/9).  Respondent-3 CEO of an energy 
programming company (A/3/7) felt the environment is conducive for business. Hussein Al 
Alattar of sawerly (a digital photography business) also used the entire incubator services 
joined the incubator because, 
 
.. we lacked structure and focus. We tried a lot of options on our own but couldn’t make a headway after 
the contest. That is why we joined the incubator. We also needed the mentoring, facility and the 
opportunity to meet other companies and to network A/10/6). 
 
Respondent-11 CEO of an animation and media advertising company felt the incubator 
gave him a very clear roadmap of your business and see funding  (A/11/6).  Respondent-4 
CEO of an online career-fit guide, said the incubator help identify markets, help with 
marketing and credibility in the market  (A/4/5).  Mr Bawazir also benefited from a fact-
finding visit to incubators in California.   Respondent-12 CEO of a transcription services 
praised the networking and financial advice give by incubator staff (A/12/11).  Respondent-
6 a mobile app developer praised the services and facilities offered by the incubator 
(A/6/8), benefited from relevant training (A/6/12), though he then suggests he became 
comfortable and You cannot expand your business when you’re in an incubator because of 
lack of space. But we are hopeful to expand when we leave the incubator. We need a little 
bit of push and we will graduate from BAIDA (A/6/15). 
 
Value-addedness by incubators was important to many entrepreneurs.  Respondent-3 CEO 
of a wireless intercom system provider details how the incubator helped him move from 




Thus the incubator helped focus product design and enabled product testing.  Dr 
Respondent-1 of a major online training company says,  
 
.. in our project we really needed a limited support from such kind of professionals or things. For example 
when it comes to IP or when it comes to tax. .. So we had interactions and I think the value added the 
most (was) the office space – it was an important and a crucial one.  That is when the lawyers went 
through all the contracts and different mechanisms and they proved to be very useful (A/1/5). 
 
In terms of suggestion to improve from the entrepreneurs viewpoint, Respondent-2 felt 
much of the work in the incubator was They had a programme which was not really 
incubation but more of training courses. We thought it would be a good idea to be part of 
it to understand and get some consultation from people who basically have been through 
start-ups and the know how to shape your business  (A/2/5).  Respondent-6 suggests after-
care services to continue motivating innovation.  Respondent-8 CEO of a recycling 
company who markets wood logs and charcoal (Saudi’s love BBQs) feels that risk capital 
providers take excessive amounts of equity and that incubators should have access to 
startup funds (A/8/7). 
 
Few of the interviewees refer to discussions on business modelling in the incubators; this 
seems odd when innovative models form such an important part of online and service 
businesses.  Respondent-6 (A/10/11) is the only interviewee who refers to such discussions. 
 
Clearly entrepreneurs are gaining benefit from Saudi incubators; however, the 
entrepreneurs’ motivation is lacking to go in and out of incubation quickly, exiting with a 
trading business.  Additionally, entry criteria appear loose and time in incubation flexible. 
 
6.3.2  Technology transfer, UILs and absorptive capacity 
 
This section explores KSA TT, UILs and absorptive capacity. 
 
6.3.2.1  Technology transfer 
 
Surprisingly few of the policy or entrepreneur interviewees referred to TT, though KFP 
deem it important to be located adjacent to the university (A/13/3).  Aziz Al Agargan of 
KACST felt it important to be located near university laboratories and specialist staff 
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(A/23/3), however, no single case was mentioned of labs being utilised by incubating 
companies nor of specialist academic staff being consulted. 
 
6.3.2.2  Building university-industry links 
 
University-industry links (UILs), however, appear important to universities, though these 
are often mediated via incubators (and perhaps other projects) located close to universities.  
Aziz Al Agargan of KACST referenced the Industry and Professional Advisory Councils 
found in many US universities (A/23/2) and the importance of close links in guiding 
research and designing curricula.  He did not mention UILs in relation to incubation.  It is 
these network links that many incubating companies crave.  For example, Respondent-12 
CEO of a transcription services views such links as an important aspect of the enabling role 
incubation centres can play (A/12/6) and Hussein Al Alattar suggests that linkages to the 
private sector are still not there (A/10/18).   The links Respondent-9 wanted were into KSA 
Ministries, he bemoaned lack of linkages, competition between Ministries, corruption and 
bureaucracy (A/9/12).  Others (for example Respondent-8 CEO of a recycling company) 
seeking marketing connections, was impresses by the connections made by the incubation 
centre.  They matched us with a retailer in Saudi who has 25 outlets and he’s now our main 
client, he said (A/8/4). 
 
In summary, whilst some universities are strongly connected to large KSA businesses, this 
is less the case for networks of SMEs, especially since larger business are reluctant to trade 
with new starts.  While Saudi universities invest heavily in TT (joint projects and inbound 
staff), these activities are disconnected from incubators lending greater support to the 
pessimistic forecasts in Middle East Eye (2016) than the optimistic Vision 2030.   
 
6.3.2.3  Building absorptive capacity  
 
Examination of absorptive capacity to manage basic research further supports this more 
pessimistic perspective.  Building entrepreneur’s absorptive capacity relates to their ability 
to understand and act upon new areas of expertise – it is project specific and quite different 
from generic training.  For Aziz Al Agargan of KACST, the Absence of technology transfer 
offices or units in many industries that would identify basic research outcomes and 
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recognize it’s production potential, (A/23/6) is a major issue in Saudi incubators along 
with unclear patenting law and raising risk capital.  Respondent-18 points out, that KSA 
large companies do not do basic research and the universities who do, do not see it as part 
of their role to increase the absorptive capacity of entrepreneurs, even ones in their own 
(attached) incubators, (A/16/11).  He goes on to contrast the preparedness of large 
companies in other countries to work with startups, developing new products, whereas 
large companies in KSA do not see it as relevant (A/18/6).   
 
The process of starting a business is one of action learning – gaining knowledge relevant 
to the business.  There is a clear gap in the ability of nascent entrepreneurs in KSA 






6.3.3  Motivation and capability for entrepreneurship 
 
None of the entrepreneurs mentions intrinsic motivation for starting their business; most 
refer to the extrinsic motivation of solving a problem.  Many have benefited from study 
abroad and technology transfer – adapting ideas from abroad to the KSA context.  As we 
shall see later, though GEM tells us the 40% of Saudis have a fear of failure as 
entrepreneurs, relative to their UK counterparts, there is no mention of emotional-readiness 
or emotional drive.   
 
Solving a consumer problem is a major motivation for these entrepreneurs.  For example, 
Respondent-9 learned to enjoy organic foods in the US, could not source them in KSA and 
this became his business passion, which he pursued despite (he says) lack of support from 
KACST taking three-years to commence trading (A/9/1).  Respondent-4 was inspired by a 
US experience, in his case online career profiling: SmartAble was trading within a year 
(A/4/1) a journey shared with a College friend.  Harakat which accesses cloud databases 
for online platforms too was inspired by a US example, in this case Ryan Finley’s Survey 
Monkey.  Respondent-7 was motivated to provide an Arabic product, in his case with more 
functionality than Sidiani.com his Saudi competitor.   Dr Respondent-8 CEO of a recycling 
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company got the idea of processing date palm oil from waste from reading an Indonesian 
example; he was motivated to establish a company, having lost significantly in the 2009 
Dubai Stock Exchange crash.  Sawerly, like iTunes and Flickr is a sharing repository for 
photographs, with the added twist of acting as a brokerage between photographers and 
clients.  Hussein Al Alattar presented the idea at a business competition with a friend and 
where trading within 6-months having been supported by PLASTICSLABS accelerator 
and a private investor.   
 
Technology transfer was an enabler and motivator for these companies along with the 
desire to solve a problem for consumers.  Respondent-11 began by transforming books into 
videos for students and then progressed to animating learning materials (A/11/1) targeting 
Arabic speaking markets.  His motivation at hroof was to promote visual communications. 
Respondent-12 CEO of a transcription services too uses communications to solve a 
consumer problem, in this case university lecture content capture and distribution in 
partnership with KSA universities. 
 
In summary, entrepreneurial motivation too extrinsic and short-term i.e. solving the 
problems of consumers, often based on the transfer of technologies from abroad, rather 
than the creation of new knowledge/technology in KSA. 
 
6.3.4  Internationalisation compliance with standards  
 
Compliance with formal (for example ISO) and informal (example usability) standards is 
important for interoperability with complementary products and services and critical for 
internationalisation.  Overall, Saudi startups seem centred on KSA market needs than 
standards compliance.   
 
Respondent-14 is typical, saying, So it’s great that we know about the western way and 
there’s a lot of things that we learn from there but at the same time let’s see how we can 
adapt it and modify it a little bit so it’s also suitable for this side of the market (A/1/4).  
Respondent-1 was not sure if Acadox makes B2C international sales notes that their online 
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education platform has B2B customers in seventeen countries, mainly Emirates and Oman 
and that standards compliance is imperative (A/1/12). 
 
Other interviewees such as Respondent-14 (A/14/15) whilst in principle favouring 
internationalisation and standards compliance were fixed on the KSA market, pointing out 
that We have a huge demand from overseas but we are usually not able to meet all their 
demands. One good thing however is that the market in Saudi is maturing now, especially 
in terms of funding existing businesses (A/14/17).   
 
Internationalising is a complex and important decision for SMEs and from a KSA 
perspective highly competitive, facing competition from Egyptian and Turkish firms 
targeting Arabic markets.  We return to these points later, in particular cross-referencing 
with the difficulties KSA startup have in raising risk capital: confining horizons to a market 
of 30-million will rarely appeal to the return rates VCs anticipate.  Our data reveals little 
focus on international market by startup, incubated SMEs. 
 
6.4  Commercialisation processes 
 
In this section I assemble evidence from entrepreneurs, policy-makers and incubation 
centre managers on commercialisation processes divided into eight sub-sections: startup 
and growth; internationalisation; labour supply; IP and regulations; governances; risk 
capital; entrepreneurial risk and leadership; and knowledge flows.   
 
6.4.1  Start-up and growth 
 
To explore the start up and growth processes I divide this section into time (dash-for-cash) 
and trouble, meaning difficulties and how they are surmounted.   
 
6.4.1.1  Time: a dash-for-cash? 
 
Companies burning equity or their own sweat capital without generating income are a key 




Some companies would feature on the ‘celebration of success’ part of incubator websites 
anywhere in the world.  For example Hussein Al Alattar who began trading after 6-months 
(A/10/3) says, We used the lean start-up methodology as a start-up with an MVP. Our KPIs 
were just a number of bookings on the website and we kept an eye on this to ensure that we 
were meeting our targets. Until now we have only 5 employees but we might need some 
more specialised employees in future. (A/10/5).  Respondent-14 (A/14/12) began trading 
after a year.  
 
However, when asked when did they feel their company became legitimate, several of the 
interviewees replied like Respondent-5 (A/5/2) when registered by the Ministry of Trade 
(after one-year in incubation): note, not when it made its first sales.  Five of the companies 
interviewed are still not trading: Respondent-2 after two-years incubation (A/2/4); 
Respondent-4 after four-years incubation (A/4/4) who says (A/4/2) It took us over a year 
to develop the vision of the company.  Respondent-7 took two-years to begin trading 
(A/7/2) and Respondent-6 is now trading after 1-year development  (A/6/1).   
 
Respondent-9 is a special case taking seven years to source organic seeds, rent land and 
secure supermarket contracts for organic fruit and vegetables (A/9/2). 
 
My point is not to call attention to the patience of incubation, nor time spent (at no cost) 
incubating, rather that at entry into incubation firms appear far from market launch and that 
incubations do not impose time limits likely to focus entrepreneur’s attention on time-to-
market. 
 
6.4.1.2  Trouble – challenges in incubation processes 
 
In view of the time some of these companies spend in incubation one might expect a long 
list of challenges faced: this is not the case.  Apart from sourcing risk capital (reviewed in 
section 4.6 below) the major challenge mentioned is having to spend time taking irrelevant 
training courses to comply with incubator rules: Respondent-2 is an example for whom 
incubation took three-years (A/2/5).  Of course, migrating young students into 
entrepreneurs does take time.  Respondent-7 draws attention to financial discipline he 
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learned during incubation: We might have invested our money into a lot things that we 
didn’t need. This would have cost us a lot in terms of result and time (A/7/14).  Respondent-
12 CEO of a transcription services, who spend one-year incubating, was encouraged to 
develop a customer feedback system as a KPI, which is not key to the success of the 
business (A/12/3; A/12/5). 
 
Respondent-8 CEO of a recycling company is far from impressed by the ability of KSA 
incubators to help nascent companies overcome difficulties. 
 
To go into an incubator either you have a new idea and you don’t have finance; or you don’t know how 
to nurture this new idea into a marketable product. Here in Saudi, having a new idea is not productive. I 
know a lady from Baida incubator; her products got rejected just within 6 months after launching the 
product. There is no protection or commercial rights, which is very dangerous (A/8/6). 
 
Incubation involves preparing a product and route to sales often termed the ‘valley of 
death’ the business spends before it reaches positive cashflow and then profit.  There is 
little evidence that Saudi incubators urgently address this dash-for-cash or are able to 
support startups in plotting practical routes to market; lack of practical business leadership 
shows. 
 
6.4.2  Internationalisation 
 
Many VCs will look for 50% of sales internationally within two-years in order to achieve 
the growth necessary for a c20% IRR exit.  In section 3.4, I discussed the standards 
compliance aspects of internationalisation; here I look at dedication to internationalisation 
Saudi startup commercialisation companies.  I find that most are not dedicated, in part 
perhaps because it is difficult to re-export imported business products and also because 
most are fixated on the KSA market.  For example, Respondent-3 (A/3/16), Respondent-7 
(A/7/15), and Respondent-12 (A/12/13) each say that they wish to internationalise in the 
future, but have no concrete plans to do so.  Hussein Al Alattar (A/10/14) considers UAE, 
Egypt and other Arab countries suitable for internationalisation, but again has no practical 





From the university perspective, Respondent-15, a Science Park Manager is concerned to 
expand his research base in publications and patents.  He says,   
 
At this point in time, we have out 14 companies, 11 are international companies and only 3 are Saudi 
companies because the bulk of the technological selling to our oil and gas industry and petrochemical 
industry are done by these American and European companies. So, they have a lot of business interests 
here and our job is to basically convince them to get away from transactional approach to coming, selling 
and going back home. We want them to imbibe their technological centres in the country and we cannot 
do it unless the countries which buy all these expensive technologies from them ask or force them to 
establish a centre here in Saudi Arabia. … the international exposure to the science pack is our basic 
element … the innovations that come out during the process of technological development provides the 
start-ups that provides the jobs creation that provides the manufacturing.  Some of the products are right 
away able to go to the manufacturing, some are still have to go through the proof of concept and to the 
prototyping, scaling up before they go to the manufacturing. But, most of them originate from these 
international companies working in developing a technological solution or a technological product for 
the industry (A/15/6). 
 
In summary, lack of an internationalisation perspective is a major difficult facing Saudi 
incubators, startups and universities, a view expressed by the majority of interviewees. 
 
 
6.4.3  Labour supply 
 
Respondent-1 a major online training company points out that recruiting educated Saudi 
labour for startups is difficult, since their preference is for large MNEs or employment with 
the Government.  This results in importing foreign skilled labour, which can be 
bureaucratic process (work permits and visas). He goes on, 
 
The most difficult of all is however business development people or marketing individuals. We also faced 
issues in sales and marketing. For example we faced difficulty in marketing when it comes to recruiting, 
and when it comes to approaching clients. They will say your company is small and we’re looking for 
something more established. But what we’re expecting is for them to ask us something like who does this 
company belong to but they want to see like a well-recognised name behind it and that gives them 
confidence to go into business with us. So in terms of marketing we face difficulty in recruiting and we 
face difficulty in approaching clients (A/1/18). 
 
Respondent-9 points to the additional problem that one Saudi national must be employed 
for each four foreign workers and sometimes the Saudis regard such positions as sinecures, 
without the need to attend or contribute (A/9/4).  As in many developing countries, the 
state plays a dominant role and people see Government jobs as secure. According to 
Respondent-12 CEO of a transcription services, bright young people in KSA take public 
sector jobs in preference to working for startups (A/12/17).  There is no tradition (and legal 




KSA’s position is not helped by brain drain.  It is normal for developing countries to lose 
(to migration) some of their most capable people; especially where there is a shortage of 
opportunities for young and qualified people. For example, 88% of Vietnamese filing for 
patents do so from a foreign residence (Economist 081215).  Of the 110,000 Saudis 
studying abroad some 25% are women (56% of those studying within the Kingdom are 
women), who often prefer to emigrate.  Though no figures are available, there is a shortfall 
(especially outside of large cities) of teachers and medical staff (only 21% of Saudi doctors 
and 55% of other medical staff are natives according to Bakhsh et al 2012). 
 




6.4.4  IP and the regulatory environment  
 
KSA company law is rooted in the French Napoleonic Code (via Egypt).  It poses serious 
issues for startup companies and their funders in particular relating to intellectual property 
law (IP), capital gains tax and the governance of risk capital funds.  Capital gains tax is 
hugely important to startups, since invariably (with the exception of low-growth lifestyle 
companies) the entrepreneur gains his/her reward by exiting or selling equity.  IP law and 
its enforcement are crucial to the value of knowledge-based startups for company valuation 
and legal protection of products sold internationally.  This is again an area where Vision 
2030 claims problems do not exist.   
 
6.4.4.1  Intellectual property 
 
Respondent-23 a national level commercialisation policy maker, is one of the most 
influential figures in KSA’s policy of commercialising technology transfers using 
incubation centres.  We discussed patenting in KSA, where applications are made to the 
Directorate of Patents at King Abdul Aziz City of Science and Technology (KACST) who 
are also responsibility for resolving disputes at a Board of Grievances.  Dr Al Agargan 
says, The ownership of the IP. The law is not well established or vague on this issue and 
there are grey areas. For example a scientist working in a university, who owns the IP? 
 
 179 
KACST might claim ownership but so might the scientist. So although the law is there it’s 
not clear, A/16/8).  Explaining the difficulties creating clarity, he says, For example the 
company in charge is KACST, which also fund the research in the university. So KACST 
claims as the custodian of the IP that compares to all other universities which is very 
difficult. It’s clear for them (A/16/9).  He points out that, most universities rejected the IP 
of the researcher outside the university (A/16/10).  Uncertainty of IP makes the valuation 
of companies and the sale of products in international markets very difficult.  Confusion 
over IP-ownership is only exacerbated by documents such as KASCT (2011), which 
unequivocally (2011:12) states that Intellectual Property generated through research 
conducted using National Science, Technology and Innovation Plan   Funding will be 
owned by the Government.  As section 2.5.3 makes clear, IP ownership by Government or 
university institutions disincentivises academic entrepreneurship and adds complication in 
attracting external risk finance.   
 
6.4.4.2  Legal issues 
 
Many incubators connect entrepreneurs to lawyers (A/9/11; A/12/17).  Respondent-20 at a 
senior commercialisation policy expert in KSA reports, Yes, we have lawyers working from 
all angles of the incubators.  So we at KACST as a company have lawyers. We have already 
done several studies in terms of issues with current laws regarding venture capital and 
investment as a whole. (A/20/18).  However, legal issues remain an important barrier to 
commercialisation. 
 
Firstly, (as we shall see in section 4.6 below) access to venture capital is problematic in 
KSA.  One reason for this is that the preferred structure of VC and their investors is a 
limited partnership.  These are possible under Saudi laws (Companies Regulation, Articles 
36 to 39), however, the simple or limited partnership (sharikat al-tawsiya, al basita) as in 
French law (unlike UK, German or US law) gives liability of all partner actions to the 
general partner, making it risky to constitute VC funds since a General Partner would be 




VC (and startup entrepreneurs) rely on exit (often sale of equity privately i.e. not by IPO).  
Saudi law is complex on private equity sales and especially so for foreign nationals.  Added 
to which capital gains are taxed at 20%, without the ability to offset cumulated losses, if 
50% of control passes.  For VCs this is a deal-breaker, since their fund is likely to be a 
portfolio in which losses (or living-dead) investments are offset by a smaller number of 
‘star’ investments. 
 
In summary, IP law, company law and fiscal arrangements in KSA are barriers to adopting 




6.4.5  Governances 
 
Here I assemble evidence relating to the governance of incubators and high-tech startups 
in KSA.  In particular, I focus on the structures, rules and embedded ways-of-working that 
influence the success of commercialisations.  Since this expansive topic generated a great 
deal of data, I have been highly selected to avoid repetition. 
 
6.4.5.1  Incubator governances  
 
Funding and control 
KSA incubators are publicly funded and attached to leading universities.  At KFP for 
example, this incubator is part of what is called the entrepreneurship institute established 
basically with the vision to position the university as a leader in entrepreneurship thinking. 
The whole mission is to provide a care system for university students to become 
entrepreneurs (A/13/1).  Respondent-15 sees its vision as diversifying the economy away 
from oil-dependency and promoting Saudi’isation (A/15/5).   
 
Respondent-17 Manager of an incubation network describes the management structure: 
 
Because we’re not a single incubator, the programme runs as a network of incubators. As a result, the 
management team at the moment is the programme CEO; industry sector directors (x3), ICT, Bio-
technology and Events, Manufacturing and Material; project management office; finance and budget 
director; entrepreneurship support director, incubator development manager and a director for shared 




Incubators are under the direction of academic staff supported by business advisors.  At 
KFP for example incubatees are excluded, If you miss 3 classes consecutively or if you are 
not making any progress at all (A/13/13).  I regard academic rather than business 
leadership of all incubation processes as a major fault in the Saudi system. 
 
Limits on range of services offered 
All of the incubators offer workspace, secretarial and digital-access and an assortment of 
professional services such as accountants and lawyers.  Some have marketing expertise on 
call.  None of the incubators have direct access to risk capital funds, instead, (A/16/3) they 
facilitate access to private and Government funds, though as Respondent-20, for example 
(A/20/16) readily agree; there are problems accessing VC.  Lack of access is not only 
access to fund, it is also access to VC expertise, critical feedback on business model and 
business plan and the network connection VCs can bring.  
 
Entry and processes 
Incubator entry is for university graduates only, who have technical knowledge and a 
business idea (however early-stage) and as KFP state show, passion, energy, flexibility and 
resilience (A/13/10).  Apart from preparing monthly reports (as does the mentor) for the 
Incubation Director, entrants must follow a programme of courses, as KFP say, It’s very 
simple. You have to be there, attend classes and each week do a pitch. Attendance is very 
important. Of course the university regulations applies to our incubates. Their mentors 
provide written reports monthly (A/13/12).  Many centres conduct business plan 
competitions (A/15/5).  In addition to working on their business project, entrants to Centres 
follow a programme of attendance and courses illustrating the academic nature of the 
incubators.  More time spent seconded into active business startups may provide greater 
insights for the potential student entrepreneurs. 
 
Key performance indicators 
Respondent-3 CEO of an energy programming company is typical, saying, We have KPI 
for employment; profit and loss; marketing; job creation; customer satisfaction and R&D, 
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(A/3/6).  As Respondent-15, a Science Park Manager makes clear, We also look at how 
many Saudis are getting into these technology development .. job creation is an important 
element, especially jobs for Saudis (A/15/5).  Respondent-21 a senior commercialisation 
policy expert in Riyadh who is responsible for the national plan for science and technology 
confesses that his real passion is research and told me he has 100 publications about bees 
and bee-keeping equipment (A/21/11). 
 
In summary, academic staff manages Saudi incubators and incubators must follow 
prescribed courses, illustrating an academic rather than business orientation as does low 
levels of interaction with existing startups and venture capitalists.   
 
6.4.5.2  SME governances  
 
Detailed coding shows five sub-themes emerging in the extensive interviews with Saudi 
entrepreneurs: resource assembly; legitimacy; risk; technical expertise and marketing; 
discipline and leadership development.  Section 4.7 below gathers evidence on risk and 
leadership and section 4.6 on the risk capital element of resource assembly.   
 
Resource assembly 
Experience in leveraging external resources varies, in particular with the quality of business 
networking incubation centres access.  Respondent-11 CEO of an animation and media 
advertising company had the positive experience at Tehran Techno Valley of partnering 
foreign companies where we can develop this products cheaper (A/11/5).  However, this 
is exceptional, for most incubatees resource assembly means apply for Government grants.  
 
Legitimacy 
Many companies felt registering with the Ministry of Trade gave them legitimacy, others 
for example Respondent-7 CEO of an e-commerce company stated when he became ‘sure’ 
of his business idea (A/7/4).  No single company mentioned typical business theory notions 
of legitimacy such as sales income, hitting breakeven, securing external funding, contracts 




Technical expertise and marketing 
Many developing countries have technically astute products, but fail the marketing test and 
overly focus on technical development: to what consumer problem is the product a 
solution; how can the product be taken to market?   This trend is evident amongst these 
Saudi companies.  Respondent-4 says, There is not much marketing story because our focus 
is to develop the product (A/4/14), Respondent-6 regards marketing as less important than 
attending the incubation centre training (A/6/16); Respondent-7 will get up there and get 
some businesses (A/7/16). 
 
Nascent firms needing technical assistance can benefit greatly from Centre connections as 
the Jwain recycling story illustrates (A/8/5).  Companies graduating from the Centres, still 
trading, such as Respondent-9’s, have a clear marketing strategy and evaluate market 
performance regularly (A/9/5); others such as Respondent-11 CEO of an animation and 
media advertising company use sophisticated marketing techniques, such as online video 
to explain the product.   
 
In summary, Centres appear de-focused on marketing leaving some nascent firms without 
a clear marketing perspective.  
 
Discipline  
Business planning is now an essential aspect of startup.  Many of the firms report 
benefitting from having to prepare a meaningful plan.  For example, Respondent-7 is clear 
that he would have wasted precious startup capital had it not been for the financial 
discipline instilled by the incubation centre (A/7/14).  However, the process would improve 
if the plans were assessed by external (potential) funders, rather than academics. 
 
6.4.6  Risk capital 
 
Reports by GEM (2012) and the WB (2013) highlight the shortage of VC in KSA as a 
retardant on entrepreneurship; this section assembles the evidence on the availability and 
nature of risk capital for Saudi firms seeking to commercialise university research and 
transferred technologies.  It is important not to simply look for a western model of VC.  
Research on the MENA region by Sherbiny and Hatem (2015) reveals that many innovative 
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firms successful launch and internationalise using family-and-friends capital, which though 
it might act as a break on risk-taking in developed economies is less risk-averse in 
developing contexts.  The section is structured around four sub-themes: Government funds; 
banks loans and facilities; private equity and international private equity.  Section 2.9.1 
above references difficulties around private equity sales and IPO, law and fiscal 
regulations.  
 
6.4.6.1  Banks loans and facilities 
 
KSA has transactional business banking only developing supportive relationships with 
bigger businesses: they lend against assets not future value.  I found not one single example 
of a Saudi bank providing startup capital in the form of loan or overdraft facilities.  This is 
a major institutional problem. 
 
6.4.6.2  Government funds 
 
Recognising the gap in startup finance, the KSA Government has established the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) though mainly targeting large industrial projects; and 
the   The Public Investment Fund targeting large-scale infrastructure projects.  Most useful 
is the Finance Guarantee Programme (Kafalah), which offers banks guarantees on facilities 
up to US$ 2-million; this is not contracting as part of the Government’s austerity 
programme.  Some Centres, such as KACST now have direct access to Kafalah and in 
exchange take an equity stake (A/1/7).  Applications for public funding are time-consuming 
and cumbersome.  Respondent-8 reported that after an application in 2012 he is still waiting 
(A/9/3 i.e. four years later) despite being supported by BADIR and Respondent-9 a series 
of bureaucratic wrangles, though with personal guarantees he did eventually get a US$ 
200,000 loan. 
 
Respondent-8 amongst others bemoans the inaccessibility of bank and Government funds 
at startup stage (A/8/8) forcing entrepreneurs to rely on family and friends and/or building 
up (expensive) credit card debt.   
 




Respondent-15, who works closely with VC funds, suggests that, In Saudi Arabia, there 
are many resources of getting early seed funding through government and private oil 
companies. There is also a consortium of Angel club where they pull resources together. It 
is a growing business in Saudi Arabia (A/15/4).  This is also the view expressed in Vision 
2030. 
 
Of the companies interviewed two reported having a VC investment: Respondent-3 CEO 
of an energy programming company (A/3/17) and Smartable (A/4/15) We’ve had an 
investment of $40,000 from a fund.  Others have products not capable of the growth VCs 
require or possibly access to alternative (and less expensive) source of capital.  Another 
possibility is that like Dr Respondent-1, the entrepreneurs have no interest in a business 
model that involves exit by sale of private equity (A/1/16).  Hussein Al Alattar was given 
a pre-seed funding grant (A/10/4) by his Accelerator  
 
Respondent-18 a commercialisation policy expert in KSA reported that they had done a 
survey of VC availability and that,  
 
…  it was very clear that there is no cultural of venture capital risk taking particularly when it comes to 
technology in small companies. But there is a vibrant private equity market in Saudi Arabia. But when it 
comes to venture networking, venture capital, there is still in the very early stages. First of all there was 
no culture, the whole country has been technology consumers for the last 50-60 years and even this heavy 
dependence on the natural endowment, and they’ve never actually produced or manufactured anything 
to a substantial degree. So the whole concept of venture support or financial technology is not matured 
(A/18/7). 
 
He went on to argue that in a rich country like KSA one would expect more VC to be 
available (A/18/9).  Respondent-20 a senior commercialisation policy expert in KSA 
suggests that major changes in culture and law will be necessary before sufficient VC is 
available (A/20/16). 
 
VCs everywhere bemoan the lack of good deals and entrepreneurs everywhere bemoan the 
absence of interested VCs, despite policy claims to the contrary (KACST 2014).  Given 
the international reports and evidence from entrepreneurs and institutions it seems fair to 




6.4.6.4  International private equity 
 
Many, particular US, Finnish, German and British VCs are active in international markets, 
sometimes resulting in complaints that public research is bought cheaply by foreign funds.  
Foreign VCs are not active in KSA (A/20/17) nor can they be expected to be so until the 
legal, fiscal and regulatory regimes alters.  Meanwhile, entrepreneurs are using their own 
capital and that of friends and (A/7/5: A/11/15) or when they can, sales income (A/5/3; 
A/6/17). 
 
6.4.7  Entrepreneurial risk and leadership 
 
All of the entrepreneurs demonstrated the tenacity of moving from concept to product, 
despite set backs and difficulties.  They entered the incubator as young entrepreneurs 
knowing how difficult the Saudi job market is using the Centre to reduce risk, develop 
skills and confidence and build a business network (A/3/12).  Like many young 
entrepreneurs their stories of risk-taking and leadership development are matter-of-fact: it 
seems that they surprised themselves.  For example, it was the failure to win the Jeddah 
business competition that inspired Respondent-5 to enter PLASTICSLABS and as he says, 
Now here we are as a company with investors, board members and useful product, which 
is getting larger and better (A/10/1).  Respondent-5 CEO of a creative arts company too 
seems surprised at his own leadership ability at selecting co-founders (the key decision in 
any business) and then making pitches and presentations (A/5/1).   
 
There are recognisable milestones along these entrepreneurial journeys.  Respondent-6 and 
his partner took the risk of working for no salary (A/6/5).  Respondent-3, reflecting the 
importance of recognition and awards, exudes pride in I was the first from my university to 
be awarded the King Prize for forming my owing company (A/3/4) and showing the 
leadership to adopt a combined free (to universities not using additional services) and 
subscription (to students) business model.  Like entrepreneurs everywhere, Respondent-6 
relied on his instinct, I knew the market and people were looking for such services (A/6/3): 
entrepreneurial leadership always has this emotional content.  For Respondent-12, taking 




We want to take leadership in this sector within the sub-region. We have a bloc where we produce 
summaries of speeches. We started this as a team of students in the university here in Saudi. We have all 
graduated now and we are now working independently for the company. It took us one year  (A/12/2). 
 
Unlike most of the incubation entrepreneurs, Respondent-14 had previously been in 
business where he had developed entrepreneurial skills  (A/14/10). 
 
In summary, while there are contextually specific ways in which entrepreneurial leadership 
and risk-taking occur in KSA, there do not appear to be any culturally idiosyncrasies.   
 
6.4.8  Knowledge flows and distribution  
 
Having briefly referred to knowledge flows in section 2.4, this section explores knowledge 
flows, from the viewpoint of the entrepreneurs and firms in particular four emergent sub-
themes: the extent to which new knowledge is endogenously generated or exogenously 
sources; secondly whether the nature of the knowledge is tacit or formally codified; third 
whether the new knowledge relates to business or to technical expertise and finally, the 
degree to which useful knowledge was international transferred. 
 
6.4.8.1  Exogenous or endogenous knowledge  
 
Most of the companies are engaged in R&D; some part of which may be importing 
knowledge generated outside, however, they actively research and develop ideas within the 
companies.  As Respondent-4 says reflecting the experience of many of the student 
entrepreneurs, R&D has been going on since we were in college and it’s still going on. We 
do it on our own (A/4/16).  A similar commitment to on-going internal R&D can be found 
at (A/3/18), (A/10/17), (A/11/16), (A/13/17) and (A/13/18).  In summary, firm-funded 
internal R&D is an important part of the on-going development of these KSA companies.  
 
6.4.8.2  Tacit or formal knowledge  
 
Only one of the companies, Respondent-9’s agri-food innovation company has done formal 
research with a university (KACST) and a company in Belarus on the use of ultrasonics.  
The other companies do not do R&D with universities.  
 




For most of the companies R&D include technical product improvement, however, the 
majority of R&D is business related, exampled by the network building by Smartable 
(A/4/12). 
 
6.4.8.4  International technology transfer of knowledge 
 
As section 3.4 indicated, several of the incubation companies brought business ideas back 
from study abroad.  Whilst there is undoubtedly examples of TT-based formal knowledge 
exploitation in Saudi commercialisation (oil, healthcare, financial services) this formally 
transferred technology exploitation was not found amongst these incubating companies.  
Smartable’s owner brought ideas from the US; Hrakt sources animation knowledge from 
India and Egypt (A/7/3); Respondent-8 CEO of a recycling company read about processes 
in Indonesia (A/8/1).  In summary, there is exploitation of transferred technologies but 
these are transferred informally not via universities or formal Government TT programmes. 
 
The TT from which incubating companies benefit is informal and tacit knowledge, often 
sourced by the entrepreneurs themselves, rather than from the TT in which the Saudi 
Government and universities invest. 
 
6.5.1  Commercialisation outcomes 
 
In this section I assemble evidence on the wider socio-economic outcomes of KSA’s 
incubator programme, leaving specific (company-level) outputs to section 5.2.  In 
particular I looked for evidence that the incubators are effecting the institutional 
arrangements discussed in section-1 and 2 above.   
 
For Respondent-5, an incubation unit Manager, association with the incubation network 
gives important leverage in attracting foreign companies to perform R&D in KSA; he 
already has 14 MNEs committed to R&D in Tehran Valley including desalination, solar 
generation and down-stream oil products.   
 
Interestingly when asked to nominate two successful incubated companies, Respondent-23 
a national level commercialisation policy maker refers to pharmaceutical and ICT 
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companies.  This perhaps illustrates that KACST’s connection to national plan priorities is 
greater than the throughput of companies in the incubator network as judged by my sample.  
Respondent-5 also from KACST (A/23/4) suggests that vibrant areas of commercialisation 
include Petrochemical products and industry, Agricultural and food products and industry 
and Minerals and mineral products.  The 9th National Plan seeks to replicate the innovation 
cluster in Silicon Valley in Dhahran Valley  
 
One institutional result of the incubator programme is to introduce a third set of goals for 
universities (in addition to research and teaching), though as Respondent-20 admits the 
enthusiasm of the universities is variable, and non-existent for evaluation studies (A/20/4). 
 
Section-1 discussed, change and innovation in KSA is not always transparent.  The 
commitment to diversify as oil revenues decline is deep.  It may be in future that wider 
institutional arrangements change to accommodate the needs of incubators and this may be 
the result of pressure from incubation networks.  For the moment, this is not evidenced, 
though it is claimed in numerous policy documents such as KACST 2014) 
 
6.5.2  Commercialisation outputs 
 
KSA’s incubation network is a major budget commitment and a strategic objective that is 
central to the 9th Five Year Plan.  How is this initiative evaluated and is there a clear 
feedback loop generating continuous improvement?  This section assembles evidence on 
inputs to commercialisation. 
 
Respondent-20 a senior commercialisation policy expert in KSA says,  
 
In terms of assessment, in KACST, yes we have done but in the other universities I don’t remember that 
they have done any evaluation. Our evaluation was not really deep in terms of looking at details but it 
was an overall assessment of the incubation process and what needs to be done  (A/20/3). 
 
When asked if the Government had evaluated the incubation programme he said, 
 
None has been done. Only KACST has done some studies and incubation as a programme is fairly recent. 
We can say barely 5 years old and you know the first years are more of establishing and testing. Based 
on that most of the incubators are now stable and so at this time I think it’s useful to do a study and an 




There are changes; for example, Respondent-18 says over time entry criteria have relaxed 
and extended incubation (over three years) is now frowned upon (A/18/3).  He says that 
profitability of the incubators themselves was never an output; rather Centres were to be 
judged on the number of events held and entrant numbers (A/18/1) – criteria closer to inputs 
than outputs.    
 
Respondent-17, Manager of an incubation network  
 
The KPIs for the whole programme basically include: clients outcomes such as the overall number of 
clients, the number of applications and the ratio of applications that become clients, the revenue of clients 
and the employment of clients. So there is a whole range of KPIs. So our CSFs include the achievement 
of these KPIs. Specifically they include: having entrepreneurial management and staff in the programme 
(i.e. having highly skilled entrepreneurs managing the incubators); having an independent governance 
system; and having a business module that works for the environment we’re operating in (A/17/4). 
 
However, no figures are publicly available measuring these KPIs.   
 
Respondent-5 notes that the university (reluctantly and only as a result of a decree from 
the Council of Ministers) gave the Valley a land and financial grant (US$ 20-million) and 
charged them to establish a science pack, that you will incubate students, you will 
commercialise technology (A/15/3).  The Chairman of the Board is the President of the 
university.  As CEO, Respondent-15 is accountable to the Board.  Using the grant and 
income from property, they employ 15 to 20 staff and have made investments, for example 
US$ 6-million in electrical technology units.  At KFP, of 10 applications for incubation, 
seven have been successful (A/13/11); like all incubators its services are freely available 
to students, who may also state receive welfare benefits. 
 
In summary, there is no systematic monitoring and evaluation of KSA’s incubation 
network outputs such as costs per project, time spent incubating, companies launch, 





CHAPTER-7  DATA FROM UNITED KINGDOM    
 
As Lewis (2011) points out, it is often the invisible (cultural predispositions) differences 
that explain actions, emotions, framing and conceptualisations creating distinct habituses 
(Bourdieu 1990).  This is neither a study of cultural differences, nor of national systems of 
innovation.  Rather, my study seeks to explore dissimilarities in commercialisation process 
and to identify how Saudi processes might improve, by analysing them through the prism 
of commercialisation research and UK experience.   
 
There are parallels between the UK and KSA: both are countries used to high oil revenues 
that are predicted to diminish (from 2015 for the UK); each faces exogenous shocks and 
uncertainties (for the UK, wars, potential EU exit).  This comparison is mainly between 
Scotland as a part of the UK and KSA.  Both countries rely on foreign labour, though as 
an ex-colonial power this is inward migration in the case of the UK, whilst KSA has 3-
million temporary workers, reflected in a dominant mono-culture and the sensitivity to 
identify found in all post-colonial cultures.   
 
This section follows the same structure as the previous chapter (figure 6.1) based on the 
framework (figure 4.1).  I reference material from twelve original interviews and materials 
from published sources, including government reports such as Edinburgh Research and 
Innovation (ERI); the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS); International Monetary 
Fund (IMF); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); World 
Bank (WB); Global Enterprise Monitor (GEM); European Union (EU) and the Scottish 
Government. 
 
Britain has a history since the 1780s of industrialisation and innovation. Whilst in 1948 
manufacturing (including oil and gas) was 41% of GDP it is now 10% (ONS 2014).  
Services constitute 51% of GDP, providing 78% of all employment.  Of this 10% of GDP 
and 13% of exports come from financial services, which since the UK is a small open 
economy with its own currency leads to high exposure to contagion.  Financial services are 




The UK’s investment rate at 15% of GDP is similar to Germany but below international 
competitors.  UK gross value added (GVA) being the GDP less the cost of inputs, is 65% 
compared to KSA’s 57% (WB 2014) and in the UK is rising strongly in non-financial 
services (at 9.6% per annum) with manufacturing rising at only 2%.   Spending on R&D 
in the UK rises at around 6% pa, being £18.4 billion in 2013 (ONS 2014) with another £1.8 
billion in defence-related sectors.  Inward foreign direct investors expend some 50% of UK 
R&D.  Overall, businesses in the UK spend 1.9% of turnover on R&D employing directly 
some 200,000 staff, out of a 30.1 million workforce.  In 2014, total business employment 
in R&D in the UK increased by 7% to 192,000 Full Time Equivalents (FTE).  
 
Innovative sectors in Britain include domestic appliances (for example, Dyson); creative 
industries (BBC, Spotify, Mind Candy); high-value microprocessors (ARM); 
design/architecture/consultancy (Arup, Burberry); retail (M&S); UK-based 
pharmaceutical companies (3M, GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca, Ineos) and financial 
services (HSBC, Royal Bank, Standard Life).  
 
At 83% the (16 to 64 years) workforce participation rate is high by international standards, 
with 75% of women working  (90% of women graduates) and half of those over state 
pension age. 
 
7.2  Drivers, enablers/barriers to commercialisation  
 
This section summarises interview and public report evidence on the ‘big’ institutional 
arrangements governing commercialisation in the UK, including the national and sectoral 
systems of innovation, how the state seeks to support entrepreneurship and the barriers and 
incentives to entrepreneurship and innovation. 
 
7.2.1  SSIs and NSI alignment and active leadership  
 
Here I present evidence on the UK national and sectoral systems of innovation, the state as 
a value creating or distributive agency, national vision, innovation incentives and economic 
stability.  Although from a Saudi perspective, UK drivers and barriers to successful 
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commercialisation at first sight look paradigmally different, on closer inspection similar 
themes emerge including access to startup capital. 
 
7.2.1.1  The UK national system of innovation  
 
Many of the (now) classic NSI studies feature case studies of the UK (Lundvall (1992); 
Nelson (1993); Nelson (1993); Nelson and Rosenberg (1993).  Porter’s (1990) study, for 
example, notes that UK R&D was overly focused on defence and too much public sector.  
He went on to regret the absence of discerning customers (demanding high quality, 
innovative products) outside of the southeast area.  It is interesting that although the classic 
push-pull debate on technology innovation concludes that both are necessary for innovation 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1979) the nature of this coupling alters as technologies change. 
 
GEM (2014) records a disappointingly total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) rate 
for the UK of 8.6% (almost half this figure amongst women and in Scotland) with 3.8% of 
working-age people owner-managers; interestingly noting a rising rate (6.3%) amongst 
people over 50. Some researchers less sanguinely suggest that overall formal education 
contributes little to UK economic growth (Wolf 2002), benefits little from spillovers from 
inward R&D investors (Audretsch and Stephan1999) and overall does not do well at 
commercialisation (Miner, Dale, Eesley MD and Rura-Polley 2001).  More recent research 
by PraxisUnico Spin-outs UK Survey (2012) reviews the performance of a variety of UK 
regions in terms of spinouts, breaking these down by type (e.g. life sciences, physical 
sciences, informatics, etc), size and level of investment.  The survey reveals, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, that all investments greater than £5m in new spinouts were made in London 
and the South-East England; and that, of those securing between £1m to £5m in investment; 
only 15% of these firms were based in Scotland.  Despite Edinburgh’s success in creating 
new firms during the period, the PraxisUnico report claims that no University of Edinburgh 
company had achieved a successful exit or trade sale in the period 2006-2011. 
 
Respondent-33 Commercialisation Director at a UK university BioQuarter (A/33/4) 
explaining that the incubation centre aims to create profit emphasises the role of 




 …you have to understand that universities are not just motivated by profits. They are motivated by high 
level things. There are lots and lots of public money that goes into universities and so they need to give 
back to society. That could be given it back in forms of economic gain or educating the population. So 
universities do these things for a number of reasons not just for profit. But by and large, yes, we’re trying 
to maximise the returns to the university to develop IP.  
 
In summary, the UK NSI is well established, perhaps too well established to respond 
rapidly to changing technologies and markets: there is a cultural chasm between 
universities and industry: a view all four UK policy experts agreed with. 
 
7.2.1.2  Sectoral systems of innovation and clustering 
 
Some incubators in the UK see their sectoral focus as on high growth companies, rather 
than particular technologies, for example, Abdul at FreeSpace says, 
 
We don’t have a sectoral focus. However, we do have a focus on companies for example those looking at 
high impact companies by which we mean that those ones they find a reputable business module will 
positively impact on millions of people in 2-3 years (A/34/9). 
 
Other incubators, such as ERI who focus (because of the university research output) on 
biomedical, software, green technology and biotechnology, see resource constraints as 
limiting SSI-building.  Respondent-35 Policy expert and UK incubation manager 
comments, 
 
I suspect strategically the exploitation of the university sector and knowledge based isn’t actually seen 
as that important or as important as it should be by the Scottish government. There is a desire I think to 
commercialise at the knowledge base level but there are others that add to the Scottish economy that are 
seen as more important just now. For instance, resolving the issues on the oil and gas sector but also 
tourism and relatively large-scale industry and renewable energy – that sort of thing.  So with the current 
Scottish government I think there’s been some reduction in the priority given to the commercialisation of 
university knowledge and I think that came at the same time with the austerity within the UK and also 
there is less money coming into the universities to support commercialisation. So, I can’t say that I feel 
that the Scottish government has any particular focus on university technology transfer and knowledge 
transfer (A/35/2). 
 
In summary, UK SSIs in emerging technologies are themselves still emerging.  The time 
gap between science and technology remains a concern. 
 
 




Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff’s (2000) definition of the TH an innovative environment 
consisting of university spin-off firms, tri-lateral initiatives for knowledge-based economic 
development and strategic alliances between firms…government laboratories and 
academic research groups shows that its effectiveness is not the existence of three 
agencies, rather it is the interaction between them.  Simply have a high quality education 
systems, as Wolf (2002) demonstrates do not impact on GDP growth.  Audretsch and 
Stephan (1999) and Pavitt (1991) show that without spillover between basic research and 
its exploitation by entrepreneurs, the gap between science and technology (Pisano 2006) 
will not shorten: in Miner et al ’s (2001) terms, the beanstalk becomes higher and the 
exploiters never reach the top.   
 
Respondent-32 manager of a UK university’s student spinout service paints a promising 
picture. 
 
In Scotland we’re very well served actually. We’ve got Business Gateway and Scottish Enterprise for 
compared to England provides very strong business support. For example they help small businesses all 
the way up through. So the government is quiet strong in terms of business support in general not just 
incubation. The private sector and academia offer something different. So I don’t know who the weakest 
link is. They all work together quiet well (A/32/21). 
 
One issue arises from the autonomy of universities to choose which research to conduct, at 
time regardless of challenges facing technologists and businesses.  In Japan, as Hayashi 
(2003) a more corporatist state ‘guides’ university research towards the needs of business 
away from basic research and towards joint projects with industry.  Respondent-33 UK 
Bioquarter Director views the TH as subject to political pressures. 
 
I think it’s very political and a tough call. Academics have to be allowed to get on with their work. If you 
try and prescribe too much you will going to stifle any innovation. So I think it’s important they have 
certain amount of independence. You’ve then got industry, which is much more applied. What industry 
has learnt over the past years is that it’s not very innovative but very good at marketing. So they’ve learnt 
to work together – academics do all the innovation and industry does the marketing. Then government 
comes along and try to force academics to become more applied in the research that they are doing. So 
it’s getting tricky because academics are seen by industry to be doing their work more and more now. So 
triple helix can sometimes be an unhealthy relationship because I’m not sure if the three parties actually 
understand what each of them bring to the market or the equation. And government always take a short-
term view. They’ve always got one eye on the next election and that means they make short-term decisions, 
which are not always in the best interest of either of industry or of the university. That is an added 
complication for the triple helix relationship. But I guess the strength is that if you’ve got the support of 
the government that helps at least provide the money for academics to be more innovative which then 
helps to feed into industry and then strengthens the economy. This works better in certain places than 
others – the US for example. But just having money and throwing money at it doesn’t always help. A 
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classical example is in Singapore where they threw millions into a project they called the A STAR 
INSTITUTE. They tried to attract industry and the top academics in but it didn’t work for them after 3-4 
years. You need to build the whole ecosystem – money, academia, VC and industry (A/33/13). 
 
Another challenge facing the UK is the concentrations of R&D spend in the southeast of 
England i.e. differential regional systems of innovation.  For example the PraxisUnico 
Spin-outs UK Survey, which breaks down spinouts by sector and region, finds that all 
startup investments spinning out of UK university valued at above £5 million were 
concentrated in the south-east of England (PraxisUnico/Young Company Finance 2012) of 
those valued above £1 million, only 15% were located in Scotland; and despite the 
University of Edinburgh’s record of spinning out some twenty-three companies per year, 
PraxisUnico reveal that between 2006 and 2011 not one of the spun-out companies had 
exited via a trade sale or IPO. 
 
Discussion in section 2.11 suggests the limited applicability in developing societies with 
‘thin’ institutions.  Respondent-35, Policy expert and UK incubation manager, suggests a 
limitation in the case of Scotland (A/35/6) 
 
… one of the problems here in Scotland is that we don’t have companies of scale. We have very few banks 
in Edinburgh and some few oil companies based in Aberdeen. But actually there is a significant amount 
of branch office economic activity. But branch offices aren’t the sort of business centres that engage with 
universities except for looking for graduate employee. So we don’t have a good local source of companies 
to engage in a triple helix activity. We also of course just now don’t have whole lot of state sponsorship 
for this activity because of austerity. Also I think it is fair to say that there isn’t a consistent policy among 
Scottish universities. So looking at the sector as a whole its definitely dysfunctional as far as the triple 
helix is concern. I think it works in Edinburgh more than anywhere else but Aberdeen, Dundee and others 
had very good of it as well. But I stress again the sector as a whole is dysfunction as far as triple helix is 
concern and the fundamental problem for me is that we don’t have a good enough population or a big 
enough population of large companies in Scotland.  
 
Respondent-26, an Egyptian entrepreneur, now building a new business in Scotland, 
comments,  
 
I think in the UK the government supports entrepreneurship very strongly with the help of academia. 
Back home I would say that it is mostly NGOs that support entrepreneurial activities. So it these NGOs 
that try to create a more efficient and more productive entrepreneurial eco-system (A/26/14). 
 
In summary, whilst a discernable TH can be seen in the UK, it is not as ‘thick’ and effective 




7.2.2  The UK state and entrepreneurship 
 
7.2.2.1  Redistributive or value-creating state  
 
The British state has a history of interventionism at home and abroad: witnessed by 
investment in a navy, infrastructure and education (Harris 2004) and post-1945 the welfare 
state.  Internationally, the British state built an empire of colonies, not least of which was 
the arms-length intervention in the affairs of KSA (Frankopan 2015) and the wider Arab 
world to secure oil supply and strategic advantage.  As Pempel (1999) notes the British 
state has historically been a development regime, which as Tsebelis (1990) argues ‘nested’ 
development with domestic and international feeding the other. 
 
Jessop (1994) argues that the strong British state since 1945 has been a semi-permanent 
socioeconomic coalition, overcoming limited natural resources and fragmented land 
ownership by using hegemonic projects or shared goals including international 
competitiveness and free flow of inward and outward capital.  Since the end of a post-war 
boom (around 1965) Jessop (1991) argues that Britain has migrated towards a hollowed-
out state sacrificing social welfare goals to those of economic growth, now evidenced in a 
Government seeking to reduce public expenditure to 35% of GDP.  One aspect of this, 
important to innovation is a rising unequal distribution of wealth and dependence of export-
led growth rather than domestic consumption (unless fuelled by personal debt). 
 
The UK is moving away from a distributive state model towards a neo-liberal model the 
value-addedness of which remains to be seen. 
 
7.2.2.2  Expert bureaucracy 
 
From the viewpoint of commercialisation changing governances from direct state provision 
to the agency-state are important.  For example, as Lythe and Butt (1975) and Lenman 
(1977) show, Scotland re-structured its economy away from traditional heavy industries at 
a slower rate than the most successful parts of the UK: its population and living standards 
went into decline.  In1991 economic development powers and budgets were delegated from 
the Scottish Executive to Scottish Enterprise and a network of local enterprise companies 
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(LECs).  One of their most successful strategies as Kinder and Molina (1999) show, headed 
by Locate in Scotland, was (using EU-funding) to attract FDI microelectronic firms, 
creating £2 billion exports and 85,000 jobs in Silicon Glen (centred on Livingston).  These 
firms were mainly US and Japanese including Motorola, NEC, Mitsubishi and suppliers 
such as Shin et su.  As MacLeod and Jones (1999) argue as China and Vietnam came on 
stream, attracting I/FDI became more difficult and the challenge became much more how 
to exploit indigenous R&D: a more challenging strategic objective and closer to the 
situation now facing KSA.   
 
Scotland then, and other parts of the UK have ‘expert’ bureaucracies supporting economic 
growth.  The advantage of such governances is that people with business expertise and 
experience are brought into decision-taking, the great disadvantage is that in picking 
winners, disruptive technologies can be side-lined, which was the case in Scotland for 
games software and until recently mobile app development.  Amongst these experts, as 
Respondent-35 Policy expert and UK incubation manager makes clear, some of the experts 
are in university-based incubation centres. 
 
… my role is to oversee all company information activity at the university with a team of advisers who 
are working with entrepreneurs from the staff base to the student base. I also have somebody who is 
running to incubation centres and various other proper interests including a science park. We have a 
small growing investment function with just about 5million investment and an intention to secure another 
6million investment for the university’s portfolio investment companies (A/35/1). 
 
In summary, UK development agencies populated by an expert bureaucracy have been 
successful in attracting IFDI manufacturers.  Incubating more knowledge-based businesses 
is more challenging: the evidence suggests that the wrong experts lead some incubation 
centres. 
 
7.2.2.3  National vision and culture of entrepreneurship  
 
The latest annual UK Innovation Report (DBIS 2014) emphasises the UK’s reliance on 
knowledge-based economic activity based, having 4% of world researchers, the 7th largest 
global R&D spend and four out of ten of the world top universities.  DBIS however, 
highlights a continued gap between scientific achievement and product commercialisation, 




Although the UK has a modern physical and ICT infrastructure, research confirms the 
DBIS view that high levels of R&D inputs are not matched by levels of output, especially 
in emerging sectors (Cefis and Orsenigo 2001; Cefis and Ciccarelli 2005; Riley and 
Robinson 2011; Lööf et al 2012).  These researchers draw attention to the science-
technology gap and the need to compare rates of output rather than input.  For example, 
OECD (2013) Innovation Scoreboard calculates that 27% of the UK workforce is involved 
in knowledge-based activities, accounting for 70% of UK total factor economic growth 
between 1960 and 2000 (Aghion and Howitt 2007).  This results in the UK ranking third 
on the Cornell University, INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
Global Innovation Index for publications.  However 60% of UK researchers are located in 
universities.  Respondent-35, Policy expert and UK incubation manager, stresses the 
importance of problem-centred knowledge commercialisation: 
 
Fundamentally, especially for more matured economies with relatively high cost bases, those economies 
need to look to exploit whatever advantages that they have especially over emerging economies – for 
instance India and China. So, I think increasingly it is important for UK, European and the US economies 
to retain propriety knowledge and exploit that propriety knowledge and essentially sustain their position 
within the world’s economy.  So the UK has a strong research base.  Edinburgh by some measures is 
within the top 20 universities within the world. It has fabulous research in a number of areas, the biggest 
computer science school in the world, one of the best medical schools in the world we generate a huge 
amount of proprietary research output which can be commercialised and certainly we would be at the 
forefront of the UK’s effort to become a truly knowledge based economy  (A/35/1). 
 
Andersen et al (2011), perhaps optimistically, suggests that the UK will ride a new wave 
of innovation in digital products, low-carbon products and health-related products 
(pharmaceuticals and medical devices) – a new innovation ecosystem.  I note how close 
these objectives (and sectors) are to those of the KSA and in both cases the urgency 
imposed by the ending of oil revenues (2025 in the UK and 2035 in KSA).  The UK 
Technology Strategy Board (now Innovate UK, speaks of high-impact SMEs and 
strengthening UILs.  My point is that in terms of strategic vision, the UK is not dissimilar 
from KSA and many other countries targeting the beneficial results of commercialising 
university research: the challenge is to successfully implement the strategy.  
 
The UK is strong on basic and applied research; however, as later section will illustrate 




7.2.2.4  Innovation incentives 
 
Located within EU tariff barriers, with tax offsets, clear IP laws and access to research 
universities and their graduates, in 2011, the UK attracted almost $7 billion of overseas-
financed R&D (equivalent to the combined inbound R&D of Canada, Finland, Japan, 
China, and Russia) and just below half that of the US; in the UK’s case foreign inbound 
R&D amounts to 25% of R&D spend.  In 2012 alone, this brought 300 new R&D projects 
into the UK (OECD 2013; ONS 2013).   Foreign funding of UK R&D is higher when 
ownership is referenced: half of all UK corporate R&D is done by UK subsidiaries of 
foreign-owned firms: 22% (US), 17% (EU) and an increasing amount from BRIC countries 
(especially China and India).  Of course, three is outwards (from the UK), with GSK 
particularly active in Israel.  UK firms and universities seem particularly good at accessing 
EU research funds such as the European Research Council, Horizon 2020 (basic research), 
and (£6 billion) 7th Framework Programme (applied research).   
 
UK university partners are attractive to foreign corporates as partners, 42 of the top 100 
world research universities are located in the UK, according to Times Higher Education 
(2014), World University Rankings 2013-14, which attract a high proportion of foreign 
researchers. 
 
Two-thirds of UK R&D is financed by the private sector; this is concentrated in emerging 
sectors: pharmaceuticals (25%); computer programming and information service activities 
(11%); motor vehicles and parts (10%); aerospace (9%); telecommunications (5%); and 
machinery and equipment (6%).   
 
The UK’s eight Research Councils are also a source of research funding (£3 billion in 
2014) and almost all universities (93%) have an access point for Knowledge Transfer 
Partnerships (KTPs) with SMEs.  These interactions are rising at 11% per year and are 
included in the £335 million consultancy fees UK universities attract from business.   
 




Macroeconomic stability (inflation, growth, monetary and fiscal policy sustainability and 
rising living standards) is an essential pillar for corporate investment (Turtelboom 1991); 
to achieve which the independent Bank of England is empowered to achieve.  As Krugman 
(2013) and others note, targeting around 2% inflation stimulates growth and stability.  
Between 1956 and 2014 GDP annual growth in the UK has averaged 2.48% (currently 
2.1%).  As a small, open economy with its own currency, the UK is particularly exposed 
to external shocks and contagion (Oshikoya 1994) one result of which, as Hausman and 
Gavin (1996) predict are raising inequalities and associated problems for demand-led 
domestic growth.  Until recently, deep-rooted democratic institutional stability has 
favoured international investment into the UK, as North (1998) suggests, however 
currently the UK’s institutional stability is questioned by support for Scottish independence 
and the impending referendum on EU membership. 
 
In 2007, rising oil prices and unemployment in the US resulting in financial crisis as 
property-based financial instruments lost value, catalysed a similar crisis in the UK 
resulting in loss of liquidity: banks ceased lending and SMEs lost credit.  All crises pose 
long-term issues (competitiveness, education, structural adjustment, institutions) and short-
term problems (unemployment, inadequate demand, poverty).  The UK Government has 
chosen to focus on monetary policy (rather than industrial policy), adopting the neoliberal 
strategy of reducing state expenditure and providing fiscal incentives to companies and 
individuals to invest.  One result of this is to exacerbate the redistribution of wealth from 
poor to richest 1%.  Brexit is now a major source of uncertainty. 
 
7.2.3  Entrepreneurship: barriers, disincentives and enablers 
 
Entrepreneurship barriers 
Why should the State be better at picking winning commercial technologies than the private 
sector?  Henderson’s (2002) study of microelectronics in Scotland argues that in targeting 
sectors using commodity chips (mobile telephones, PC manufacturing) the UK state missed 
opportunities (such as ARM’s system-on-a-chip technology) that became globally 
competitive.  A similar story might be told about biotechnology in Scotland, where in 1996 
the therapeutic cloning at the Roslin Institute (part of the University of Edinburgh) was 
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world-bating technology, commercialised as PPL Therapeutics.  Sadly, attempting a 
licensing model for (what proved to be) a non-proprietary technology meant that currently, 
of the 84 biotechnology companies in Scotland, most are commodity producers.  The UK 
has two main barriers to commercialising university research: a clash of governances and 
access to resource assembly. 
 
At one level the clash of governances between academic researchers and business 
entrepreneurs relates to gaols: research publication, organisational prestige and intellectual 
problem-solving as opposed to profit from sales, knowledge-exploiting with new solutions 
to consumer-problems (Henderson 2002).  As evidence below illustrate, the view of 
Scottish incubation managers is that skill shortages and difficulties obtaining banking 
facilities are major barriers to innovation.   
 
Entrepreneurship disincentives 
In 1924 the Macmillan report identified lack of smaller amounts of startup capital (today 
under £1 million) as a major disincentive for entrepreneurs.  Literature often focuses on the 
size of investment forming the Macmillan-gap examples being Targeting Innovation 
(2009) and BIS (2014).  However, as Lee et al  (2011 and 2013) point out, especially for 
busy academics focused on important research, the time and detail involved in applying for 
grants and/or bank facilities is cumbersome – a disincentive incubation centres attempt to 
ease. 
 
For many academics, entrepreneurship or solving industries problems is outside of their 
culture, as HEFCE (2009) 35% of academics believe that universities are already too 
focused on meeting the needs of industry rather than independently pursuing research.  
 
Entrepreneurship enablers 
Which forms can commercialisation and knowledge transfer take? Knowledge transfer 
refers to a transfer of ideas and knowledge from within universities to other users. 
Frequently, the knowledge created within universities will have a commercial application 
and a commercial value, which can be exploited through commercialisation activities. 
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Central to the concepts of commercialisation and knowledge transfer is the notion of IP, 
which can generate licensing revenue or income from spinout companies. Universities can 
also engage in contract or collaborative research activities on behalf of and/ or in 
collaboration with companies and private sector organisations. They can also help 
businesses and generate income through offering consulting and advisory services. 
 
For the Scottish Government (2004) high quality teaching and research and effective 
commercialisation are goals that make Scottish higher education internationally 
competitive a fact justifying expenditure on Smart Awards, Co-investment Fund, Catapult 
Centres and Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (KTPs) all of which are intended to enable 
entrepreneurship. 
 
7.2.3.1  Commercialisation and entrepreneurship in Scotland – success stories 
 
Taking Scotland, as part of the UK as an example; Scotland is a small open economy: 
with 70% of economic activity owned outside the region as outside-ownership figures 
show (oil (96%), financial services (71%), whisky (80%), salmon (83%); only one-third 
of the £103 billion corporate assets located in Scotland are owned in Scotland.  An 
internationalised economy is not necessarily a problem, especially if there is a pipeline of 
innovative indigenous companies.   
 
Scottish university spinouts number about twenty-five per year (200 since 1967) according 
to Targeting Innovation Ltd (TIL 2006) with seventeen employing more than 50 people.  
Figure 7.1 indicates some successful Scottish university spinouts.  
 
These are other spinout companies are important, especially so since 30% of all 
commercialisations attract external investment and each of the firms in figure 7.1 have (or 





Company Products University connection Employees 
1982 Axis Shield Medical devices and tests Dundee and Ninewells hospital 400 




1989 VSLI Vision Imaging technologies  University of Edinburgh 360 
1996 Cyclacel Oral therapy biopharma Dundee and Ninewells hospital 75 
1998 Kymata Opto-electroncis Glasgow 200 
2004 RESPONDENT-
28 
Oil and gas exploration University of Edinburgh  75 
 
Figure 7.1: successful Scottish university commercialisations (Source: TIL 2008) 
 
 
 Axis Shield, which now has a turnover of £200 million and R&D sites in Norway and 
Germany, began life as a conversation around a kitchen table between two doctors and 
a management consultant (Gordon McAndrew) about commercialising a blood test 
developed in a local university hospital in Dundee.  
 Respondent’s-28’s story appears below in sections 7.3.3, 7.3.4 and 7.4.6.  Having 
developed geo-imaging technology capable of identifying carbon reserves without test 
drilling, the company was born global; rising first VC and then via a trade sale sold for 
US$ 234 million.  It was the second largest spinout by a UK university. 
 
NESTA (2007) argues that in universities can provide regional leadership in restructuring 
economies and Roper (2006) that these activities are illustrative of the future.  There are 
three problems with these perspectives; firstly, Scotland employs 2,594,000 people: it is 
unlikely that spinouts in the immediate future will substantially contribute to overall 
employment or mitigate the impact of process innovations in important sectors such as 
financial services.  Secondly, referring to points made by Rodik (2011) and others, lost 
jobs (in microelectronics a mechatronics technician workforce) are neither being replaced 
by the skills available nor the level of skills and knowledge available.   
 
Success stories should not be interpreted as an absence of failures or problems such as 
governance and culture clashes between academia and business; rather they are illustrative 
of how effective research, targeting problems consumers will pay to be solved can produce 
sustainable innovations. 
 
7.2.3.2  Institutional barriers to entrepreneurship  
 
Having presented a KSA SWOT (figure 6.2), the UK SWOT for commercialisation looks 
as follows (7.2).  SWOT shows the UK strong on research, education, IP and fiscal policy.  
IP is most relevant to large or high-growth companies, since registration may take three-
years and is likely to cost c£500,000: as the Berr (2007) argues, if the UK is to have an 
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illustrious business future, then knowledge is at the heart of it.  UK weaknesses, are likely 
to be found in other advanced economies and relate to startup funding gaps, a low skills 
equilibrium in sections of what is an ageing population and a cultural gulf between 
academic research and business exploitation of knowledge.  Bodies such as the London 
Stock Exchange (2015) and the House of Commons report on business funding (HoC 2013) 
acknowledge problems with risk capital availability to startup and rapidly developing 
companies bridging what they term the valley of death.  
 
STRENGTHS  WEAKNESSES 
 Availability of capital and FDI   Lowering levels of public spending and 
innovation support 
 Strong VC and Angel networks   Funding gap facing startups and SMEs 
 High quality university education    Low skills in bottom quartile 
 High quality university research   International below average STEM skills 
 Hi-tech clusters around universities   Poor record of bank lending to startups 
 Clear IP law and stock of knowledge    Governance clashes between academia and 
business  
 Low corporate tax rate   High youth unemployment rate and poverty 
 Light touch regulations   Ageing population  
 In some sectors, effective knowledge 
networks international and across 
governances  
  Academic (business) entrepreneurship 
disincentivised 
 Fiscal   Diminishing oil revenues within 10-years:  
    R&D confined to narrow sectors 
OPPORTUNITIES  THREATS 
 Strong education opportunities   Open to exogenous shocks (wars; oil price, 
currency) 
 Attractive to international knowledge 
labour 
  Internationally low labour productivity  
 WTO, EU member   Uncertainty over relationship with EU 
 High rates of international technology 
transfer 
  Weak trading links with China 
 Major policy initiatives on 
entrepreneurship 
   
 English language    
 
Figure 7.2: UK SWOT for commercialisation  
 
The UK is a beneficiary of inward TT (students, researchers, companies) and outward 
knowledge partnerships, though its weak trading position with China may be a concern 
(7.0% of UK imports in 2014 and 3.5% exports, with some notable but few knowledge 
exchange links).  The international use of English language gives the UK opportunities that 
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help cross-cultural divides, though the country’s colonial history can be a source of 
resentment. 
 
Whilst many commercialisations simply recombine existing knowledge in the form of new 
solutions to consumer problems, the lure of basic research (such as cloning) is to create a 
paradigmally new way of doing things (Llewellyn Smith 2006), this as Respondent-35, 
Policy expert and UK incubation manager points out is the most fundamental challenge of 
commercialisation, a view endorsed by all incubation unit Managers. 
 
I think the biggest problem is where basic research ends and where marketable products begin. So, an 
entrepreneur or the university will have to take the basic research and rework it into a shape where it 
can be a marketable product.  They may be sufficient to underpin a research paper but before they can 
work in the commercial world they need to be stress tested, they need to be engineered into and agreeable 
form and that’s before you start to consider things like IP.  Basic research is a kind of egalitarian activity 
and by that I mean researcher will work together with both researchers within an institution and 
researchers around the world.  So when you have a particular outcome from a piece of basic research it 
is not enough just to presume that it belongs to the university of Edinburgh for instance. One has to look 
back and see how that research outcome actually emerged and work with other universities potentially 
to agree on owner of technology, to agree income sharing arrangement, to agree how cost will be shared 
etc. so the whole thing is quiet challenging right from the identification of the technology, who owns it 
etc all the way through to the fact that products do not come out of vacuum research activity. Products 
have to be developed and need substantial amount of money. A classic example is drug development. A 
drug target might come from a research study but it needs to taken through patient trial etc and that could 
cost hundreds of thousands of pounds if not millions before that piece of basic research can be 
commercialised  (A/35/9). 
 
In summary, the UK SWOT for commercialisation shows institutional maturity: the 
challenges are in the ‘softer’ areas of culture. 
 
7.2.3.3  Incentives to entrepreneurship  
 
Startup capital in the UK comes from family and friends (11.6%), individuals (6%), bank 
loan (4%), bank overdraft (9.4%), VCs (1.3%), government grant (4.8%) and credit card 
(5.5%).  Various early-stage grant opportunities (Proof of concept and Smart Awards) act 
as incentives to some innovative startups (SE 2012).  Most universities (93%) have some 
form of technology transfer office arranging KTPs, consultancies and supporting startups.  
However, as Professor Sir Tim Wilson, states in “A Review of Business–University 
Collaboration, presented to the House of Commons (2012), The main challenge for the UK 
is not about how to increase the supply of commercial ideas from the universities into 
business. Instead, the question is about how to raise the overall level of demand by business 
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for research from all sources.  The NHS, or rather its databanks can be a major 
entrepreneurship incentive (NHS 2014) allowing big data analysis techniques to profile 
correlations between disease and (ill)-health.   
 
7.2.3.4  Institutional enablers  
 
Respondent-35 (A/35/10) lists what he believes are the institutional enablers of 
commercialisation in Scotland pointing out the VCs often avoid startups in which Angel 
networks are more interested. 
 
Here I note five important institutions enabling commercialisation in the UK: design 
capability, IP, clustering and local state support.  
 
The UK Design Council (2015) echoes Walsh et al’s (1992) conclusion that design-
capability is a major competitive advantage.  Major companies, such as Dyson a producer 
of household equipment, thrive on design.  In Edinburgh alone a brief web search identifies 
over 50 design companies.  Recent research on the redesign of public services to take 
account of research (Radnor et al 2013), argues that (Kinder et al 2014) service redesign 
in the UK is less effective given a weaker democratic footprint that in Finland.   
 
Clear IP law and redress in the judicial system is a major attraction for inward R&D 
investments into the UK.  These same advantages SMEs BUT cost/time.  Increasingly time-
to-market or non-patent 
 
Whilst early work on university science parks, showed that, as property businesses most 
are not successful, it is now understood that this is a narrow criterion for success and that 
knowledge spillovers and proximity to universities can act as an incentive to innovators 
(Varga and Acs (2000).  As far back as Porter (1990), the UK’s ability to cluster sectorally 
associated businesses was lauded.   
 
Competition between cities and regions for business development is a competition for taxes 
and the social benefits of employment.  In the UK, the local state undertakes a range of 




At 6.8% Scotland’s total early-stage entrepreneurial activity rate (GEM 2014) is similar to 
England, though the startup rate in Scotland (16:1000) is half that of England, where more 
businesses fail.  Although starting more lifestyle, less export i.e. service-bases businesses, 
women’s’ TEA rate in Scotland is now 5.2% and rising.  Amongst the Scottish 
entrepreneurial initiatives are the EDGE Fund (Encouraging Dynamic Growth 
Entrepreneurs), awarding £520,000 to 16 businesses each year and the Prince’s Initiative 
for Mature Enterprise (PRIME) supporting startups by the over-50s.  The Scottish 
Investment Bank’s total investment, including deals done through the Scottish Loan Fund, 
reached £32.4 million, leveraging a further £60.4 million in private sector investment into 
over 106 companies.  Roper and Love (2006) argue that this constitutes a differentiated 
(from England) NSI an argument it is difficult to accept given the porous boundaries 
between the two and inter-related actors and causal relationships, indeed Scotland 
differentiates in two major parameters: lower R&D spend and a higher proportion of US-
owned companies.  This is not to argue that aspects of Scotland’s support for 
entrepreneurship are not good: for example the University of Edinburgh achieves 40% of 
all Scottish university research grants and has successfully created biomedical, 
biotechnology and artificial intelligence enterprise parks.   
 
7.2.3.4  Disincentives to entrepreneurship  
 
For many service companies and companies able to quickly obtain first-mover advantage 
patenting is increasingly irrelevant (though some copyright protection may be of benefit.  
The high cost and slowness (often 3-years) of the UK patenting system is such an important 
disadvantage for some companies that they prefer (Respondent-28 is an example) to 
register their headquarters in the US.   
 
7.3  Commercialisation inputs 
 
This section presents evidence on inputs to commercialisation, with section 7.4 
investigating processes and 7.5 below exploring outcomes and outputs.  One point is 
paramount: the emotional attachment of the entrepreneur to the project and as Respondent-
30 food company CEO replies, when asked about her most difficult challenge - It’s just the 
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hard work, (A/30/19).  Not all of the entrepreneurs cited are university researchers, as 
Abdul the Director of FreeSpace in Cambridge points out,  
 
I would probably say that’s in the minority. The last time we updated our records about 6months ago, 
about 15% of our community had come directly from the university, about 60% of our community was 
working with the university but weren’t the researchers themselves. And the remaining 25% had no 
relationship with the university whatsoever.  (A/34/10) 
 
7.3.1   Incubation and start-up services 
 
Noting the success in Africa of mobile telephony for e-commerce, undergraduate students 
at the University of Edinburgh had the idea of using the same network to link tourism 
opportunities with isolated villages and disseminating health education.  None of the 
students had any business background, as Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-
tech spinout says when asked to illustrate the importance of incubation for the story of her 
startup, without incubation I don’t there would even been a story (A/24/13). 
 
7.3.1.1  Success criteria 
 
Like many early-stage startups, Respondent-30 a food company CEO renegotiated her 
success criteria as ideas crystallised, saying I would say it has been very fluid so far 
(A/30/2).  Only when she met other young entrepreneurs did she start to believe that she 
could create a trading company (A/30/3).  At Polorum the CEO of a UK university high-
tech spinout sets self-sustaining company as the success criteria (A/24/14).   
 
7.3.1.2  Problems in service range and quality 
 
Here I present evidence of the range, quality, cost and usefulness of incubation services to 
entrepreneurs.  
 
7.3.1.3  Cost and value-for-money of incubators from firm perspective 
 
Respondent-30 joined the incubator to share ideas, meet other entrepreneurs and for the 
(free) support offered (A/30/6) using all of the services available (A/30/7), which she found 
useful and value-for-money (A/30/9) in particular making business connections and 
building her own business network (A/30/12).  This is typical of the student entrepreneurs.  
Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout also a student found the network 
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connectivity most important (A/24/11), she says, We won’t be a company if we hadn’t been 
in an incubator. We certainly had the idea but we weren’t actually considering turning it 
into an actual product (A/24/12). 
 
7.3.1.4  Incubator customer contentedness  
 
Most incubatees used commodity (office services) professional (marketing, design) and 
networking (connecting into business networks) at the incubation centres.  In most cases 
these were free; Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout (A/24/7) views 
them as part of what her tuition fee pays for; as did Atli Fanndal, A/29/10).  Respondent-
27 Manager of a small international technology company (A/27/7) accessed free services, 
which are incredibly useful (A/27/7); she also went to paid-for events:   
 
You know if you go to community events you have to pay for professionals to talk to you. I have done that 
and I think they are value for money because even if you spend 5 hours talking to people and you find one 
or two pieces of advice that will help your company then it’s value for money no matter how much you’re 
paying for that as long as you get something back (A/27/8). … So my strategy was to talk to as many 
people I trusted as possible It was also about trying to find mentors – people who have build businesses 
before and who can help you with the problems you are about to face because if you can try to avoid 
those problems before they happen, it saves a huge amount of time (A/27/6). 
 
Respondent-26 was amazed at getting high quality services for free (A/26/7) none of which 
would have been available in his home country, Egypt (A/26/9) and that, 
 
.. they do also support you with contacts; accountants, lawyers, mentors and other people to support your 
business idea. They do that for you. Actually one of the mentors the business throughout as well. So I do 
help out on that side (A/26/8). 
 
Respondent-25 (A/25/6) felt being in the incubator would help attract external investors 
and paid £800 for some specialist services (A/25/8), which he thinks .. could have been 
cheaper than they were (A/25/10), though these paid-for services created a websites that I 
could advertise the product (A/25/11). 
 
For Respondent-29 professional and networking services were most important (A/29/7), 
he found also, 
 
I would say the main reason it is to help us develop the idea further. It was very lonely, hard and a bit 
expensive doing it by ourselves. So coming into an incubator is to help us take decision and network. 
There is a lot of support and support systems in the incubator and that’s what we hope to benefit from by 




Many incubatees commented that without the incubator they would not have created their 
business; for example, Respondent-30 (A/30/13) thinks the incubator could have 
 
I think I would open up to more modern way of thinking and focus more on values. So a lot more of value-
sharing rather than its current competitive nature at all times (A/30/18). 
 
Joanna Young of SEC, a research student is less satisfied saying I didn’t go into an 
incubator (A/31/7); There were no services (A/31/9) and incubator managers did not help 
her build a network (A/31/11).   
 
Respondent-32 manager of a UK university’s student spinout service is careful to manage 
expectations about its role. 
 
Looking at this in terms of physical property I would say we’re not a traditional incubation centre but we 
do have space that they can use. So, at the moment they get an office space, they get access to internet, 
we have some IT equipment, and they have access to meeting rooms. But in addition to all that they get 
advisory services. So, in terms of physical space it’s much more of the case that they are located more 
close to us (A/32/13). 
 
In summary, most incubatees view their experiences in incubation positively. 
 
7.3.2  TT, UILs and absorptive capacity 
 
Respondent-35, Policy expert and UK incubation manager emphasises the social role of 
universities in building a knowledge base that addresses social and business problems. 
 
You know in research intensive universities sometimes you end up with graduates that are technically 
very capable but that miss out on some of the life skills that are available in most of the teaching focused 
universities. So, there is definitely a greater focus just now on smaller or post-1992 universities – the 
technical institutes that changed into universities in 1992 – partly because they are churning out high 
quality graduates who are capable of getting jobs.  But the universities are still doing all these research 
and I think there is the missed opportunity for the Scottish Government. Scottish enterprises are still 
backing it to an extent but I think to a lesser extent. And I think again that reflects the austerity – the fact 
that there is just less money in the public purse just now means that less is coming to universities to take 
care of knowledge transfer (A/35/3). 
 
These are sentiments echoed by Respondent-32 (A/32/16).  Many of the entrepreneurs too 
feel that the part of the role of universities is to address social issues, for example  




It was created about and for home enthusiast. I mean engineers who work at home. That was the vision 
of the company to create a product for people who work from home. The timeframe was about one and 
half years here in Edinburgh (A/25/2). 
 
Several of the entrepreneurs refer to international TT, not formal or purchased TT, rather 
informal knowledge or new informal combinations embedded in new business ideas, 
though formal EU research networks play some part in basic research.  
 
7.3.2.1  Technology transfer 
 
Respondent-35 Policy expert and UK incubation manager feels that richer universities in 
the southeast of England (Cambridge, Oxford, Imperial) have more resources to purchase 
and stimulate TT.  However, he suggests,  
 
In terms of Edinburgh, the exportable knowledge is coming from various areas of science; notably 
medical sciences, computer science and informatics, engineering in particular and renewables for 
instance, chemistry, and geosciences.  There is a lot of interests in renewables but I doubt computer 
science is very reliable source of technology as is the medical school.  So those are the mainstream 
activities.  In terms of international tech transfer we would love to do more but international tech transfer 
is expensive and we have a budget. So we do have various reps around the world notable in the US, 
China, and with other European countries (A/35/8). 
 
Half of the interviewees have benefited from knowledge transferred from abroad.  These 
include Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout aligning with African 
usage patterns of mobile technologies and Respondent-26 who’s new business offers online 
delivery of gifts sourced in Egypt and the UK to consumers in the other country.   Joanna 
Young’s Scientific Editing Company was inspired by the difficulties English as a second 
language authors have being published.  More formal TT by Respondent-28, the largest 
and most internationalised of the companies interviewed occurs on a systematic basis with 
researchers in the US. 
 
Other interviewees have so far on their startup journey depended entirely on knowledge 
they have generated themselves or identified within their university, examples being 
Respondent-25 CEO of a successful UK technology spinout (A/25/1), Respondent-27’s 
ideas from Portuguese solar technologies and Respondent-29 (A/29/16).  There is no 




7.3.2.2  Building university-industry links 
 
For Respondent-35, Policy expert and UK incubation manager building UILs is crucial to 
effective commercialisation; he says,  
 
I think increasingly so because the university sees or especially research universities see industry as a 
way of continuing research projects. In the last 10 years there’s been a shift from the mid-2000s onwards 
we saw quiet a lot of focus on company formation and licencing of technology. I think universities hoped 
that would generate a significant income stream for them. But as it turned out few universities make 
serious amount of money from licensing technology or from the formation of new companies. Some of the 
big universities in the US do, but very few other universities make a significant amount of money from 
company formation. We have very few companies in Scotland who are engaging with the universities not 
just this university but all universities.  Scotland has lots of small companies, one or two big ones, and 
one or two medium size ones as well. But the top end of the company scale, the largest companies are all 
based in the south, the largest companies in the UK are all based in the South …  So, to really create an 
impact locally for commercialisation or perhaps the most effective way of doing it is through company 
formation because those companies setup generally in Edinburgh employ people from Edinburgh, employ 
graduates from the university of Edinburgh and the wealth creation and the sharing of that wealth through 
the economy is through Edinburgh. So there need to be a boundary between the clear financial benefit of 
industry engagement but also delivering impact locally which is primarily done through company 
formation (A/35/4).  
 
Respondent-33 University Bioquarter Director the Commercialisation Unit as playing an 
essential role in UILs. 
 
The university formally has a director for commercialisation (one of the vice principals) and sitting below 
him/her is a director of commercialisation. But we also have ERI, which is the technology transfer 
organisation. I guess until we came along they had quiet a nice little system. People complaint until we 
came along and started doing the job almost as outsiders.  ERI still hold all the IPs for the university 
even though we develop it (A/33/16).  
 
For the entrepreneurs, linking with businesses was important to their startup process, 
posing (answering?) issues associated with market and supply chain as evidenced by 
Respondent-25 (A/25/12) and Respondent-30 food company CEO (A/30/14): however, the 
nature and form of useful knowledge arising from interactions with businesses varies 
between startups. 
 
7.3.2.3  Building absorptive capacity  
 
Respondent-27 began developing her business idea in partnership with family-friend 
business owner.  Whilst designing a solar voltaic farm, she developed the knowledge to 
create a new LED light bulb for B2C sales (A/27/1).  Family and friends gave feedback on 
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early prototypes, made small investments in the project and eventually became its first 
customers. 
 
Over the period of 6-7 months of getting that feedback we were ready to build the product and get ready 
for the big retailers and companies. That I when we started building the supply chain and developed a 
product that was ready to go to the market. So we started with small things after we had raised some 
finances from friends and family. We wouldn’t have got where we are without our network and that’s the 
most important thing (A/27/4). 
 
Several of the entrepreneurs built new capabilities in response to market feedback.  For 
example, Atli Fanndal of Freeland (A/29/1) began with the idea of an online investigative 
magazine, which he then migrated to a subscription news site learning from marketing 
feedback.  Respondent-30 too developed a new model in response to feedback (A/30/5).   
 
The incubator Mangers too have built new capabilities in response to their market feedback 
i.e. business partners and entrepreneurs.  Respondent-33 says they learned quickly that 
academic management of incubators was disastrous: he represents a strategic shift by the 
College of Medicine to embed business expertise in its incubation (A/33/1).  One example 
is getting researchers with promising outputs to work with business to solve problems 
customers have, instead of simply pursuing knowledge for its own sake (A/33/12). 
 
Both entrepreneurs and incubation managers view incubation processes as learning 
opportunities: extending their knowledge range and building new capabilities.   
 
7.3.3  Motivation and capability for entrepreneurship  
 
What motivates these entrepreneurs and how confident are they in their capability to build 
businesses?  Research in the UK suggests that entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to 
make a social contribution and to have control over their own destiny or “be their own 
boss.”  Motivation for startup is rarely to become rich.  The evidence from these 
entrepreneurs supports this research.  Respondent-27 believes her new light bulb will help 
her company and consumers (A/27/1); Atli Fanndal aims to add to the veracity of news 
reportage (A/29/1); Respondent-31, a high-tech startup CEO hopes to help foreign authors 
to get published (A/31/5); and Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout 
is contributing to social development in west Africa (A/24/4).  Helping oil companies 
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locate exploitable hydrocarbons before drilling motivates Anton Ziolkowski of 
Respondent-28: a project that operationalized his electromagnetic research.  In his case, 
attracting Leon Walker (ex-Schlumberger) in 2003 added the motivation of having a 
company with growth potential.  Instead of licencing or selling the technical, Anton 
remained involved and in June 2007 Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS) bought Respondent -
28 Ltd. for $275 million – Scotland largest university spinout.  As the company grew, the 
entrepreneurs’ motivations altered as shown by Anton’s remarks below on his journey from 
hydrocarbon researcher to successful businessperson. 
 
We had two competitors but many potential buyers. So it was a sellers’ market. We signed contracts with 
the lawyers and the corporate finance advice people. Finally when we got our investors in, they wanted 
65% of the company and we wanted to get enough money so that we could get to positive cash flow. We 
wanted all the money upfront. We actually thought we needed £10 million but got £7.4 million with a 
rather high transaction cost.  So we looked for a CEO who was worth about £100 million. So the 
management team was the CEO, myself and a colleague. The investor put us through a lot of trouble to 
see if we were a decent team (A/28/1).     
 
Making a social impact and seeing the results of their research work operationalised rather 
than becoming rich motivates these entrepreneurs.  
 
7.3.4  Internationalisation compliance with standards  
 
By the nature of the industry it was involved in, Respondent-28 was a ‘born global’ 
enterprise.  Every one of the entrepreneurs I interviewed have vision of international 
growth.  For example, Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout wants 
sales in Africa and has a team from six countries (A/24/2); Respondent-26 seeks to source 
and sell between the UK and Arab countries (A/26/4); Atli Fanndal of Freeland speaks of 
becoming a global brand (A/29/13); Joanna Young of SEC targets customers at 
international conferences (A/31/5).  In VC circles a well-used dictum is “never limit your 
upside,” meaning avoid putting an upper limit on the value of an investment.  For these 
startup commercialisation entrepreneurs the upside is turnover generated from overseas 
sales: it did not occur to any of them to only target national markets.  Private equity 
providers (VCs and Angels) consider that for backing high-risk businesses (without a 
trading record or proven technology) their return should to close to 20% IRR.  A 
concomitant of this is a rule-of-thumb for many VCs that the business plan should aim for 




7.4  Commercialisation processes 
 
In this section assembles evidence on the day-to-day processes of commercialisation 
incubation in UK universities. 
 
7.4.1  Start-up and growth 
 
Often business startup is viewed as primarily a financial ‘dash-for-cash;’ however, from 
the entrepreneur’s viewpoint it is a journey of intense learning, emotional commitment and 
hard work, during which radical new product, process and/or business models emerge.  
From an original idea disseminating health-related information around African villages, 
Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout came up with the idea of a 
community messaging service and then of a mobile app to support it (A/24/1), saying that 
We’ve really tried keeping it simple and cheap. At the moment no one is getting paid and 
we’re just focus on getting things in place (A/24/16).  Polorum’s journey was from a social 
need, via information dissemination to a software product-enabled service.  Though as she 
confesses none of the entrepreneurs are yet taking salary despite long hours.   
 
As Frydrych, Bock and Kinder (2016) show, an important aspect of Kickstarter, (an online 
source of distributed capital for equity and social enterprises), is network building a 
feedback ideas that strengthen the initial pitch business plan.  For Respondent-25 CEO of 
a successful UK technology spinout, this is precisely what happened.  Having benefited 
from feedback on a Facebook site, he then migrated (A/25/5) to generic 3-D modelling; a 
journey reflecting his engineering expertise.  Respondent-30 was inspired by a family 
history in consumer foods (A/30/1) and blended her original idea with a knowledge of teas 
and bespoke eating. 
 
Respondent-33 Bioquarter Director has witnessed the creative pathway of many companies 
moving from original idea to refined ideas and then further refinement cross-referenced 
with market research and standards compliance.  Of the early stages he says, So it’s not a 
company at that stage in time. It’s a series of technologies, a series of projects which we 
have got in mind and when they are all ready we bring them together, bring a management 
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team and look for investment (A/33/2).  Respondent-32 too emphasises connecting 
entrepreneurs with funders and mentors (A/32/14). 
 
7.4.1.1  Time: a dash-for-cash? 
 
Classically, (Bell 1991) a startup raises and burns equity on startup costs and then begins 
trading, hoping to hit breakeven and later profit: a ‘U-shaped’ is often termed the dash-for-
cash i.e. income exceeding costs before equity if burnt.  As Bell and others note, under-
capitalisation bedevils startups and may then be forced to trade equity at fire-sale prices.  
Being blessed with sufficient own-resources as Respondent-26 was (A/26/2) avoids the 
distractions and costs of raising capital.  The other entrepreneurs were less fortunate.  As 
already mentioned, Respondent-25 raised capital from Kickstarter and early orders to 
launch Maketechnics (A/25/4) and avoided cashflow difficulties.  Respondent-27 (A/27/2) 
worked for a family friend for no salary (getting R&D access for the solar project and then 
developing the efficient light-bulb idea as a way of generating capital from sales income).  
She spent 3-years without salary subsidising herself.  Following another well-beaten track, 
Atli Fanndal launched Freeland with gift-capital from family and friends, later adding 
subscriber income to fund expansion (A/29/4): again for 2-years he worked without salary.  
Joanna Young used spare time (from research assistant employment) to launch SEC, only 
after 3-years building up the business to a size that paid an income (A/31/2).  Whilst taking 
a similar period Anton Ziolkowski of Respondent-28 and his collaborators where in full 
time employment; they subsidised the initial launch.   
 
In summary, these entrepreneurs personally sacrificed time, income and emotional-capital 
during their dash-for-cash periods in order to launch their companies.   
 
7.4.1.2  Trouble – challenges in incubation processes 
 
Company startup is rarely a linear progression; instead it is subject to the vicissitudes 
presented by opportunity and setback testing the commitment of the entrepreneur.  For 
those with business experience (and own capital) such as Respondent-26 suggests that the 
main problems seem to be network building in what to him is a foreign context (A/26/5).  
Having spent three-years in what amounted to unpaid postgraduate business learning, 
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Respondent-27 only then, she says, I realised that I can make a career out of it. So we 
started to make things that people wanted and I think that is the most important thing 
(A/27/3): Ms Dawson’s tenacity and commitment were tested severely during incubation.  
For Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout the challenge was network 
building (charities, African communities, app developer, mobile companies) all at a 
distance and involving nuanced cross-cultural understanding (A/24/5).  Every startup faces 
challenges during which committed and tenacious entrepreneurs show determination to 
succeed.  To paraphrase Leo Tolstoy, All happy startups are alike; each unhappy startup 
is unhappy in its own way. 
 
7.4.2  Internationalisation 
 
Section 7.3.4 above concludes that each of these entrepreneurs had a vision of international 
standards compliance and international sales.  This section explores how they went about 
internationalising.  For Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout using 
contact in Africa (NGOs; mobile network companies; community leaders) was key.  In 
addition they marketed their service using social media and exploited networks at home, 
in particular a software engineer to develop the app (A/24/15).  Respondent-26 came 
endowed with a small UK business network (MBA-related and alumni) and an extensive 
network in Egypt and Arabic countries, based around a heritage business (A/26/10): his 
achievement was building the new business constituency by mobilising these disparate 
international networks around his new idea.  His Egyptian background proved an asset in 
the international mergers and acquisitions side of his business, since as Sherbiny and 
Hatem (2015) explain, heralding from a country in which doing business is difficult is a 
strong training ground for doing business in other similar counties. 
 
Most other entrepreneurs have little business (still less international business) experience.  
Respondent-27 Manager of a small international technology company for example aspires 
to sales in the USA, UAE and into the far East (A/27/12) but has not yet developed an entry 
model (direct sales, agent, licensing).  Joanna Young’s model of using international 




For the incubator managers, internationalisation is important (to grow sales, employment 
and attract R&D partners) and sourcing external investors as Respondent-33 says, we had 
a nice technology, which became expensive to carry forward. So we contacted a company 
in Australia because they had the money and the market (A/33/11).  Respondent-35 too is 
very conscious of the need to operate internationally, citing the need to cooperate with 
research and sales partners not only in the southeast of England, but also in in New York 
and Boston, Chicago too (A/35/5). 
 
7.4.3  Labour supply 
 
Evidence from KSA (section 6.4.3) showed the difficulties in sourcing trained labour for 
expanding startups and accessing business professionals, such as accountants, lawyers, 
marketing planners and design consultants.  A major difference between KSA and the UK 
is that while labour supply may involve costly searches and high costs, the supply of 
specialist labour is greater.  Crucial to the growth of Respondent-29’s online business-
journalism company was assembling a network of journalists, which he has done.  
Similarly, Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout quickly found an app 
developer and Joanna Young academics to work on potential journal paper submissions.  
Each also had access to business professionals in the incubation centre or for Respondent-
25 CEO of a successful UK technology spinout paid outside experts (A/25/6). 
 
Abdul, Manager of FreeSpace in Cambridge with a current portfolio of 158 companies 
(A/34/7) suggests that an established ecosystem makes sourcing labour less problematic.  
 
7.4.4  IP and the regulatory environment  
 
Here I assemble evidence on IP and the regulatory environment and their effects on 
commercialisation processes. 
 
7.4.4.1  Intellectual property 
 
Since IP protects income steam by avoiding imitation, it is important to entrepreneurs and 
potential investors.  Respondent-33 Bioquarter Director stresses the importance of IP for 




We come along with our commercial hats on and we introduce them to ways that can give them a 7-year 
protection in the market. This means it allows you special dispensation to the regulatory authority, giving 
them a much quicker root to get the product to the market. It’s a quicker way, it’s a better way and gives 
you 7 years protection. It’s a way of encouraging companies to moving into very specialised diseases 
they would normally not do (A/33/7). 
 
Respondent-28 were unusual for ‘technical’ entrepreneurs, in that in 2001 when 
Ziolkowski, Hobbs and Wright realised the use of their electromagnetic technology in 
identifying hydrocarbons, they immediately applied for a patent, with support from ERI (at 
a cost of £19,000 for which ERI took an equity option).  Only in 2005 was the patent 
granted:  
 
D.A. Wright, A.M. Ziolkowski, and B.A. Hobbs, 2005, Detection of Subsurface Resistivity Contrasts with 
Application to Location of Fluids: United States Patent Number 6,914,433.  
 
A more normal route is to use time-to-market or copywriting as protection (Pisano 2006) 
the strategy pursued by the other entrepreneurs, for example, Respondent-27 (A/27/5). 
 
7.4.4.2  Legal issues 
 
Each of the interviewee entrepreneurs had the legal advisors associated with their incubator 
available and unsurprisingly encountered little or no legal challenges; as Respondent-35 
suggests (A/35/10) addressing the legal aspects of commercialisation is part of the 
incubator service.  For example, Respondent-27 says, I did have a very good relationship 
with the university incubator. They were very useful in helping get the company off the 
ground and helping me start just the legal processes of the company. They are also helpful 
in building networks with other people (A/27/9).  Respondent-32 manager of a UK 
university’s student spinout service explains how this works.  
 
We provide what we call clinics.  We will provide them with access to a legal adviser, accounts adviser, 
IP adviser for an initial free meeting.  But we don’t then necessarily go on to provide them with further 
assistance to them.  It will then be up to the pay for that themselves. So in some cases again through 
different funding routes we can assistance. For example we work with Scottish Enterprise and they very 
often have assistance with the IP side of things. It’s not often you get SIEs funding that takes care of the 
IP side of things (A/32/14).  
 
Legal issues for UK startup commercialisations seem well handled by incubators. 
 
7.4.5  Governances 
 





7.4.5.1  Incubator governances  
 
Incubator governances in the UK are project-driven, not training programmes: time limits 
for occupancy focus entrepreneur’s attention of business planning. 
 
Vision and culture and entry 
From the viewpoint of the incubating firms, the incubator is a supportive learning 
environment.  Respondent-27 says There is always something happening and you just need 
to speak to the appropriate people. (A/27/9).  Respondent-29, an entrepreneur (A/29/6) and 
four others make similar points.  However, such an environment has its limits.  Though 
Respondent-28 were not in the formal incubator (Technology Transfer Office and then 
SHEINS) the complexity and big company interest shown in their product, meant 
Respondent-28 says, at certain point we decided we could get better advice from outside. 
We had to pay for everything (A/28/3): Respondent-28 moved into a specialist private 
incubation unit oriented towards early-IPO. 
 
It is precisely because of the limitation of generic incubation services, the College of 
Medicine at Edinburgh University established the Edinburgh Bioquarter: a recognition that 
generic services do not suit specialist and high-growth potential technologies to which 
Respondent-33 alludes.  As Respondent-33 says, Edinburgh Bioquarter aims to 
commercialise IP and maximise return for the university and for NHS Lothian (A/33/3).  
They operate with three groups: one business development using UIL such as licensing, a 
second supporting spinout and a third evangelising commercialisation amongst staff 
(A/33/6).  Respondent-33, Bioquarter Director sees these activities as large part of the 
impact 25% of the septennial research assessment exercise (RAE).  He goes on to pose 
these activities as part of a new culture for universities: 
 
So the culture change we do is getting academics more accustom to industry because they still belief that 
industry is kind of a dirty job. They even think that if they collaborate with industry, industry is just going 
to steal their ideas. They also get worried that it will affect their standing in the scientific world. That 
people will think badly of them because they are working with industry. So, they are very nervous about 
all that. It’s therefore our job to come in and assure them that industry has changed and that culture 
change is the third thing we do. We also run all sorts of networking evenings, business seminars, business 
breakfast and all sorts of things just to get people interact with industry more, understanding what goes 
on in industry. That’s a lot of it – it’s breaking down barriers between industry and academia. The 
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management structure is therefore broken down based on these services we render. So we’ve got a head 
of capital creation, head of business development and the head of communications (A/33/6). 
 
Respondent-34 in Cambridge echoes this view, in his case contrasting the entrepreneurial 
culture there with that in the Gulf region (A/34/12).  For Respondent-32, inspiring students 
to consider entrepreneurship and to develop their own entrepreneurship skills and to 
forming a business either while they are still at the university or upon graduation (A/32/3), 
is their core vision.  All UK incubation managers then view their role as 
creating/strengthening/legitimising entrepreneurship as a meaningful activity amongst 
university staff and students.   
 
LaunchEd was part the University’s incubation unit expansion from staff entrepreneurship 
towards including students, seven years ago and now has a 5-member business team 
(A/32/4).  To attract interest they support the Entrepreneurship Club and business 
competitions making extensive use of social media, saying 
 
last year we engaged about 1600 students which is quiet small considering that we have a population of 
about 30,000 students. But out of the 16,000 students we had close one-to-one engagement with probably 
400-500 and 30 business start-ups out of that. So that’s the kind of business pipeline it comes out quiet 
small (A/32/8), 
 
She is clear that LaunchEd is not a training programme (A/32/11), rather all students can 
book space and appointments: the work is all project-based around the student’s business 
ideas (A/32/9) creating 20 to 30 startups each year (A/32/10).  They arrange some business 
internships; typically a 3-month slot with agreed and evaluated aims (A/32/11).  All 
services are free (A/32/18). 
 
Services and improvements 
Section 2.9.1 above considers literature on generalist/specialist types of incubator and the 
range of value-adding services they provide.  It is clear that UK universities, such as 
Edinburgh and Cambridge see the need for both models.  In the bio-medical sector, as 
Respondent-33 says, the need is for even greater specialisation, however, this requires a 
refocusing by the universities.  
 
I think the model we have here where we’ve got a team who come from industry, who really understand 
what industry is interested in and the way industry works and all that we do here doesn’t really exist 
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anywhere else. I think probably less than 3-4 universities in the whole of the UK have such a system – 
Cambridge, Oxford, UCL and Imperial College in London. So I think it’s a model that should be adopted 
much more widely. But the real challenge to stop all that from happening is the universities themselves. 
it’s the way they are set up, it’s the way they are governed and it’s difficult to get the people around to 
understand that this is required. (A/33/15). 
 
University-industry links 
Whilst contribution towards a knowledge-based economy is a general goal of UK 
universities (section 7.3.2 above), building the links with business to operationalise this, 
despite the reluctance of some researchers as Respondent-33 Bioquarter Director makes 
clear. 
 
I think it’s incredibly important and I think it has been neglected in the past. I also think that if academics 
are going to move towards applied, it’s important they do that in partnership with industry. Because you 
what, in the Pharmaceutical field for example the academics always screw up. They don’t just do things 
rights because they think it’s easy and know what to do. I think if you’re developing a product and you 
know it will eventually involve industry, it’s better to work with industry from the start. So academic have 
the tendency of misunderstanding the complexity of what is required to for instance get a drug through 




Incubator governances, particularly a culture supporting commercialisation for these 
interviewees fundamentally challenges the way universities view their incubation 
activities.  For Abdul at FreeSpace in Cambridge, it is important that services are charged 
for (A/34/2); make profit (A/34/4), and (citing US models) become an important income 
stream back into the university funding research (A/34/11).  
 
In summary, incubator governances in UK universities attempt to operate with a culture 
promoting entrepreneurship, operating not through training programmes but rather as 
business projects and entrepreneur development.  They are both generic and specialist, see 
links with business as an essential part of their own and the university’s activities and in 
some cases have the strategic perspective of becoming important income streams for their 
parent universities. 
 




At Cambridge’s Respondent-34 is clear that the culture in an incubation centre must grow 
the individual entrepreneur as the same time as developing spinout companies (A/34/8).  
For the entrepreneurs a growth in self-belief is evidenced in their incubation journey.  
Respondent-25 CEO of a successful UK technology spinout began to believe he could 
succeed when he tested his product and liked it (A/25/3); Respondent-27 grew confident 
with the support shown by incubator staff (A/27/11).  Respondent-28, who used a private 
sector incubator, suggests that weekly presentations to incubator mangers focused attention 
on the pathway to market (A/28/4).  For Atli Fanndal of Freeland, when subscribers began 
paying into the company bank account, his confidence soared (A/29/3); for Respondent-
26, it was applying business skills (A/26/11).  Incubation developed these budding 
entrepreneurs as individuals, increased their self-confidence and honed skills necessary for 
business judgements. 
 
One aspect of the culture in these incubators that is crucial is the focus on outcomes: getting 
companies up and running.  At FreeSpace, with 102 entrepreneurs on the books, 70 in 
residence and 70 graduated into trading companies (A/34/6) incubation processes orient 
towards trading.  Entrepreneurs interviewed shared this perspective, for example 
Respondent-25 sees his company’s trading success as model for others to follow (A/25/17).   
 
From the perspective of entrepreneurs the incubators could improve their access to funding 
sources (Respondent-27, A/27/10), a point echoed by others for example Respondent-26 
(A/26/12) and Respondent-32 (A/32/22). 
 
The incubators are learning environments with a clear outcome: trading companies 
operating in a culture esteeming commercial success. 
 
7.4.6  Risk capital 
 
As a social enterprise, Polorum leveraged startup resources from NGOs and state agencies 
(in addition to family and friends) rather than capital markets (A/24/4).  Respondent-25 
made a successful Kickstarter pitch (309 customers) using the income to start 
Maketechnics (A/25/4); Teadough too used early sales income to launch the company on 
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a sustainable footing (Hannah Dimsdale, A/30/4).  Starting off with paid employment, 
Joanna Young of SEC was able to begin trading by not incurring new costs, apart from her 
own time (A/31/4). 
 
My interviews in the UK were towards the end of the 2008 financial collapse (2013 to 
2014) when few banks offered facilities (loans or overdrafts) to SMEs in general and 
startups in particular.  Companies with patentable IP may obtain a state grant or grant from 
the university (Respondent-33, A/33/2) and in exceptional cases from dedicated funds set 
up by banks, such as the TSB fund.   
 
Since external risk capital (especially VC) can be expensive, it is only appropriate for 
startups with the prospect of high-growth and profit.  In this dataset, VC investment was 
only appropriate to Respondent-28, who had little difficulty attracting offers  (A/28/4).  
Respondent-28’s R&D was funded firstly by research grants and then by subsidy (lab-time 
and salaries) Edinburgh University and later a £200,000 proof of concept grant from 
Scottish Enterprise.  With promising technology patenting, followed by IPO was possible 
and therefore attractive to VCs: £7.4M from HitecVision, Energy Ventures and Scottish 
Equity Partners (the VC arm of Scottish Enterprise) in 2004.  The equity was then sold by 
trade sale in 2007 to Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS) for US$ 275 million who retired the 
researchers from active involvement the second-largest spin-off from a UK university 
(A/28/2). 
 
In summary, these companies launched on sweat equity (unpaid labour) with contributions 
from family and friends and ploughing-in early sales income; none got significant support 
from banks.  With promising patentable technology, only Respondent-28 was appropriate 
for VC, which they successful raised and then successfully exited. 
 
7.4.7  Entrepreneurial risk and leadership 
 
Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) work on Prospect Theory, we have understood that 
entrepreneurial risk-taking contains a high emotional element, which research shows 
(Brockhaus 1980; Busenitz 1999) often remains unarticulated, kept private and referred 
 
 226 
too only in matter-of-fact ways.  For entrepreneurs outside of universities who for example 
give up their job or offer their home as loan security, the risks are higher and much more 
emotionally-charged than for my group of interviewees, further explaining the 
interviewees absence of comment on their risk-taking.  Even reflecting after the period of 
most risk, Respondent-25 CEO of a successful UK technology spinout is typical in saying, 
that he was focused on getting my products to the customers (A/25/18) or Respondent-24 
who matter-of-factly filled in forms and than got on with it (A/24/3).  Anton Ziolkowski 
describes Respondent-28’s journey to selling his company for US$ 275 million almost as 
an everyday event.  Only those with a business back and in Respondent-26’s case a MBA) 
reflect more closely on the risk and leadership associated with starting a business, in his 
case realising that his first business idea was not what he wanted to do and taking up a 
completely new strategy of consulting on international M&As seeking to justify the 
University’s decision to support his entrepreneur visa (A/26/4). 
 
7.4.8  Knowledge flows  
 
This section presents evidence on knowledge flows focusing on their endogeneity, 
formality, business or technical nature and international transfer.   
 
 
7.4.8.1  Exogenous or endogenous knowledge  
 
Respondent-33 Bioquarter Director is very clear that knowledge of building businesses is 
exogenous to universities and that a key role of incubators is to bring into the university 
system the knowledge and skills commercialisation requires.  He is focused on developing 
products and raising startup resources, saying, 
 
It’s about networking – the more contacts you have, the more people you speak to the more you’re likely 
to succeed (A/33/10) … you often hear people complaining about TTOs and that’s usually because people 
who run TTOs have really been a product of the university system … they don’t really have the opportunity 
to learn how industry works and what industry is interested in. besides they don’t have a long list of 
contacts they bring with them from industry … the reason why we’re here is that the College of Medicine 
wasn’t spinning out the number of companies they were supposed to be spinning out. They hadn’t spun 
out any companies for the 10 years before we came here. The last 5 years we’ve spun out eleven and 
we’ve got another five companies in incubation at the moment. If you look at industrial funding that was 
coming into the College it was a few million when we came here, now this year there is about £15 million 
of industrial funding. That’s because we come from industry – we understand what industry wants, we 
know what industry is looking for, but also most importantly when we’re building companies because 
we’ve been there and done it, we know what investors are interested in … everyone in my team here come 
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from industry … we look for technology around the college and around the university and we actually 
build companies. We will bring in a management time at that point to sort of front up the company, find 
investment for the company and spin out. So, my background is I’ve been in industry for over 30 years … 
I’ve been Chief Executive of about 5-6 companies; all venture backed companies. So, basically I’ve done 
it all. I’ve build companies; I’ve spun companies and have raised money for companies. I’ve done IPOs 
on the stock market I’ve been involved in trade sales and raised over 60 million pounds of financing in 
my time. So basically I’ve seen and done it all. I’m not an academic but I’ve got a science background 
(A/33/1). 
 
7.4.8.2  Tacit or formal knowledge  
 
The companies entering the UK university incubators have a product, however, most agree 
that the incubator contribution is identifying the market and entry route: a combination of 
tacit and formal knowledge (Respondent-31 of SEC A/31/17; Respondent-27, A/27/13).  
The other incubator contribution is help finding startup funding (Respondent-32 manager 
of a UK university’s student spinout service, A/32/14).  The incubators draw the student 
and staff entrepreneurs into fields of knowledge (marketing/capital assembly) beyond their 
experience, some of which is formal knowledge (market segmentation, 4-Ps, financial 
agreements) other aspects of which is tacit (market orientation, pitching, networking with 
funders).   
 
7.4.8.3  Technical or business knowledge  
 
Few companies (Respondent-28) radically progress the technical nature of their product 
during incubation.  Entrepreneurs (A/24/6) and incubation Managers (A/32/15) emphasise 
that it is the development of the business idea, which is the Incubation Centre’s focus. 
 
7.4.8.4  International technology transfer of knowledge 
 
Respondent-35 Policy expert and UK incubation manager who believes that only one in a 
hundred research projects will result in successful commercialisation, suggests that  
 
In terms of Edinburgh, the exportable knowledge is coming from various areas of science; notably 
medical sciences, computer science and informatics, engineering in particular and renewables for 
instance, chemistry, and geosciences. There is a lot of interests in renewables but I doubt computer 
science is very reliable source of technology as is the medical school. So those are the mainstream 
activities. In terms of international tech transfer we would love to do more but international tech transfer 
is expensive and we have a budget. So we do have various reps around the world notable in the US, 
China, and with other European countries. But it’s comparatively modest compared to the southeast [of 




In summary, the actual amount of commercialisable knowledge internationally transferred 
from UK universities appears limited, though the amount is much greater than in KSA in 
the private sector. 
 
7.5.1  Commercialisation outcomes 
 
The Biggar (2012) report on the Economic Impact of the University of Edinburgh’s 
Commercialisation Activity suggests that its commercialisation activities add £95 million 
per year to the Scottish economy, supporting 1,913 jobs directly through 35 spinout 
companies per year (cumulative total of 213) and technology licensing (income £3 million 
per year) giving a total value added of £140 million with 2,415 jobs supported in Scotland 
and a further £23 million and 471 jobs in the rest of the UK. 
 
As section 7.2 above illustrated, universities such as Edinburgh and Cambridge accept that 
contributing towards a (more) knowledge-based economy is part of their strategic goal.  
The incubation managers, however, question the commitment of the universities to 
implementing this goal.  Respondent-32 for example, bemoans lack of space (A/32/6).  For 
Respondent-33 of Bioquarter Director apart from strengthening staff commitment to 
commercialisation major constraints are finding business prepared to joint-venture with 
universities and external funders prepared to invest in university commercialisations The 
latter point is important bearing in mind the governances clashes referred to above.  As 
Respondent-33 says, It is also a challenge sometimes dealing with academics – some of 
them are very academic (A/33/14).  He admits that  
 
The one target we’ve fallen short of is the number of what Scottish Enterprise call high growth companies. 
We haven’t spun out as many high growth companies as they wanted us to. The reason for that is what 
we learnt very quickly is there isn’t the access to VC in Scotland that is required. So we need to build the 
ecosystem and the ecosystem need to be much stronger (A/33/17). 
 
Respondent-34 too feels that outside of the incubation Centre innovation systems are 
replete with barriers. 
 
I think every innovation system has to adapt itself to its local environment. The module that we use is 
much more like a natural ecosystem as opposed to a more industrial manufacturing thing. So we don’t 




Pointing too some successes (Vision Group and Lantern in 2004) Respondent-35 hopes 
that increasing the size of potential deal-flow by coordinating with Aberdeen and 
Strathclyde universities (the Enterprise Campus project) will help build a more supportive 
external ecosystem (A/35/7). 
 
Whilst important, particularly in emergent sectors, commercialisation in Scotland support 
0.1% of employment – its impact is limited. 
 
7.5.2  Commercialisation outputs 
 
There is no publicly available cost-benefit analysis of UK university incubation centres.  
From private sources it is clear that Centres such as Edinburgh and Cambridge are net 
value-adding.   
 
Spun out trading companies that are investible (in Edinburgh, 35 a year) are deemed a 




CHAPTER-8  IN-CASE AND CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS    
 
This relatively short chapter, as chapter-5 explained is the first part of my analysis; the next 
chapter reintegrates my conclusions with research literature, pointing out my theoretical 
contribution.  The purpose of this chapter is not to integrate with literature rather it is to 
compare and contrast the institutional setting (including culture) facing commercialisation 
is KSA and the UK.  I use multiple units of analysis as institutions, organisations 
(incubators and universities) and firms are nested and mutually inter-relate.  Since I aim to 
avoid repetition, I cite sections from the data chapters and interview references from 
appendices, rather than repeating raw interview data.   
 
The structure of this chapter follows the top-level variables in my initial analytical 
framework (shown in figure 4.1).  These are (a) cultural heritage, which includes wider 
societal institutions; (b) commercialisation drivers/barriers, which includes a contrast 
between findings on the Triple Helix in the UK and KSA; (c) commercialisation inputs, 
which includes sectoral differences within and between the two countries; (d) 
Commercialisation process, which includes support for entrepreneurs including funding 
and commercialisation outcomes.  Hence the major themes for my research, identified in 
the literature review and embedded in figure-4 structure the discussion in this chapter. 
 
8.1  Cultural heritage 
 
As Lewis (2011) points out, it is often the invisible (cultural predispositions) differences 
that explain actions, emotions, framing and conceptualisations creating distinct habituses 
(Bourdieu 1984).  This is neither a study of cultural differences, nor of national systems of 
innovation.  Rather, my study seeks to explore dissimilarities in commercialisation process 
and to identify how Saudi processes might improve, by analysing them through the prism 
of commercialisation research and UK experience.   
 
There are parallels between the UK and KSA: both are countries used to high oil revenues 
that are predicted to diminish (from 2015 for the UK); each faces exogenous shocks and 
uncertainties (for the UK, wars, potential EU exit and potential Scottish independence).  
My comparison is mainly between Scotland as a part of the UK and KSA.  Both countries 
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rely on foreign labour, though as an ex-colonial power this is inward migration in the case 
of the UK, whilst KSA has 3-million temporary workers, reflected in a dominant 
monoculture and the sensitivity to identify found in all post-colonial cultures.   
 
Institutionally the countries widely differ.  Whilst both are monarchies, the Saudi King has 
absolute power, whereas the UK monarch is symbolic within a parliamentary democracy.  
In KSA women are under the guardianship of men; in the UK though often unequally 
treated, women have equal rights.  Saudi Arabia has a young demographic profile with 
51% of the population under-26, whereas 70% of the UK population is over-25.  The UK 
is a secular society with declining rates of religious observance (except amongst its five-
million Muslims), whereas Islam is a dominant social force in KSA.  The UK economy is 
service-based and increasingly knowledge-based; KSA remains highly dependant on oil, 
though the (religious) tourism industry is vastly important. 
 
8.2  Commercialisation drivers/barriers in a developing economy  
 
Here I assemble evidence relating to the first (from the left) set of influences on 
commercialisation seen in figure 1.4. 
 
8.2.1  Institutional arrangements effecting commercialisation  
 
I first compare NSI, SSIs and the triple helix (TH). 
 
8.2.1.1  National systems of innovation  
 
Whereas in Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) terms KSA has a statist TH model, the UK 
appears more tri-lateral featuring hybrid organisations – much more non-linear and focused 
on shortening gap (quicker knowledge flows because thicker institutions in place), though 
commercialisation activity is (85%) clustered in the southeast of England.  Evidence 
suggests that whilst the UK more successful commercialises scientific research than KSA, 
there remains in the words of Respondent-33 Commercialisation Director at a university 
BioQuarter (A/33/4) a gulf between business and universities, with the latter avoiding 
profit-motivated activities.   In KSA, commercialisation policy and initiatives are top-down 
and centralised, as section 6.2.1.1 shows, creating institutional thinness in areas such as 
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corporate law, tax and IP law, which despite Government policy favouring 
communications and heavy investment in international TT purchases, means that 
incubation centres achieve little, as Dr Mohapatra’s comments indicate (A/18); though in 
time as institutions and cultures change, this may alter.   
 
8.2.1.2  Sectoral systems of innovation 
 
Layton (1972) drew attention to the UK’s ability to ‘invent’ without ‘innovating,’ i.e. a 
commercialisation gap.  Indeed, Collinson and Gregson’s (2003) international comparison 
of innovation systems reveals that for US VCs, science-based R&D in the UK is a source 
of under-priced IP.  In several sectoral studies Molina and Kinder (2000; 2001) show how 
systems of innovation in creative industries and software can act as barriers to innovation 
and exploitation of scientific research in the UK.  This section explores the role of active 
agency within sets of institutions orientated towards innovation and growth in particular 
sectors: in short, the degree to which Pisano’s (2006) science-technology gap is 
successfully overcome.  Commercialisation SSIs in the UK show some spatial clustering 
successes (such as Respondent-34, A/34/9) at Cambridge refers to in Cambridge and 
incubation centres focused on a supply of university R&D (such as Respondent-35 Policy 
expert and UK incubation manager references in 7.2.1.2). 
 
KSA has successfully taken some early steps to create SSIs in emerging technology fields, 
however, the next challenges are more difficult: encouraging a more entrepreneurial culture 
and experimental organisational forms.  Over the last ten years, the Saudi Government has 
recognised the need to diversify its economy, faced with oil price volatility and the 
impending ending of its reserves.  It’s Five Year Plans and Vision 2030 now set sectoral 
targets.  In the Ninth Five Year Plan, electronics, upstream petrochemicals and healthcare 
technologies and (the cross-cutting theme) absorptive capacity building are highlighted.  
As section 6.2.1.2 indicates, there has been significant investment in the Tehran Techno 
Valley Science Park; as Respondent-15 (A/15/1) says, they have bought some 300 patents 
from the US Patent office and established the new Badir network of incubators (ICT, 
biotechnology and advance manufacturing), aimed at exploiting them (Respondent-16 
A/16/4).  Both countries face the challenge of embedding commercialisation as a culture 
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in university-related SSIs: the challenge however is greater in KSA given the top-down 
control of initiatives and the NSI deficiencies mentioned above.  
 
8.2.1.3  The Government, university and industry triple helix 
 
In neither country does the TH approach the Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) ideal-type 
exist since in both countries academic and business governances remain difficult to bridge 
and amongst academic researchers predominant culture does not prioritise 
commercialisation. 
 
The UK’s TH is more institutionalised that in KSA, however, the same cultural gulf exists 
between academic researchers focusing on publications and academic entrepreneurs 
referencing commercialisation.  As section 7.2.1.3, indicates and especially the comments 
of ERI’s Commercialisation Director, Respondent-35 (A/35/6) whilst there are exceptions, 
most academic researchers fail to boundary-hop between academic and business 
governances (all five UK incubator managers agree).  In Edinburgh’s case, biomedical and 
AI research is readily commercialised and Respondent-28 is an example from geosciences; 
however, the culture of entrepreneurship fails to reach into the mindset of many researchers 
and some Government initiatives (for example REF impact) are viewed as blunt 
instruments.   
 
KSA has a less matured (Respondent-7, A/16/1) TH as we would expect in a developing 
economy, as Respondent-10 sawerly CEO says, we are still not there (A/10/18) referring 
to an ecosystem that is statist and top-down (picking winners, selecting TTs, controlling 
funding) and constrained by researchers failure to participate.  The Government accepts 
TH goals and invests heavily in physical infrastructure and purchase of TT, but is not yet 
prepared for the array of experimental and hybrid organisations necessary to support an 
entrepreneurial culture.  Large Saudi businesses (in oil and finance) accept the goal of TH-






8.2.2  Development state attributes 
 
Since the development state (Woo-Cummings 1998) ideas may present a strategic way 
forward for KSA, this section explores more closely the degree to which it has DS 
characteristics, contrasting with the IMF/WB neo-liberal model in the UK. 
 
8.2.2.1  Redistributive or value-creating state 
 
Culturally, gift-giving and clientism have been important in Saudi culture with oil wealth 
increasing the ruling elite’s ability to provide largess, often in the form of grants, 
government (sinecure) jobs and welfare payments.  Public debate in KSA often cites the 
mantra of modernising without westernising with attention turning to Asian (post-
Washington consensus) models of development and more generally what is a sustainable 
model for Saudi economy and society.  As IMF (2014) and the Economist (120116) KSA 
is currently retrenching state expenditure. 
 
Whilst the debate on the development state is not echoed in the UK, debate on what 
constitutes a sustainable model is very much alive (EU, Scottish independence, 
devolution).  As a trading nation, international competitiveness is important to the UK and 
embedded in the dominant neoliberal ideology, which promotes diminution of state 
spending and range of public services.  An important tension in the UK is between central 
and localised agencies; the latter (local Councils and universities for example) seeking to 
protect levels of investment.  The UK Government aims to become more value-adding than 
value-distributing, however countervailing democratic forces pulling in other directions 
mitigates any shift.   
 
8.2.2.2  Expert bureaucracy 
 
Creating and implementing five-year plans and policies such as Saudidisation, innovation 
via TT and building absorptive capacity in an absolute monarchy requires serendipitous 
state expert decision-takers.  For example the Japanese MITI carefully enforced B2B and 
UIL around R&D.  KSA lacks the large manufacturing export companies Japan had in the 
1960s and 1970s and instead places TT and incubation under the management of academics 
(section 6.2.2.2) failing to attract offshore R&D by foreign companies for institutional 
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reasons.  Some respondents point to push back against the inexpert bureaucracy (such as 
Respondent-14, A/14/14).  
 
It may be that over time business expertise increases in the KSA bureaucracy.  In the UK, 
‘arms-length’ hybrid agencies straddling the public and private sector (such as Scottish 
Enterprise and ERI) have some amount of expertise.  As Respondent-35 Policy expert and 
UK incubation manager argues, their role is enculturating universities to embed 
commercialisation, with firms such as Respondent-28 illustrating how this can successfully 
work.   
 
To summarise, placing commercialisation resources under the control of an expert 
bureaucracy is unfinished business in the UK; it has yet to begin in KSA. 
 
8.2.2.3  National vision 
 
How we see ourselves and how others see us (identity) if continually renegotiated as 
achievements, events and environments alter.  The UK has the (fragile, misplaced?) self-
assurance of imperial power, often (as Respondent-35 in 7.2.2.3 does) viewing itself as a 
knowledge hub; inventing and designing products for other to manufacture.  In this vision, 
national champion companies and research universities play an important role, as does self-
deception since competitive economies fail to readily accept lower places in the 
international pecking order.  Section 6.2.2.3 shows educated Saudis identify dissonance 
between policy and practice: policies for a knowledge-based economy and practice 
inhibited by institutional constraints and lack of entrepreneurial culture the result of which 
is a failure to create the technological products and companies matching the national vision.  
As an outsider, Respondent-17, Manager of an incubation network sees these dissonances 
sharply as the A/17/2 quote reveals, overcoming which Dr Tahir suggests is imperative if 
the national vision is to be achieved (A/22/1).   
 
Knowledge and the ability to create and exploit new knowledge is a crucial building block 
of a national culture.  Having lived in the UK now for five years, I see how much time and 




8.2.2.4  Innovation incentives 
 
Section 7.2.2.4 describes a structure of innovation incentives familiar in WB, IMF and 
OECD models: clear IP and corporate law, a variety of capital markets, fiscal concessions 
on R&D and risk-taking, basic and applied (university and corporate) research partners and 
successfully accommodating international R&D off-shoring.  Indigenous knowledge 
production and initiatives supporting its commercialisation are structured and funded in 
visible, accountability and impersonal agencies and rules on a meritocratic basis: a clear 
supply-side to UK innovation incentivisation evolved over time.   
 
Such a structure is not evidenced in KSA (section 6.2.2.4), indeed interviewees point to 
perverse incentives as alternatives to innovation such as occupying space in incubators for 
unlimited time without paying fees and receiving welfare payments or grants.  The 
alternatives to being innovators (Government sinecures, investment in a rising property 
market) further diminish the incentive to innovate.  Add to this, issues from an 
entrepreneur’s perspective around IP and company law and tax, and as Respondent-20 
notes (A/15/5), the incentives (incubation network, state grants) fail to incentivise (all four 
policy-makers concur).  In practical terms, KSA appears a typical resource-rich country 
without innovation incentives 
 
8.2.2.5  Macro-economic stability 
 
As an open economy with a single resource export KSA is vulnerable to exogenous   shocks 
adding to the instability arising from internal experimentation with democratic processes.  
Section 6.2.2.5 suggests that from the viewpoint of long-term institutional adjustment to 
better-suit innovation, KSA is fragile.  With an internationally traded currency and open 
economy (including some oil dependency) the UK too has fragilities arising exogenously 
and internal tensions from income distribution and spatial inequities.  However, it ability 
to attract foreign investment and R&D illustrates a higher degree environmental stability 
for innovation than KSA. 
 




Here evidence on entrepreneurship institutional barriers/enablers, incentives and 
disincentives and also using evidence assembled in sections 6.2.3 and 7.2.3 of previous 
chapters I compare success stories and SWOTs for entrepreneurship in KSA and the UK.  
The next section examines evidence on commercialisation as a particular type of 
entrepreneurship.  
 
8.2.3.1  Entrepreneurship: success stories 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the short time KSA has supported academic entrepreneurship, there 
are few success stories.  As section 6.2.3 notes, there are successful and internationalised 
KSA businesses in many sectors and given the investment in TT and 100,000 students per 
year studying abroad, a pipeline of spinout companies is likely to development: to date this 
has not occurred.  In other sectors successful Saudi entrepreneurs are well-known, such as 
the Al Subeaei Group  founded by Mohammed Alsobaie, who’s first business venture was 
selling matches as an orphaned youngster and Abdulrahman Alzamel who took over a 
small textile business converting it into the internationally successful Chairman of Zamil 
Group in steel and construction.  KSA has successful entrepreneurs; it has yet to create 
them from commercialisation in advanced technology fields.  The UK can point to 
numerous successful academic entrepreneurial ventures, with section 7.2.3.1 summarising 
Axis-Shield and Respondent-28: both employing over 300 high-level staff and with 
international sales and R&D facilities.   
 
8.2.3.2   Entrepreneurship: institutional barriers and disincentives 
 
Although KSA has a long history as traders and many family businesses, as section 7.2.3.2 
indicates cultural predispositions today view small businesses as subordinate and 
unworthy; especially since social welfare can be generous.  The main barrier to 
entrepreneurship in KSA is cultural as illustrated by comments from Dr Respondent-1 of a 
major online training company (A/1/1 and 2) and Respondent-15, a Science Park CEO 
(A/15/7); all four policy-makers and incubation managers mention this.  At a structural 
level, KSA’s TEA-rate at 9.4% is above that of the UK despite other institutional barriers 
such as (section 7.2.3.2) the unpreparedness of banks to lend to startups and the issues 
associated with women starting businesses in a strict Muslim culture.  It may be as some 
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interviewees suggest that the nature of incubators is a barrier; as section 7.2.3.4 shows, 
they are criticised for being managed by academics, ‘pushing’ imported technologies and 
running programme training rather than business project development.  Another structural 
barrier is the lack of private risk capital and exit (via trade sales) difficulties.   
 
Some the institutional barriers and disincentives (banks, private risk capital, exit routes, 
management of incubators) can (some already are) be improved.  Others such as 
disincentivising welfare payment and obstacles to women starting businesses are deeply 
rooted and require more fundamental institutional change. 
 
Cultural factors too are important institutional barriers to entrepreneurship in the UK, 
including (section 7.2.3) the persistent reluctance of banks to fund startups and SMEs.  
Whilst the UK has more supportive IP and company law and taxation; alongside exit routes 
and research capability (both endogenous and offshore) than KSA (section 7.2.3.2), there 
remains a cultural (governance) chasm between industry and academic research (A/35/9).  
Patenting in the UK is slow and costly (section 7.2.3.4) and can lead to firms relocating.   
 
In summary, barrier institutions to entrepreneurship and structural disincentives are 
stronger in KSA than the UK.  In both countries however cultural factors are important: 
the position of women, predisposition against small businesses and personal service 
businesses in the KSA and in the UK a gulf between academic researchers and industry 
needs. 
 
8.2.3.3    Entrepreneurship: institutional enablers and incentives 
 
Section 7.2.3 records some of the institutional enablers for entrepreneurship generally and 
university commercialisation in particular; such as (in Scotland) Scottish Enterprise 
business advisors; the Co-Investment Fund, Knowledge Transfer Partnership; Smart 
Awards and funding of Angel networks via Linc.  These couple with UK-wide fiscal 
policy: R&D write offs and capital gains discount on risk capital investments; and the 
associated trade sales or AIM as exit routes.  Section 7.2.3.4 notes the wide array of 
business professionals available: lawyers, accountants, designers, marketing planners, and 
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sophisticated logistics and supply chains.  Many larger companies have Corporate VC 
funds and/or arrangements to mentor or partner with startups.   Most universities and cities 
have incubation centres, often managed by business people.   
 
In its core sectors (oil and financial services) KSA has supported national champions, such 
as Armco; however, interviewees recognise that institutions and structural initiatives 
remain work-in-progress for university commercialisations (for example, Respondent-18 a 
commercialisation policy expert in KSA, A/18/4).  Nonetheless, the Government profile 
commercialisation in its Five Year Plan is funding the Badir incubation network and 
invests heavily in purchasing patents and TT by importing international researchers and 
incubation specialists.   
 
8.2.3.4  Entrepreneurship: SWOT compared 
 
Figures 6.2 and 7.4 take international data (GEM, IMF, WB and Government documents) 
combined with interview data to produce SWOT analyses for entrepreneurship in KSA and 
the UK.  Sections 6.2.3.2 and 7.2.3.2 present the conclusions of the SWOT analysis.  As a 
beneficiary of inward R&D, a wide basic research capability and EU member, the UK’s 
weaknesses relate to UIL governances and external shocks (currency, oil price and war).  
In short, whilst imperfect (education levels, weak Chinese links) institutions and structures 
favour entrepreneurship in ways that KSA is now in the process of building.  Like all 
institutional change this takes time and works best with a clearly directed national vision, 
with structural factors (law, capital, taxation) undoubtedly being more easily altered than 
deeper cultural factors (women entrepreneurs and predisposition against small businesses).  
KSA threats (end of oil revenues and image abroad as a place to do business) are significant 
as is location in an unstable geographic zone.  Success stories are important motivators and 
models in change process, perhaps focusing support on a smaller number of high-growth 
potential businesses will achieve success to celebrate and emulate in KSA.  A major 
difference between the SWOTs is entrepreneurial culture: not particularly amongst 
academics, rather the different legitimacy of founding a business contrasts between 




8.2.4 Knowledge flows: absorptive capacity and adaptation capability 
 
Given my research focus on commercialisation, vibrant knowledge flows shortening the 
gap between science and technology and addressing consumer’s desires in international 
markets is crucial to my research topic.   For the KSA section 6.24 paints a picture of 
significant investment in basic and applied research capability often via TT, as KACST’s 
Respondent-20 outlines (A/21/4) and as Respondent-18 points out, building a general 
(from 2006) and now sector-specific network of incubators attached to Saudi Arabia’s most 
research-intensive universities (A/17/3).  Given the timescale for creating university 
research capability and embedding commercialisation in university cultures, it may be 
argued that KSA is doing well, perhaps especially so compared with other top-ten oil 
producers such as Russia, Iran and Venezuela or other top-twenty (by GDP) countries such 
as Indonesia and Turkey.  Simple comparisons with the UK (section 7.2.4) reveal little, 
since it has spent since 1209 (Cambridge) and 1583 (Edinburgh) cumulating knowledge.  
What is revealing is the ability of the UK to attract international corporate R&D, funding 
from international bodies such as the EU 7FP and an increasing tendency (not yet as strong 
as interviewees would wish (A/35/4) to link with industry in joint R&D projects (though 
Edinburgh works closely with big-pharmaceutical, pet-food, ICT and engineering 
companies).  As research capability and thereby absorptive capacity improves in KSA the 
attraction of international R&D and subsequent spillovers may prove an important policy 
objective.  
  
8.3  Commercialisation inputs 
 
I now turn to comparing evidence of practice of commercialisation, rather than policy or 
entrepreneurship in general i.e. the actual input into commercialisation processes; this is 
followed in the next section (8.4) by analysis of the relative processes themselves.  To 
avoid repetition of data chapters, I focus on summarising the differences (referencing 
sections of the data chapters), following the structure of the data chapters, though 
somewhat condensed. 
 




Section 6.3.1.1 suggests that KSA incubator entry criteria relate to the motivation of the 
entrant rather than the quality and/or marketability of the research idea (UK), few entrants 
come with ideas resulting from paid-for TT (though many reference business ideas sourced 
from studies abroad.  Since there is no systematic evaluation of Centre outputs it is not 
clear how many graduate as trading businesses.  Length of stay in incubation seems to lack 
discipline.  UK rules on entry and exit are much tighter, though in Cambridge some 25% 
have no association whatever with the university (A/34/10).  Technologies from 
international research (grant-aided or jointly with international companies), is more 
prominent in the UK than KSA as 8.3.4 below details.  
 
8.3.2  Service range, quality, cost and value-for-money to users 
 
Incubators offer staff and students free access to space and office, professional and 
specialist advisors in both the UK and KSA, which from the viewpoint of the entrepreneurs 
is value-for-money (6.3.1.3 and 7.3.1.4).  Where the incubators differ is in market-
orientation.  UK Centres are able to offer business mentoring, sometimes links with trading 
businesses and links to potential investors.  In KSA incubators insist on programmes of 
training, UK centres focus on developing the entrepreneur’s confidence and the business 
idea as a project (section 7.3.1).  Overall, not unexpectedly given the different chronologies 
and experience, the Saudi incubators are less focused on the market and have less 
substantive links to research developed within the universities. 
 
8.3.3  Technology transfer, UILs and absorptive capacity 
 
University Commercialisation Manager Respondent-35 suggests that older established 
universities in the UK have the research capability links with international research and 
businesses to effectively build UILs and exploit endogenous and transferred technologies 
(section 7.3.2).  Edinburgh, for example exports/sells technology (renewables, chemistry, 
and geosciences, (A/35/8), unlike the KSA universities on who’s behalf 30 US patents were 
purchased.  Although Saudi incubators are located on university campuses and Aziz Al 
Agargan of KACST felt this gave access to university research and facilities (A/23/3), no 




Half of the UK incubatees have benefited from (informal) knowledge transferred from 
abroad (7.3.2.1), about the same as KSA, however, a difference is that the most successful 
(largest, most valuable) incubated companies in the UK, such as Respondent-28 and 
Maketechnics, were build on indigenous research, exploited through incubation.  When 
asked (A/21/6) to name a KSA company benefiting from this basic research, Respondent-
20 could not name one.   
 
In both countries strong UILs are acclaimed as very important: Respondent-35 (A/35/4) 
and Respondent-33 (section 7.3.2.2) for the UK and section 6.2.4 for KSA.  Whilst UK 
universities work with international companies, this is rare outside of oil in KSA.  Indeed, 
KSA finds it difficult to get Saudi companies to mentor or otherwise support companies in 
incubation.   
 
In summary, the older more researched-based UK universities with established links to 
business and international research has stronger TT and UILs than in KSA; that said KSA 
incubators are much newer. 
 
8.3.4  Building absorptive capacity 
 
Similarly with building absorptive capacity: KSA invests in educating 100,000 students 
abroad each year, supports visiting scholars, joint research and patent purchases, as section 
6.3.2.3 notes.  However, building international-level research capability and with it 
absorptive capacity takes time.  In many fields such capability has already been 
accumulated in the top UK universities, however, Incubation Centre Managers identify as 
a challenge, building business capacity in Centres and evangelising commercialisation 
amongst academic researchers, for example Respondent-33 (A/33/12).   It may be, given 
the success of KSA as a centre for health-tourism focusing on building absorptive capacity 
in areas such as this (for example new medical devices) where there is some cumulated 
knowledge is better than (say) targeting biotechnology where there is less heritage 
capability.  Alternatively, emulating India’s success with the ‘lean’ GE Scanner, KSA may 
be able to use its advanced manufacturing capabilities to re-engineer medical devices and 




8.3.5 Motivation and capability for entrepreneurship 
 
I have mentioned several times (section 6.3.3) Saudi entrepreneurs being motivated by 
ideas or combination of ideas arising from study or visits abroad, motivating 
entrepreneurship.  Given male guardianship, it is difficult for Saudi women to startup 
businesses and only 30% participate in paid employment; those Saudi women inheriting 
family businesses run them successfully.  5.7% unemployment does not seem to motivate, 
possible because welfare payment are high and there are prospects of a sinecure 
Government job (section 7.2.3.2).  Given current reductions in state spending, this may 
change as the alternative to entrepreneurship becomes less desirable.  Those Saudis 
becoming entrepreneurs do so for similar reasons as in other countries (section 7.3.3.): 
control, social contribution, operationalising research, with motivation changing as 
companies grow and new opportunities emerge or as in the Respondent-28 case a business 
mentor motivates the academic researchers to follow a particular path (A/28/1). 
 
8.3.6 Internationalisation compliance with standards 
 
For those entrepreneurs seeking rapid internationalisation or being ‘born global,’ 
compliance with standards enabling to trade in international markets is essential.  Section 
7.3.4 illustrates the importance of this to UK entrepreneurs in incubation.   
 
Another aspect of international compliance is the ability to raise capital from VCs who 
invariably look towards the turnover from internationalisation as essential to given them 
their desired return for the risk taken, especially for startups with little trading history.   
 
As section 6.3.4 illustrates neither growth nor getting VC is an immediate concern for 
Saudi incubator entrepreneurs, who target local/regional markets, which is odd given the 
wide international reach of the country’s national champions in oil and finance and KSA’s 
leading position in the Arab and Muslim world.  The downside of importing business ideas 
from other countries is that it is difficult to then re-export them.  It would be possible to 
export into less developed (less contested) markets, such as Africa, however, most KSA 
into Africa appears to be for agricultural production such as the Saudi Star Agricultural 
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Development US%2.5 billion in Ethiopia and Manafea Holdings US$125 million 
pineapple growing and processing in Zambia.  Export guarantees in KSA are subject to 
Government approval i.e. not impersonal rules. 
 
To summarise, internationalisation is the norm for many university-based startups in the 
UK, in KSA it is the exception. 
 
8.4  Commercialisation processes 
 
Here I compare and contrast the actual practices of commercialisation in the UK and KSA, 
following the same structure as in the data chapters, whilst combining some of the sections 
to avoid repetition. 
 
8.4.1  Startup and growth: dash-for-cash and incubation challenges 
 
As section 6.4.1.1 in KSA whilst there are examples of early innovation (Respondent-10, 
A/10/3) and elongated incubation (Respondent-9 A/9/2) the norm is extended innovation 
as a result of incubation conceptualised not as developing an idea and planning a route to 
market, rather earlier idea development and training.  All five UK incubators are more 
selective accepting business ideas which, then developing the individual entrepreneur and 
business plan (section 7.4.1).  Stronger linkages to mentors, business, investors or via 
crowd-funding feedback introduce add to the business discipline and project feel of 
incubation.  In KSA, because incubation is free, often entrepreneurs receive welfare 
payments and without business mentoring, Saudi incubation processes are relaxed as 
section 6.4.1.2 illustrates.  Time is not money.   
 
Whilst the commitment and emotional sacrifice of entrepreneurs in both countries is not in 
doubt the Saudi system lacks the business discipline that linkages to the real world of 




About half of the entrepreneurs in UK and KSA incubation draw upon (recombining) ideas 
from abroad.  However, sections 6.4.2 and 7.4.2 show two important differences.  Firstly, 
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more of the UK entrepreneurs are exploiting international network connections in shaping 
and launching their business (Respondent-24 CEO of a UK university high-tech spinout 
and Respondent-27 are examples.  Saudi incubating entrepreneurs (section 6.4.2) aspire to 
international sales but rarely have international network connections, Secondly, 
encouraged by incubation managers (A/33/11 and A/35/5) UK incubating entrepreneurs 
are targeting early international sales, whereas for the Saudi entrepreneurs (A/3/16, A/7/15 
and A/12/13) internationalisation is more of a dream than a plan.   
 
8.4.3 Labour supply 
 
Respondent-1 a major online training company (section 6.4.3) points to the difficulties 
recruiting talented staff to startups in KSA (preference to work of large companies or 
Government or simply to enjoy benefits), in addition to the overall brain drain (especially 
of women).  Using equity options as a recruitment motivator is not an option under Saudi 
law.  Labour supply is a major constraint for Saudi incubator startups.  In the UK, equity 
options are often used; for example, this is how Respondent-28 attracted ex-Schlumberger 
executive Leon Walker in 2003.  As economies develop and the middle-class professionals 
grow and diversity, it is expected as FreeSpace Manager, Abdul suggests (A/34/7) that 
business professionals become more available; a trend that should in future benefit KSA.  
However, at the moment labour supply, including experienced business mentors, is a major 
problem in KSA and significantly less so in the UK.  Generous benefits from a rentier state 
(see 9.16.2 below) coupled to low women’s startup, high emigration rate and workforce 
participation rates (section 9.16.3 below, add to KSA’s labour shortages. 
 
8.4.4 IP, legal issues and the regulatory environment 
 
Patenting and copyrighting are well-established legal processes in the UK, though costly 
and time-consuming, though many firms prefer time-to-market as protection and/or US 
patenting (since it is a large market example for pharmaceuticals or Respondent-28 
diagnostic equipment (section 7.4.4.1).  Speaking of IP, Respondent-23 a national level 
commercialisation policy maker says, The law is not well established or vague on this issue 
and there are grey areas  (A/16/8) in particular calling attention to disputes between 
individual researcher and university entity ownership of IP.  Without clear and enforceable 
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IP law, not only is defence against imitation difficult also it is attracting external investors 
becomes problematic.   
 
Too some western business eyes KSA corporate law seems idiosyncratic (its origins are 
French-Egyptian): VCs want to establish limited partnerships and operate with firms that 
can trade equity (against salary or further round investments) and very importantly to be 
exempt from capital gains tax on ‘star’ investments and thereby offset losses on failures.  
Legal services, such as establishing a company are ‘commodity’ services provided by UK 
incubators - it takes a hour online (section 7.4.4.2); business partners or larger incubating 
units (such as ERI) are also capable of documenting more complicated financial and equity 
ownership structures (Respondent-32, A/32/14).   
 
KSA law and regulatory environment contrasts unfavourably with those in the UK (or US 
or Germany) and are a constraint on commercialisation. 
 
8.4.5 Incubator governances  
 
Respondent-13, Manager of a KSA Incubation Unit outlines the Saudi strategy:  which is 
to develop research capability, purchase international patents and jointly work with 
international universities and companies to commercialise scientific knowledge in selected 
sectors into internationally competitive products using incubators attached to its best 
universities (A/13/1).  In both instances deep connections into university scientific formal 
research may be tenuous, though not for the most successful UK incubated companies such 
as Respondent-28.   
 
As sections 6.4.5.1 and 7.4.5.1 illustrate there are sharp differences in incubator centre 
governances, depicted in figure-8.1, which I summarise as in KSA being an add-on to the 
university and in the UK a bridge to business. 
 
8.4.6  SME governances during incubation 
 
The market oriented bridge-to-business culture in UK incubators focuses on individual 
entrepreneur (A/34/8) and the project – the business plan (A/28/4) for SMEs the 
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governances amount to active participation in action learning towards the goal of business 
launch (section 7.4.5.2).  Entrepreneurs in KSA incubators face exactly the same 
challenges to reach market and profitability, however as section 6.4.5.2 suggests legitimacy 
and resource assembly are closely inter-related.  Low business connectivity and absence of 
focus on markets, for some companies such as Respondent-4’s (A/4/14), means that lack 
of interest from capital providers and potential business partners is understandable; for 





Incubator management   Academics (A/17/7)  Business people (A/32/4) 
Entry  Idea stage (A/13/1)  Product stage (A/32/9) 
Activity  Programme orientation (A/13/13  Project-orientation (A/32/3) 
  Training (A/13/12) and then 
business planning 
 Business plan/project focus 
(A/33/12) 
  Length of stay flexible (A/18/3)  Time limited stay in incubation 
Links  Low business links (A/15/6; 
A/10/18) 
 Strong business links (A/33/15 
A/33/12) 
  Limited service connections 
(A/16/3 
 Strong service links (A/27/9) 
  Limited links to external capital 
(A/20/16) 
 Systematic pitches to external 
capital (A/33/2) 
Evaluation  No clear output KPIs (A/3/6 
A/15/5) 
 Internal and external KPIs and 
evaluation (A/33/3; A/34/11) 
 Could be stronger CBA (A/33/6; 
A/33/6) 
Culture  Limited business discipline 
(A/7/20) 
 Business discipline (A/34/4)  
  Add-on to the universities 
(A/3/19) 
 Bridge-to-business (A/35/3) 
 






8.4.7  Financial resource assembly 
 
Unless a startup can run on sweat equity or private resources it needs external capital from 
either friends and family or external investors (bank, VCs, Angels or crowd-funders).  
Assembling capital is therefore a test of how others view the legitimacy of the venture.  
Again there is a sharp contrast between the UK and KSA: though across the world 




Section 6.4.6 reveals the reluctance of Saudi banks to fund (loan, overdraft) startups and 
perhaps commercialisations under (unproven) academic governances.  This is a problem 
too in the UK, especially during recession, though most banks (Lloyds, TSB) have startup 
units.   
 
Both KSA and the UK Governments offer startup funding in the form of grants (UK Smart 
Awards or Kafalah funds in KSA; in the latter case personal guarantees may be called 
and/or equity stakes taken.  In exceptional circumstances incubators access their own funds 
– this was the case for Respondent-28 (A/33/2) and Hussein Al Alattar’s pre-seed funding 
grant (A/10/4). 
 
Funding risk is not new in KSA, as Hoyland (2015) notes, historically Arabian traders have 
funded trading caravans and new settlements.  From this perspective, the Prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH) and Meccan traders assembled financial resources to fund risk-
taking.  Private equity is relative new in KSA, though as Respondent-15 (A/15/4) reports 
there is a new Angel network in Tehran Valley.  Respondent-18 a commercialisation policy 
expert notes the absence of a VC culture (A/18/7) which in any case would require 
important changes to the law (A/20/16): understandably foreign VCs are not active in KSA 
(A/20/17) nor did any interviewee refer to corporate venturing funds by large KSA 
companies.  UK entrepreneurs in incubation regularly pitch to investors, often Angel funds 
and also Kickstarter (A/25/4) and VCs for larger ventures (A/31/2).   
 
The UK has several hybrid organisations funding business startups including the Corporate 
Venturing Scheme (c100 startups per year with c£30 million investment by 250 corporate 
venturers enjoying tax concessions) and the Princes Trust and Fund which each year help 
56,000 young people start businesses.  Given the predilection for online activities in KSA, 
an Arabic-language crowd-funder based in KSA might be successful. 
 




Both section 6.4.7 and 7.4.7 evidence risk-taking and leadership by Saudi and British 
entrepreneurs often relying on instinct (Respondent-6 A/6/3 is an example and investing 
heavily in an emotional journey (A/5/1).  Leading a startup, especially commercialisations 
facing technical and market risk involves multidisciplinary activity overcoming problems 
and barriers.  Both sections conclude that Saudi and UK entrepreneurs in a matter-of-fact 
manner get on with it.  
 
Whilst as figure 8.1 suggests the dominant culture in incubators is more business-focused 
in the UK, the leadership and risk-taking aspects of entrepreneurship are recognisable in 
both countries exemplified in similar fear-of-failure and TEA rates (GEM 2014); however, 
there are differences favouring commercialisation in the UK.  Institutional barriers and 
structures (law, tax, partners) are greater in KSA.  Given the availability of talent, the 
distributed-leadership model (recruiting and empowering staff) works well in the UK 
(Respondent-28).  Risk assessment for UK and KSA incubators is a vital part of business 
planning.  UK entrepreneurs have an advantage in risk mitigation since risk syndication 
whilst not reduced per se by syndication (only its consequences), but is reduced where the 
syndicators bring expertise or network connections (international, business and capital 
section links): much more likely for UK than Saudi entrepreneurs.   
 
8.4.9  Knowledge flows and distribution  
 
Section 6.4.8 and 7.4.8 explore in practical terms the types and effects of knowledge flows 
on companies incubation the commercialisation of knowledge in KSA and the UK.  Taking 
R&D to include recombining or redesigning existing knowledge into new product 
(including service) solutions, section 6.4.8.1 indicates that most of the Saudi entrepreneurs 
have and are undertaking R&D.  The same is true in the UK except it is endogenously-
generated knowledge from basic or applied research that features in the entrepreneurs’ 
R&D – the knowledge is deeper (section 7.4.8.1).  Whilst amongst student entrepreneurs 
in the UK similar tacit knowledge is referenced to that used by Saudi entrepreneurs, 
amongst staff entrepreneurs (Respondent-28) like Respondent-9 (who is doing applied 
research on ultrasonics jointly with a company in Belarus) the knowledge is more formal.  
UK researchers are often part of international teams, with the Respondent-9 exception, 
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none of the Saudi entrepreneurs are and none use the (paid-for) technology transfer patents 
or cite imported researchers.  In the UK, it is commercialisation staff rather than researchers 
who seek international opportunities to exploit research.  Sections above (8.4.5 to 8.4.8) 
show that formal and informal knowledge flows between entrepreneurs and existing 
businesses are stronger in the UK than in KSA. 
 
8.5  The results of commercialisation: outcomes and outputs 
 
Section 7.5.1 indicates the important yet limited impact of university commercialisations 
in Scotland citing the Biggar Report (2012) and evaluations by the University, Scottish 
Enterprise and the Royal Society of Edinburgh.  For both Cambridge and Edinburgh 
enhancing commercialisation outcomes depends crucially on removing barriers and 
inducing a stronger culture supportive of commercialisation amongst university 
researchers.  Respondent-20 sees a similar cultural change as crucial in KSA by (A/20/4).  
For now, Edinburgh University is able to spinout some 35 companies a year (A/33/9).  
 
Whilst the UK’s capabilities attract some 324 international R&D investments each year 
UK in 2014 (UKTI 2014), some of which are with UK universities, KSA is just starting on 
this track setting targets in the 9th Five Year Plan and introducing 14 MNC R&D projects 
at Tehran Valley in 2014.  While Respondent-17 Manager of an incubation network says 
there is a whole range of KPIs (A/17/4), Respondent-20 of KACST says, I don’t remember 
that they have done any evaluation (A/20/3).  Section 6.5.2 concludes that there is no 
systematic public monitoring and evaluation of either the outcomes or outputs of Saudi’s 
incubators and commercialisation networks.  There may be private evaluations.  As noted 
above, many public evaluations of commercialisation and university incubators are 
available in the UK, however, these ex clude detailed cost-benefit analysis of outputs and 
(as far as I am aware) there are no follow-up studies of incubated companies – particularly 
important given the high death-rate for startups.    
 




Figure 8.2 summarises the results of my cross-case analysis, again structured by the themes 
derived from my literature review and embedded in my initial framework (shown in figure 
4.1).  
 
Figure-8.2 illustrates deep institutional and cultural factors restraining KSA’s 
commercialisation (and diversification) activities.  Evolution of these institutions took 
almost a century in the UK’s case and only slightly less for the US.  Asian economies using 
the development state model have shown how these timescales can be truncated into two 
decades, provided that the state leadership empowers expert bureaucracy, oriented towards 
export-led industries and is directive of R&D efforts that combine business acumen with 
deepening university research and absorptive capacity, all informed by a shared vision of 
national destiny behind which key agents enrol.  It is to discussion associated with these 
ideas from previous research and others that I now turn to in Chapter-9 which draws 










CHAPTER-9   ANALYSIS AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT   
 
9.1  Introduction 
 
Here I reintegrate an analysis of my data with previous research literature, answering the 
three research questions set out in section 5.4 and indicating the theoretical contribution 
worthy of publication made in this research.    
 
My research design uses Charmaz’s (2006) constructed grounded theory, as part of which 
I presented a provisional analytical framework in figure-4.1, which I am now able to revise 
in the light of evidence gathered and interpreted.  Themes from my initial framework 
structure this chapter, as they have my previous data presentation and in-case analysis 
chapters: institutions.  I approach these themes using an out-to-in perspective, triangulating 
between (a) what previous research leads me to expect, (b) what I actually found 
empirically, and (c) the sense I make of what I have found and how it can contribute to the 
development of knowledge in the area of commercialisation in oil-rich developing 
economies. 
 
The major narratives emerging from my research in relation to KSA’s commercialisation 
appear in my initial framework and are made visible by my decision to contrast 
commercialisation process in KSA with those in the UK.  To illustrate, institutional 
thickness is a major theme from the grounded data and figure-4.1 begins by highlighting 
its importance as a theme.  The inter-relationship between state, universities and business 
(including Triple Helix) jumps out of my research as a major theme and is embedded in 
the figure 4.1 framework in terms of development state characteristics and knowledge-
based economy, each of which is then disaggregated into commercialisation inputs and 
processes.  Another major theme prominent in the research is support for entrepreneurs, 
including funding (and the associated questions of risk, exit, IP law and business 
governance law).  This too features strongly in my figure-4.1 framework and under the 
heading of enablers and barriers too are disaggregated into sub-themes.  In short, I am 
satisfied that my initial framework, derived from the literature review, has given useful 
 
 254 
structure to my thinking and subsequently to data gathering (chapter-5), data presentations 
(chapters 6 and 7) and my cross-case analysis in chapter-8.  Figure-9.1 details the structure 
of this chapter based as is shown on major and sub-themes derived from my literature 
review (chapters-2 and 3), initial framework (chapter-4), and in-case analysis (chapter-8 









My analysis chapter flows towards section 9.6 answering my research questions and 
section 9.7 pulling together my theoretical contribution; part of which is revising my initial 
framework into a final version.  Overall, as figure 8.2 revealed, KSA faces long-term, deep 
institutional and cultural challenges if it is to successfully diversify from oil dependency.  
A good start has been made with Vision 2030 receiving wide distribution and acceptance 
(as an idea if not always in practice) and substantial investment in the infrastructure 
network that includes university-based incubators, university research departments and 
enablement of non-oil business and research networking.   
 
UK experience suggests that some areas of commercialisation are more prone to success 
than others.  In Edinburgh Veterinary Science, Biotechnology Artificial Intelligence and 
Medicine (with to some extent Electrical Engineering) are successful; in Cambridge 
Biotechnology, Software (games and security), Engineering and Finance are prominent 
successful commercialisation sectors.  In KSA, one could point to great success in oil and 
gas extraction, refining and logistics and to the important religious tourism sector.  Two 
points follow.  UK’s successes are in areas involving formal knowledge cumulation, which 
builds upon years of basic and applied research – in short these sectors could only 
unfavourably compare with KSA commercialisations.  Cross-sector comparisons are 
therefore difficult between countries.  An added complication is the gap between policy 
announcements, particular in KSA and practical effort and achievement.   I therefore begin 
this analysis chapter with a short section on the policy/practice gaps, focusing on the 
persistence of the gaps in KSA. 
 
 
Risk and mitigations during analysis 
There are main four dangers facing this analysis.  Firstly, it is clear that ‘culture’ is an 
important explanation of actions within each country and of differences between 
commercialisation activities between KSA and the UK.  Following Dretske (1981) and 
Douglas (1987), my concern is not to reify culture – ending as a non-explanation.  Instead, 
each section seeks to identify the origin, continuity and change in cultural predispositions 
– in short what active agents can do to alter negative aspects of culture.  Since the 
institutions I reference are nested, I continually switch between units of analysis, returning 
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always to the level of the firm.  The second danger inherent in all cross-country 
comparisons (Browaeys and Price 2008), especially those between a developing and 
developed economy and society is otherisation (Jackson and Gozdecka 2011): stereotyping 
one is all good or bad.  Grounding in evidence and literature helps avoid this danger, as 
does an honest approach (Bulmer 1969) to accepting differences in stage of development, 
morès and goals.  A third danger is relativism: things are different, but it does not matter 
since there is no one-best-way and all solutions are equally valid.  This is unlikely to be the 
judgement of international markets in goods, capital, labour and knowledge: best practice 
may be a chimera; nevertheless for KSA (and the UK) better practice at commercialisation 
is essential.  I am a commercialisation practitioner in KSA and wish the best for my 
country.  A fourth danger is loss of focus, which I address by structuring my analysis to 
answer the research questions posed seeking every lesson possible to support Saudi 
Arabia’s future. 
 
9.2  Policy, perceptions and practice on commercialisation in KSA 
 
Only as institutions mature and a coherent and accepted vision of national destiny is 
communicated and accepted can the gap between policy and actual practice narrow.  As a 
state in transition from oil-dependency, bridging the policy/practice gap takes time, since 
for example the urgency of national renewal experienced in Japan (1945) and China (1949).  
Instead, as 9.2 illustrates, KSA has in part become enculturated into a rentier mentality, 
enjoying soft incomes from oil: at national and local implementation levels the gaps 
between how selected policies are perceived in KSA and their delivery in practice.  These 
policy/practice gaps are not selected to portray KSA negatively, rather to acknowledge that 
in practice gaps exist and need to be discussed and addressed in order to bridge the 
perceptions/reality gap.  
 
9.3  Theme-1: Institutions, culture and the developing economy 
 
Figure-9.3 summarises with reference to literature and data sections four of the main sub-
themes arising in my research of how institution and culture in KSA are influencing 
commercialisation.  Perhaps understandably, policy documents such as Vision 2030 make 
no mention of such problematic areas.  In this section I triangulate between these issues, 
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my data and my interpretation in order to paint a picture of the thematic interaction between 
institutions, culture and commercialisation in KSA. 
 
Policy Perceptions  Actual practice in KSA 
Vision 2030: diversification via 
commercialisation to achieve 
modernisation without 
westernisation 
The National (020617) survey 
suggests that 58% of Saudi 
Executives strongly support 
Vision 2030, another 34% agree, 
only 8% say outlook unchanged. 
Unclear yet if the population as a 
whole buy into the strategy, 
especially young people and 
those comfortable with rentier 
incomes (Ulrichsen 2011) 
Saudisation: to increase private 
sector employment eradicating 
rentier mentality  
Bloomberg (2016) suggests oil-
dependency culture remains 
strong 
Still only 15% of the roles are 
occupied by Saudis: young 
people prefer Government or 
large foreign company jobs 
Vision 2030 targets a range of 
knowledge-based sectors  
UK Government (2017) suggests 
KSA is targeting petrochemicals, 
auto-assembly and 
biotechnology  
Incubators not yet focusing on 
innovative and exportable 
products (section A/23) 
Vision 2030 views KSA as 
knowledge and business portal 
for GCC economy  
UN (2011) says KSA ICT 
infrastructure capable of GCC 
leadership 
A/20 acknowledges GCC 
struggles to internationalise 
SMEs 
The last ten five-year plans in 
KSA have promoted 
diversification from oil 
View expressed by interviewees 
and promulgated in policy 
documents  
Albassam (2015) and others 
conclude that little progress has 
been made in 40 years 
Vision 2030 emphasises 
vocational education and 
training 
Major investment in education 
eg 110,000 Saudis studying 
abroad 
Universities and young people 
remain averse to vocational 
education  
Risk capital KASCT (2014) and A/3 says 
risk capital available 
A/5, A/6, A/7 A/20 say risk 
captial not available. 
banks 
Successful TT and 
commercialisation  
Vision 2030 says TT and 
commercialisation a success  




Figure-9.2: KSA policy perceptions and practice 
 
 
Key sub-themes Literature 
section 
Example authors Data section 
Meta institutions – 
monarchy and Islam - 
conservative 
1.1 Abu Hakima 1967  
Abdullah (1995)  
6 (introduction); 
6.2.2.1 
Islam inhibits innovation 1.6 Huntington 1996;  
Aury (1997; 2001) 
6.2; 6.2.3.4  








Perestroika without glasnost 
- restructuring without 
openness 
2.3 North (1990, 1999, 2009);  
Porter (2009) 
6 (introduction) and 
6.3 
 




9.3.1  Meta institutions in Saudi Arabia 
 
The dominant discourse in the literature (section 2.3) suggests that transition from a rentier 
state (Beblawi 1990) follows North (2007) and Rosenberg and Birdzell’s (1986) prescribed 
route, perhaps employing Bouckaert’s (2007) bureaupreneurship model of property 
transfer.  Other prominent western scholars similarly conclude that KSA cannot 
successfully transition, including Pappas (2003); Peters, Rice, and Sundararajan (2004); 
Volkmann (2004); Lalkaka (2006); and, Alshumaimri, Aldridge and Audretsch (2010).   
 
The central point in Vision 2030 is that KSA can modernise without westernising – use its 
oil wealth to import and commercialisation (largely US) technology, creating a successful 
knowledge-based economy by 2030 joining the top-15 (by GDP) economies, while 
retaining institutions such as an absolute monarchy and strict Islamic social morès.  
Technological diversification using oil revenue investment being the key strategy, KSA is 
now using King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) to promote 200 
R&D units, 2,500 projects and network of incubators and case-based research applauds 
achievements in emerging technological sectors for example Al-Kibbi (2002); Al-Kurdi 
(2002); Ramady (2005), and Al-Thawwad (2008). 
 
Is it possible that North is wrong?  Japan, Korea and Taiwan using US technology transfer 
(TT) built successful economies with without democratic institutions.  China’s growth uses 
a Beijing-model at variance with the Washington consensus.  Are authors such as Pack 
(2008) wrong to suggest that Arab economies are incompatible with knowledge-based 
growth achieved by commercialising transferred technologies?  Alternatively, is Rodik 
(2011) correct arguing that of globalising economy, national sovereignty and democracy; 
only two out of three are possible?   
 
Many people in KSA believe they can successfully modernise without adopting the western 
institutional framework, that democracy is unnecessary – these ideas link closely with 
debate on national systems and the development state in following sections.   Here I explore 
three dimensions of this debate: does Islam inhibit innovation, does Saudi culture suppress 
entrepreneurship and can rapid economic development occur (as Rodik [2011] and others 
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suggest) without open democratic institutions?  As figure-4.1 indicates since these issues 
significantly influence commercialisation, they are of great importance to my research. 
 
9.3.2  Islam inhibits innovation? 
 
A brief examination of the arguments shows the fallacy of suggesting that Islam necessarily 
inhibits innovation as Huntington (1996) argues since non-Arabic Muslim countries in the 
past (textiles in northern India and early-19th century Egypt) and currently (Turkey, 
Kazakhstan and Xinjiang in China) are innovative.  One in 40 of the four million US 
Muslims run a business.  Historically the Arab Muslim enlightenment in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries made important contributions to world culture as discussed classically 
by Robinson (1996) and more recently by Beckwith (2009), Lapidus (2012), Alkhateeb 
(2014) and Frankopan (2015).   
 
KSA today has 17 companies on the Forbes-2000 global list (US$567.8 billion in assets), 
compared to 56 India (50 times the size).  No single interviewee, two-thirds of whom had 
studied aboard referred at any point to Islam constraining technological innovation; though 
I acknowledge with Lewis (2011) that invisible cultural influences are difficult to recognise 
and that a central precept of Islam is opposing innovation in religion, a cultural trait to 
which I now turn.  I conclude that strategy documents, such as Vision 2030 are correct to 
assume that there is no intrinsic inhibition in Islam to entrepreneurs and innovation a point 
twelve of the KSA interviewees endorse. 
 
9.3.3  Saudi cultural traits inhibiting entrepreneurship 
 
Figure 9.4 summarises some of the cultural traits potentially impacting on KSA innovation 
and entrepreneurship.  There are of course positive traits in the Saudi culture supporting 
entrepreneurship, in particular traditional trading culture, commitment to family and family 
businesses, and friendship with non-Saudis are important.  There are also important sub-
cultures in KSA that may negatively effect innovation and entrepreneurship, including the 
following list. 
 
 A privileged military (10.7% of GDP and 300,000 staff) often deploying advanced US 
equipment, though with no evidence of knowledge spillover. 
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 Shī’a minority (15% of population): religion/state identify clash; periodic clashes 
 4,000 Mutaween (religious police) resentment and periodic protest 
 Travel or brain drain (10,000 emigrants per year) 
 
Institutions and cultural traits Possible effect on innovation and entrepreneurship 
 Absolute monarchy: centralised 
and top-down control 
 Lack of experimentation and localised innovative  
 Few hybrid organisational forms 
 Islamic religious dominance  Against innovation  
 Early Medina ideal –looking back not forward 
 Resource-richness and largess  Welfare alternative to business startup 
 Import alternative to productivity rises (e.g. agriculture in 
Africa because there is no alternative) 
 Guardianship of women  Low workforce participation 
 Low business startup rate 
 US technology transfer  Suppresses indigenous innovation with limited spillover and 
adaptive commercialisation  
 Youth lack of work ethic  Low young person business startup 
 Welfare dependency 
 Never-ending education  
 Quota of Saudi employees for existing businesses 
 Formalistic education   Inactive pedagogy 
 Weak UIL and entrepreneurship education  
 
Figure 9.4: KSA institutions and cultural traits  
possibly effecting entrepreneurship and innovation 
 
9.3.4  Perestroika without glasnost i.e. restructuring without openness 
 
North et al (2009) insists that without an open society (western democratic institutions) 
economies fail to modernise, despite the experience to the contrary in development states 
such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and now China.  Section 8.1 sets out the major institutional 
arrangements in KSA: it is an absolute monarchy, compacted with Islam (Madelung 1997; 
Alkhateeb 2014), with a low women’s participation rate in employment and business start 
up and significant brain drain.  These arrangements mean that commercialisation (and all 
other) initiatives are centrally and top-down directed, careful not to challenge these meta-
institutions.  Though historically a trading nation, since the advent of oil and US alliance 
(Anderson 1981; Grayson 1982) traditional gift-giving to maintain loyalty and legitimacy 
has is now pervasive adding to a reluctance to embrace industrialisation and modernisation.   
 
KSA’s culture disincentivises risk taking as a result of (a) ambitions being limited to 
Government sinecure jobs, unending education or simply welfare benefits; (b) 
disparagement of employment in SMEs relative to large companies; and (c) reluctance to 
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experiment with hybrid organisational forms and new ideas.  The economy appears stuck 
in oil, finance and religious (and now health) tourism.   
 
Economic historians such as Mokyr (1990) and Landes (1998) make the point that 
centralised politico-economic systems do badly because experimental are discouraged: 
there is no bottom-up pressure for change out of fear of offending the centre.  Put another 
way, by Bowles and Edwards (1993) patterns of consumption and products must align: 
glasnost and perestroika are twins.  Figure-4.1 captures this interaction by ‘nesting’ levels 
of institutions since as Bourdieu (1984) makes clear, most people inhabit several habituses 
and are likely therefore to hold conflicting values.  Whilst RQ-2 invites conclusions 
identifying hegemonic values, the world of practice will always be more nuanced.   
 
9.3.5  An Arabic development state model? 
 
Here I argue that the state needs to play a central role in directing KSA’s move towards 
diversification into a more knowledge-based economy and cannot afford to leave 
development issues simply to market forces.   Neither KSA nor the UK is a development 
state.  My argument in section 2.4 is that envisioning itself as a DS may be the best strategic 
outlook for KSA, since its strategy of modernisation without westernisation disavows the 
Washington model, implicit in North’s insistence of adopting US-style democratic and 
social institutions and finds little and as my analysis shows the associated ideas of the TH 
and innovation systems remain a future project for KSA.  Of course, KSA is highly unlikely 
to adapt the Beijing-consensus, in the form of single (communist) party leadership; other 
characteristics however (see figure-9.5) may prove important. 
 
I note that despite numerous differences between interviewees (on policies such as 
incubator management, provision of risk capital and purchase of TT), there is no difference 
on the need for radical institutional change, whereas UK interviewees are more sanguine 




Example authors Data section 
Advantages of catch-up in 












Pempel (1999) 7.2.2.1 
8.2.2.1  




A national vision? 2.10.3, 
appendix 2 
Pempel (1999)  
Vogel (2011) 
8.2.2.3  
Stability and innovation 
incentives 
2.3 Bellin (2004) 6.2.2.5; 7.2.2.5; 
8.2.2.4 & 8.2.2.5  
KSA can be a DS? 2.4.2 Gap in literature   
 
Figure 9.5: main issues from literature and data on KSA as a development state 
 
Catch-up economies traditionally seek to slowly climb the international value tree, often 
beginning with labour-intensive manufacturing (textiles), migrating to advanced assembly 
(cars, chips, televisions, mobiles) and only then growing from small seeds incursions into 
emerging sectors; in KSA’s case, access to US TT and oil-wealth offer alternative growth 
paths (Brett 2009).   
 
As section 8.2.2.1 notes, the UK sees itself as migrating from a value-distributing welfare 
state into a neo-liberal value-creating state; focusing state spending and tax concessions on 
wealth creation.  Since its foundation, KSA has been a value-distributing state (first the 
zakat and later oil revenues); section 6.2.2.1 suggests value-distribution remains important 
in retaining legitimacy and social stability, whilst there is resentment at largess to the Saud 
family princes.  Mazzucato’s (2013) point is that all successfully developed economies 
have benefited from state interventions, hence discussion on the development state 
strategy.  
 
The point about a DS’s expert bureaucracy is that it places (contested) scarce resources at 
point that make a difference to strategy implementation.  For example MITI decided on 
technology targets and then enforced business-to-business and university-to-business R&D 
joint projects, afterwards allowing competition in sales.  Similarly, China’s TVEs, SEZs 
and SOEs became hybrid, semi-state (bureaupreneurship, Bouckaert 2007) organisations.  
Section 8.2.2.2 shows successful commercialisation in the UK guided by similar hybrid 
organisations, increasingly led by expert business people (as are most PPPs).  In KSA 
(section 6.2.2.2) this is not the case: for example academics lead incubators (Respondent-
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14 A/14/14) and he says, dull economists lead economic policy-making: centralised control 
inhibits governance hybridity and experimentation. 
 
As section 8.2.2.3 notes, the UK has a self-confident vision of itself as a knowledge-based 
economy (see Respondent-35, 7.2.2.3).  There are issues with this, for example the social 
exclusion of less educated people threatened by globalisation and the extent to which elite 
groups (such as university researchers) accept the vision when it requires change to their 
own practice.  KSA too have a knowledge-based vision of the future, it its case under the 
umbrella of monarchy, Islam and rejection of western cultural values.  If this vision is 
accepted by KSA citizens, who is to say its not a good vision.  This is Respondent-16 
(A/16/4) point.  Without a shared (national) goal, it is unlikely that individuals and 
communities will sacrifice now, for future benefit.   
 
Section 8.2.2.5 argues discerns fragility from exogenous shocks facing both the UK and 
KSA, further whilst at first sight KSA faces more internal instability (governance 
transitions, minorities, position of women) the UK too has uncertainties (Scottish 
independent, north-south divide, social exclusion).  Change and stability oscillate 
everywhere.  What is different (section 8.2.2.3), are incentives to innovation; later sections 
(8.2.3.2, 8.3.3 and 8.2.3.4) show many of these (law, tax policy) to be structural.  The 
culture of entrepreneurship problem faces difficulties in both countries; the larger research 
base in the UK, however, produces more commercialisations.   
 
One aspect (particularly of the Chinese) DS approach is evolution and context.  Deng 
Xiaoping (Vogel 2011) famously implemented his modernising vision by metaphorically 
stepping on stones to cross a stream; in short by opportunistic experimentation.  It may be 
that improving KSA’s commercialisation activities (RQ-3) a degree of trial and error is 
necessary.  Certainly, my framework (figure 4.1) should not be deterministically 
interpreted; rather drivers, inputs and processes should iteratively interact to settle on best 
ways (to commercialise) in the Saudi context. 
 




KSA’s meta institutions, including Government structure, Islam, Saudi culture and its 
strategy of modernisation without westernisation (Vision 2030) are inhibiting the rapid 
commercialisation is knowledge-based technologies.  In particular the Saudi gift-giving 
culture with associated clientism and favouring friends and family in appointments when 
coupled with vast flows of oil revenue have created a rentier mentality eschewing 
entrepreneurship.  Simply opening up labour markets and company formation to market 
forces is likely to lead to regime instability and to spread to the existing successful KSA 
sectors (oil, gas, finance and tourism).  My argument is that the state’s role in institutional 
and cultural renewal is pivotal.  An Arabic version of Chalmer’s (1982) development state 
thesis to overcome the burden of (institutional) backwardness mobilised around a national 
destiny vision and with an expert bureaucracy leading economic development, may be an 
alternative.  A major contribution of this research to theorisations of Arab economic 
development is therefore the idea of an Arab Development State as a vehicle to deliver 
modernisation without westernisation.   
 
9.4  Theme-2: the triple helix and systems of innovation  
 
Here I argue that that Triple Helix (TH) is not functioning in KSA (indeed it operates 
ineffectively in the UK) and because of KSA’s ‘thin’ institutions.  I show that despite 
frequent references to the TH idea in policy documents and by practitioners, shallow 
university-industry linkages, absence of basic research migrating into marketable 
commodities and low levels of academic entrepreneurship negate any suggestion of the TH 
operating in KSA.  I also show that despite the idea the sector focus, deliberately creating 
ecosystems commercialising knowledge in software, logistics and life-sciences, these have 
yet to take root in KSA, which unlike the UK has been unable to create successful clusters 
around its leading research universities.  Theoretically, I challenge the usefulness of TH 
theory, arguing that it is at best a metaphor.  Unpacking the idea of knowledge-based 
development, I argue that KSA’s knowledge conduits as presently constituted are incapable 
of building the endogenous knowledge base necessary to fulfil Vision 2030 pointing to 
strategic and operational ways in which this could improve.  Creating this national vision, 
trust in an expert bureaucracy and in doing so recapturing the Saudi work ethic from oil 




9.4.1  Operation of the triple helix 
 
Drawing upon the literature discussion in sections 1.2 and 2.7, figure 9.6 highlights on-





Example authors Data sections 
KSA NSI lacks institutional 
thickness and clustering 
1.2 Porter (1990; 2009) 6.2.1.1 
Is TH more than metaphor; 
can it be found anywhere? 





Figure 9.6: Main arguments from literature review on NSI and triple helix 
 
Porter’s (2009) conclusion (section 6.2.1.1) that KSA’s NSI lacks institutional thickness 
and effective clustering is confirmed by my data.  Respondent-18 (A/18) for example 
confirms this, pointing however to only ten years of policy initiatives in KSA trying to 
thicken institutions and create clusters and suggesting that in ten years time the picture may 
be different.  However, the failure of TH theorists to develop a clear policy initiatives is 
reflected both in the difficulties both the UK and US face in embedding commercialisation 
into universities and the wide range of suggestions for institutional change analyses suggest 
for KSA. 
 
Similar theoretical issues face triple helix theory (sections 2.7) of the literature review.  
Data sections 7.2.1.3 and 8.2.1.3 support Said’s (2004) argument (section 1.5) that the idea 
of a TH is simply inappropriate to economies/societies in the processes of institutional 
development to support commercialisation (see also 2.5 on universities).  My argument 
that TH is best seen as a metaphor, rather then robust theory of policy-guide even in 
developed economies is supported Respondent-33 Bioquarter Director, (A/33/13) and 
Respondent-35 Policy expert and UK incubation manager (A/35/6).  This develops the 
critique of TH mounted by Mowery and Sampat (2004).  In both countries Government, 
business and universities working closer to support commercialisation is clearly desirable, 
beyond that it is not clear what TH theory adds, as Respondent-7 (A/16/1) suggests.  
Various quadruple helices have been suggested (section 2.7.1), no data from either country 
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suggests such theoretical innovations will overcome its lack of focus.  My study joins those 
mentioned in section 2.7.2 finding insufficient evidence for the operation of a triple helix, 
especially as Balzat and Hanusch (2004) argue in developing economies. 
 
Section 8.2.3.4 comparing SWOTs, shows the both the UK and KSA face external threats 
and opportunities, in particular the UK’s role in international knowledge flows (inward 
R&D investment and university links) is an important opportunity.  Although there is 
discontent in the UK about its national vision as a knowledge-based economy (from lower 
skilled groups threatened by globalisation and impoverished by negative wealth 
redistribution) the vision dominates policy.  In KSA there is no clear dominant vision of 
what the country will be famous for in 25-years time.  In terms of figure-4.1, there is a 
dissonance between economy and society in KSA: a point to which I return in my 
conclusions chapter.   
 
9.4.2  Universities and university-industry links 
 
The arguments and gaps in research I identified are shown in figure-9.7.  Note, I discuss 
absorptive capacity below in section 9.15. 
 
Problem-centred learning inculcates the skills and confidence to solve individual, social 
and business problems after graduation.  As Roy (1992) and Kahn (2011) establish, 
university education in KSA does not use action-based pedagogy, rather the default is rote 
and passive learning (see section 6).  Indeed, every KSA university student must attend 
Qu’ran by rote learning classes, as the Chronicle for Education (2011) notes, this pedagogy 
does not deliver marketable skills or capacity for innovation and entrepreneurship.  UK 






Example authors Data sections 
Rote learning pedagogy  1.2; 2.1 Roy (1992) 
Kahn (2011) 
6 




Giroux (2006)  8.2.1.2 
8.2.2.2 and 8.2.4 
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Providing human capital 1.6 
2.5.3 
3.9 
Gaspar and Glaeser (1998); Kim 
(2000); Ramady (2010) and Jordan 
(2011) 
8.2.3.4  
8.24, 8.35 and 8.4.
  
Business engagement 2.5.3 Siegel (2006) 
Lecuyer (2006) 
8.3.2; 8.33, 8.4.8, 
A/15/6 and A/10/18 
Building absorptive 





Verspagen (1993); Kinder (2002); 
Etzkowitz (2000) and 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990 
8.3.3 
 
Figure 9.7: Arguments and data on university-industry links 
 
 
Whilst authors such as Giroux (2006), as section 9.2.3 above notes, DSs marshal scare 
R&D resources by directing university research fields, privileging applied research and 
insisting on partnerships with business.  Clearly, there are balances here beyond research 
agendas, with universities often playing a critical-friend role in social disputes and 
defending free speech and supporting only applied research may not prove attractive to 
foreign researchers.   
 
As the researchers in figure 9.5 emphasise providing high-level human capital is a critical 
contribution of universities in developing economies.  Section 8.4.3 notes that labour 
supply is a major constraint in KSA but not in the UK.  Not because UK universities are 
perfect but better.  Also, UK firms expect to train and invest (especially online training). 
 
Saudi students following medical, engineering and business courses in the US and UK are 
often surprise at the degree of business engagement such as speakers, live case studies, 
business-based projects, internships and general engagement with business; this can be 
especially so in medical, engineering and informatics schools. 
 
Whilst UK UIL is imperfect, in KSA it is at early stages and a major constraint on 
commercialisation and (as I shall argue below) on university reform. 
 
9.4.3  SSIs: active agency and knowledge spillovers 
 
Effective SSI’s feature beneficial knowledge flows and a leadership (however informal) 
able to align innovations with market potential exploiting untraded interdependencies 
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(section 2.6.2).  In practical terms, these may include a supply or specialist labour, access 
to specialist professional services and most importantly knowledge spillovers stimulating 
innovation as a result of social interactions in an environment purposively seeking 
innovation.  Whilst Respondent-15, a Science Park Manager mentions SSI activity in the 
oil industry (A/15/1) the only SSIs around commercialisation of university research in KSA 
is to be found in the 5-year Plan i.e. in intentions such as the Badir network of incubators 
and Tehran Valley.  As section 8.2.1.2 reveals, far from untraded interdependencies, I 
found little evidence of cooperation between incubation centres or their staff.  There is 
simply not sufficient throughput to create knowledge flows and spillovers.  This is not so 
in the UK, where software is a recognisable SSI around Cambridge (A/34/9) and bio-
medical in Edinburgh (7.2.1.2).   KSA now has high quality infrastructure in which to 
locate clustered sectors, the challenge now is the human, social and knowledge flow 
dimensions of SSI-building.  This will be helped by knowledge sharing between science 
parks and universities. 
 
9.4.4  Knowledge and learning and the knowledge-based economy 
 
I find much of the business literature on learning (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995 is an 
example) frustratingly fails to differentiate the (often passive) management of knowledge 
from active learning of new knowledge.  Here I adopt a synthesis of active learning and 
business development theory; figure-9.8 summarises my theoretical arguments and data on 
which I draw.   
 
The important of active learning from a Vygotskian perspective (section 2.1) is that TT is 
never passive; technologies are always adapted to suit a new heritage, sense-making or 
challenges.  Additionally, as section 1.5 notes, knowledge transfer always requires re-




Example authors Data section 
Active learning not passive 
knowledge needed to 
transfer and adapt 
technologies 
2.1 Vygotsky (1934) 
Engeström (1987) 




Knowledge acquisition in 
TT non-linear, cultural 
issues 
1.5 Lewis (2007) 8.3.3 
Active agency rather than 
artefacts transfer and 














Pisano (1997 and 2006) 8.2.4 
8.2.1.1 
Meaning of KBE socially 
negotiated in context 
2.2.1 Boyer (1988 1990; 1996) 8.1 
 
Figure 9.8: arguments and data on knowledge and knowledge-based economy 
 
Data sections 6.2.4 and 7.2.4 show Saudi and British incubating entrepreneurs using 
knowledge transferred from aboard (mostly tacit and recombinations) in their product 
development.  Only the largest commercialisations (Respondent-28; Respondent-9) 
systematically use formal scientific knowledge transferred across international borders, 
which they adapt to constitute a new product.  Saudi and UK policy should differentiate 
between supporting commercialisations capable of significant growth, compared to those 
with less potential (the former often embedding formal knowledge).  Theoretically, 
conceptualising startup as a process of active learning importantly challenges more passive 
knowledge-management perspectives. 
 
Section 1.5 makes the point that all technology transfers are non-linear: the outcomes are 
unforeseen in their impact on society or the innovation ecosystem (Chang 1995).  As 
evidence in 8.3.3 shows, this is rarely as a result of entrepreneurs mining home university 
research, though for UK researchers and entrepreneurs outcomes may be the result of 
interactions with international company resources.  Cultural differences can give products 
new meanings and uses, such as Respondent-8 CEO of a recycling company says idea of 
processing date palm oil from waste from Indonesian.  Chesborough’s (2011) work on open 
innovation and Kinder’s (2004) critique of closed project management approaches 
underline the importance of non-linearity.  The management of startups as a project is then 
a matter of balanced judgement: sufficient discipline to move the project forward coupled 
to the flexibility open innovation demands.  This is a further policy reason for placing 




In a field of research such as innovation shaped by crossing cultures or systems (national 
or sectoral) there is always a danger of determinism: the view that other pathways could 
not have been followed (Rosenberg 1982).  Hence sections 2.1 and 2.6 in the review of 
previous research contests theorisations that insufficiently allow for active agency; an 
example being Breschi and Malerba (1997), favouring instead) idea of agents and 
institutions mutually interacting and shaping and  
 
The entrepreneurial journeys cited in chapters six and seven vindicate a non-deterministic 
view of TT in which agency is important (Archer 1996) and Ogle’s (2008) notion of ideas 
space, illustrating with many examples entrepreneurs creating new products for their target 
context/market – Respondent-9 is a good example.  Innovation and entrepreneurship are 
always social activities performed by individuals who learn; take risks, which is why figure 
4.1 gives prominence to active agency. 
 
Many innovation theorists, such as Saha et al (2004) conflate new economy or knowledge-
based economy with the use of ICT.  Leaving aside the point that PCs, Internet and 
databases are now mature rather than new technologies, section 2.2 argues that this view 
distracts attention from the main point – made by Pisano (1997) – that if there is a new 
wave of innovation, it is not limited to a particular technology, rather it is the result of a 
shortening timeframe between scientific discovery and technological exploitation as 
internationally competitive products.  As section 8.2.4 illustrates, this can be the result of 
universities doing applied research (often with industrial partners), refocusing away from 
the next important basic research issue, towards applications.  As 8.2.1.1 shows, shortening 
knowledge gaps is less likely in KSA where joint projects with foreign international 
companies are fewer and since research projects are more centrally determined.  
Theoretically and in policy-making clarity of terms and objectives is important: sadly too 
many development strategies loosely use terms, building houses on sand. 
 
In section 2.2.1, I emphasise Boyer’s (1988) point that in sustainable economies, 
consumption modes (including culture, human relations) must align with regime of 
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production.  This point is reinforced by economic development consultant reports that 
invariable suggest adopting the same target technologies everywhere, regardless of heritage 
and capability.  Boyer’s point is that comparative advantage based on knowledge resources 
differentiates rather than homogenises.  We see KSA variously committing to biomedical, 
software, green technology and biotechnology (7.2.1.2) and advanced manufacturing 
(A/16/4) and downstream oil, healthcare and financial services (section 6.4.8.3).  
Insufficient attention is paid in KSA to what its knowledge-based economy should look 
like: its strategic gaols for 25-years hence.  By contrast, the UK has no industrial strategy 
and Innovate UK (7.2.2.3) aims to amplify successful research in whatever field it occurs.  
This alignment between changing society and changing economy is a central point of this 
research – change is harmonious or conflictual.  In the UK, many people who’s jobs have 
disappeared or been restructured resent the change over the last 40 years, that has 
undoubtedly benefited the majority.  For KSA, the next 25-years seeking to diversity its 
economy is likely to be equally problematic.   
 
9.4.5 Summary theme-2: triple helix and systems of innovation  
 
While agreeing with critics of Etzkowitz’s (2000) TH theory as inapplicable to emerging 
economies without mature institutions (Saad 2004), my argument goes further suggesting 
that data from Edinburgh shows the limited reach of academic entrepreneurship even inside 
of mature innovation institutions; accepting that in parts of Edinburgh and Cambridge 
commercialisation works well.   
 
Many commentators refer in general terms to KSA’s knowledge base and its lack of 
vocational orientation (xx) and absence of business links (xx) and applied research (xx).  
My work digs deeper into these issues identifying a rote learning, rather than problem-
centred pedagogy as problematic and absence of UILs throughout the university systems 
(teaching, projects, work-based learning and incubation centres) as a major weakness in 
KSA’s university system.   
 
I show in section 9.4.5 that while KSA universities spend considerably on TT (embodied 
technologies, patents and visiting researchers) there is little connection between the TT and 
 
 272 
commercialisations, which tend to be based on informal learning from international study 
or travel.  Investment in TT while helping build absorptive capacity, is not contributing 
directly to building sectoral systems of innovation.  There is a disconnect between imported 
knowledge and target sectoral capabilities, reflecting the absence of UILs and in particular 
university research being guided by the needs of businesses in nascent sectors.   
 
My data shows a clear gap between the UK and KSA in the use of active learning and 
problem-solving pedagogies, enhanced in the former case by joint-research and student 
work-based learning around projects.  KSA policy documents, such as KACST (2010) 
point to considerable investment in TT; however, they fail to draw connections between 
the TT and sectoral capacity building in the form of commercialised products.  Reviewing 
the business impact of TT in target sectors is likely to reveal the need for more focus on 
applied research and closer liaison between universities, incubators and the leaders of 
innovative sectors.  
 
9.5  Theme-3: Support for entrepreneurs  
 
Here I analyse support for entrepreneurs, including financial support, contrasting my 
findings in KSA with those in the UK and with previous research on KSA and KSA policy 
documents.  Amongst the barriers to commercialisation I find that while the entrepreneurial 
mindset is yet to be embedded in UK universities, in KSA it is almost non-existent.  
Commercialisation enablers in the form of university-based incubators are far less 
connected into university research in KSA than in the UK; an illustration of ‘thin’ 
institutions.  Commercialisation processes also differ in that UK incubators are more 
business disciplined i.e. market oriented and inter-connected with business via strong 
university-industry links.  Given this, resources assembly and access to risk capital is more 
systematic in the UK whereas in KSA banks only infrequently offer facilities to startups, 
Angel funds are rare and incubatee companies rarely interact with potential funders.  
Legitimacy amongst KSA incubatees is perceived in terms of legal recognition, whereas 
UK incubatees discern it in terms of sales and trading.  Importantly, incubation 
management in KSA remains in the hands of academics, whereas leading incubators in the 
UK business leaders manage incubation facilities.  Though reliable outcome figures for 
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incubation value-for-money are unavailable in both countries, KSA outcomes are 
disappointing to policy-makers and Managers.  Knowledge flows in KSA incubators are 
failing to exploit TT purchased by universities and are characterised by competition rather 
than cooperation between incubation centres.  I conclude by identifying major blockages 
in KSA knowledge flows for commercialisation processes.  While the physical 
infrastructure for KSA commercialisation and administrative support services matches that 
of the UK, support for entrepreneurs in KSA is only now emerging and reflects the low 
level of development in the indigenous knowledge-based private sector and a continued 
rentier mentality.  There is a considerable gap between policy pronouncements on support 
for entrepreneurs in KSA and practice.  Theoretically, this section demonstrates the 
inapplicability of much of the literature on support for entrepreneurs in the KSA culture 
and context, supporting the need for a new framework, such as the one I develop from this 
research. 
 
9.5.1  Barriers and incentives 
 
My literature review highlights several gaps to which this research brings new evidence, 
summarised in figure-9.10. 
 
Methodological issues bedevil social science research: confusing ought and is and 
establishing causal links between social agent actions and results.  Etzkowitz (1998) theory 
of the TH is criticised above (section 9.3) as metaphoric – more ought than is.  Here I 
analyse the causality question: do universities as institutions incentivise academics towards 
commercialisation?  In his first work, Etzkowitz spoke of universities as regional leaders 
citing Stanford and Silicon Valley.  However important startups are in regional economies, 
evidence suggests that the impact of university activities on regional economies is limited, 
for example, section 8.3.1 shows this is the case in Cambridge and even more limited in 




Example authors Data section 
Are these university 
entrepreneurial  
3.2 Etzkowitz (1998) 8.2.3 
Are academic researchers 
also entrepreneurs? 
3.4 Gulbrandsen (2005), Mowery and 




What incentivises academics 
to commercialise – money? 
3.7.4 Siegel et al (2003); Schankerman 
(2003); Markman (2004) 
7.3.3 





Kenney and Goes (2004) 8.2.3.2 
8.2.3.3 
 
Figure 9.10: arguments and data on academic entrepreneurship incentives and barriers 
 
Gulbrandsen (2005) noting the intention of universities to commercialise, pose the issue in 
terms of individual academic researchers spinning out companies, patenting or consulting.  
Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) find increased patenting by academic researchers, however, 
as Shane (2004) argues, the patent is an input and only a potential output to 
commercialisation, if the criterion is profitable trading exploiting research: entrepreneurs 
purposively take innovation risks to create profit.  While Dasgupta and David’s (1987) 
argue that academic and industrial researchers do the same things but for different reasons 
(papers not profit) and different audiences (peers not market) is appealing, evidence 
suggest otherwise: academic entrepreneurs pursue answers to social rather than only 
intellectual problems.  Incubation managers in both KSA and the UK (section 8.2.1.3) 
complain that most academic researcher have no entrepreneurial mindset.  There are 
academic entrepreneurs; section 8.2.3.1 gives examples however they are a minority. 
 
Much of the research on academic entrepreneurship is based on US data, for example 
Ambos et al  (2008) and Lam (2010) where IP ownership rests with the individual 
researchers; unlike the UK and KSA where it is owned by the institution.  Incentives 
structures therefore differ, with the university as an institution driving formal-knowledge 
academic entrepreneurship, as in the Respondent-28 case.  Most of the staff entrepreneurs 
interviewed draw on informal knowledge, over which the university has no legal rights.  
For student entrepreneurs, university incubation is mainly unrelated to university research.  
Shane (2004b) argues that the Bayh-Dole Act in the US, which ascribes IP to the institution, 
is an advantage.  From a policy perspective, it is important that both the researcher and the 
institution are motivated to exploit research.   
 
Researchers have suggested that monetary reward incentives staff academic 
entrepreneurship (Schankerman 2003), disincentivises academic entrepreneurship 
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(Markman et al (2004) or is only a part of the incentives (Siegel et al 2003).  My research 
(section 8.3.5) suggests academic entrepreneurs are motivated by control, social 
contribution and the satisfaction operationalising research rather than monetary reward.  
For KSA, the point made in section 8.2.2.4 mitigates against this conclusion in that some 
(especially student) academic entrepreneurs appear motivated to extend their incubation 
period by receipt of welfare benefits.  Otherwise academic entrepreneurs face the same 
barriers as other entrepreneurs: in KSA (section 8.4.8) these revolve around a culture 
demeaning SME employment and structures such as company law, IP law and difficulties 
marshalling resources, with resource marshalling being an important barrier also in the UK. 
 
In summary, the picture I find of academic entrepreneurship is more nuanced that some 
researchers represent.   In both countries commercialisation as a legitimate activity is yet 
to embed in the mindset and activities of most academic researchers.  Little formal 
knowledge is commercialised in KSA resulting in low-growth companies, whereas in the 
UK, research are more likely to exploit formal knowledge.  This point is missing from KSA 
policy documents such as KACST reports, which focus on TT as an input into universities 
rather than as an output into successful products and companies. 
 
9.5.2  Commercialisation inputs and enablers 
 
Three issues emerge from my literature review relating to enablement of academic 
entrepreneurship, which figure-9.11 summarise. Clark (1998) suggests that successful 
university commercialisation is enabled by the following inputs: strong leadership of 
commercialisation; strong UILs; diversified funding sources; strong research base and 
entrepreneurial culture amongst academic staff.  From a university ‘push’ perspective 
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Push not pull 3.5 Clark (1998) 8.3 
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Lam (2011) 8.2.3.4  
8.2.3.3 










Figure-9.11: arguments and data on commercialisation inputs and enablers 
 
However, significantly they understate the importance of market and product ‘pull’ factors, 
this is important since evidence (section 8.3) shows that outward orientation towards 
markets matters (including supply chain, partners and customers).  Comparison of SWOTs 
for entrepreneurship in the UK and KSA (section 8.2.3.4) emphasises that the ecosystem 
facing SMEs critically influences success: entrepreneurs convert ideas and knowledge into 
consumer solutions.   
 
Referring back to figure 3.8, incubators may be generalist or specialised: Edinburgh’s 
BioQuarter is an example of the latter and LaunchEd of the former.  As sections 6.3.1.4 
and 7.3.1.4 entrepreneurs in both countries accessed a range of commodity (space, office 
support), specialist and professional services. Lam’s (2011) research shows that some 
academic disciplines (medicine, biotechnology, software) are more prone to 
commercialisation than others.  This highlights the importance of specialist services being 
available, adding to points made in 8.2.3.1, that incubators managed by business people 
are more likely to succeed than those managed by academics, however the business people 
need specialist knowledge.  I also note (section 3.7.6) that few universities offer all 
disciplines and those specialising in less commercialisable disciplines (theology) are less 
likely to incubate businesses. 
 
Dahlstrand (2000) and others define a university spinout as taking ideas originated in parent 
organisation to market and Shane (2004) that the higher the quality of research an academic 
performs, the more likely s/he is to commercialise.  My evidence only partly supports these 
findings.  As section 8.4.3 illustrates, about half of the entrepreneurs I interviewed obtained 
significant (informal) knowledge from visits abroad, with the exception of Respondent-9 
and Respondent-28 few commercialised formal university research.  Blumenthal et al ’s 
(1996) argument that applied research funded by industry is most likely to result in 
commercialisation sounds intuitively true, however, my research generated no relevant 




I conclude that researchers such as Clark (1998) understate the importance of market-pull 
and business discipline in considering commercialisation inputs, a conclusion I later 
include in my revised commercialisation framework.   Secondly, that the source of 
knowledge for commercialisation ventures in KSA (and to an extent in the UK) is not 
university-generated knowledge, (often purchased TT knowledge in the KSA’s case); 
instead it is more likely to be the transfer of business models or informal ideas gained by 
staff and students from international study or visits. 
 
9.5.3  Commercialisation processes 
 
This section explores commercialisation processes, leaving legitimacy and financial 
resource assembly for discussion in the following two sections.  Here, as figure 9.12 
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Stages models 3.6.1 Van de Ven et al (1999) 8.4 
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Dickson, Coles and Smith (1998) 
 
Hard work and emotional 
commitment 
4.7.1 Kahneman (1973) 7.4.1 
8.4.1 
JVs influence research 
agenda and learning 
3.7.4.3 Siegel et al (2003) 
Meyer-Krahmer et al  (1998) 
 
KSA structures misalign 
with its technology strategy 
2.2.2 
3.3.8 
Bell (1990) 8.4 
 
Figure-9.12: arguments and data on commercialisation inputs and enablers 
 
In disputing linear models of innovation, Van de Ven et al (1999) speaks of the chaotic 
journey of academic entrepreneurs (and all entrepreneurs) iterating between dimensions of 
their business plan and its implementation.  Section 8.4 captures some of this seeming 
chaos confirms (as section 9.5 above does) the non-linearity of entrepreneurship processes.  
 
Researchers have commented upon models of entrepreneurship, with Dickson, Coles and 
Smith (1998) suggesting that licensing (or sale of IP) allows academics to retain their 
research focus, point raised also by Radosevitch (1995).  Licencing is a more typical route 
to commercialisation than new company formation (section 7.4.5.1) as Respondent-14, a 
KSA Science Park Manager (A/15/7) and Respondent-35 (A/35/4) attest.  There are three 
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reasons for this: firstly many academics have neither capability nor inclination to cross-
governances into business (PPL in 7.2.3 is an example.  Secondly, (section 6.4.4.2 and 
8.4.8) many VCs will only invest if business people are leading the venture.  Thirdly, 
starting up a company is hard work and distracting from academic pursuits; Stephan et al 
(2007) find that commercialisation crowds-out research work and Respondent-28 
evidences this (section 8.48).     
 
As section 7.4.7 indicates, startup and growth require high emotional investment and hard 
work; Danny Kahneman (1973) emphasises the emotional element; as Geuna and Nesta 
(2006) put it: patent or publish.  My research finds that for many academics 
commercialisation is just too distracting from their main goal (7.4.1 and 8.4.1) and as Smith 
and Parr (2003) suggest they avoid it and like Respondent-21 yearn to get back to authoring 
on bee-keeping (A/21/11). 
 
When academic researchers do engage with business, perhaps not to commercialise, there 
is feedback into their research (section 3.7.4.3 and Siegel et al 2003): interestingly all of 
the academic staff incubating that I interviewed have continued their academic work in 
addition to launching businesses.   
 
In summary, data from both KSA and the UK suggests academics that while more UK 
academics are prepared to facilitate the commercialisation of their research, motivation 
remains a problem.  In KSA, the ethos of universities is yet to accept applied research and 
its commercialisation with only few exceptions indicating a gulf between Vision 2030 
statements and practice.    
 
9.5.4  Resource assembly and commercialisation 
 
This section addresses three gaps in research literature related to resource assembly as 
shown in figure-9.13; I also point to significant gaps between KSA policy statements and 
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Figure-9.13: arguments and data on resource assembly and commercialisation  
 
Section 3.7.6 on research funding shortages, notes with D‘Este and Perkmann (2010) that 
where industry funds research an outcome commercialisation is likely: few businesses fund 
basic research (though as Pisano 2011 suggests, increasingly business philanthropy funds 
difficult-to-research diseases).  Two issues arise that I have not seen in the literature.  
Firstly, section (8.2.1.2) raises the point from Collinson and Gregson’s (2003) work that 
some publicly funded IP in the UK is purchased for private profit by US VCs.  A 
concomitant point is that where individual researchers exploit knowledge arising from 
publicly funded research there is an ethical issue of private gain at public cost.  Secondly, 
section 3.7.6 discusses the issue of research funding, highlighting researchers such as 
Wright et al (2004) discussing the provenance of funding.  My point is that whatever the 
provenance, many research grants come as closed-innovation: prescribed processes and 
outcomes (Kinder 2002) that may exclude commercialisation activity or following-up non-
specified activities.   
 
Section 1.2 mentions the curse of natural resources (Sachs and Warner 2001) as an 
explanation of why resource-rich economies can lack innovation.  In my experience, many 
VCs are wary of free cashflow, suggesting it breeds indiscipline and lack of focus.  Put 
bluntly how relevant to building a business is a background in an academic environment 
and access to free cashflow? 
 
Assistance with business planning, financial structuring and accessing finance and business 
partners are an important part of the services KSA and UK incubators provide academic 
entrepreneurs.  My own impression is that whilst Arabs freely speak about their personal 
finances (whereas Europeans are circumspect), in business Arabs are disinclined to focus 




Section 8.4.7 suggests that few banks in KSA and UK fund startups, however academic 
entrepreneurs in the UK more than in KSA are pitching to angel investors and using 
Kickstarter.  Only a minority (such as Respondent-28) are of a size and growth potential to 
attract venture capital.  In section 2.3, discussing the importance of institutional thickening 
Storper and Salais (1997) highlight finance.   Here I note the important policy issue facing 
the KSA Government to promote HNWIs involvement in angel and crowd-funding 
initiatives.   
 
Despite policy statements, such as KACST (2011) funding of applied research and proof-
of-concept in KSA continue to be Government-led and are neither provided nor guided by 
business.  This contrasts with the UK where private funding of applied research is normal 
and Angel funders (plus grants) fund early stage commercialization.  While bank facilities 
can be difficult to obtain for early-stage companies in the UK, in KSA none are available.   
Resource assembly for spinout companies in KSA remains a major problem.  
 
9.5.5  Legitimacy and commercialisation  
 
This short section makes a single point.  Following Scott (1995), legitimacy is now one of 
the core concepts in entrepreneurship theory (Venkataraman 1997), hence its incorporation 
as a building block in my (section 4.4) framework.  Legitimacy is recognition as a viable 
agent in the eyes of the new venture’s customers, suppliers, funders and partners (section 
8.4.7).  Only legitimate companies will attract external investors as section 6.4.5.2 notes.  
In the same section I note that no single KSA interviewee alludes to business metrics of 
legitimacy such as breakeven, profitability or margins – though some had achieved this 
legitimation.  Instead, several refer to legitimacy as formal or legal recognition, for 
example becoming registered as a company, illustrating naïvety.  In discussing legitimacy, 
I expand Scott’s (1995) idea to align with KSFs i.e. legitimacy in the eyes of the market 
and customers is paramount; legitimacy in the eyes of regulators is a qualified condition 
prior to market legitimacy. 
 




Cultures are socially-constructed: patterned behaviour that over time becomes an 
unconscious predisposition guiding thought and action (Lincoln and Kalleberg (1982 in 
governances; Bourdieu (1985).  Incubator managers in KSA and the UK continually refer 
to lack of entrepreneurial culture amongst academics; though not articulated the cultural 
heritage of academic incubator managers and entrepreneurs is an important theme running 
throughout my evidence (for example figure 8.1; 8.45, 8.46) and a central aspect of my 
framework (figure 4.1).  Researchers now pay significant attention to culture and 
governances in entrepreneurship (Porter 2009), yet often citing culture as a black box, 
meaning hidden and cannot be understood or altered.  This section addresses some of these 
issues from literature (figure-9.14) analysing the changes in policy and practice likely to 
help change cultures and governances. 
 
Business models evolve as entrepreneurs clarify their core value-adding activities (Zott and 
Amit 2007).  Any business planning activity should return again and again to the business 
model.  A simple example: Respondent-24 (7.4.1) changed from a text-charging to an app 
download subscription model as she gained understanding of her market.  Other UK 
entrepreneurs too reiterated their business models (section 7.4.1).  Only Hussein Al Alattar 
(A/10/11) of the Saudi entrepreneurs spent time thinking about his business model (section 
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Figure-9.14: arguments and data on academic entrepreneurship - culture and governances   
 
In part this difference illustrates the closer connection the UK entrepreneurs have with 
business people (from business and as incubator managers) and funders (via pitching).  
Perhaps also it illustrates a cultural trait: the Arab trader buys cheap, sells dear and creates 
a margin.  Saudi people obsessively use the mobile Internet and social media; it is therefore 
odd that there is little interest in online business models, for example Anderson (2009).  
There is an inconsistency between Incubator Managers saying they prepare businesses for 
launch in KSA (section 6.4) and the practice of not discussing business models. 
 
In section 3.6.2 I discusses various typologies of incubating companies.  The focus of 
researchers (Pirnay et al 2002 is one example) is on the organisational relationship between 
parent originator and new-Co.  From the viewpoint of new companies, their organisational 
relationship is less important than the processes by which they overcome the liability of 
newness by creating their own legitimacy in the eyes of partners and customers.   
 
Section 9.8 above considered the degree to which financial reward motivates entrepreneurs, 
endorsing Franklin et al (2001) and Colyvas et al’s (2002) conclusion that control, social 
impact, and self-esteem are more powerful motivators for academic entrepreneurs.  
Audretsch (2000) studying biotechnology spinouts suggests that age has an important 
mediating effect (3.7.2): this may be true in a long-gestation field such as biotechnology 
and in particular in US universities where only older academics have tenure and less 
publication pressure.  Another dimension to emerge from my research: in the UK students 
consider it ‘cool’ to start a business, this is less so in KSA.  Addressing these cultural issues 
is a major policy question facing KSA.   
 
Figure 8.1 contrasted incubator governances between the UK and KSA noting that business 
people now manage successful UK incubators whereas academics manage in KSA, though 




In summary, section 8.4.6 suggest that my research evidence shows a greater market-
orientation amongst UK academic entrepreneurs.  Partly, business connected and discipline 
or business incubation managers (benefits; stay time).   Researchers and Incubation 
Managers often refer to entrepreneurial culture, however, researchers rarely dig into issues 
such as motivation or issues concretising commercialisation such as business models.  My 
research finds greater motivation to launch businesses amongst young people in the UK 
relative to KSA, assisted by a more practical business orientation in incubation centres. 
 
9.5.7  Outcomes/outputs of commercialisation 
 
There is a dearth of reliable quantitative data on the outcomes and outputs of university 
commercialisation.  More research is required: quantitative studies of incubator cost-
benefits and economic impact and qualitative studies with control groups not located within 
incubators.  Figure-9.15 poses questions based on gaps in the literature that this section 
elucidates.   
 
It is understandable as Bruneel et al (2012) argue that incubation-supported startup is more 
efficient than unsupported startup, resulting in higher survival rates as Sherman (1999) 
suggests.  My experience in commercialisation suggests a failure rate (market or leadership 
rather than technology) of 50% within two-years (Manigart et al 2002 suggest a 56% failure 
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It is therefore difficult to recognise figures such as only 16% of French spinoffs failed over 
6-years (Mustar 1997); only 32% of 3,376 US university spinoffs failed in a twenty-year 
period (AUTM 2012); only 13% of Swedish spinoffs failed over a 33-year period 
(Dahlstrand 1997), and a European network study finding a two-year failure rate of 9% 
(EBICN 2012).  I am not challenging the veracity of this research, simply pointing out a 
significant variation from VC industry figures (EVCA 2013).   
 
Figures in section 2.7.10 claim significant economic contribution to economic growth from 
university commercialisations.  However, as my methods chapter notes, evaluating the 
economic benefits of projects over time, (given multipliers and assumed causalities), is 
problematic.  For example, the AUTM in 2001 calculated that spin-offs from American 
academic institutions between 1980 and 1999 created US$ 33.5 billion in economic value-
added; this sounds impressive until calculating this is 0.25% (a quarter of 1%) of the year 
2000 GDP.  Section 7.5.1 gives figures from the Biggar (2012) for Scotland showing a 
similar amount of contribution; despite references in policy documents such as KACST 
(2014) to success, interviewees could name successful commercialised research in the 
KSA.    
 
All incubators were asked for cost-benefit analysis or raw income-expenditure data: none 
were able or prepared to provide this data (6.5.2; 7.5.2).  ERI alluded to internal and 
confidential financial assessments.  Current evaluation frameworks focus on the quality of 
incubator services and the incubator as a property business, such as Erlewine (2007) which 
AUTM use.   Further research is urgent necessary to produce generally acceptable and 
comparative data around cost-benefits of incubation units. 
 
The structure and institutions of the UK economy are hardly recognisable compared with 
those of 50-years ago; still more so is the pace of change in KSA.  As section 2.3 argues, 
citing Di Maggio and Powell (1983), North (1990) and Hodgson (2006); the pace of 
institutional change in a developing economy/society context is faster.  This is because 
 
 285 
mimetic, normative and coercive processes are all operating: thin institutions (like loose 
networks) can be an advantage in times of rapid change.   
 
Successful commercialisation outcomes, as Biggar (2012) notes must include figures on 
sustained companies successfully trading, either profitably or with a pathway to profit.  
Despite the absence of cost-benefit figures in the UK, Managers were able to point to 
successes; this is not the case in KSA where there is an urgent need for auditable figures.  
Overall, there is a lack of empirical justification for the theoretical claims (eg Bruneel et al 
2012) that incubated firms launch more efficiently and sustain longer than non-incubated 
firms.  
 
9.5.8  Knowledge flows and the economy  
 
KSA spends too little on R&D, gets too little in return and fails to attract international 
projects; a weak entrepreneurship culture is exacerbated by distortions resulting from 
resource-richness including high-return outlets for capital and high welfare payments and 
formal education disconnected from industry.  Policy claims (Vision 2030) that TT and 
commercialisation are successful in KSA do not match with evidence from practice.     
 
In 2010 KSA launched a decade of entrepreneurship accompanied by various initiatives 
such as the Fast Growth-100, National Entrepreneurship Centre, the Prince Salman 
Entrepreneurship Institute and the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology 
(KAUST).  The King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) in Riyadh 
has 200 R&D units and 2,500 projects contributing to KSA’s over 26,000 journal papers 
and 8,000 registered patents.  Yet little of the activity is finding its way into new companies 
and products – the central question of this research (sections 1.2 and 2.10).  More 
fundamentally, lack of commercialisation is not a policy priority.  Global R&D is rising 
and international knowledge flows are increasingly US-EU-East Asia by-passing.  Spend 
of 0.3% of GDP on R&D (UK is 1.8% and 6,000 researchers (UK 250,000), almost zero 
international R&D is a problem.  My first point in figure-9.16 is that KSA policy-makers 
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Figure-9.16: arguments and data on academic entrepreneurship impact and knowledge flows 
 
Knowledge-based economy and knowledge base society misalignment are observable in 
both KSA and Scotland.  North’s (1990, 2009) point that only Washington-consensus 
(open democratic) institutions create modern economies is criticised (section 9.15) as 
ethnocentric.  However, as Castells (1997) argues, a knowledge economy does need a 
knowledge society, freely clashing and developing ideas.  Krugman (1993) refers to the 
development trap: moving from middle to higher income requires an educated workforce 
creating new competitive products: the challenge facing India, China and Singapore.  This 
is one of Stehr and Ericson’s (1992) reasons for suggesting that privileging economic over 
societal development cannot work: in effect, Boyer’s (1996) argument that mode of 
production and regime of accumulation must align.  For KSA there appears to be a 
misalignment between strategic goal and social development.  
 
How different is catch-up in a knowledge-based era of economic development?  
Gerschenkron’s (1966) argument, which is now integrated into the development state 
thesis, is that the state can enable rapid catch-up by targeting the importation of advanced 
technologies even (Davison 2000) leapfrogging market leaders – as many Japanese 
manufacturers did.  Importing knowledge embedded in plant and equipment is entirely 
different from importing knowledge for knowledge-based products and services since this 
requires sufficient capacity to understand and adapt the exogenous knowledge not simply 
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to operate equipment (section 1.5).  KSA does not allow branches of international 
universities to establish in the Kingdom, but has recruited some 1,000 international 
lecturers and a glance at higheredjobs (2015) reveals hundreds of vacancies.  My point is 
that despite the importation of foreign knowledge, commercialisation rates remain low.  
Theoretically, catch-up in the era of more knowledge-based products is more difficult, 
unless people are imported for applied research on company projects – which as noted 
above, KSA is failing to do.   
 
Section 9.2 and 9.6 above criticise the weak UILs in KSA’s universities, here a more 
fundamental question is asked.  Is the KSA university system fit for purpose and aligned 
with Government strategy of building a knowledge-based, diversified economy?  The data 
suggests that it is not, (a) it employs an out-dated pedagogy; (b) is not vocational; (c) too 
much research is not applied, and (d) too disparate.  Little seems to have altered since Roy’s 
(1993) critique of Saudi education’s formality.  
 
Whereas UK universities increasingly employ problem-centred (action) learning and a 
pedagogy that encourages critical thinking Kahn (2011) found KSA universities still using 
talk-and-chalk, lecturer-centric pedagogy.  Indeed, even in the incubators, students must 
follow a programme of courses, distracting focus from their business project.  If new ideas 
and recombinations of knowledge (Gibbons et al 1994) are to flourish, Saudi universities 
need to fundamentally alter their pedagogy.  
 
Jacob et al (2003) note that few KSA students and courses are vocationally-oriented.  This 
is in sharp contrast with the UK.  In section 6.2.3.4 Respondent-18 and I favourably 
contrasted the IIIT (B) where student dissertations are new products and business plans.  
Indeed, since Nehru India has carefully deployed IIS and IIM.5  Students in Edinburgh on 
medical, engineering, music or veterinary courses expect modules on business and 
commercialisation.  KSA too should embed vocational orientation and entrepreneurship on 
all courses and (section 9.6) achieve this by much closer links with businesses.   
                                                 
5  Indian Institute for Information Technology; Indian Institute for Science and Indian Institute for Management 




Section 8.4.9 suggests that with honourable exceptions such as Respondent-9, few Saudi 
researchers do applied research, focusing on solving problems, which may result in new 
products.  As section 3.7.4.2 notes, applied research can result in high-level intellectual 
challenges and (section 3.7.4.3) interactions with businesses identify such challenges.  This 
links with point (d) above and Gibbons et al ’s (1994) argument that academic disciplines 
can either reflect what is comfortable for academics or the needs of society.  KSA 
universities follow a traditional disciplinary structure; they would better follow 
interdisciplinary paths.  What famous for?  
 
In summary, KSA universities need a radical reform of pedagogy, UILs, vocational 
courses, commercialisation and applied research.  Without suggesting that the UK is an 
ideal type, a comparison reveals four blockages in KSA significantly greater than in the 
UK: connection to global knowledge flows; manner of distributing knowledge (pedagogy); 
inability to flow (both ways) between business and university; governances and weak 
network (between incubators and businesses).  These are the barriers a policy agenda 
seeking KBE must address.  
 
9.5.9  Support for entrepreneurs - theme summary   
 
The major narratives I have found in terms of support for entrepreneurs is the academic 
entrepreneurship (particular commercialising formal knowledge) is more deeply embedded 
in UK universities and difficult to find in KSA universities, which have few industry links 
(in applied research or work-based learning) and poor networking between business and 
their incubators.  By offering generous grants and little business discipline, KSA incubators 
can become shelters for students rather than engines of innovation.  Availability of risk 
capital is general in the UK and largely absent in KSA, where legitimacy is interpreted 
judicially rather than in market terms such as sales and partnerships: the rentier mentality 
appears still strong in KSA.  While business people now manage UK university incubators 
in KSA they remain managed by academics.  Neither country gathers robust value-for-
money data on its incubators, however it is clear that the expensive infrastructure in KSA 
produces few successes, unlike those in the UK.  KSA incubators exploit informal 
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knowledge gathered on international visits by staff and students rather than the expensively 
purchased TT, whereas formal knowledge flows in the UK result in some basic and applied 
research being commercialised.  Overall, the UK can point to some success in its 
commercialisation strategy whereas in KSA there are major gulfs between policy 
pronouncements and practice.   
 
Theories of academic entrepreneurship such as Shane (2004) find little verification in a 
developing, resource endowed economy such as KSA, where institutional arrangements 
and culture act as barriers to innovation and are unlikely to drive catch-up.  I find that 
Clark’s (1998) ‘push’ factors (leadership, UILs) remain a valid explanation of UK relative 
success and KSA’s current lack of commercialisation. Absence of UIL Siegel et al (2003) 
and membership of international research networks adversely effect KSA’s ability to 
commercialise advanced technologies, harmed also by the lack of risk capital (Chang 
(2005) and discourse about business models.  Gerschenkron’s (1966) idea of catch-up, is 
dated, synthesising it with Castells’ (1998) idea of knowledge flows is useful, however, 
KSA is unable to exploit commercially its purchased knowledge flows, because of 
institutional constraints.   
 
9.6  Answers to research questions and theoretical contribution  
 
In developing economies, transferred technologies often fail when infrastructure, human 
capital or culture prove inadequate (Chang 1995).  More optimistically, appendix-2 gives 
examples from China and India of successful TTs.  KSA is a rich country with an advanced 
infrastructure, education system and Government deeply committed to acquiring and 
exploiting advanced technologies.  Yet, as sections 9.14, (drawing from 6.5.l; 7.5.1 and 
8.5) show, the record of successful commercialisation of university knowledge in KSA is 
poor.  Why is this the case, what can be done about it and are our theoretical models 
adequate to explaining why KSA performs badly?  Having spent 20-years working in Saudi 
commercialisation, my PhD research set out to answer these questions, which I now do.   
 
Having selected and justified three research questions (1.4 above) their theoretical (1.6) 
and practical significance (1.6), section 1.7 illustrated the intellectual flow of my research: 
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critically reviewing literature to identify gaps and arguments (chapters 2 and 3) referencing 
the UK as a comparator, suggesting an analytical framework to structure the research 
(chapter-5) and then justifying a method of assembling and analysing data (chapter-6).  In 
chapters 7 and 8, I assembled original data from original interviews, public reports and 
previous empirical research, which I subjected to in-case and cross-case analysis, and in 
chapter-9 have reintegrated these results with previous research.  The purpose of this 
section is to bring my intellectual journey to a conclusion; setting out what I have 
discovered.  In answering my research questions I assemble evidence justifying (and 
challenging) my answer, then highlight the theoretical and policy implications of my 
answers.  To assist the reader (and myself) each of the following three sub-sections begins 
with a summary table. 
 
9.6.1  Answer to research question-1 
 
My answer to RQ-1 recognises that only in the last two Five Year Plans, has the 
diversification vision and commercialisation strategy been articulated (figure-9.17).   
 
Institutional change model 
North (1990; 2009) adds significantly to our view of institutions and institutional change 
in particular ideas of explaining stability change using institutional analysis featuring active 




What is the contribution of state owned science parks and business incubators in Saudi 
Arabia towards commercial innovation and entrepreneurship? 
Summary 
answer 
Saudi university-based incubators have been established as an important part of a 
strategy to diversify the economy as oil revenues decline.  They are not yet delivering 
significant new products and businesses facing institutional barriers, cultural barriers, 
governance clashes, and interrupted knowledge flows.  Significant areas of economic 
development and commercialisation theory fail to guide KSA policy-making and 
implementation.  Marshalling resources behind a clearer national vision of the future 
will assist KSA’s diversification strategy.  Comparison with the UK shows that some of 
these issues also arise. 
 Evidence Section(s) 
Supporting   OK on inputs, so far: universities, R&D, incubators 9.2.1 
evidence  Low R&D spend 9.15 
  Inputs but outputs papers and patents 9.15 
  Problematising lack of commercialisation  9.11 
  TH myth: statist version, cross-cultures, state hegemony 9.4 
  Non-entrepreneurial universities and academics 9.8 
  Governances  9.13 
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  Mediating effects 9.13 
  Outcomes and outputs 9.14 
  International knowledge flows 9.15 
Counter-  Oil and gas and international oil companies; health tourism  9.13 
evidence  100k students study abroad 9.13 
 Author/theory  
Theory   North (2009) wrongly dismisses alternative models 9.15 
contribution  Gerschenkron’s (1966) theory dated in era knowledge economies 9.15 
  The development state thesis may prove a model for KSA 9.15 
  Etzkowitz’s (1983) triple helix lacks empirical support as 
significant in either a developing or developed economy 
9.3, 9.5 and 9.8 
  Governances clashes challenges academic entrepreneurship theory 
application to developing and developed economy 
9.13 
  Outcomes and outputs – need for systematic quantitative research  9.14 
Policy 
agenda 
 University system needs radical change: UILs, pedagogy and 
vocational courses – reinforcing curse of resource richness 
9.15 
  Need for CBA evaluation of incubators in both countries, also 
access policies and business leadership 
9.10 
  Cultural and governances issues in both countries  9.13 
 
Figure-9.17: Summary of RQ-1 answer, noting my theoretical contributions 
 
As I argue in section 9.15 North’s insistence that economy modernisation is necessarily 
accompanied by adoption of open democratic government (i.e. accepting pluralism and 
alternative centre of power) contradicts Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese and now Chinese 
experience (Chang and Grabel 2004); arguable the openness and tiering of India’s public 
administration is a barrier to modernisation (Smith 2008).  My contribution goes further 
than disputing North in three ways.   
 
The cultural and governances changes required from universities are at an early stage 
(9.2.1).  That said problematising commercialisation, especially culture, governances and 
structures is essential if commercialisation is to be more.  Whilst these are matters of 
degree, compared to the UK, KSA has less entrepreneurial universities and academics.  
Outside of my research footprint and outside the incubators, there may be counter evidence 
showing that in oil and gas large companies and family firms are commercialising.   KSA 
universities (section 9.15) are not focused on commercialisation; they are rarely partners 
in significant international knowledge flows.   
 
Placing incubators (especially specialists such as biotechnology) proximate to universities 
has many advantages, though there is little formal knowledge flow between the incubators 
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and the universities.  As interviewees in the UK and KSA suggest, expecting research 
academics to cross governances and effectively manage incubators is unrealistic: the 
incubators need to be managed by business people and may be better (some at least) located 
on business premises. These arguments have implications for my framework, which I 
return to below.   
 
Catch-up in the era of knowledge economies 
Gerschenkron’s (1966) argument that state-supported technological leapfrogging can 
enable technological catch-up is now dated, since comparative advantage rest in knowledge 
stores and their exploitation rather than the possession of product and process artefacts.  
This argument reinforces the importance of institutions with absorptive capacity and the 
ability to generate and exploit knowledge; it also underscores the changing (‘softer’) role 
of the state in development without at North does, insisting on open Government.   
 
The development state thesis may prove a model for KSA 
Development state theory, suggesting that mobilisation around a national vision, led by a 
expert bureaucracy, which is now integrated into the development state thesis, is that the 
state can enable rapid catch-up by targeting the importation of advanced technologies even 
(Davison 2000) leapfrogging market leaders, with a determined policy agenda privileging 
economic over socio-political advances has worked successfully as an Asian model.  My 
suggestion is that for a country such as KSA, seeking modernisation without 
westernisation, this may be a model to follow.   
 
Production and consumption alignment 
Thirdly, choosing to follow this model sets the challenge (Boyer 1996) of aligning 
production mode with regime of accumulation: in particular knowledge-based creativity 
(in the case of KSA) with its inherited Arabic and Muslim culture.  Imposition of a western 
consensus on KSA would be (in Weber’s terms) an iron cage, not a light cloak.  KSA has 
to evolve its own institutional arrangements, which as Brett (2009) argues are likely to 
differ from those of developed economies because market entry is contested.   KSA has a 
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unique Islamic/Arabic heritage an organic solidarity (Durkheim) that will influence and in 
turn by influenced by the exigencies of operating in global markets. 
 
Finally, in agreeing with critics who challenge the applicability of TH to developing 
contexts, I argue additionally that TH theory is also inapplicable to the UK context as a 
policy – its use is best confined to a laudable metaphor not a policy guide.   
 
The triple-helix is not a policy guide 
Section 9.3 presents research evidence (Said 2004) and empirical evidence (data sections 
7.2.1.3 and 8.2.1.3) that for developing countries, lacking institutional thickness TH theory 
(Etzkowitz 1983) is an inappropriate guide to action for developing countries.  I further 
agreed with Mowery and Sampat (2004), citing evidence in section 9.5 and 9.8, that there 
is scant evidence supporting theory in the UK.  My conclusion in 9.8 is that TH theory is 
best seen as a metaphor or ideal type and not a guide to action in developing countries.  
 
Governances in developed and developing economies 
That institutions matter is beyond dispute, following North (1990) section 2.3 argues that 
useful institutional analysis explains both stability and change: institutions are the 
(stability) end point of active agents pushing against or combining habituses to create a 
new world more suiting their aspirations.  In short, path dependency or direction-of-travel 
are not pre-determined; outcomes alter with agents’ aspirations and their ability to 
negotiate and act upon new governances including (Sender 2001) an entrepreneurial 
habitus.  My point in section 2.3 is that developing countries lack untraded 
interdependencies (Storper 1997) and institutional thickness (Amin 1994) in the same way 
that less developed regions within developed countries are disadvantage.  The different of 
course is that institutional isomorphism is easier when the best practice example is 
proximate, in a similar cultural setting and is part of the same meta-institutions: this is the 
situation facing universities in the UK’s deprived regions.  I argued in section 9.4 above, 
that the challenges of catch-up (Gerschenkron (1962) grow more complex for a developing 
economy in a global economy privileging knowledge products.  To draw from global 
strategy literature, KSA commercialisation faces a wide psychic distance (Johansson and 
 
 294 
Vahlne 1977) from best practice and elongated network building processes to overcome 
the liability of newness (Mathews (2002a and 2002b) by learning, linkages and leverage.  
There is an important lesson from Japanese success here.  The machine that changed the 
world did not diffuse lean production technology by trading with indigenous firms, rather 
as Womack et al (1990; 1996) and Oliver and Wilkinson (1982) show, their processes and 
culture became a exemplar via knowledge spillovers.  Seeking knowledge spillovers from 
international R&D sources seems therefore an important way for developing economies to 
address the deficits alluded to in section 9.4 and challenges Storper, Amin and global 
strategy theorists pose.  Attracting international R&D and amplifying spillover effects 
(culture, ways-of-working and commercialisation processes) appears from theory 
important to KSA leap-frogging into the governances successful R&D commercialisation 
requires. 
 
Policy: academic priorities 
Two important policy recommendations arise from this part of my research.  Firstly, in 
both countries a much higher proportion of academic researchers need to prioritise 
commercialisation above papers and patenting (9.15): this will only occur if appointment 
and promotion policies reflect this re-balancing (9.13 mediating effects).  R&D spend at 
0.3% of GDP is low; in difficult budgetary times, it may be that cumulated resources can 
be deployed into a (Norwegian-style) development fund.  TH is not a model for KSA (or 
other developing states), who need to recognise a greater degree of state leadership coupled 
with devolved power and resources and encouragement to experimentation (especially in 
hybrid organisations such as joint incubator-HNWI angel networks and corporate 
venturing).   
 
Policy university reform 
Section 9.15 concludes that the KSA and UK university systems need reform.  In the UK’s 
case this means going further along the existing direction of travel by encouraging a culture 
of UIL and commercialisation, strengthening internationalisation and cross-cultural 
learning environments, improving action learning where it is weak and making creative 
use of online learning, using contact time for critical discourse rather than information 
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transmission.  KSA’s university is not fit-for-purpose, if the purpose is supporting a 
knowledge-based economy and commercialisation; debate around this purpose will 
undoubtedly be conflictual (Islamic scholars and academics) and will require strong 
leadership.  Reform should include the following four points. 
 
 Most fundamentally KSA universities need a more active learning pedagogy, centred 
on problem-solving based on applied and joint with business faculty research and 
encouraging critical thinking by students: this should reflect in curricula design, 
teaching methods and assessments. 
 To strengthen UILs, KSA universities should benchmark with successful models (such 
as IIMB, IIITB); encourage businesses to work with university in knowledge transfer 
partnerships and work with business bodies to introduce more vocational courses.  
Regular transfer of staff between industry and university should be encouraged.  
Structures and resources should fund more applied research pulled by suggestions from 
business (including international businesses and research centres). 
 Inter-disciplinary structures, research centres and courses should be encouraged, taking 
advantage of online opportunities to merge knowledge repositories and student 
interaction (Christensen et al 2011).  Such courses should be offered internationally.   
 Universities should evolve into international learning environments encouraging staff 
and students from abroad 
 
University reform is a major policy question facing KSA and the UK that should reflect 
cultural heritage and values; for this reason I do not agree with the one-best-way package 
of reforms Christensen and Dyring (2011) propose, which amount to diffusing the US 
model. 
 
9.6.2  Answer to research question-2 
 
My answer to RQ-2, (see figure-9.18 summary), revolves around culture and structures.  
Compared with the UK and other countries more successfully commercialising university 
research, KSA has important structural deficits including: unclear IP law; inadequate 
company law; inefficient capital and exit markets; and disincentivising capital gains 
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taxation (SWOTs; section 9.19).  Unlike the UK where for young people owning a business 
is ‘cool’ (9.12 cultural preferences in KSA favour Government or large company 
employment (9.2.4).  Whereas UK universities increasingly expose young people to 
business (9.6) and vocational course (9.15) this is not the case in KSA, where also 
academics are disincentivised from commercialisation (9.8) by governances favouring 
publishing or patenting.  KSA incubation is a pushed rather than pulled by markets, having 
too little connection to existing businesses ((9.9).  
 
In the UK incubators and SSIs business people increasingly managed, whereas in KSA 
they are overly influenced by academics and under central government control (9.7).  
Unlike the UK, KSA is excluded from important global knowledge flows not attracting 
international R&D or participation in joint-university research projects (figure-9.18).  UK 
incubators encourage pitching and exposure to VC, Angel and crowd-funding sources – 







How do financial, social, cultural and human capital blend in KSA’s innovation and 
entrepreneurship processes and how might their impact be improved? 
Summary 
answer 
Relative to both the UK and its own contextualised needs, KSA has important structural 
deficits inhibiting innovation including the incentivisation of researchers, ability to 
attract international R&D and the management of its incubation centres.  These couple 
with issues in company and IP law, capital markets and tax law along with the 
governances and pedagogy in its university system.  Existing theory neglects the 
challenges facing the KSA: a resource-rich country, with Arabic and Muslim traditions.  
Clear national leadership, including a preparedness to devolve and experiment can 
mitigate these barriers.  
 Evidence Sections 
Supporting   IP, risk capital, company law; tax, exit markets 9.19; 8.2.3.4 
evidence  Human capital: motivation/capability to commercialise 9.6 
  Cultural disincentives 9.2.4 
  Legitimacy ‘cool’ 9.12 
  Little vocational orientation 9.15 
  UILs 9.6 
  Agency in SSIs, focus, centralisation 9.7 
  Pull and push 9.9 
  Disincentives to academics  9.8 
  Resource assembly 9.11 
  Interrupted flows 9.15 
Counter-  Sub-cultures 9.2.3 
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evidence  Family businesses  
  Academic entrepreneurs in both countries 9.6 
 Author/theory  
Theory 
contribution 
 Insufficient active agency in KSA NSI and to allow devolved 
leadership, risk-taking, business leadership and experimentation 
9.5 
  Little evidence of academic entrepreneurs in UK or KSA  9.6 
  Innovation in incubators pushed not pulled: lack of market and 
business discipline in KSA incubation 
9.9 
  Resource-richness theory (Auty 1985) and rentier mentality 
(Beblawi (1987): links to culture 
9.11 
  Transition routes from rentier state – issues for KSA 9.4 
  Knowledge flows mainly informal and recombinations not formal 9.9 
Policy   IP, risk capital, company law; tax, exit markets 9.5 
agenda  Motivating academic entrepreneurship  9.6 
 
Figure-9.18: Summary of RQ-2 answer and contribution to theory 
 
Active agency in NSI, SSI and clusters 
Throughout this research I have emphasised the need for active agency in leading SSIs and 
generally in institution-building (9.5).  I now see this formulation whilst correct is 
inadequate since the agency needs also to be capable of providing business development 
leadership (which many academics can not) and to be nested in wider institutional 
arrangements allowing experimentation with cross-governance projects having devolved 
authority and resources from the centre.  
 
Evidence of academic entrepreneurs in UK or KSA 
Only two of the entrepreneurs interviewed (Dr Saud and Respondent-28) conform to the 
idea of academic entrepreneurs commercialising formal knowledge from their university 
research.  This is scant evidence for academic entrepreneurship, in particular, the claim that 
it amounts to a new innovation paradigm discussed in chapter-3.  Indeed, in both the UK 
and KSA incubation managers point to low commitment by academic researchers to 
commercialisation.  I am not suggesting that academics in KSA and UK are not 
entrepreneurial, rather that their activities are not mainly in the direction of starting and 
building new businesses based on their research.  The business entrepreneur has a business 
purpose towards which s/he creates an innovation, marshals resources, seeks business 
legitimacy: all of which require risk-taking.  As US research, and the Dr Saud/ Respondent-
28 examples illustrate, there are academics who can straddle business and university 
governances, however these are a minority.  One of my theoretical contributions is 
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therefore to question the generalisability of academic entrepreneurship and to suggest that 
much more quantitative research on its outputs is necessary before the theory can be 
regarded as general applicable.  Research, such as Massa and Testa suggests misalignment 
of gaols between entrepreneurs, academics and policy-makers.   
 
Pulled not pushed incubators 
University commercialisation aims to create linkages between new knowledge, solutions 
to problems that can be profitably exploited (technology) and the resources (including 
capital and leadership) capable of starting and building a business.  As section 10.1.2 below 
makes clear, the old debate between pull and push in innovation studies ended with 
agreement that both are necessary; hence my criticism in section 9.9 of Clark (1998) for 
being mainly concerned with knowledge-push.  For generalist incubators (such as 
Edinburgh students and KAUST) the pull is resolved by proof of concept and market 
testing; linking with existing businesses and funders.  Experience suggests these businesses 
rely on informal knowledge, recombinations of practice and whilst viable are not likely to 
prove high-growth.  Specialist incubators (medical devices, software, biotechnology) face 
different pull issues; in their case identifying exploitable knowledge and pulling the 
knowledge and/ the academic entrepreneur into incubation.  My contribution here is to 
highlight the proactive nature of incubation in specialist fields and therefore the need to 
facilitate regular knowledge audits by business people of researcher’s work, seeking 
exploitable knowledge.   
 
Resource richness and innovation  
In a rentier state, the ruling elite uses their unearned wealth to buy loyalty and internal 
peace (Field 1984d; Auty 1985, 1999, 2001, 2001a, 2002, 2004).  Much of the rentier state 
literature focuses on national level settlements and the effect on institutional development 
and relationships with the ruling family/elite (Bulte et al 2005; Losman 2010) relationships 
not effort are rewarded with Government contracts and sinecure employment.  Instead I 
want to focus on two less researched aspects of the oil rentier state: firstly, its impact on 




Research such as Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999); Auty (1997, 2001), and Sachs (2001) 
allude to resource-richness disincentivising innovation and entrepreneurship since focus is 
on consumption over investment or (for example Collier 2008) that it promotes instability 
from inter-elite battles for control.  My research (9.11) suggests that Government welfare 
payments (including subsidising incubation tenure and extended periods of study) act as 
disincentives to entrepreneurship and additionally, HNWIs faced with risky startup 
investment or assured 10% returns on property investment, take the latter choice.  These 
predilections are mix with an Arab culture to invest in things (gold, property) and the 
Muslim aversion to usury.  My research reveals a rich problem for future research.   
 
Beblawi (1987; 1990) uses the term rentier mentality to describe how Saudis view 
themselves as dependants on the ruling elite; what Moore (1998) graphically terms subjects 
rather than citizens, with accompanying expectations of state benefits.  These benefits in 
KSA emerged under King Faisal’s state building in the 1950s and 1960s emerging as 
Hertog (2007) shows as a model of expatriate labour working (in advanced and menial 
jobs), whilst Saudis benefited from Government sinecures or generous benefits.  This is 
what I have termed the value-distributing state.  What value is created apart from rentier 
income derives from vibrant markets in property and stocks.  Launching the 8th Five-year 
Plan outlining the commercialisation strategy to diversify also proposed an indigenisation 
of the labour force.  Whilst numbers of expatriate labour seem to have declined, the rentier 
mentality remains strong and is a major cultural obstacle to company startup and 
innovation, since Saudis continue to expect a high living standard without effort: my 
contribution to debate on KSA development. 
 
Transition routes from rentier state – issues for KSA 
As I have shown, institutional theorists such as North (1990) point to only one transition 
route for KSA – to adopt western open institutions (see also Kolstad and Wiig 2009 and 
Collier and Hoeffler 2009); I suggest other transition routes, including the development 
state model, which includes a value-adding state.   Rentier state theorists tend to adopt 
North’s position.  Chaudhry (1994) suggests as a transition route, adopting neo-liberal 
market institutions; the impact of which in KSA would be significant destabilisation, a 
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position with which Losman (2010) agrees, though he presents no alternative.  Hertog 
(2007) believes that another period of state modernisation in KSA will shift towards the 
value-adding model, however Ulrichsen (2011) argues such a strategy will bring conflict 
into the settlement between the house of Saud and Islam.  My view is that the policy of 
indigenisation is the correct approach: bottom up incentivisation of Saudis to take 
employment, including startups. 
 
Knowledge flows mainly informal and recombinations not formal 
Section 9.9 reveals that most of knowledge used by KSA and UK entrepreneurs was 
informal not university research, often obtained from foreign travel or recombining 
existing knowledge to new purposes.  Gibbons (1994) suggests that universities organising 
research themes (or to be even more focused jointly with companies, organised for a 
business project purpose) are more likely to be interdisciplinary.  Respondent-28 is a good 
example, drawing in software and computing disciplines following the initial geology 
discovery.  Section 2.1 argued that active learning rather than passive KM better 
conceptualises the processes of understanding and using new knowledge, some of which 
is likely to be tacit learning - not necessarily associated with codification cycles as Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (1950 suggest.  Knowledge distribution is especially important in 
multidisciplinary teams, since negotiating meaning (definitions and causalities) is a well of 
innovation.  To return to Gibbons, purposiveness is important to commercialisable 
research, which as section 2.2 argues means reducing the distance between science 
(discovery) and technology (product and sales).  Incubation managers in KSA and the UK 
are unhappy at the siloed organisation of research in their respective universities. 
 
Policy: IP, law, tax, risk capital, exit markets 
The UK has evolved structures supporting startup and commercialisation over a 35-year 
period; areas in which KSA is beginning to innovate.  Perhaps a ten-year timescale for 
change could be agreed and an experienced agency (such as a the European Venture Capital 
Association) appointed to guide a structural change process. 
 
Policy: Motivating academic entrepreneurship  
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UK and KSA reward structures privilege journal publication above teaching excellence, 
administration contribution or commercialisation.  This is understandable given the 
importance of research in international university indices such as the Financial Times, 
Economist, AMBA and AACSB rankings.  It is notable that UK universities rank highly 
because they focus on journal output rather than commercialisation – a major challenge for 
incubation managers that needs attention.  Benefactions to UK universities (for example 
the Saudi billionaire Wafic Saïd’s funding of Oxford’s business school) and many other 
corporate donors are international companies.  Improving research output, teaching and 
commercialisation at the same time is challenging and will require game-changing 
injections of resources and their management by capable people.    
 
9.6.3  Answer to research question-3 
 
Conventional wisdom is that KSA must die in order to enter heaven: it must reject its 
heritage and identity and westernise in order to modernise.  Whilst rejecting this argument, 
the leadership of KSA has not articulated an alternative: my research points to a way of 




Why do innovation and entrepreneurship processes in KSA appear less effective than 
those in the UK? 
Summary 
answer 
Whilst structural issues inhibiting commercialisation may be addressed, deeper 
institutional and cultural issues explain KSA’s poor 303 relative to the UK.  Theoretical 
approaches such as TH, NSI and SSI that simply record these differences are of little use 
in promoting change.  Dominant models of development (North; Porter) dismiss the 
possibility of modernisation without westernisation.  KSA may benefit from exploring 
alternative models, such as an Arabic version of the development state model; though 
alignment between social and economic/ technological change poses change challenges.  
KSA’s university system needs fundamental reform including new approaches to 
pedagogy, organisation of disciplines and engagement with industry. 
 Evidence Section(s) 
Supporting 
evidence 
 Meta-institutions think, centralised, top-down: low experimentation;  9.2.1 and 
figure 9.2 
  Social/economic misalignment; sinecures, big government jobs 9.2.4 
  Supports Porter on NSI but NSI no policy agenda 9.3 
  UK attracts international R&D; global knowledge distribution  8.2.3.4; 9.15 
  UK better KBE vision 9.4 
  Less formal knowledge commercialised 9.15 
  Value-distributing state  9.4 
  Hybrid organisations  9.4 
  Women’s contribution to entrepreneurship and innovation in KSA 9.2.4; 9.4 
  Welfare payment and the rentier state 9.11 
  Exogenous shocks 9.4 
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  Crossing governances  9.13 
  Interrupted knowledge flows 9.15 
  Radical university reform 9.16.1 
Counter-   Development successful: universities, R&D, incubators 9.2.1 
evidence  TH faulty in both countries 9.3 
  UK (like KSA) elements not buying into vision 9.3 
  Both exogenous shock fragile 9.4 
  Both alienated underclass  9.4 
  Balance of basic and applied R&D  9.6 
Theory  Author/theory  
contribution  Bowles and Edwards (1993) aligning production and consumption 9.2.4 
  State experimenting – stepping on stones 9.4; 9.16.2 
  Huntington wrong: Islam can be innovative 9.2.2. 
  Contribution of women to entrepreneurship and innovation  9.2.4; 9.4 
Policy  Culture matters: UK and KSA (reinforced by rentier mentality) 9.11 
agenda  No bottom up push for change – how to do it changing governances  9.2.4, 9.13 
 
Figure-9.19: Summary of RQ-3 answer and contribution to theory 
 
Saudi meta-institutions (9.2.1), principally Islam and the Monarchy retain the support of 
the Saudi population.  That is not to say these meta-institutions are not criticised, for 
example for being overly centralised and top-down, which inhibits experimentation.  Other 
criticisms include waste of resources on vanity projects, the limited contribution of women 
to entrepreneurship and a university system failing to deliver effective teaching, research 
or commercialisation.  
 
Theory aligning production and consumption: vision and stepping on stones 
Although meta-histories differ in emphasis between state (Mokyr 1990; Mazzucato 2013) 
and market (Landes 1998) as influences all agree that a combination of decentralised 
experimentation (vertical) and (horizontal) economy/society alignment is necessary for 
long-term growth.   Bowles and Edwards (1993) using regulation theory as an explanatory 
framework for US technological history show that as modes of production alter, so too 
must regimes of accumulation.  Post-war UK history demonstrates a shift from 
manufacturing to services and with it more knowledge-workers and knowledge-related 
employment.   
 
As I noted, this creates a problem for social groups disconnected from globalisation and 
with low knowledge capabilities.  Since 1932, the Saudi economy has been dominated by 
oil, religious tourism and later financial services.  Having established a knowledge-
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economy vision the Kingdom now faces the challenge of migrating mode of production 
(including university commercialisations) and consumption regime (education of staff, 
lifestyles promoting creativity).  These are big, meta-historical issues.  Such changes 
cannot be legislated since they stem from cultural practices that evolve over time, 
discarding outmoded habituses in favour of the new.  A clear vision of the (knowledge 
economy) destination is crucial to change.  Technological paradigm shift do not occur 
evenly, quickly or without failure of some experiments.  Deng and Nehru are characterised 
by their vision (wealth, strength and independence and for Nehru science, independence 
and social progress).  KSA needs an overarching vision that agents support and work to 
achieve.  For example, company-sponsored and private universities could be an 
experiment, from which some positive lessons are learned and other experiences rejected.  
For example, Hewlett-Packard has an international network of company-run incubators 
and may be persuaded to establish one in KSA.  In section 9.4, I used Deng’s metaphor of 
stepping on stones to cross a stream – one step at a time, experimenting, giving up central 
control, negotiating consensus around a vision of the future.  Bold leadership will be 
needed.  
 
Islam can be innovative 
Section 9.2.2 above rebuts Huntington’s (1996) argument that Islam somehow retards 
innovation referencing economic performance in Turkey, Kazakhstan and Xinjiang and 
Muslim entrepreneurs in the US and UK and the success of large Saudi companies.  Since 
1978 Muslims have been awarded 11 Nobel prizes including one for physics and two for 
chemistry.   
 
Women’s contribution in KSA 
Women make an important contribution to the UK economy having a 68% labour market 
participation rate: it is 5% in KSA.  Half of the self-employed in the UK are women and 
women lead one-in-five businesses (http://www.prowess.org.uk/facts).  In developing 
countries women-led businesses (often small-scale manufacturing or services) are 
important for economic growth (Mead and Liedholm 1998; Langowitz and Minniti 2007), 
reducing poverty (Prahalad and Hammond 2002) and as Eddleston and Powell (2008) 
 
 304 
argue, women’s’ self-fulfilment.  In many countries, developing and developed, the 
different nature of women’s social capital (Rankin (2001), in particular raising capital, is a 
major inhibitor.  Research in other Muslim countries, shows that whilst issues around 
balancing work and home can inhibit women starting businesses, startup has the advantage 
(see Jamali’s 2009 research in Lebanon) in overcoming discriminatory labour markets.  
Pointing out that the Qu’ran raises no objections to women working outside the home, 
Roomi and Parrot’s (2008) argue that in Pakistan demonstrates that all Islamic societies 
underestimate the business contribution of women.  In China it is said that women hold up 
half of the sky: in KSA’s economy they do not.  Legitimating startup and outside the home 
working in KSA will contribute significantly to innovation rates and non-oil GDP growth; 




Policy: Culture matters: UK and KSA 
Culture is a social construction, embedded ways of thinking and doing arise from patterned 
behaviour (mimetic) but also from manipulation (normative and coercive): this is after all 
why strategies are set – to shape cultural change in a privileged direction.  Deterministic 
uses of culture, such as Pack’s (2008) argument around Asian flexibility versus Arab 
intractability are unhelpful, since active agents are left with no possibility of making 
changes.  Rothaermel et al (2007) argument on structural changes to motivate academics 
appears more useful in the UK context, where basic institutions to create knowledge are in 
place.  KSA faces the deeper challenge of legitimising commercialisation in the mindset of 
businesses and academics within a wider cultural context distorted by resource-richness 
and its accompanying demotivation of innovation and risk.  Managed cultural change is 
the result of hundreds of small actions that add up to quantitative movement: this is the 
agenda KSA’s leaders need to instigate. 
 
Policy: No bottom up push for change – new governances 
My point above on aligning the new knowledge-based strategy with social morès, 
consumption patterns and evolving social structures, using decentralisation to allow 
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experimentation translates in policy terms to using reflection-in-action (Schön (1983) to 
allow new governances to emerge.  These new governances, as Kooiman and Jentoft (2009) 
note may be messy and hybrid, (for example public-private partnerships, social enterprises, 
user-led cooperatives).  Only by after top-down risks (one thinks of King Abdullah and the 
launch of KAUST) will pressure from bottom-up grow to alter for the better KSA’s 
governance structures.  
 
9.6.4  Framework revision and theoretical contribution 
 
Following Charmaz (2007) having presented and used in data gathering, presentation and 
analysis an initial framework (figure-4.1) as a result of my research I now (figure-9.20) 
amend the framework as a contribution to theory of commercialisation in resource-
endowed, developing economies as part of my contribution to theory.   
Under drivers and enablers the framework now includes a specific reference to rentier 
mentality given its importance as a disincentive to entrepreneurship, and to 
entrepreneurship enablers is added especially universities given importance of shift from 
rote-learning to active learning, problem-solving and embedding university-industry links 
into teaching and applied research.  I have added the reference to (TT) technology transfers 
to the SSI arrow, given the importance of seeking to transfer technologies the universities 
will commercialise and in the same arrow the importance of national leadership and vision 
(development state ideas) behind which to enrol people and resources – a major problem 
currently in KSA where the gulf between policy and practice is apparent.  To emphasise 
the point, I have also added vision to macro-economic stability, since the vision must 
deliver degrees of both stability and change.  Against flexible labour, I have added trained 
highlighting the necessity of young people to accept that vocational education is relevant.  
Applied is added to basic research given the finding of researchers lack of preference to 
work on joint project with businesses.  Finally, in the left side of the framework, I have 
added business leadership to the section on incubators given its importance.  The 
commercialisation inputs column is unaltered except for the inclusion of capital in the 
lowest circle.  I now head the column on commercialisation process with Business 
leadership of processes a major finding from my research and in the final column include 
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Quality of UILs as a major output (and input in subsequent cycles) of commercialisation.  
This final framework will appear in my research publications and further research.  
 










Figure-10.1: Structure of Chapter-10 
 
10.1  Research questions answers and contribution to knowledge  
 
Whilst cultural, institutional and structural differences explain the better performance of 
the UK in commercialisation than in KSA, weaknesses in culture, institutional governances 
(not structures) are evident in both countries.  Despite significant investment, there is a low 
level of successful commercialisation (company) outputs and (economic and social) 
outcomes in KSA: my answer to research question-1.   
 
Structures are the legal, fiscal and market enablers or barriers to commercialisation in 
particular and to entrepreneurship and innovation in general.  Specifically, KSA has 
inadequate structures relative to the UK for IP law, company establishment and ownership 
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changing, raising risk capital and exit markets.  These structural deficits also feature 
significantly in my answer to research question-2, however cultural and institutional issues 
predominantly explain why the linkages in my framework are stronger in the UK than 
KSA.  In particular, KSA is weaker than the UK in university governances (applied 
research and UILs); the passive non-problem based pedagogy; shortage of human capital 
for startups and SMEs (exacerbated by the low women’s participation rates) and 
preparedness of central government to devolve resources and encourage experimentation.  
Commercialisation processes in KSA are also weaker than in the UK, where the processes 
remain imperfect and unsystematic: my answer to research question-3.  For both countries, 
the challenge of improving commercialisation processes is one of adjusting institutional 
governances and the culture predisposing relationships between academic researchers and 
incubators on the one hand, and business leaders and funders on the other hand.   
 
I discuss structural policy and management issues below in section 10.7 and 10.5.  Here I 
note that the KSA has these important structural deficits, which contribute towards 
‘thinner’ institutions and a negative culture - acting as important barriers to the 
commercialisation of transferred or indigenously generated knowledge.  Section 10.4 
below summarises my contribution to the body of empirical findings. 
 
My answers to these research questions as been informed by theory: what does previous 
research and theoretical frameworks lead us to expect to find, and how does this align with 
what we actually empirically discover: what does my research add to this body of 
knowledge?  Figure 10.1 classifies the theoretical contributions highlighted in chapter-9 
under three headings, which I now discuss: these are commercialisation in developing 
countries, KSA’s commercialisation strategy and academic entrepreneurship. 
 
10.1.1  The Triple Helix and commercialisation in developing countries  
 
Since Veblen (1965) and Sleznick (1949) we have understood the importance of 
institutions to economic success, social well-being and innovation.   Di Maggio and 
Powell’s (1983) work highlights the importance of isomorphic change in shaping 
institutions to mirror models with proven success, not least of which as figure 4.1 captures 
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is the cultural glue influencing relationships between agents in different institutions and 
reshaping institutions (section 2.3).  Comparing the UK and KSA meta-institution reveals 
as expected important differences (figure 9.1 and section 9.2) encapsulated from the 
viewpoint of commercialisation in SWOTs (section 8.2.3.4): both have a strategy of 
creating a (more) knowledge-based economy, however, the UK cumulated knowledge 
capabilities and position in global knowledge chains gives it advantages.    
 
Gerschenkron’s (1966) argument is that led by the state, prioritising advanced technologies 
and leap-frogging (Davison 2000), perhaps using mimetic, normative and coercive 
isomorphic processes gaps can be narrowed.  However, I argue in section 9.15 that as 
knowledge rather than natural resources or technology access becomes the source of 
national competitive advantage, Gerschenkron’s (1966) theory needs updating to focusing 
on the challenge of joining global knowledge chains such as attracting international R&D, 
universities participating in international R&D projects and creating the absorptive 
capacity to appreciate and adapt exogenous knowledge into new competitive products and 
services.  Updating Gerschenkron’s (1966) theory has important policy implications for 
Saudi universities and UILs, which I return to below.   
 
In both the KSA and UK Etzkowitz’s (1983; 2000) TH theory is oft-cited.  Yet not only 
has Said (2004) challenged its applicability to developing economies with ‘thinner’ 
institutions, as section 9.3 argues, policy-implementers in both countries question is 
usefulness citing governances clashes between academic and business institutions and the 
lack of entrepreneurial culture amongst academics.  Whilst Mowery and Sampat (2004) 
too challenge the generalisability of TH theory international, my argument is that its 
applicability in both developed and developing countries is as a metaphor or ideal type – it 
is not a theory grounded in any verifying empirical evidence: as the famous statistician W 









 Etzkowitz’s (1983) triple helix lacks empirical support as significant in either 
a developing or developed economy 
  North (2009) wrongly dismisses alternative models 




 Resource-richness theory (Auty 1985) and rentier mentality (Beblawi (1987): 
links to culture 
Strategy and its  Transition routes from rentier state – issues for KSA 
Implementation  The development state thesis may prove a model for KSA 
  Insufficient active agency in KSA NSI and to allow devolved leadership, risk-
taking, business leadership and experimentation 
  Innovation in incubators pushed not pulled: lack of market and business 
discipline in KSA incubation 
  State experimenting – stepping on stones 
  Huntington wrong: Islam can be innovative 
Academic   Little evidence of academic entrepreneurs in UK or KSA 
Entrepreneurship   Outcomes and outputs – need for systematic quantitative research 
  Knowledge flows mainly informal and recombinations not formal 
 
Figure 10.1: Summary of my theoretical contribution ordered by importance 
 
Institutions and culture supporting entrepreneurship and innovation do not exist in isolation 
from other socioeconomic and political influences.  Porter (2009) and North (1990) point 
to open society (meaning western democratic) institutions are necessary for knowledge-
based economic growth.  This is an especially important point in KSA where the ruling 
elite (and much of society) rejects such as strategy favouring instead modernisation without 
westernisation and citing development state models, such as China, that have successfully 
taken different routes.  In section 9.2.1 I argue that North’s (1990; 2007) view 
ethnocentrically privileges a one-best-way solution to institutional change and that (a) 
modernisation without westernisation seems possible (Asian examples); (b) an Arabic 
version of the development state thesis may be possible and (c) part of the challenge in 
such a solution (Boyer 1996; Bowles and Edwards (1993) will be a realignment between a 
future (knowledge-based) regime of accumulation in KSA and a (changed) mode of 
regulation.  Many of the latter points (women in the labour market, criticality in 
universities, structures supporting startup and growth) are discussed below under policy 
implications.  North’s (1990) predicts KSA’s modernisation without westernisation 
strategy will fail; I am challenging the generalisability of his theory outside western 
economies and in drawing attention to the possibility of an Arabic development state model 
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highlighting the fact that such a model involves not only re-theorising Arabic economic 
and innovation strategies, it reaches deeply into other social relationships. 
 
Referring back to figure 10.1, this section has identified four areas of theory relating to 
commercialisation in developing economies to which my research adds.   
 
10.1.2  KSA’s commercialisation strategy – theory development 
 
Motivating entrepreneurship amongst academic researchers is a serious barrier to 
commercialisation in both the UK and KSA rooted in the perverse incentives in university 
governances where publications and basic research are rewarded not applied research, 
commercialisation or teaching.  Amongst students and nascent entrepreneurs in general the 
UK and KSA differ in cultural attitudes towards startups.  Owning a business is ‘cool’ in 
the UK whereas in KSA people prefer to work for large companies or (46% of employees) 
for the Government.  Cultures are socially constructed; section 9.2 argues with Auty (1985) 
and Sachs (2001) that resource-richness can be a brake on innovation and entrepreneurship, 
making two contributions to this theme.  Firstly, I argue that the brake arises not simply 
from financial disincentivisation (welfare payments, sinecure jobs, generous education 
grants), there is what Beblawi (1987; 1990) terms a rentier mentality: a culture that a high 
living standard exists as a right, rather than something to be worked for.  This encourages 
HNWIs to invest in property rather than take the risk of startups failing and pervades young 
Saudi attitudes towards becoming entrepreneurs.  A second contribution to thinking about 
the rentier state is around its transition.  After all, the motive Saudi Government’s has for 
commercialisation is the impending depletion of oil stocks and revenues after 2035.  Most 
theorists adopt North’s position that westernisation is the only option.  In sections 6.2.2, 
7.2.2 and 8.2.2 I develop the idea of the value-adding state, arguing that the UK is moving 
away from a value-distributing model and similar trends are beginning in KSA as oil 
revenues fall and levels of largess and 46% of all employment being in the public sector 
become unsustainable.  This is new territory for the KSA elite hoping that the 




Cultural and motivation changes are important parts of identity construction.  Faced with 
the mantra of modernisation without westernisation and inability to create the institutions 
that support western NSIs, SSI and THs, many Saudis now look to the Asian development 
state as a model (section 2.4).  Plainly, KSA does not have some of the characteristics of 
the DS (vision and shared goals, expert and autonomous bureaucracy, mercantilism (figure 
3.4), I suggest (section 6.2.2; 8.2.2; 9.4) that one way of negotiating a vision for post-oil 
KSA success is to paint on the development state canvas, seeking to place positive aspects 
of the Asian experience into an Arab/Islamic model of the future.  I intend in further 
research to return to this point and explore the barriers and benefits to an Arabic 
development state. 
 
One aspect of both the development state and the western market model is the preparedness 
of central elites to devolve sufficient power and resources to allow experimentation.  I 
suggest that in KSA’s case this may involve special economic zones, allowing 
experimental new governances (private universities, company-led universities) and 
experimental sources of risk capital.  Throughout this research, I have emphasises the 
importance of active agency: people taking decisions and risks, from which new patterns 
emerge, new cultures and eventually new institutions.  Deng Xiaoping famously used the 
metaphor of stepping one stones: trying-out, experimenting, improvising.  KSA’s next 
decades are a high-velocity environment (Eisenhardt 1989); in absence of North’s road-
map improvisation will learning in action (Weick’s (1993) simultaneity) in which 
universities are likely to play a major part. 
 
Knowledge-based economies reduce the time gap between science and technology; 
between the invention of knowledge via research and its embodiment in products and 
services for sale (Pisano 2011).  The incubator is therefore a bridge addressing this gap: a 
managed risk-reducing route commercialising knowledge.  As section 2.9.1 shows, 
research typologises incubators by ownership (private/university); generalist or specialist 
(figure 3.8) and services (figure 3.8) examples being Becker and Gassmann (2006) and 
Von Zedtwitz (2003).  My research suggests additional important variable to previous 
typologies of university-related incubators: management, pull-push coupling and UILs.  
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My research shows a clear trend in the UK towards place incubation management in the 
hands of experience business-people, not academics.  The second important new variable 
between incubators arising from my research is balance between pull and push, which I 
considered in 7.2.1.1 and formed part of my criticisms of Clark (1998) in section 9.9 and 
9.16.2.  Relationships between pull and push in innovation theory are viewed as ‘coupled’ 
(Nelson and Rosenberg 1993) i.e. both pressures are needed.  As Pavitt (1991) shows in 
some fields for highly formal knowledge or long gestation periods ‘push’ predominates: 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and satellite research are examples.  In other fields ‘pull’ 
predominates – the IIIT(B) students’ apps are an example or simple medical testing 
devices.  Where pull predominates knowledge-trawling is an important function of the 
incubator, for pulled ideas market-testing and analysis become paramount.  A third variable 
incubators revealed by my research is the depth of services (similar to that of clusters in 
figure 2.7), shown in figure 3.8.  In particular the depth of UILs and ability to joint-venture 
with existing firms, access mentoring and network linkages and ability to pitch for risk 
capital are important.  These characteristics of incubators are more prevalent in the UK 
than KSA.  My contribution is to suggest that future comparative research on incubators 
add to the criterion currently used deepening understanding of why some incubators are 
more effective than others.    
 
In section 9.2.2 I argue that evidence from Islamic countries, the US, KSA’s 17 Forbes-
2000 list, and history disputes Huntington’s (1996) thesis that Islamic economies are 
doomed to low rates of innovation because the faith discourages enquiring minds.  Of 
course Islam is far from homogeneous.  Is it the case that ‘cultural Muslims’ (a self-
description in Kazakhstan) are more or less innovative or as Nasr (2007) claims that Shī’a 
are more innovative.  My point is that in rejecting Huntington’s otherisation of Islam 
researchers should not fall into the same trap; there is a clear case for further cross-cultural 
research between Muslim countries.   
 
Referring back to figure 10.1, this section has identified seven areas of theory relating to 




10.1.3  Academic Entrepreneurship  
 
My research focused on university-related incubators.  Entrepreneurship theory (chapter-
3) suggests that academic entrepreneurship is emerging as particularly important for 
knowledge-based economies (Henrekson and Rosenberg 2001).  As I note in section 9.16.2 
only Respondent-28 and Respondent-9 fit the classic model of academic entrepreneurship: 
university-based research, formally codified and embedded into new products and 
commercialised.  The other entrepreneurs use informal knowledge, gathered outside of 
universities and then generic university incubators to develop their product.  Respondent-
28 left the university incubator to enter a private one (7.4.5.1) and Respondent-9 (left the 
incubator in which he worked (6.3.1.4).  My research gathered no evidence supporting 
academic entrepreneurship theory’s validity.  Instead academic researchers were shown 
uninterested in commercialisation (7.3.2) and unable to cross governances between 
research and business (8.2.1.3; figure 8.1).  Acknowledging the contrary evidence from the 
US (3.7.9), I can only conclude that suggestions of a new paradigm emerging by Nerkar 
and Shane (2003) exaggerate the contribution of academic entrepreneurship and that much 
more quantitative research is necessary to test the theory. 
 
As I explained in the methods chapter my initial intention was to prepare a cost-benefit 
analysis framework as part of my research, however at piloting it became clear this would 
not be possible since incubators either did not have or would not publicly release the data.  
AUTM data is generic and insufficiently detailed for CBA purposes.  Indeed, as I suggest 
in section 9.15 the data from the US on the success rate and longevity of university spinouts 
seems exceptional.  As in the entire field of academic entrepreneurship there is a need for 
cross-country research, drawing on robust CBA data and indisputable figures of incubation 
graduation and subsequent trading.  Edinburgh’s ERI benchmarks against Cambridge 
University incubation units, regarded as benchmarking against the best (7.2.1.1).  For KSA 
the gulf with the US in research base, institutional arrangements and culture makes 
benchmarking against them problematic.  This research suggests that models in IIMB and 
IIITB in India and the incubation centre at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou (as developing 




Apart from Respondent-9 and Respondent-28 who exploit formal knowledge resulting 
from university research, the entrepreneurs I interviewed look different from the linear 
models of Etzkowitz (1983) and Shane (2004) and closer to Gibbons et al (1994) 
recombinations of knowledge, often using informal learning gained outside of universities.  
Had I limited my dataset to (for example) biotechnology or software, or a post-incubation 
sample of (say) turnover at US$ 5 million or specialist incubators, these findings may have 
been different.  Nonetheless, for my dataset the linear model of university-based formal 
knowledge migrating into businesses is not visible.  From the viewpoint of incubation-
relating knowledge flows in developing economies, this evidence shows that high-growth 
companies are more likely to arise from specialist incubators and from spillover from 
global knowledge chains.  Since KSA is outside of global knowledge chains attracting 
international R&D centres (as China and India successfully do) and enhancing UILs 
become important.  In summary, the knowledge flows I find are not those predicted in 
academic entrepreneurs or TH theory, re-theorising the nature of knowledge flows in 
incubators may assist KSA in refining its strategy.  This point links strongly with section 
10.3 below, in which I consider policy implications for KSA, in particular the need for 
reform of the universities. 
 
Referring back to figure 10.1, this section identifies three areas of theory relating to 
academic entrepreneurship to which my research adds.   
 
In summary, fourteen areas of theory development summarised in figure 10.1 under three 
sub-headings add to the fields of knowledge covered in this research and as section 10.6 










Embarking on this research, I realised that existing frameworks were inadequate: 
insufficient active agency, not nested, too ethnocentric and unsuitable for comparative 
research or insufficiently interdisciplinary.  Having review literature on innovation and 
entrepreneurship (chapter 2 and 3) I constructed a new theoretical framework in chapter-4, 
citing Charmaz’s (2007) constructed grounded theory approach; i.e. a framework with 
which to structure data gathering and analysis and then to revise in the light of grounded 
theorisations.   
 
The figure-4.1 framework has internal validity in that its use has guided my research 
without identifying concepts or causal relationship omitted or redundant.  In particular, the 
framework allowed easy movement between nested levels of institutions and enabled 
reference to active agency and at times lack of it.  In section 9.17 I suggested revisions to 
the framework increasing the prominence given to culture (especially entrepreneurial 
culture) and digging deeper into institutions (for example centralised control and the 
contribution of women in entrepreneurship and innovation).   
 
Figure-9.20 illustrates my revised framework.  Its external validity will I hope be 
established if accepted in guiding KSA policy-making (10.3), feature in my publication 
plan (10.6), and used in dissemination activities (10.8). 
 
 
10.2  Validity, generalisability and limitations  
 
Validity  
Since my ontological stance is post-positivist - I draw upon the subjective interpretations 
of incubation managers and entrepreneurs = there is no truth out-there awaiting discovery; 
rather respondents and researcher socially construct validity (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984).  
The task of the research is to dig sufficiently deeply into socially construction to create an 
explanation the meaningfulness of which is not from referencing external ethnographic 
factors, rather meanings for the person in context (Gill 2000).  As Biber and Leavy (2010) 
argue, as social researchers, we construct a reality and then triangulate with previous 
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empirical research and theory, Scapens (1990) and Humphrey  and Scapens (1996) test the 
logic and validity of our social construction. 
 
Validity is therefore the quality of what Rorty (1989:73) calls knowing and doing in praxis 
and Yanow (2000) meaning making.  Validity derives not from the cumulation of facts, 
rather from analytical rigour (see Hawkesworth 1988) of well-chosen cases and context 
using an empathic perspective (Yanow 2003).  As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2003) point 
out, whilst appropriate positivist evidence-based decision-making may be appropriate for 
practice adaptation, in emergent and dynamic social fields critical research methods can be 
more revealing.  Validity and trustworthiness in ethnographic research rests on honestly 
gathered data, honestly interpreted, respecting alternative interpretations (Angen 2000) to 
which I aspire.  The validity of this abductive research, which is exploratory, rests upon 
the groundedness and the representativeness of data and triangulating with earlier research.  
This qualitative research aspires to internal (logical, conceptual robustness) validity, 
providing the scaffolding for further research testing these concepts as hypotheses in a 
wider array of cases for external validity using cross-sectional analysis.  I recognise, 
therefore, that my empirical material allows only limited generalisation, a point Burns and 
Grove (1999:296) make, other than concept validation since the sample is small and may 
not be representative.  As Galasinski (2000) notes, the validity of the novel is not verifiable 
truth-hood or falsehood, rather the integrity (believability) of the narrative, the absence of 
exaggeration, evasion and manipulative inaccuracy that derives from honest and repeatable 
assembly of facts as perceived by social agents.  
 
Generalisability 
As Yin (2003) notes, casework may be designed to generalise from sample to population, 
however, my research design more follows William’s (2000) notion of comparison and 
generalisation to other contexts being normative and tentative.  I note also Kinder’s (2002) 
insistence that since context is so important in social research that before conclusions can 
be generalised careful re-contextualisation is necessary.  This is especially so given the 
idiosyncratic culture and context of KSA compared to other developing economies 
interesting in learning from it’s commercialisation experiences and because of my 
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conclusion that whilst structures are important, institutional arrangements and culture 
crucially effect processes and outcomes.   
 
Limitations 
My original idea was to contrast incubation in four countries (the others being the US as a 
developed economy and China as a non-Arab/Islamic developing country).  Time and 
resources did not permit the four-country data gathering.  Access to a wide range of 
published research on the subject was useful for triangulation; however, some of the data 
is very context-specific.  For example, the data on US incubation graduation and longevity 
rates, which as I suggest above is a field requiring much more cross-country quantitative 
comparison research.  One of my research aims was to synthesise learning theory with 
innovation and entrepreneurship theory; I am aware that since learning is subject to cultural 
and contextual factors that my comments on this too may be limited in their applicability 
to other cultures. 
 
 
10.3 Policy implications of answers to research question answers  
 
My research identifies six policy areas arising from my research for policy-makers in KSA 
to consider, I also refer to UK relevance, where appropriate: three are classified as mainly 
structural and three are ‘wicked’ culture and governances issues. 
 
KSA is in the early stages of implementing its commercialisation strategy to diversify its 
economy.  Should a globally competitive technology arise in KSA, structures would inhibit 
its exploitation as section 9.5 and 9.8 note.  This is not the case in China where lithium-ion 
batteries flourish or India’s offshore value-added services or for UK Internet financial 
services.  Figure 10.3 summarises the structural issues KSA needs to address to enhance 
commercialisation.   
 
KSA is not alone in not having a standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA) regime for its 
incubators; neither do AUTM in the US and the UK Association of Science Parks.  Perhaps 
working with international bodies, KSA could set up a project with this goal.  The aim 
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would be a robust CBA as part of a holistic evaluation of incubators (including their 
leadership, processes and impact.  In effect, this fills the gaps in the last column of my 
figure 9.4 framework giving policy-makers an evidence base for policy making. 
 
 Important policy suggestions Section 
Structural 
policy issues 
 Structural reforms: IP and company law, risk capital, tax, exit 
markets – structural changes in KSA 
9.5, 9.8 
and 9.14 
  Need for CBA evaluation of incubators in both countries, also 
evaluation of policies and business leadership 
9.10 
  Motivating and re-modelling academic entrepreneurship  9.6 
Policy relating 
to culture and 
governances 
 KSA’s university system needs radical change: UILs, pedagogy, 
applied research and vocational courses – reinforcing curse of 
resource richness 
9.15 
  Contribution of women to entrepreneurship and innovation  9.16.3 
  Culture and governances matter: they can be reconstructed by 




Figure 10.2: Summary of policy issues for KSA arising from my research 
 
 
In both the UK and KSA academics are institutionally disincentivised from 
commercialisation by reward systems that privilege publication.  Perhaps this explains the 
predominance of informal, non-university knowledge entrepreneurs’ use in university-
associated incubators.  Individual reward systems that reflect institutional goals 
(commercialisation) are likely to better incentivise achieving the goals. 
 
I now turn to culture and governance policy issues arising from my research, each of which 
is problem and likely to be highly controversial.  Section 9.15 argues that the KSA 
university needs fundamental reform, citing inactive pedagogy, lack of vocational courses, 
poor UILs, low levels of applied research, and absence of international research 
partnerships (particular with company R&D centres).  Invariably reflect their society’s 
needs and as these change so too must KSA’s universities.  The challenge is not a simple 
benchmarking but rather asking what will KSA’s society and economy look like in 25-
years time and how do we create the universities then needed?  This is a major policy area 
for Saudi Government and society not only for its academics.    
 
It is not possible to overestimate the sensitivity to the social roles of women in a deeply 
Islamic and Arabic society such as KSA.  Section 9.16.3 notes that diversified economies 
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greatly benefit from women’s participation in business and labour markets.  Like other 
‘big’ issues facing KSA, such as transition from a rentier state, this issue too needs to be 
negotiated carefully over time. 
 
IP law IP law in KSA is unclear yet a clear legal framework is essential if knowledge-based 
companies are to trade international and attract external investors. 
Company 
law 
Whilst startup legal processes have been streamlined, VCs need limited partnership 
legal platforms and easier ownership transfer.  Many VCs only invest in consolidated 
cumulative preference redeemable ordinary shares, which do not currently feature in 




Shortage of risk capital can be a problem in every country (UK included).  KSA lacks a 
VC network, networks of Angel investors and an Arabic crowd-funding site.   
Banks Examples such as the UK Small Loan Guarantee Scheme and Export Guarantee Fund 
will help increase bank support for startups and SME growth.  Trading equity or friends 
and family capital is a poor model for high-growth startups. 
Taxation External investors look for tax exemption on capital gains from high risk startup 
investments and write-off of historic R&D costs; Saudi fiscal policy needs amending. 
Exit markets KSA for no formal Alternative Investment Market (AIM) allowing efficient initial 
public offerings (IPOs) – a major policy gap. 
 
Figure 10.3: Summary of desirable structural reforms  
identified in this research to enhance commercialisation  
 
My final policy implication relates to the last point: culture and governances.  There are no 
blueprints for complex socio-economic change – that is why stepping on stones guided by 
a vision of the future – is a useful approach.  Sections 9.13 and 9.2.4 make the case for 
devolved resources encouraging experimentation in organisational forms and processes. 
 
10.4  Research question answers and empirical contribution  
 
As I noted in my introductory chapter, KSA entrepreneurship and innovation is under-
researched: much more is written about veiling and monarchy than Saudi companies and 
technology.  I note Al Thawwad and Rashed’s (2009) work on regional policy and though 
dated, Al-Ghailani and Moor’s (1995) contribution on technology transfer.  My main 
reference point empirically is the work of Al-Mubarak and his colleagues (2010a; 2010b; 
2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; and 2014); however, his studies are at an incubator unit of 
analysis rather than moving between agents, organisations and institutions, as my work 
does.  Al-Mubarak does some comparative work though his substantive work is with other 
developing countries, not with a developed country as in my case and his primary expertise 




Detailed quantitative research in KSA is notoriously difficult: Arab culture favours 
friendliness without openness.  I was able to use a network built over twenty-years working 
at KACST to interview important figures in Saudi commercialisation: Respondent-23 a 
national level commercialisation policy maker is the father figure; Respondent-17 Manager 
of an incubation network, Respondent-18 and Respondent-20 lead the primary network for 
Saudi commercialisation at KACST.  My dataset therefore containing elite interviews is 
unique.   
 
In Edinburgh, using university contacts I was able to assemble data from extensive 
interviews with leading figures in commercialisation heading ERI: Respondent-35, 
Respondents 33 and 32.  In addition, Dr Abdul at Cambridge gave me extensive access and 
introductions to companies.   
 
In summary, as figure-1 in the appendix illustrates, I have assemble an extensive and 
unique dataset exceeding all others in relation to KSA commercialisation: this is my 




10.5  Management practice 
 
My research focuses on institutions, culture and processes, here I make ten 
recommendations to agents active in KSA’s commercialisation and incubation processes, 
summarised in figure-10.4.  
 
(1)   Leaders of incubation networks in both countries acknowledge that leadership of 
incubation centres demand competences and capabilities from business rather than (only) 
academic experience.  This reflects an outward-looking, demand-pull and ability to cross 
governances that few academics possess.   Boards of Incubation Units should appoint Unit 
Management with experience in launching relevant new businesses in the context (Scotland 
or KSA) in which the unit operates.  Further, all incubation unit staff should have a business 
mentor and spend time learning business mechanics.  Crossing governances is a major 
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challenge in commercialisation – the best way to achieve it is to bring experienced business 
people into the Incubation Units. 
 
 Management practice recommendations Affected agents 
1 Business leadership Incubator management  
2 Management of UIL network  Incubator Managers and members of 
their business network  
3 Embed entrepreneurship in universities  University lecturers and students 
(and perhaps standards authorities) 
4 Active learning pedagogy  University staff 
5 Incubator recruitment (near market, winners), discipline, 
courses etc 
Entrants, Managers and business 
mentors 
6 Incubator processes and business links Managers, incubators and business 
partners 
7 Build wider university-industry linkages  University Management, applied 
researchers and business network 
connections 
8 Pre-post launch mentors (business growth support) Incubator Managers, entrepreneurs, 
business support staff 
9 Internships and secondments (vs MSc) Incubator Managers, Careers 
Service, Large company partners 
10 Local/alumni Angel funds (ex-pat) cf IIIT(B)  
 
Figure-10.4: Summary of management practice recommendations  
 
(2)  Managers such as Respondent-20 at KAUST or Respondents-35 and 32 are not 
simply incubation centre Managers, rather they are managing a network of actors operating 
in a system purposively created to commercialise.  Network management entails 
mobilising people not under command-and-control (business leaders, researchers, funders) 
towards the system goals (commercialisation in its many forms) and referencing the 
specific culture and context in which the commercialisation system operates.  These 
networks, which are currently loosely-coupled as advisory or supportive, should be 
reconstituted as more closely-coupled systems.  Firms and individuals in the system can 
then agree goals and targets and take responsibility for offering services such as business 
mentoring, short capability-enhancing internships and assisting entrepreneurs in creating 
their own business legitimacy in the eyes of potential partners by agreeing to introduce 
entrepreneurs to other businesses providing services or contracts relevant to the building 




(3) Saudi universities are too far removed from the world of business and should 
encourage more applied research, where possible jointly with growth-potential local 
business.  Bridging university-industry governances will also be helped by nudging 
universities to join international research projects.  Incubation units should systematically 
trawl university research seeking potentially commercialisable technologies and/or 
opportunities for joint-working with local businesses or international business located in 
KSA and their supply chains.   Working with local economic agencies, Incubation Units 
should systematically scan the needs of local businesses (for example their imports or 
supply blockages) and seek the support of University departments to conduct applied 
research relevant to meeting business needs.  Every single university programme should 
include some element of entrepreneurship learning, ideally a course during which students 
experience a short secondment into a business and prepare project work associated their 
major with business development. 
 
(4) Universities continue to use a rote learning, teacher-centred pedagogy and should 
move towards problem-centred and active learning i.e. relating technical learning to 
potential problem-solving innovative solutions and doing so in a manner that develops the 
skills and confidence including trans-disciplinary teams, in short preparation for the world 
of work.   
 
(5) KSA incubation units appear insufficiently clear on selection and entry.  Incubation 
Unit managers should set criteria such as entry only for businesses within one year of 
market launch or for only six-months to prepare a proof of concept.  Two points follow: 
firstly, improving entry quality will improve the launch and success rate and secondly, Unit 
Managers and staff will dedicate time and resources towards better quality projects.  For 
example, KSA finds it difficult to establish mentoring and links with existing businesses 
for projects incubating projects.  Perhaps in part this is because the projects are so far from 
market?  Promising projects rarely find it difficult to find mentors and partners.  Where 
these are not available locally, Incubation Units should identify international partners, 
perhaps using links from international companies operating with KSA.  The Indian Institute 




(6) Incubatees should periodically present to a panel of business representatives, 
should always have a business mentor, should spend time on short secondments into 
business rather than courses in the Incubation Centre and should in general adopt a market-
oriented perspective and discipline.  Incubators should more rigorously reject entrants 
simply sheltering under an umbrella of generous state payments.  
 
(7) Incubators can lead the deepening of wider university-industry linkages by 
adopting the CONNECT model including (a) legal/risk-finance presentations to potential 
academic entrepreneurs; (b) technical presentation on applied research and its potential 
commercialisation to potential investors, startup lawyers etc and (c) periodic celebrations 
of successful commercialisation (both from KSA and abroad) to the wider audience 
interested in commercialisation. 
 
(8) The incubators make insufficient use of business mentors for academic 
entrepreneurs.  All entrepreneurs should have pre- and post-launch mentors.  Where these 
cannot be found amongst local businesses in the target sectors, then mentors can be sought 
from foreign international companies in other sectors such as oil, health and logistics.  All 
business plans should include an international section and mentors should support post-
launch exploration of internationalisation.  Where particular launched companies should 
internationalisation potential the Incubator Centre should procure and attach a business 
growth support mentor for the entrepreneur. 
 
(9) Universities should encourage graduates seeking international MSc qualifications 
to choose programmes offering internships or work-based-learning and/or offer 
scholarships for pre-programme internships (perhaps associated with improving language 
skills.  Working with large business partners, the University might arrange internships at 
international branches of companies active in KSA.  Internships should be viewed as a 




(10) KSA lacks sources of readily available risk capital.  University should launch Angel 
Networks inviting alumni and ex-pats to enrol, alongside locally high-net-worth-
individuals.  Perhaps universities might offer administrative services to the networks and 
procure grants for Investment Managers.  The IIIT-B is a good model.   
 
Not all of these suggestions to improve management practice in Incubators will be relevant 
to all, however, selected adoption – based on my research findings – will strengthen KSA 
Incubator management.  
 
10.6  Publication plan 
 
I plan four journal publications arising from this thesis as summarised in figure 10.5, in 
each case I hope that my supervisors will co-author. 
 





Various papers in IJTM explore the NSI or 
commercialisation arrangements in different countries; I 
propose an empirical addition to this theme of the journal 
I have begun 
preparation of this 
paper, aiming for a 
draft by July 2017 
The Journal of 
Technology 
Transfer 
My work links with policy debates on technology transfer 
and commercialisation in JTT; I propose a policy 
contribution. 
Mapped out, draft by 
end of September 
Research 
Policy 
RP has covered a range of theoretical subjects connecting 
with my research over the year.  I propose to link with these 
from the perspective of commercialisation in an Arab/Islamic 
country, setting out the critique of North (1990), Etzkowitz 
(1983) and selected KM theories, introducing the idea of an 
Arabic development state. 







Journal thread of risk capital sources and structures in 
developing countries since the provision of risk capital in 
developing economies occurs midst ‘thin’ institutions it is 
often informal (Bell 1997).  In KSA as a rich country there 
appear to be unique opportunities (and difficulties).  These 
are threads of debate in CIJEF, which I will pick up, drawing 
conclusions form KSA data. 
Draft by June 2018 
 
Figure 10.5: Publication plan 
 
I intend to publish a version of my thesis as a textbook/training course aimed at 
entrepreneurship education and policy development in resource-endowed economies.  My 
idea is following a scene-setting into, to threat my research findings in a ten-session course 
for incubation managers, policy-makers and funders.  Tentative discussions in KSA 
suggest that the Government may fund this project and that universities are interested in 
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offering the course.  I see the course as appropriate not only to oil-rich Arab countries, but 
also others seeking to diversity from oil dependency in Central Asia and Africa.   
 
10.7  Further research 
 
Throughout my analysis, I have referred to areas requiring further research, the most 
important of which are listed in figure 10.6: we only have one lifetime!   
Area of further research 
Quantitative study of outputs, outcomes including cost-benefit analysis of incubation activities across 
countries and in particular how leap-frogging can occur in the age of knowledge based economies. 
The impact of commercialisation on universities, employment and creation of competitive technologies 
in developing countries; comparing (a) China, India and KSA, and (b) in a separate study, other Muslim 
countries/regions such as Turkey, Egypt, Kazakhstan and Xinjiang. 
Sharps (1964) study of how technological innovation and society interact (steel axes for stone-age 
people in Australia) always fascinated me.  Ethnographic study of technology and social change in KSA 
may help inform debate on the interaction between Arab and Islamic cultures in KSA and the evolving 
roles of women. 
 
Figure 10.6: Areas of further research arising from my research 
 
It may be a future Centre for Commercialisation in KSA will recruit staff with expertise 
and interest to support my own further research work 
 
10.8  Dissemination and impact 
 
I am already disseminating this work and it is having some impact, as recent top-level 
seminar in KSA illustrates. Over the next year or two I propose the following dissemination 
and impact activities. 
 
 Publish the papers and textbook mentioned above and the associated management 
training course. 
 Introduce ideas from my research at the annual Saudi Arabia Innovation conference in 
Jeddah (June 2018).  
 To raise with KACST and Ministries the idea of a research Centre for 
Commercialisation in KSA to carry on this work, including dedicated PhD studentships. 
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